

The decision to reinforce Australia's military commitment to rebuilding Iraq has naturally excited further argument over the validity of joining the March 2003 coalition intervention. Much of this argument is not 'public debate' because each side tends to talk at each other rather than about the real issues. The overall effect is an unfortunate degree of political polarisation and subjective emotion that has not been seen since the early 1970s Vietnam controversies.

Vietnam neutered effective public debate on defence for years afterwards and still echoes among those whose strategic perceptions are still shaped by that war, rather than today's strategic realities. Political polarisation always threatens the detached and long-term perspectives needed to consider, plan and resource our defence effectively.

Back in 1975 the ADA was founded, as an independent and non-partisan public interest watchdog, in an attempt to mitigate such polarisation and further genuine debate over the long term. We believe the following points are worth making.

In war circumstances change quickly and commitments by any government not to become more or less deeply involved can only ever be provisional.

Irrespective of how or why we became involved in Iraq, dwelling on the claimed rights or wrongs of the matter only obscures objective consideration of the current strategic question; whether we have a responsibility to assist with resolving the current situation in that country and, if so, how we could best do this?

Geostrategic and operational similarities and differences between the Iraq and Vietnam wars were discussed in the Winter 2004 *Defender*. In general, claims that the insurgency in Iraq resembles the 'insurgency quagmire' of Vietnam tend to be made by those with an insufficient knowledge of either war.

Of crucial importance to the wider defence debate is the main reason why we have not contributed large conventional ground forces—because we can't!

Our long-term neglect of defence resourcing means the Army, for example, is not suitably equipped to deploy and sustain a brigade, or even a battalion group, in a mid to high intensity conflict.

We can only send a small force, without tanks or attack helicopters, to a relatively quiet area of Iraq for a comparatively short time. The disgraceful neglect of our defence revealed by these inadequacies must be urgently reversed before the Army has to be committed in greater numbers in a similar or worse situation, and probably one closer to home.

We cannot avoid 'foreign entanglements' by configuring the defence force so it is incapable of being deployed overseas. In most cases, threats to Australian national interests will normally mean the ADF will have to be deployed anyway.

Service personnel should not be exposed to harm unnecessarily because Australians sitting safely at home seek to avoid 'foreign entanglements' by keeping the ADF ill-

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Our cover

A Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopter, delivered to the Australian army in December 2004, flying over Brisbane.

Photo courtesy DoD

equipped or understrength. There is, of course, always the opposite risk of governments being tempted to use the ADF unnecessarily if it is configured to maximise its strategic utility. The bottom line of the conundrum is surely that the greater risks and deeper moral dangers lie in the first rather than the second temptation.

The inadequacies in our defence preparedness revealed by the Iraq war should be a fundamental part of a new and real defence debate. ♦



The letters pages are an important part of *Defender's* role in furthering public debate on national security issues. Letters to the Editor of *Defender* are submitted on the condition that the Australia Defence Association as publisher may edit all letters and reproduce them in electronic form. Emailed letters should be sent to <defender@ada.asn.au>. All writers must supply their name, address and daytime telephone number. Identification of writers will be withheld where justified. Letters should be kept to a maximum of 250 words (ideally 150) and avoid personal attacks.

Sir: Recent issues of *Defender* and *Defence Brief* have discussed the continuing structural problems within the Department of Defence and the burden of ministerial oversight that now falls on just one minister. The ADA has also suggested that the matter of the diarchy should be critically re-examined. I agree that there is a theoretical problem with the diarchy if a CDF and Secretary pursue conflicting agendas. I would argue this has never been more than theoretical as Defence has never had the situation where both were trying to show any leadership at the same time.

Without debating the merits of what they were trying to do, by my reckoning only Shedden, Tange and perhaps Hawke on one hand, and Generals Gratton and Baker on the other, sought to actually manage Defence. The others have been grey men, serving out their time without rocking the boat. The real problem for Defence is not conflict but the failure of its leaders to lead.

Previous tensions caused at least in part by public servants trying to completely control capability development and strategy formulation are much dissipated, not least because many of the worst offenders have retired or been retired. In the days when FDA was at its height there was certainly a serious problem. The FDA model was borrowed from Robert McNamara, complete with its pernicious culture—arrogance, ignorance and the debater's wit. Most of the individuals schooled in FDA culture have left or mellowed.

Too often, however, it is still left to public servants to make financial decisions which impact on capability—but this is because Servicemen won't make the hard decisions themselves.

Name and Address Supplied Australian Capital Territory

Sir: Recent discussion on financial management and equipment procurement difficulties in the Department of Defence, and continued higher defence management problems and reorganisations generally, prompted me to reflect on my knowledge of the Air Board in 1965–66 (before Tange abolished the Service and Supply Boards in 1974 and vested all their statutory responsibilities and powers in one man, the Minister for Defence).

With the Air Board, the Chief of Air Staff (CAS) was the statutory chairman and the Minister for Air was invited to attend whenever he wished. The Army and Naval Boards had slightly different constitutions regarding the chairman and I believe the Minister for the Navy could and often did actually

chair the Naval Board. Our Minister, Peter Howson, attended Air Board meetings religiously (perhaps his business experience was a factor here) and he also took a great interest in the RAAF and its goings-on. He visited bases frequently for more than the common parade and drinks in the Mess, which was as far as some ministers ever got. Mr Howson was Minister for Air for several years, unusual in the Menzies governments I believe. (My predecessor as staff officer to the Minister had served five ministers in four years).

Because of his energy, interest, tenure, and no doubt his very clear mind, Mr Howson came to know a great deal about the RAAF and he was very successful, I think, in getting the RAAF's needs addressed and approved by Cabinet—although occasionally Air Board requests were modified by prime ministerial preference for things British. No doubt two-way trade with Britain was then more important than nowadays. Mr Howson was also very active in helping when the Air Board was powerless, for example in getting the disgracefully slow Mirage production accelerated.

What the RAAF had at that time was a real and very experienced board of directors in which individual members had personal, professional and statutory responsibilities for matters where they had much experience. The Board members each had an experienced and *trained* staff, large enough to do the task but not too big. Much was also delegated to commanders at the three levels of AOC, OC and CO. RAAF-wide orders were Air Board or Air Force Orders issued by CAS and drafted by the relevant Board member.

The Secretary of the Department of Air (also a Board member) presented to the Minister, every month, an expenditure running sheet. This showed the 'overs and unders' for every main group of expenditure, with lots of details, so that the Minister knew what was happening and could ask the relevant Air Board member or members what they had in mind to get the plan back on track.

The old structure of statutory Service (and Supply) Boards had a few faults (notably with inter-Service cooperation) but it had several distinct advantages over current arrangements. The Boards linked technical expertise and staff responsibility for all important decisions and they were accountable by law. They allowed (and really required) the Minister to get to know his departmental and Service leadership thoroughly, and to really understand the problems of the particular Service. They linked the Minister directly to the decisions for which he bore statutory, constitutional and parliamentary responsibility, and from an early stage of the decision-making process.

Current structures appear to put too much work on too few, and not always technically qualified, people at the top. In comparison, the statutory boards shared the load among those with expertise, authority and responsibility. As the reorganised Defence Materiel Organisation becomes a 'prescribed agency' under the Financial Management Act mid year, and begins to look somewhat like the old Department of Supply pre-1974, the proven model of the statutory Supply and Service Boards should be re-examined.

John Macneil
Air Commodore (Retd), Victoria

Sir: I appreciated the ADA responses to recent revisionist articles by Hugh White in the *Sydney Morning Herald* and the *Age* decrying the partial replacement of the Army's obsolete tanks. What Mr White has never appeared to grasp is that the wars we might have to fight are more than likely to have little to do with his 'view' of the world and its future, and everything to do with what the Australian government of the day requires the defence force to do in the national interest.

In any 'high-end' conflict, and indeed in ones of much lower scale and intensity, either in our own region or further afield, numerous camouflage shirts and Bushmaster lightly armoured trucks make as much sense as carrying a knife to a gunfight. The growing availability of weapons such as thermobaric rounds and Koronet anti-tank missiles mean that urban and jungle fighting at most levels would be unnecessarily suicidal without at least some modern tanks and some modern infantry fighting vehicles. In 2005, the ADF remains one of the few modern defence forces in the region without a single infantry fighting vehicle in its inventory. We might be able to get our diggers to the vicinity of the battle in modern helicopters and refurbished 1960s-era armoured personnel carriers, but once there we still expect them to undertake the assault unprotected and on foot, irrespective of the opposing firepower and the physical terrain and distance to be covered. No amount of new tanks and attack helicopters can completely cancel out such a 'missing link' deficiency in the complete picture of a balanced combined-arms force.

The generation of 'know-it-all' civilian officials in the Department of Defence responsible for this situation should hang their heads in shame, not seek to defend discredited policy legacies by pontificating in our daily newspapers and further endangering the lives of our defence force personnel.

Don Webb
South Australia

Sir: As an ex-5/7th Battalion soldier, I note that the mechanised infantry being deployed to southern Iraq are not taking their armoured vehicles with them but will be transported around in 2nd Cavalry Regiment LAVs. It's a sad commentary on our defence preparedness when our only mechanised infantry unit cannot take its organic vehicles, even on a deployment to a relatively low intensity conflict (at least in that part of Iraq), because the vehicles are not good enough.

The wheeled LAV2 was also procured and is operated as a cavalry reconnaissance vehicle— a quite different role. It

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lacks a true mechanised assault capability in comparison to a tracked vehicle such as the M113A3 or a M2/M3 Bradley, or even to an extent the wheeled LAV3 the Kiwis now have. Now I understand it is unlikely that the troops going to southern Iraq would be required to undertake mounted assaults, but this is no excuse for the current disgraceful situation with our mechanised infantry vehicles.

As our M113 armoured personnel carriers (APC) approach the half-century in age they are now invariably older than the fathers of their drivers. Various upgrade or replacement projects from the mid 1980s have been canned, downgraded, delayed and/or reduced in scale. Even the eventual (limited) upgrade that did finally get through means that the 1st Brigade (including 5/7RAR and 2 Cav), our only mechanised formation, will not get any upgraded M113 until the end of 2006.

Even with this upgrade they will still only be (M113 A1) APC not real infantry fighting vehicles (IFV). Now some armchair commentators will say that the Army does not need IFV and they would be partly right. Certainly the entire infantry force does not need them. But the 1/6th of our infantry units that are mechanised surely need IFV if they are to ever operate as part of a truly 'hardened' combined-arms team at battalion, company and platoon level—*not* really very large forces for many tasks. Those who scoff at this, or claim that such a force smacks of fighting with the Yanks far away, should remember there are plenty of regional and home-defence contingencies that could require unit and sub-unit forces of this capability and size.

In 2007 we get the first of our new Abrams tanks whose obvious main purpose, given their limited numbers, is to provide heavy armour support to the 87 per cent of our infanteers who are various forms of light infantry and primarily fight on foot. But we still need some basic capacity to undertake long-distance, mobile mechanised operations in Australia and the region, and this means 5/7RAR at least need a proper IFV to keep up with the Abrams when needed. The 'team' bit in combined-arms team means there is little point having fast and well-protected tanks trying to operate with slower and much less protected APCs.

Instead we get a few upgraded APC and, spare me, the even less capable Bushmaster armoured truck. If this is 'hardening the army' then lord help us.

Adrian Quilty
New South Wales

Sir: I particularly enjoyed the articles on the Navy's new amphibious ships and on the need to rebuild the Australian Merchant Marine [*Defender*, Summer 2004/05]. However, the latter article did not address the current attitude of the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) and the calibre of current Australian seamen. We do need a much larger Australian Merchant Marine, and Australian merchant marine officers are as good as they get, but has the MUA ever looked at its large part in the sad decline of the fleet.

John Gates
Queensland

Sir: Members of the Maritime Union of Australia are justly proud of the sacrifices made by generations of merchant mariners who served in the country's fourth line of defence in wartime. The well-researched and thoughtful article *Rebuilding the Australian Merchant Navy* is therefore welcome support for the growing awareness that a strong Australian-flagged merchant fleet is as much about bolstering defence and security as it is about reinforcing our trade and economic position.

The authors have a clear understanding of the importance of shipping in a changing global economic and security environment, but there are perhaps even more options available for a robust maritime framework which could service both military requirements and the general Australian transport task.

At a time when trade is frustrated by bottlenecks in ports and a massive imbalance of trade figures, our shipping task is left at the mercy of flags of convenience shipping. The cost of this to Australia includes the continual degradation of our Merchant Marine as a strategically vital asset, the loss of an entire skills base, threats to our physical environment and an obvious dilution of our overall capacity to ensure our maritime security.

The current government needs to put aside irrational and ideological attacks on the industry and grasp some of the broad range of opportunities available. As the article makes clear it is a myth that 'Australia is a nation of shippers and not a shipping nation' (to quote the current deputy prime minister). Fresh thinking is also needed all round to blow away the myopic political view that union influences on maritime transport logistics are the sole impediment to the revitalisation of an entire range of maritime professions and related industries.

Like the Japanese soldiers coming out of the jungle years after the end of World War II, the current government should recognise their warring with the maritime unions needs to end. Government, importers, exporters, ship owners, ship builders, ship repairers, educational institutions and unions all need to be involved in encouraging and rebuilding this vital industry, not just protecting the bit that is left.

Dean Summers
Australian National Co-ordinator,
International Transport Workers Federation

Sir: Luckily I was sitting down with a glass of good red and quite relaxed when I started to read my Summer 2004/05 *Defender*. This enabled me to cope with the profound twin shocks of reading an article by Professor Paul Dibb in the national journal of the ADA, and with finding myself in considerable agreement with his argument.

What is happening? Has Professor Dibb changed his views? Has there been a *coup d'état* at the ADA? I think we should be told.

Peter Marks
Queensland

Editor's note: The article by Paul Dibb and Geoffrey Barker was published on its merits as a contribution to public debate.

(Letters cont'd p. 16)

Australis is a collective name for a number of individual contributors to *Defender*

Aceh catastrophe a catalyst

Australia's speedy and significant humanitarian assistance to Indonesia, following the catastrophic tsunami that hit Aceh on Boxing Day, demonstrates both the complexity and the growing resilience of the Indonesia–Australia strategic relationship.

Aceh is one of the most sensitive areas of Indonesia. This time last year it would have been unthinkable that Indonesia would have welcomed such large numbers of foreign military personnel into the province. At its peak more than 1000 ADF personnel were involved. Many AFP disaster victim identification specialists have been there from the earliest days and will stay long after the troops have all returned home by the end of March.

The tragedy of the tsunami brought the peoples of Indonesia and Australia together as never before. Australia has demonstrated it is a true friend of Indonesia in the past, such as during the 1945–51 independence struggle with the Netherlands and the 1997–98 Asian Economic crisis, but these were primarily government-to-government relationships. This time it is different because it feels different. Despite the conspiracy theories peddled by the Islamists the relationship has again been tested and found not wanting.

The tsunami was an appalling tragedy for the people of Aceh and its aftermath remains a great challenge for all Indonesians. Our \$A1 billion assistance package to help Indonesia cope is clearly needed, has caused no worthwhile dissent on both sides of the Arafura Sea, and is a judicious investment in bolstering the nation-to-nation relationship. While we all would have preferred such a tragedy not to have occurred, it has undoubtedly offered both countries the opportunity to truly strengthen an often problematic strategic relationship. ♦

Renewed effort in Iraq

The 22 February 2005 announcement of an increase in our military support to the rebuilding of Iraq had somewhat of an air of inevitability about it. In August 2004 ago the Dutch indicated they would probably not be rotating their contingent again. They went firm on this in November. Since then, and especially by late January, there had been an increasingly desperate quest to find another country willing to protect the Japanese Ground Self Defence Force

engineering contingent, which was undertaking a range of construction and humanitarian-assistance activities in southern Iraq.

While equipped with armoured vehicles and well armed for immediate self-protection, the Japanese cannot fully defend themselves because the JGSDF is constitutionally forbidden to 'engage in hostilities' outside Japanese territory (although there is much debate in Tokyo about relaxing this strict interpretation of the constitution or even repealing it). Under the current strict interpretation, for example, the Japanese cannot even undertake defensive patrolling around their bases. The deployment in Iraq is the first ever overseas deployment of the JGSDF in a war zone, although they have been contributing to UN peacekeeping missions since 1992. Australian troops helped protect Japanese military engineers in Cambodia in 1992–93 under similar circumstances. At that time the JGSDF were permitted by the then Japanese government, after long debate, to wear only pistols.

Without someone willing to protect them the Japanese would probably have had to withdraw. This would have had obvious consequences on the ground in Iraq, for the maintenance of the US-led coalition, for US-Japan relations overall, and for the rationality of the domestic political debate in Japan about modifying the peace provisions of the Japanese constitution. These latter two aspects had considerable and direct potential to adversely affect Australia's strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's direct appeal to John Howard and our, however reluctant, agreement to shoulder these additional responsibilities demonstrate the implications extended far further than Iraq.

Given that the Japanese needed to be protected by a professionally capable force this effectively meant a Western country rather than contract security personnel or the third-world contributors relied on for infantry in many UN peacekeeping operations. It is probable that Australia was long ago identified by the US, UK and Japan (and probably ourselves) as the option of last resort. This explains the sudden announcement and its apparent reversal of previous intentions not to increase to our commitment.

Many of those who were opposed to the 2003 collective intervention in Iraq have criticised this decision too. The essential point, however, is that the validity of the original

intervention is now largely peripheral to the issue of consolidating Iraq as a free and stable country, and one not prone to threatening its neighbours or otherwise undermining international peace and security.

This year, following the constituent assembly elections in late January, there will be a crucial series of referenda and elections in Iraq to decide a new constitution and then freely elect a permanent government. The process cannot be unduly hurried without threatening its success. Conversely everyone recognises the need to withdraw foreign forces as soon as possible—when the new Iraqi government can effectively assume responsibility for security.

Given our previous and continuing involvement in Iraq it therefore makes sense to beef up the military and diplomatic effort over the next year or so. There is an identifiable and achievable strategic goal in sight and therefore little risk of an open-ended commitment. This will not, of course, stop some critics from suggesting polemical and erroneous analogies with the Vietnam ‘quagmire’ of the 1960s.

Finally, no matter when or how the Saddam Hussein dictatorship eventually fell there has long been a high probability that this would result in a civil war between Iraq’s Shi’ite and Sunni Arabs. No minority ascendancy class gives up power willingly, especially where their power has been largely underwritten by violent repression of the majority over a long period. The insurgency in Iraq is mainly fuelled by Sunni fears of what will happen to them when the Shi’ites take charge and perhaps revenge.

Even critics of the US-led intervention in Iraq should be willing to admit that it is better that such civil strife is supervised and ameliorated by the physical presence and restraint of the international community rather than the Iraqis just being left alone to a bloody civil war. From both a humanitarian, and an international order and stability viewpoint, the bloodshed will obviously be a lot less and the risk of the situation escalating to involve neighbouring countries much reduced. It also maximises the chances that Iraq will emerge as a comparatively stable and democratic country in the region. ♦

Mis-playing the Vietnam card

The Winter 2004 *Defender* noted in some detail seven major differences, and two middling similarities, between the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. Subsequent events have confirmed not dismissed that analytical comparison. Recently, the insurgency nature of the conflict in Iraq has prompted some to make further mistaken Vietnam analogies.

One thing usually ignored by those deliberately misusing Vietnam analogies to criticise developments in Iraq is that the former war essentially comprised two phases (and in reverse order to that in Iraq). In the first phase, from the very late 1950s to the Tet offensive in early 1968, the bulk of the fighting was between communist guerillas, both South Vietnamese and those infiltrated in from North Vietnam, and the South Vietnamese security forces and their foreign allies. This phase was effectively won by the anti-communist side, although this did not seem clear to most on both sides at the time.

The second phase began after the significant destruction of the Viet Cong during and after the Tet Offensive. The brunt of the ensuing communist campaign was borne by regular North Vietnamese troops and largely fought in conventional battles. When Saigon fell in April 1975 there were 17 NVA divisions deployed in South Vietnam in contravention of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords.

Throughout both phases of the Vietnam conflict the communist side had the direct, wholehearted and sustained military support of two neighbouring countries and the indirect support of both a super-power and a regional great power. In Iraq the whole international and regional geostrategic frameworks are fundamentally different and no analogous foreign support exists. Moreover, the conventional intervention by foreign forces came first in Iraq and under quite different circumstances. The subsequent minority Sunni insurgency has quite different roots and attributes, and cannot prevail in the long term. There will be no major conventional invasion from outside to restore the deposed Sunni ascendancy class to power.

Finally, Australian public debate has recently been littered with much loose employment of the grand strategy terms *end-state*, *strategic goal* and *exit strategy*. Again various Vietnam ‘quagmire’ bogeys have been raised and inappropriately applied to Iraq. There is insufficient understanding that exit strategies obviously have to be adapted to changing circumstances—that is why they are a strategy not set in concrete. In the Iraq situation, moreover, the strategic goal is a free, democratic and stable country that is not a threat to its neighbours, the wider region or the international rule of law embodied in the UN Charter. The end-state is a democratically elected Iraqi government able to enforce and sustain reasonable standards of political discourse, security and hopefully liberty. The exit strategy for coalition countries is to withdraw as soon as this situation is achieved. The only real questions involved are how long this will take and how they may best be achieved. Genuine disagreement on these points in objective debate is to be expected. ♦

Two flawed pursuits of truth

Recent controversy over claims aired on the ABC *4-Corners* program by retired DIO intelligence analyst, Rod Barton, was not a high point for informed public debate. The program did not ask Mr Barton all the contextual questions it should have before selectively publicising disputed facts, or if it did, it did not put them to air. The result was, at best, an unnecessarily tendentious program. This was exacerbated by the tendency for many viewers to listen only to the bits that reinforced their existing beliefs, either way, about the repute of the Howard government.

What is not in doubt is that the *4-Corners* program painted a grossly inadequate and inaccurate picture of Australian procedures for the conduct of interrogations under the Geneva Conventions. As a result the program unnecessarily damaged the reputations of the country and its defence force with seemingly little regard for the truth and the national interest. Much of this can probably be put

down to inadequate research and a poor knowledge of defence matters generally by those putting the program together. Whatever way you look at it, the conception, execution and publicising of the program was unprofessional journalism unbecoming the supposedly independent national public broadcaster.

The selective airing of facts and claims in the program caused the subsequent session of Senate Estimates, two days later, to become understandably bogged down for eight hours on the difference between an interrogation and an interview in their military context. This can appear an arcane difference to those without the appropriate professional and legal knowledge, but is a well known and necessary moral, legal and practical distinction among practitioners of interrogation, their supervisors and commanders, and those who care to read up on the subject.

Senator's time would have been far better spent properly grilling senior defence officials on the department's continuing financial management difficulties, especially given the repeated annual audit qualifications on Defence accounts. The ADA has long been a strong supporter of parliamentary committee oversight mechanisms. It was disappointing to see the estimates process sidetracked by matters that could have been sorted out easily by reference to the appropriate statutes, regulations, policy documents and ADF doctrine manuals.

Not for the first time at estimates the politics got in the way of the oversight. ♦

Real lessons of Barton affair

The real lessons from the Barton affair have unfortunately been obscured. The most important one is that again we have had a serious breakdown in the passage of information between an operation in the field and the Defence hierarchy in Canberra. Just like the controversies over the so-called 'children overboard' affair and the reporting from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the fundamental problem occurred not in the link between the field and Canberra but when the information reached Russell Offices.

Once again there was not a clear and unadulterated chain of military command from the CDF to and from an operational element, in this case, Barton. His reports back to Canberra and his post-tour debriefings strangely dog-legged into International Policy Division rather than moved straight up the correct joint-Service command chain. In this day and age such an unnecessarily convoluted arrangement, reminiscent of Crimean War-style command farces at their best, is nothing short of a national disgrace.

This problem could be fixed quite simply, by distinguishing the strategic military headquarters from the Department of Defence bureaucracy, and ensuring the headquarters directly controlled all aspects of all defence operations overseas. The optimum way to achieve this would be a formal split between the two entities and return to the command structure we had before 1997. This would be comparatively easy to achieve despite predictable howls otherwise from the military and civilian bureaucracies.

Why Barton's chain of command was so unnecessarily convoluted was apparently not pursued by *4-Corners*. The matter was subsequently aired, to some incredulity all round, during Senate Estimates. While Barton was nominally meant to be supervised by the senior ADF officer in the Australian contingent attached to the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), this did not occur in practice.

Barton, a retired public servant, had served with UNSCOM and the ISG before. Senior ISG officials requested his return to Iraq to further assist the ISG. Barton was brought back into the public service under contract on several occasions for this purpose. He was then nominally attached to the Australian contingent as a civilian but his status as a retired senior public servant, his virtually independent duties, and the fact he had been requested specifically by the Americans, all served to make his status anomalous to say the least. His reporting, tasking and command chain links were hazy at best. They were certainly not clear, responsive and accountable.

The clear proof of this is that all Australians in the contingent were advised verbally and in writing not to participate in interrogations by coalition or Iraqi forces, and to immediately leave any form of questioning when they considered duress was involved. Barton, however, has claimed never to have received such an instruction. Whether he did or did not is actually irrelevant. The circumstances that resulted in it being impossible to confirm or deny the matter one way or the other are proof alone of the disgracefully unclear command, accountability and administrative arrangements supposedly governing Barton's deployment to Iraq.

It surely would have made more sense to temporarily commission him as a reservist officer in the ADF before deploying him on Australia's behalf to a war zone. If the lower salary involved presented a problem, then his pay could have been supplemented in some manner to accord with his expertise and personal perceptions of appropriate remuneration. As a member of the ADF he would have been subject to military discipline, proper command, appropriate supervision, formal accountability, and there would have been no doubts about his international legal status or national duties and responsibilities. If Barton had been unwilling to accept this, then the Americans should simply have been told that, if they really wanted him, they should engage him directly on a US contract entirely independent of the Australian government, its defence force and their respective reputations.

It is also worth asking why, when Barton (a retired DIO employee) was brought back on contract, he was administratively attached to International Policy Division and not, as you would expect, to DIO? One version of the explanation is that DIO declined to do so. If so, this line of questioning should be pursued as part of the reforms to ensure anomalous attachments of civilians in war zones do not occur ever again.

Finally, instead of just taking Barton's claim that he had 'interrogated' Iraqi detainees at face value and unprofessionally broadcasting it to the world in a simplistic

and tendentious manner, *4-Corners* could have asked the simple questions: ‘Are you a qualified interrogator?’; ‘Where did you qualify as an interrogator?’ and ‘Were you duly authorised to participate in interrogations?’. Other perfectly reasonable questions would have been ‘Mr Barton, do you understand the difference between an interrogation and an interview, and if not, why not?’. The only question along such lines actually aired in the program allowed Barton to make the incorrect, irrelevant and emotionally expressed observation that it was an interrogation because the person he was questioning wore an orange jumpsuit and was accompanied to the room for the interview by an armed guard. If this was true, for example, criminal lawyers visiting people in prison would be conducting interrogations and not interviews every time they discussed something with a witness on remand or after sentence. Furthermore, not once during the *4-Corners* program was it discussed that the orange-clad individual being questioned by Barton had apparently volunteered to do so.

The whole episode appears to have occurred because Barton, who is not a qualified military or police interrogator and who has apparently never qualified on any professional course at the Defence Intelligence Training Centre, did not understand the important legal, procedural, moral and operational differences between an interrogation and an interview. It was a misunderstanding on his part, probably a genuine one, blown out of all proportion by a poorly put together television documentary; rather than any of the other conspiracy theories suggested by both sides of politics and those with political or other barrows to push on the Iraq War. But it was a misunderstanding that ended up diverting the leadership of the country, and its parliament, away from real governance issues for nearly a week. Just as importantly, it diverted due attention from what went seriously wrong with the arrangements governing Barton’s deployment to Iraq. ♦

Punishing Abu Bakar Bashir

The 30-month prison sentence imposed on Abu Bakar Bashir has naturally disappointed many people around the world. There is a small chance it might be extended if the prosecution appeals. Even this light sentence may be overturned on appeal. This is, however, a highly complex and nuanced situation in strategic and moral terms. Australia needs to tread carefully.

The West, and most of the international legal system, has responded to the threat from Islamist terrorism by designating such acts as a crime. Implicit in such a stance is the rule of law with all its attendant evidentiary requirements. Bashir getting off lightly is consistent with the international pattern of post-9/11 attempts at anti-terrorism prosecutions. While Islamist small fry have been convicted at trial across the world few senior terrorists have. In the majority of the trials conducted under accepted international standards of human rights, the ‘rules of evidence’ have undone what many would predict as a natural verdict.

Few informed observers have any doubt that Bashir is Jemaah Islamiyah’s spiritual leader. Most believe him guilty of some form of direct involvement in terrorist crimes. The problem is that a range of constitutional, legal and criminal

investigation obstacles stand in the way of convicting him of his probable major involvement in terrorist offences. As predicted in the detailed article by Professor Hasjim Djatal in the Winter 2003 *Defender*, the constitutionality of the retrospective application of the emergency decrees on terrorism promulgated after the Bali bombing was always going to be questionable. After the bulk of these decrees were struck down on constitutional grounds, the types of charge that could be levelled at Bashir under normal Indonesian law were also limited. Many of them essentially related to the Indonesian version of criminal conspiracy, which is difficult to prosecute under our legal system too.

In contrast, the Bali bombers were convicted by a judicious and overwhelming prosecution case sustained by forensic evidence, confessions, witness reports and detailed circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy is far more of a subtle crime where ‘intent’ hides in the thick fog of ambiguity, rumour and semi-plausible explanation and denial. The structure of Jemaah Islamiyah is less formal than most organisational command chains. There are few paper trails and many ambiguous means and modes of communicating orders.

Despite being declared a terrorist organisation by the UN and many other countries, Jemaah Islamiyah is not a proscribed terrorist organisation in Indonesia so membership alone is not a criminal offence. The virtually complete certainty that Bashir incited the attacks in Bali and Jakarta, and the high probability that he even authorised such action, however indirectly, does not easily translate into a conviction. This is especially so when some of the best prosecution witnesses were in custody overseas and not available to testify at all or in person, and those who were in Indonesian custody were his co-conspirators and accomplices who are most unlikely to help any prosecution case.

If Bashir’s trial had occurred under the Suharto dictatorship the application of the rule of law to the case would have been only cosmetic and Bashir would have been dealt with relatively ruthlessly. This would have satisfied natural justice but at the cost of sustaining all the other imperfections of the New Order regime. This would undoubtedly have been too high a price to pay for both Indonesia and Australia, not least because Islamist wrath festered under the dictatorship and grew steadily worse the longer the Suharto regime suppressed political pluralism.

Nowadays, however, Indonesian democracy is taking firm root. Respect for the rule of law, however imperfect its evolution thus far, and however frustrating its current application, will eventually strengthen Indonesian democracy to the benefit of that country and all its neighbours. Australians need to take the long view. If we respond with unrestrained indignation, or worse, we just bolster the simplistic slanders and deceptions of the Islamist extremists.

Abu Bakar Bashir is a wily plotter but still an extreme and violent bigot. It also needs to be remembered that for many years the bulk of Jemaah Islamiyah’s victims have been Indonesians. One day soon he or his followers will go too far and will not be able to elude even Indonesia’s still maturing criminal justice system. ♦



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The Australia Defence Association (ADA) is Australia's only independent and non-partisan public-interest guardian organisation on national security issues. Membership of the Association is open to all Australians interested in Australia's defence and in effective public debate on national security issues.

AUSTRALIA DEFENCE ASSOCIATION

(ABN 16 083 007 390)

<www.ada.asn.au>

Founded in Perth in 1975 by a retired Service Chief, a leading trade unionist and the director of a business peak body, the Australia Defence Association (ADA) has long been Australia's only truly independent and non-partisan community watchdog and 'think-tank' on national security issues. Detail on the aims, activities and structure of the Association can be obtained from the ADA website

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Major Furphy

Dr Who joins defence



The new ADF command and control structure has meant they have had to give Barney (Air Marshal Barney Stoush, my boss the VCDF) a colonel to act as his chief-of-staff when Barney wears his new second hat as Chief of Joint Operations. I now no longer have to always be the bag carrier when Barney attends *briefings*. The downside is that I still cop all the *meetings* that keep Russell Hill humming but often so unproductive. Another downer is that I no longer get to accompany Barney as often, when he is periodically able to flee the great grey sponge to visit real live sailors, soldiers and airmen doing what they're meant to do.

The other day Barney and the colonel, luckily a cavalryman who knows LAVs upside down and inside out even before they are blown up, were away sorting out the PM's sudden change of tack over reinforcing our commitment to Mesopotamia. I took the opportunity to make a brew, reached into the in-tray to extract the shiny new *Defence Capability Development Manual 2005* hidden there, and sat back to read.

While obviously not yet a bestseller at Angus&Robertson, the manual provides 'authoritative guidance' (of course) to the dark and mysterious processes, whereby strategic guidance from our political masters, when it emerges, translates into deciding which things will most efficiently kill the Queen's enemies. Of course this does not mean the most effective kit is necessarily then bought. That is the role of procurement, a completely different and often unconnected process, with its own separate bureaucracy and a host of competing imperatives.

The most important of these potential saboteurs to operational effectiveness is the cheapest and/or most nefarious tenderer, followed closely by the manufacturer or importer who can best rig a connection to a factory or a glorified boat-building ramp in a marginal electorate. A raft of inter-state rivalries, ideological fixations, academic pet theories, financial formulae, project management gobbledygook and terms of trade mumbo jumbo also apply.

The end result of the development and procurement processes sometimes produces neat 'solutions' for the managerialists but no-one else. One such lurk is to buy kit *fitted-for-but-not-with* all its component parts, including weapons. As Barney remarked when the AI Muthanna announcement was made, this inevitably means the ADF have to scramble to find, buy and fit the missing bits when the troops have to be suddenly rushed off to some crisis involving the proverbial two-way range.

Inevitably the new manual is already known as the DCDM. At least this rolls off the tongue much better than its predecessor, the acronymically dissonant *Capability Systems*

Life Cycle Management Manual (CSLCMM). Even more usefully its list of applicable acronyms and abbreviations is down to a two page menu for alphabet soup comprising only 74 ingredients. Mercifully only three of them denote committees; although I noted the department's senior capability decision-making committee has changed its name again. No doubt to further the illusion of genuine reform.

This reminded me that I had once asked Barney what the Chiefs of Staff Committee now did seeing that the Defence Capability and Investment Committee, among others, had usurped its role. After some thought he confessed to a degree of puzzlement on the question himself, but perhaps that's because he is only an invited member. Eventually Barney proffered the judgement that maybe it just hadn't been abolished yet, or transmuted into legal limbo—like the old inter-departmental defence committee and the statutory defence council, which became zombie organs of state because the civvies felt outnumbered when the CDF had the Service Chiefs present to back his professional judgement up.

Sipping my brew I noticed someone old enough to remember pre-dinner ABC TV in the 1970s and 80s had even managed to slip the acronym TARDIS into the list. Perhaps they figured a timelord from the planet Gallifrey was needed to make sense of *The ADF Requirements Development Information System*. This naturally triggered a recollection of one of Barney's horror stories of the bad old days of capability development during and after the Tange dynasty. Barney had commented in passing that 1980s Force Development and Analysis Division types were nicknamed Daleks by those too polite to openly question the legitimacy of their ancestry. When I asked why, Barney said he thought it came from the timeless philosophical dichotomy where the Daleks always referred to themselves as '*the supreme* life form in the universe', whereas everyone else called them '*the most evil* life form in the universe'.

After flipping through the manual's ten-page glossary of technical terms, about 20 per cent of the total text, I turned to reading up on the 'Needs Phase'. This began, fittingly, with a great photo of our obsolescent and soon to be scrapped patrol boats, followed by a diagram illustrating the strategic capability planning process. The diagram's accuracy was admirable, being circular and predicated on the pious hope of receiving the strategic guidance needed too initiate the cycle.

Luckily the phone then rang to rescue me from further exertions on the comprehension front. Barney and the cavalryman were now returning earlier than anticipated. I quickly hid the manual back in my in-tray lest Barney see me reading it and post me to Capability Development Group. ♦

Whole-of-government reform:

A practical first step

Neil James

At a political and public-service reform level there is a renewed and strong push for a whole-of-government approach to tackling the big economic, social and strategic issues that face us. With the increasing complexity of government and the fluid international situation, there is a great need to integrate policy making and implementation within and between various government departments and agencies. Such an approach would mean a paradigm shift for many. Reform is thus resisted in those parts of the Commonwealth bureaucracy prone to bureaucratic inertia—or where the professional or specialist skills required have cultivated a degree of organisational expertise and *esprit de corps*, but at the cost of an insular outlook.

One of the really big issues is national security and the Australia Defence Association has long advocated a whole-of-government approach to it. The Association believes, for example, that we should have one national security White Paper not separate defence and foreign affairs versions produced at different times. Similarly, the ADA believes we need a statutory national security council to improve information flows to the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC) and provide a clear, accountable and robust chain of command for executive and public-service decisions. Such a council (with a deliberately tiny staff) would assist not replace the NSCC and would combine (some) executive, and co-ordination, functions. The council would comprise the Ministers on the NSCC, the Chief of Defence Force and Service Chiefs, the permanent heads of PM&C, Defence, DFAT, Treasury and Attorney-Generals, the AFP Commissioner, the heads of the intelligence and security agencies, and perhaps even the relevant state premier when required.

Such macro-level reforms require considerable inter-departmental reshuffling and legislation and will take time, vision and persistence by the government of the day. In the meantime, useful reforms further down the organisational food chain require only administrative changes and could be implemented very quickly and effectively. One such whole-of-government reform in the national-security field would be to reconstitute staffing in the Department of Defence's International Policy (IP) Division.

This division, set up in 1974, provides Defence with

internal policy advice on international developments affecting Australia's defence interests. The division also plans and manages Defence's international relationships, such as the procedural machinery of collective defence agreements with foreign states, foreign defence attachés and advisers in Australia and our reciprocal representatives posted overseas, and Australia's defence assistance programs to regional countries. The division obviously interacts closely with the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C).

There is no doubt that Defence needs to maintain such a function but the current form of the division is far from ideal. The evidence indicates that the existing IP Division is too insular and too small to constitute a self-sustaining professional organisation. There are continual problems with linking policy advice into broader whole-of-government perspectives. Just as importantly, from a national security perspective, there have long been marked problems with subordinating defence international policy support to overall national, and military, strategy considerations. These stem from longstanding problems with the retention of corporate knowledge and an insular and occasionally arrogant organisational culture. In addition, staff-experience levels within the division are largely inadequate, especially in the important aspects of understanding and dealing with foreign cultures.

There is little point to expanding the division in order to improve its ability to integrate advice and nurture corporate and individual expertise. Indeed there has long been criticism within Defence that it has already shown protracted tendencies for bureaucratic empire building, and has, at times, even developed 'personality cults'. There is, however, another logical alternative. Simply put, it is the outputs of the division and the authority to direct its work that are essential to Defence, not the ownership of the expertise required.

Current strategic uncertainty is spurring rationalisation across whole-of-government national-security arrangements. The current ineffective structure of IP Division should be reformed through a focus on outputs rather than their means of achievement. An obvious step would be for DFAT to provide the civilian side of the policy-making staff in the division, rather than Defence trying

unsuccessfully to maintain a sort of third-string, quasi-diplomatic capability. The day-to-day administrative and financial aspects of Australia's defence assistance to regional countries could remain in the hands of Defence civilian staff, much as Ausaid works with DFAT. The international policy-making aspects would, however, be in the hands of appropriate professionals from the diplomatic service and the more senior ranks of the defence force.

If the civilian policy-making positions in IP Division were routinely occupied by professional career diplomats rather than generalist public servants, often with limited tenure, several favourable benefits would accrue to both departments and to the national interest overall.

First, the diplomatic, trade and defence aspects of Australia's international relations would be much better integrated on a whole-of-government basis. This would have procedural benefits both domestically and overseas. The refining of policy advice, and its means of communication to Ministers, would also eventually assist the NSCC to take a better strategic overview of the myriad components required to formulate a true national strategy.

Second, there would be better day-to-day working relationships between DFAT and Defence, particularly those involving the defence force, which is currently too often isolated except at the most senior levels. Diplomats and ADF personnel tend to work together well overseas, both in conventional representational and exchange situations and in contingency situations such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and security-assistance missions. This foundation should be built on. Closer integration of the respective back-room policy functions back home in Canberra would mean both departments would gain an enhanced understanding of their respective core businesses on a much broader basis, and in much more detail.

Third, DFAT and Defence staffs, particularly at the working level, would benefit from the opportunity for much closer interpersonal relationships. Diplomats at all levels of their career development would have a broader range of home postings. More importantly, they would be able to better develop their knowledge and practical experience of how the military and diplomatic facets of Australia's international relations interact and mutually contribute to Australia's national security. Defence-force officers at mid to senior levels, both at the strategic level and in the field or at sea, would substantially increase their exposure to the perspectives offered by professional diplomats. Steps would have to be taken, of course, to ensure that diplomats temporarily outposted to Defence represented a broad cross-section of diplomatic talent and ability. The interaction between the two departments would not be assisted if IP Division was used as a dumping ground for less able DFAT staff.

Fourth, there has long been a significant problem in the higher management of Australia's defence with career international policy bureaucrats trying to inappropriately

drive defence strategy (and then capability development) rather than, as in all comparable countries, the policy properly being a supporting subset of the strategy. This unfortunate phenomenon has also tended to greatly exacerbate professional and personal tensions between the civilian bureaucracy and the defence force. If DFAT staffed most civilian policy positions in IP Division both of these perpetual problems would disappear, or if they lingered could not possibly be worse than at present. The regular employment of diplomats in IP Division would also better groom such staff should they later be considered for deputy secretary positions in Defence. This, too, would reduce the recurring friction in Defence caused by senior career Defence bureaucrats seeking to exclude military staff from providing their professional input to policy making and advice to interdepartmental forums and to Ministers.

Fifth, IP Division has also tended to attract too many personalities who have wrongly perceived themselves to be quasi-diplomats, or academics attracted to the higher salaries offered in the bureaucracy, but who have little real professional interest in national security or rapport with the profession of arms. Often these individuals, while able after a fashion, have lacked the intellect, tact and broader perspectives expected of professional career diplomats. Some senior individuals have remained within IP Division for very long periods. In other cases, particularly at desk-officer level, the opposite has occurred through a short time in IP Division being regarded as just a ticket-punching exercise for bureaucratic careerists. Specific job tenure at the working level is too often measured in months, rather than the extended time necessary to establish a competent level of corporate knowledge; much less wisdom, in such a challenging and nuanced cross-cultural awareness environment. Both these extremes of tenure, and motivation, have not been conducive to effective policy-making, integrated corporate knowledge across the whole of government, and the long-term institutional health of the division.

Finally, the regular rotation of diplomats through home postings in IP Division would eradicate the twin problems experienced at present whereby senior staff become stale or over-confident through ultra-longevity, and junior staff lack experience and/or continuity because of their high turnover rates.

Accordingly, an appropriate Customer Service Agreement between DFAT and Defence should be instituted whereby DFAT provides all or most of the civilian policy-making staff in IP Division. Such a practical first step to whole-of-government reform in the national security field would set a great example for further, deeper reforms in this and other fields.



Neil James is the Executive Director of the ADA. A shorter version of this article was published in the February-March 2005 edition of 'The Diplomat'.

Rising China:

Risk of miscalculation

Robyn Lim

Deng Xiaoping must be spinning in his grave. His successors seem unable to follow his sensible advice that a 'rising China' should build up its wealth and power gradually, without provoking powerful rivals to combine against it.

Today's China does not seem to be calculating very well, as evidenced by an oil policy full of contradictions, as well as dangerous hubris towards Japan. More than anything else, greed could lead to Chinese miscalculation, a disease that comes from wanting too much too soon. Japan succumbed to the same disease in the 1930s, with results disastrous for itself and for the wider region.

In 2005 the most significant strategic development in this region is likely to be rising tension between China and Japan, despite their growing economic interdependence. As Lee Kuan Yew once observed, the two great powers of East Asia have never previously been strong at the same time. As a product of history, much visceral instinct lies just under the surface—something not present between the superpowers during the Cold War.

Sino-Japanese tensions will focus increasingly on Taiwan, as well as their dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands and contested sovereignty over potential oil and gas fields in the East China Sea. And as China probes eastward, it will meet the bedrock of the US-Japan alliance.

So things could go very wrong in East Asia, the only part of the world where great power war remains thinkable. The differences among the major actors that determine the East Asian balance (and are manifest in Southeast Asia) do not stem from simple misunderstanding. So they are not likely to be resolved by means of dialogue through regional forums, preventive diplomacy or so-called non-aggression pacts. Rather, these tensions are grounded in clashes of strategic interest. Only a stable power equilibrium can contain them—because 'only power checking power can restrain the use of force'.

Geopolitical parallels?

The study of geopolitics—which focuses on the spatial dimension of international politics—does not provide a template. It cannot do so because history does not repeat itself. Still, some patterns are too striking to ignore.

When a land power that occupies a central geographical position starts to manifest blue water ambition, alarm bells begin to ring in the capitals of the maritime powers and all who depend on them for protection. The history of the recent struggles between land and maritime powers provides little comfort for China, the current Elephant with Ambition.

Last century saw three failed bids for hegemony over Eurasia by continental powers. Two by Germany and one by Russia. During the Cold War, the United States led to victory a mixed continental-maritime coalition held together by the sinews of maritime power. Thus Whales 3: Elephants 0. Maritime power alone did not win these titanic struggles, but in each case it provided the keys to victory.

That outcome would have not surprised Alfred Thayer Mahan, who famously wrote in *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* that 'history has conclusively demonstrated the inability of a state with even a single continental frontier to compete in naval development with one that is insular, although of smaller population and resources'.

As China's blue water ambition becomes manifest, alarm bells are ringing in Washington and Tokyo. China sees itself as reasserting its rightful position as East Asia's Middle Kingdom after its century of humiliation. But the United States is not likely to see things that way.

Because of the maritime basis of its own security, America needs to see power balances struck, and conflicts resolved, as far from its shores as possible. It cannot tolerate a bid for hegemony over Eurasia, or any of its critical parts, and China is the current chief candidate. China possesses the motive, will and opportunity to seek dominance in East Asia.

If China were to succeed in doing so that would detract from American security, directly by excluding the United States from the area, and indirectly by its effects on Japan.

The US-China Nexus

The US-China nexus will drive strategic developments in this region. True, these great powers have many shared interests. These include avoiding war, and preventing the nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. Moreover, it suits the interests of both parties, as well as the wider region, that Japan should continue to rely on the United States for

its nuclear and long-range maritime security.

But the United States and China are pursuing opposed interests that could lead to war if unchecked. In relation to the Korean peninsula, for example, China's success in having reduced South Korea to the status of craven ally has increased the risks already present as a consequence of North Korea's nuclear ambitions and dangerous brinkmanship.

Further afield, Sino-American tension is also rising. China may think that its growing strategic foothold in Latin America is merely tit-for-tat for America's continued dominance in China's backyard. But President Hu Jintao's recent Royal Progress through Latin America (including Cuba) will remind United States of the reasons for the Monroe Doctrine.

In Iran, as in North Korea, America wants to see regime change. But both regimes are developing nuclear weapons as the best available guarantee of retaining power. So there is symmetry among Washington, Pyongyang and Tehran. All are playing the same game, albeit from different points of view.

China doesn't want Iran to succumb to American pressure. So Beijing has hinted that it might block the Bush administration from taking the issue of Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions to the UN Security Council. PLA-related companies also continue to provide Iran with missile technology. China encourages Iran's defiance because Beijing understands better than most that the United States intends to use its position in Iraq and Israel to secure a dominant position in the Middle East and Gulf regions. But China, by raising its head above the parapet on the Iran nuclear issue, is drawing ever more attention to the growing challenge that Beijing is posing to global US interests.

Nor can the United States afford to ignore China's drive to bring Taiwan to heel—because of America's own interests as the dominant maritime power, and because of Taiwan's importance to Japan's strategic security.

Taiwan flashpoint

The island of Taiwan occupies a vital position on the First Island Chain because it screens the maritime approaches from the west to both China and Japan. Few in the Japanese navy have forgotten the USS *Queenfish*, a submarine that lurked in the Bashi Channel (between Taiwan and Luzon) in the latter stages of the Pacific War and sank an inordinate amount of Japanese shipping.

The Taiwan issue is a strategic residue of the Cold War. It was sidelined during the latter stages of the Cold War, when the United States and China moved into strategic alignment in order to resist the growing Soviet power that threatened them both. The Taiwan issue resurfaced with the end of the Cold war, and with a dangerous twist, because Taiwan had become a democracy. Now neither China nor the United States can control the competitive political process on Taiwan. That's an illustration of the fact that democracy is not a panacea to strategic problems.

Indeed, to the growing irritation of the Bush administration, some in Taiwan seek to poke China in the

eye and expect the United States to keep China on a leash. That is redolent of the way Chiang Kai-shek kept provoking Japan in the 1920s while expecting America to keep Japan on a leash.

Moreover, Taiwan's raucous democracy is a challenge to the legitimacy of the regime in Beijing, or rather to the lack of it. In China, unlike in the unlamented Soviet Union, the party and the military have always been equals. Moreover, the legitimacy of the PLA is bound up with the 1937–1945 war against Japan. For these reasons, none in the leadership in Beijing can afford to look weak on Taiwan.

Today there is no Old Deng who, wielding the authority of the Long Marcher, can insist that China play the long game. Tensions between the United States and China, for example, would be easier to manage if each party had reason to think that time was on its side.

In relation to Japan, China wants a quiescent Japan, not a powerful rival. But its provocations to Japan, starting with Jiang Zemin's disastrous 1998 visit, are producing the kind of Japan that China least wants. Can it be in China's interests, for example, that it is no longer taboo in Japan to talk about pre-emptive strike and nuclear weapons?

China's provocation of Japan

Do China's provocations towards Japan show that the PLA is beginning to slip its leash, the way Japan's military did in the 1930s? China's warships and survey vessels constantly intrude into Japanese-claimed waters without giving the required notice, and have demonstrated astounding hubris by sailing through the Tsugaru Strait between Honshu and Hokkaido, the maritime heart of Japan.

Japan's leaders have not forgotten that during the 1904–5 Russo–Japanese war, the Vladivostok Squadron escaped Admiral Togo's blockade, sailed through the Tsugaru Strait, and panicked the defenceless cities on Honshu's eastern seaboard. Today's China, fixated on waving its own bloody shirt—'remember Nanjing'—(and still teaching a highly nationalistic version of history in its textbooks) is unlikely to understand how Japan reads its history. It is not hard to see, however, that 'remember the Vladivostok Squadron' and 'remember the *Queenfish*' must have particular resonance in a resource-poor but populous archipelagic state barely off the east Asian littoral.

Moreover, last November a Chinese submarine was tracked as far out as Guam, way out in the Second Island Chain. That was yet more evidence of Chinese ambition—even though the submarine was only an old Han, and the Chinese seamanship on display showed that China has a long way to go in being able to operate submarines efficiently.

Small wonder that Japan's new defence policy outline named China as a threat, along with China's quasi-ally North Korea. In fact, this Chinese maritime incursion was God's gift to the Japanese navy, then in a knife fight with the finance ministry about its budget. The submarine's refusal to travel on the surface while transiting a Japanese strait, as required by international law, was headline news

in Japan. Moreover, the submerged submarine was most enthusiastically ‘pinged’ by Japanese surface ships and maritime surveillance aircraft in order to make the point that it is Japan, and not China, that has the real navy in North Asia.

We will soon see Japan basing its maritime surveillance aircraft on Shimoji-shima, near Ishigaki (east of Taiwan and south-west of Okinawa), and close to both Taiwan and the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands. Japan is also developing amphibious capabilities lest China try to take the Senkakus by force. That would enable Japan to invoke Article V of the US–Japan security treaty.

Moreover, neither Japan nor the United States can afford to ignore growing Chinese strategic pressure in the South China Sea, the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean.

Malacca Strait

China’s extensive territorial claims in the South China Sea represent the greatest threat to strategic stability in the ASEAN region. Because the ASEAN claimants are unable to combine in defence of their interests, China will pick them off one by one when the time is ripe. In addition, a growing foothold in friendless Burma has allowed China to press on the Malacca Strait from both directions. China, by virtue of its alignment with Pakistan—designed to contain India within its subcontinent—has also acquired a strategic foothold on Pakistan’s Indian Ocean coastline by building the port of Gwadar in Baluchistan, which will be connected to Karachi, 460 km away, by the hard-surfaced Makran Coastal Highway.

Would anyone be surprised to find Gwadar had become a PLAN submarine base, pointed equally at the Gulf and the western entrance to the Malacca Strait? Indeed, the eight Kilo class submarines that China ordered in 2002 (in addition to the four the PLAN already operates) are being built in three separate Russian shipyards—another sign that China is in a hurry, not least because it sees Taiwan slipping from its grasp.

Oil: China’s Achilles heel

China’s Achilles heel is its dependence on Middle Eastern oil. So in 2003 Hu Jintao issued an order to secure oil supplies abroad that would not be subject to interdiction in case of a conflict over Taiwan. The result has been a near-hysterical scramble to secure oil production in such places as Brazil, Venezuela and Sudan.

Thus China paid an inflated price for a trade deal with Brazil that included funding for a joint oil-drilling and pipeline program said to be three times the cost of simply buying oil on the market. Moreover, in Sudan, which now supplies some seven per cent of China’s oil, China has become one of the leading supporters of the odious Sudanese regime. Thus, in relation to the Darfur issue, China found itself threatening for the first time in decades to wield its veto power in the Security Council against a petition initiated by the US and backed by France and Britain.

But China, however hard it tries, cannot avoid

dependence on Middle East oil and gas. Moreover China, in planning a blockade of Taiwan, has more to worry about than the US Seventh Fleet interdicting its oil supplies. China cannot assume that the Japanese navy would necessarily remain in port. How could China hope to prevail against the world’s two most powerful navies—which also have a long history of close co-operation (whatever Japan’s interpretation of its constitution says to the contrary).

The Chinese also understand that Australia, a particularly close US ally, fronts the Indian Ocean and the Southeast Asian straits, and has a powerful fleet of modern, ocean-going conventional submarines. Given Australia’s equities in US alliance protection, and its long history of seeing the long-term worth of defending small democracies from totalitarian aggressors, it’s hard to see Australia being able to stay out of a Taiwan Strait clash—even though the booming resource trade is increasing China’s leverage in Canberra.

India, which has its own strategic ambitions and sense of historical grievance, might also join the fray if New Delhi calculated that China was bound to lose in a Taiwan Strait clash (a reasonable assumption). Although India behaves with characteristic ambivalence, no one in Beijing can afford to assume that India would not take the opportunity to avenge its humiliation by China in 1962—and pick up some of the spoils if a failed attempt to take Taiwan led to a collapse of the regime in Beijing.

If that were to happen, Vietnam might also be keen to avenge the humiliations of 1974 (China’s invasion of the Paracels) and 1988 (naval clashes in the South China Sea)—as well as Deng Xiaoping’s administering the ‘first lesson’ by invading northern Vietnam in early 1979 (to make the point that Vietnam could not with impunity invade Cambodia with Soviet backing, and that Moscow was an unreliable ally).

China’s continuing *sotto voce* tensions with Vietnam—which has sought dubious refuge in ASEAN—are a reminder of Mahan’s dictum previously quoted. China has land borders with fourteen states, few of which it can call a friend. The weaker states will have no choice but to acquiesce to growing Chinese power. But others will be inclined to resist, and to form coalitions in order to do so.

For example, the hubris on display in Beijing may lead Russia and Japan to sink their differences in order to align against a ‘rising’ China that threatens them both. It would not be the first time Russia and Japan have resolved their differences, the precedent having been set in the period from 1907 to 1916. Indeed, recent visits by senior Japanese army officers to the Russian Far East would have any old *geopolitiker* sniffing the breeze.

As noted, the history of Whales 3: Elephants 0 stands as a warning of the difficulties that China faces in managing its ‘peaceful’ rise. It is all starting to look redolent of what happened in Germany early last century when an arrogant and foolish young Kaiser sacked that great helmsman Bismarck. Wanting too much too soon, the Kaiser soon provoked the formation of the very coalition of the flanking powers (France and Russia) that Bismarck had laboured

so hard to prevent. That soon led into a disastrous war.

Currently, those advising Deng's successors are said to be studying this history. But are they learning the right lessons? If not, it will be a familiar story of greed, hubris and miscalculation leading to war—and this time with nuclear weapons as part of the equation. ♦

Professor Robyn Lim, an Australian, is Professor of International Relations in the Faculty of Policy Studies at Nanzan University in Japan. She is the author of 'The Geopolitics of East Asia: The Search for Equilibrium' (Routledge, London, 2003) which was reviewed in the Summer 2004/05 'Defender'. This article is based on a paper she presented to 'Regional Outlook Forum 2005' at the Institute of Southeast Studies in Singapore in January 2005.

(Cont'd from Letters p. 4)

Sir: David Mason (*Defender*, Summer 2004/05) laments the 'psychological dependence on the US alliance' as a cause for the public's low interest in defence and defence spending. In large measure I agree. Indeed the insurance industry has a name for it, the 'morale hazard', a situation where people, for instance, leave their keys in their cars because they are insured.

The insurance industry addresses this problem by loss sharing provisions and reduced premiums for loss-control measures. I wonder how many people are aware that, as I understand it, there is a loading of over 20 per cent on their inner city home insurance to cover terrorist incidents. If they did they may, such as in the case of the similar fire levy, demand that some of their premium be used to fund terrorist fighting and terrorist prevention measures just as the fire levy funds metropolitan and rural firefighting services.

**Kevin Walsh
Victoria**

Sir: The last issue of *Defender* carried two articles on Islamist terrorism which promote a viewpoint that I believe is counter-productive in the 'war on terrorism'. One was by Dennis Richardson, the head of ASIO, and the other by Paul Dibb (from the ANU) and Geoffrey Barker (of the *Australian Financial Review*). Both articles promoted the view that such terrorism is not primarily motivated by political, economic or justice concerns but by pure, religious dogma and a hatred of the values of our society - a world view which is so alien to our own that we can never communicate with these people or reduce their desire to destroy us. In short—the perfect enemy.

Yes, fanatical ideology is there—but fanatical groups could never sustain their existence without a base of support and sympathy in the societies they operate within. The base of this support is a widespread perception within Muslim societies that the West has been unjust and exploitative in its dealings with the Muslim world. This is based on hard economic and political realities, not ideology. It is largely a function of the foreign policy of the West. One of the major grievances, of course, is the treatment of the Palestinians by Israel and the unbalanced manner in which the United States supports Israel. Addressing such foreign policy issues would be a much more effective way of conducting the 'war on terrorism'.

The idea that this is all about religion cannot be correct. The real world does not operate like that. Religions and ideologies do not exist in a vacuum—economic, social and political forces lie behind them. Even religious wars have as their foundation political and economic realities, not empty ideological concepts. To focus on religious fanaticism is to mistake the symptom for the disease. Terrorism has concrete foundations—the religious ideology comes on top of them. Continuing on the course we are going will only exacerbate the problem and help to bring about a self-fulfilling prophecy—the 'clash of civilisations'. We must fight an effective 'war on terrorism' by addressing the very issues which are sustaining the terrorists.

**Colin Mitchell
South Australia**

Sir: Dr Malcolm Kennedy's thoughtful review essay on three recent books on the 1942–44 Papua and New Guinea campaigns was a good example of effectively using history to draw contemporary lessons and warnings, and plan for the future. Hopefully television, the internet, and the decline of deference generally, will prevent future Australian politicians and American and Australian 'chateau generals' from treating successful field commanders so disgracefully and then blocking the truth getting out.

**Phillip Bradley
Western Australia**

Sir: May I add my voice to those who have thanked *Defender* for publishing the thorough and scholarly review of Tony Kevin's polemic on the sinking of SIEV X. You only have to visit Mr Kevin's self-publicising and self-righteous website to learn how much he has been stung by Dr Frame's calm and balanced criticism of his unfounded claims.

Lyn Strachan [Letters, *Defender*, Summer 2004/05] may be right to call for Tony Kevin to be prosecuted for criminal libel, but there are two problems sustaining such a prosecution. Kevin defames organisations but not individuals with his calumnies, and a charge of criminal libel really requires the defamation to be so malicious and unfounded that it is likely to cause a serious breach of the peace. The restraint of those police and Service personnel subject to his insults would appear to be Kevin's only saving grace in this regard.

**Kerry Beecher
New South Wales**

association update

2005 essay competition

To help celebrate *Defender's* 22nd year of continuous publication HarperCollins Australia have generously donated three copies of Paul Ham's new book *Kokoda* (reviewed in the Summer 2004/05 *Defender*) to be prizes for the journal's writing competition in 2005. A copy of *Kokoda* is awarded to the ADA member or *Defender* subscriber who personally writes the best essay-type article published in each issue of the journal.

Essays need to discuss a major issue affecting the formulation of Australian defence policy or strategy, or a major capability issue affecting the ADF. They must be 1200–1500 words unless prior permission for a longer piece is obtained from the editor, and be submitted by the 15th of the month in February, May, August and November respectively. The awarding of the prize will be judged by the journal's editorial board and their decision is final.

The winner of the essay prize in Autumn 2005 is Dr Paul Monk from Austhink in Melbourne. ♦

Defender index available

The *Defender* page on the ADA website now includes an index of articles, reviews and commentary in *Defender* over the last few years. ♦

Melbourne chapter lunch

The Melbourne-Geelong Chapter of the ADA is holding a special luncheon meeting on Tuesday 22 March 2005 at the Kelvin Club, Melbourne Place in the City from 12:30 to 2:00 pm. The meeting will be addressed by ADA Executive Director, Neil James, on the topic 'The Politics of Australia's Defence in 2005', and will also be updated on other matters.

The cost of the lunch is anticipated to be \$35 a head. To assist with confirming numbers for dining, members or others interested in attending need to contact David Forbes on <dforbes@vicbar.com.au> or telephone the ADA national office on (0408) 412-588. Members are also encouraged to bring guests. ♦

Membership upgrade offer

Associate Members wishing to upgrade their membership level to a Fellowship of the Association should contact the national office on (02) 6231-4444 or send an email to <membership@ada.asn.au>. Associate members exercising this option before the end of April 2005 will have their new Fellowship subscription period extended to 30 June 2006 at no additional charge. ♦

Conference Calendar

ADA members and other *Defender* readers may be interested in the following public conferences and activities:

Australian International Airshow 2005
15–20 March 2005, Avalon Airport, Melbourne
Enquiries: (03) 5282-0502 or www.airshow.net.au

**Department of Defence (Strategy Group)
Joint Future Warfighting Conference 2005**
Preparing for Tomorrow's Threat Today
20–21 April 2005, National Convention Centre, Canberra
Enquiries: (0412) 472-766
www.defence.gov.au/strategy/fwc/default.htm

Defence Materiel Organisation Defence & Industry Conference 2005
Getting Down to Business (with the DMO as a prescribed agency)
20–22 June 2005, National Convention Centre, Canberra
Enquiries: (02) 6266-0247
www.defenceandindustry.com.au

**UNSW-Univ. of Melbourne-QUT Homeland Security
Summit & Exposition 2005**
Safeguarding Australia
12–14 July 2005, National Convention Centre, Canberra
Enquiries: (02) 9420-2020
www.safeguardingaustraliasummit.org.au

King-Hall Naval History Conference 2005
Sea Power Ashore and in the Air
21–22 July 2005, National Convention Centre, Canberra
Enquiries: (02) 6127-6514
seapower.conferences@defence.gov.au

RAAF History Conference 2005
Masters of Air Power
12 August 2005, National Convention Centre, Canberra
Enquiries: (02) 6266-1355
airpower@defence.gov.au

Chief of Army Conference 2005
*Facing Complexity: New Dimensions in
Strategy and Warfighting in the 21st Century*
22–23 September 2005
National Convention Centre, Canberra
Enquiries: (02) 6265-9828
www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc

DSTO Land Warfare Conference 2005
Warfighting in the 21st Century
04–07 October 2005
Gold Coast Convention and Exhibition Centre
Enquiries: (08) 8259-5873
www.dsto.defence.gov.au/corporate/conferences/landwarfare

Chief of Army History Conference 2005
Coalition Warfare: The Challenges for Junior Partners
13–14 October 2005,
National Convention Centre, Canberra
Enquiries: (02) 6266-4248
emma.robertson@defence.gov.au

Dangers every bit as great:

Remodelling the paradigms of Australian strategic policy debate

Paul Monk

In an address to the national summit on *Australia's Relations with Asia* in Old Parliament House on 13 August 2004, Professor Paul Dibb remarked that dealing with terrorism is a police matter, not a military one. Those who claim that the strategic environment has fundamentally changed are quite mistaken, he argued. Al Qa'eda and its ilk are a problem, but as threats go they are simply not in the same league as the old Soviet Union.

Philip Bobbitt, in his acclaimed study of war and peace, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History*, sees the matter differently. He argues that the dangers which have arisen in recent years are every bit as great as those we have just faced down. They are all the more so for being of a different nature to the threats faced down in the Cold War and characterised by unprecedented uncertainty.

Bobbitt argues that the new dangers will compel profound reassessments of the nature of 'national' security itself and, with it, the civil laws, force structures and rules of engagement that buttress such security. Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that unless such changes begin, in anticipation of what could now happen at any time, we could face a catastrophic breakdown in global order.

To see why he believes all these things—and believed them before the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States shook up so many people's views of global security—requires plunging into the profound rethinking of the course of modern history that his book embodies.

It has been greeted by those best placed to assess it as a masterpiece for our times. In the words of Professor Sir Michael Howard, it will surely rank as one of the most important works on international relations published during the last fifty years. It offers what William Shawcross has greeted as an awe-inspiring survey of the roots of strategic thinking, international law and the constitutional structure of states over the past five hundred years.

As Michael Howard remarked, in his Foreword, it is a remarkable and perhaps unique book. 'There have been many studies of the development of warfare, even more of the history of international relations, while those on international and constitutional law are literally innumerable. But I know of none that has dealt with all three of these together, analysed their interaction throughout European history, and used that analysis to describe the world in which we live and the manner in which it is likely to develop'.

There are three central premises to Bobbitt's argument, from which he draws four powerful inferences. The first premise is that modern history is best understood as a series of epochal wars that have shaped both state constitutions and the international society of states. The second premise is that strategy, law (both constitutional and international) and history (as a study) are inextricably intertwined, since they shape one another. Properly speaking, none can be understood without close reference to the others. The third premise is that the state is not withering away, but nation-states are turning into market-states, which have a different constitutional and strategic logic than nation-states.

Bobbitt's first premise is grounded in a view of history that goes back via Hobbes and Machiavelli to Thucydides. Indeed, he opens his argument with the claim that Thucydides was the first to write the history of an epochal war, when he realised, in 413 BC, or shortly thereafter, that the struggle between Athens and Sparta was not merely a series of wars but a prolonged, fundamental conflict, which would shape the whole future of the Greek world. 'So it is with all epochal wars', he asserts, '—the Hundred Years' War, the Thirty Years' War, the Punic Wars—and so it will be seen of the war of the twentieth century'.

'Epochal wars', he writes, 'put the constitutional basis of the participants in play and do not truly end until the underlying constitutional questions are resolved'. From this premise he derives his first inference. 'We should regard the conflicts now commonly called the First World War, the Second World War, and the Korean and Vietnam Wars, as well as the Bolshevik Revolution, the Spanish Civil War and the Cold War as a single war', he infers, 'because all were fought over a single set of constitutional issues that were strategically unresolved until the end of the Cold War and the Peace of Paris in 1990'.

That single war, which Bobbitt dubs the Long War, was fought to determine which form of constitution—liberal parliamentary, fascist or communist—would replace the imperial states of Europe that had emerged after the epochal war of the Napoleonic period and had dominated the world between the Congress of Vienna and August 1914. This competition was itself triggered, he argues, by the instability of two imperial states—Germany and Russia—which morphed into the fascist and communist forms that the liberal democracies then had to master in order to survive.

He sees this process as rigorously analogous to earlier epochal struggles, which shaped the emergence and fate

of princely states, kingly states and territorial states between the 16th and 19th centuries. Just as earlier epochal wars were resolved by major international settlements—Westphalia, Utrecht and Vienna—so the Long War was resolved by the 1990 Peace of Paris. This settlement, setting the seal on the victory of the liberal parliamentary nation-state over fascism and communism, encouraged Francis Fukuyama to declare the ‘end of history’.

Bobbitt offers a more challenging and realistic appraisal of what had actually happened and a far more complex prognosis as to what possible futures we now face. At the heart of his prognosis is the claim that, having resolved the great constitutional issue of the 20th century that had divided them, nation-states of the early 21st century are ‘uncertain as to how to configure, much less deploy, their armed forces’. The uncertainty has arisen, because the traditional answers depended ‘on certain assumptions about the relationship between the state and its objectives that the end of this long conflict has cast in doubt’.

This brings us to Bobbitt’s second premise: that strategy, law (both constitutional and international) and history (as a study) are inextricably intertwined, since they reciprocally shape one another. It is most concisely stated as follows:

‘The state exists by virtue of its purposes, and among these are a drive for survival and freedom of action, which is strategy; for authority and legitimacy, which is law; for identity, which is history’. Law cannot come into being until the state secures a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Strategy cannot be formulated unless law prevails, for in its absence there is only civil war or banditry. ‘Yet the legitimacy necessary for law and for strategy derives from history, the understanding of past practices that characterizes a particular society’.

The most important thing about this premise is his second inference: that the key technologies produced by the Long War—weapons of mass destruction, information technology and global communications—are undermining the very possibility of nation-states in the 20th century sense. Just as surely as cannon and muskets in an earlier era undermined the possibility of principalities and feudal baronies, these technologies, he argues, began to undermine the nation-state at just the point when its liberal parliamentary form had triumphed over its darker rivals for primacy.

They render it increasingly difficult for the nation state to maintain the kind of sovereignty by which it was defined. They render the defence and governance of territories and populations increasingly problematic. They do so by creating threats which transcend borders or territorial conflict; by creating economies that transcend any national base; and by making possible histories which the nation-state cannot master through the control of information.

This brings us to Bobbitt’s third premise: that the state is not withering away. Nation states are turning into market-states which have a different constitutional and strategic

logic than nation-states. They have their roots in the liberal parliamentary nation-state, but are being forced to evolve under the above pressures and there are decidedly different ways in which things might turn out. One thing which will differentiate them will be the capacity they exhibit to reshape their military and security forces for what Paul Bracken, writing in 1993, called ‘an entirely new operational environment, taking account of revolutionary changes in military technology and the possible appearance of entirely new kinds of competitors’.

What all variants of the market-state will discover to their cost, according to Bobbitt, is that the permeability of borders due to the uncontrollability of capital flows and of information, combined with the social consequences of these developments, the novel dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction in many more hands and forms than during the Cold War, environmental and viral hazards, the difficulties in managing consensus or marshalling resources for strategic purposes and the unrelenting nature of economic competition require new ways of thinking about what they themselves are and how they must cooperate.

It is these considerations that give Bobbitt his third and fourth inferences. The third inference is that the old strategic

paradigm of threat, deterrence and retaliation must be replaced by a new one based on vulnerability, pre-emption and resilience. This will require fundamental rethinking of strategic doctrine, force structures and international law. Such rethinking has barely begun, but must accelerate or be overtaken by events in possibly catastrophic ways. The fourth inference is that international institutions, now in large measure discredited, will be necessary, but will have to be transformed or reinvented if they are to play the constructive role required of them.

Stated broadly in this manner, these inferences of Bobbitt’s may seem quite common fare. Certainly, variations of them have been in circulation for some time. What he has put together, however, is a powerful synthesis, with historical and conceptual roots that give it considerably more leverage than other, more superficial reflections along similar lines. Taken together with his other premises and inferences, these elements of his worldview offer, I suggest, quite a powerful set of lenses through which to re-examine both recent developments and future prospects.

Bobbitt called his Postscript, the only part of his book written after 9/11, ‘The Indian Summer’. The phrase, he wrote, ‘usually evokes a pleasant sensation of warm autumn weather that gives us a second chance to do what winter will make impossible’. Its origin, however, ‘is more menacing. The early American settlers were often forced to take shelter in stockades to protect themselves from attacks by tribes of Native Americans. These tribes went into winter quarters once autumn came, allowing the settlers to return to their farms. If there was a break in the approaching winter—a few days, or weeks of warm summery climate—then the tribal attacks would be resumed,

and the defenseless settlers became their prey. Once again, the settlers were forced to band together or to become victims, attacked one by one’.

He went on to argue that we are now in such an Indian summer and must look to our defences. If these first attacks ‘inspire us now to deal realistically and creatively’ with the emerging dangers of the 21st century, then the sacrifice of thousands on 9/11 could yet be turned to our common advantage. But if we disregard the implications of those attacks, he warned, we could find ourselves confronted by ‘a world-rending cataclysm’ as global institutions fracture, states lapse into turmoil, weapons of mass destruction proliferate and are used, and civil law is warped by fear into new authoritarian forms. For, he concluded, ‘we are entering a fearful time, a time that will call on all our resources, moral as well as intellectual and material’.

Why does he apprehend such a cataclysm? First, because, in his own words, ‘War is not a pathology that, with proper hygiene and treatment, can be wholly prevented. War is a natural condition of the state, which was organised in order to be an effective instrument of violence on behalf of society ... On 11 September 2001, the nascent community of market-states came to this knowledge as every society that preceded it has: through violence’. Second, because the nature of the war that hit home that day is something existing laws and strategic doctrines are not equipped to deal with. Third, because the cascading consequences of not being so equipped could trigger crises far worse than most people can readily imagine.

Immediately after 9/11 and for some time thereafter there was a vigorous debate about whether it should be responded to as a crime or an act of war. Bobbitt is not in doubt that it was an act of war. The problem is that it was not an act of war by a nation-state and therefore put customary usage of the laws and machinery of war out of their reckoning. Al Qa’eda is a virtual state, not a territorial one, not a nation-state, ‘which means that our classical strategies of deterrence based on retaliation will have to be rethought’. They cannot be effective in these circumstances, because ‘what threatens the states of the world now is too easy to disguise and too hard to locate’.

We are, Bobbitt believes, on the cusp of a new epoch of war, the nature of which will confound those who think of war merely along the lines given by 20th century experience. The liberalism that emerged triumphant from the 20th century will have to reshape itself to cope with what is coming and most of its citizenry are unprepared for what this will entail. Their very concepts of security are outmoded and confused. Most fundamentally, ‘National security will cease to be defined in terms of borders alone, because both the links among societies as well as the attacks on them exist in psychological and infrastructural dimensions, not on an invaded plain marked by the seizure and holding of territory.’

‘In such a world’, Bobbitt tells us, ‘we must move our thinking from threat-based strategies that rely on knowing precisely who our enemy is and where he lives, to vulnerability-based strategies that try to make our infrastructure more slippery, more redundant, more versatile, more difficult to attack. ... There will be no final victory in such a war. Rather, victory will consist in having the resources and the ingenuity to avoid defeat. So long, however, as states rely on a deterrence and retaliation model for their strategic paradigms—that is, a model that requires a threat-based analysis—they will inevitably neglect those steps, including enhanced intelligence collection, pre-emption, the development of defensive systems (including sensors), vaccinations, the pre-positioning of medical supplies and advanced methods of deception, that provide the basis for operating within a different paradigm, one that relies on a vulnerability analysis’.

Against such a background, what are we to make of the strategic policy debate in Australia? First, that the debate looks narrow and ill-informed against the deeper conceptual understanding of world affairs Bobbitt provides. Second that those who continue to defend the old strategic doctrine, Paul Dibb most of all, appear to dismiss with scorn even preliminary

‘Australia is faced by growing problems in maintaining its defence force, because of budgetary constraints. The expensive nature of contemporary advanced platforms and the lure of the marketplace on Service personnel both contribute to this budgetary squeeze.’

attempts to rethink matters. They need to be confronted by something as formidable as Bobbitt’s thesis in

order to be forced into a serious debate. Third, that, while some tinkering with the force structure has taken place in the past four years, it would appear to have taken place on an improvised basis, an ad hoc basis, not on the basis of deep and consequential thought.

Australia is a nation-state evolving into a market-state for the reasons identified by Bobbitt. As much as any such state, though with our own peculiar variations on the common themes, we are becoming more and more implicated in world order and global infrastructure security challenges, less and less likely to be threatened by conventional territorial invasion. Yet the Defence of Australia doctrine still postulates territorial defence and denial of the so-called sea-air gap to a notional major adversary as its absolutely central priorities. Those priorities take the lion’s share of defence spending allocations.

Even as our actual military and security commitments more and more resemble those that Bobbitt’s worldview would anticipate, the defenders of the old doctrine insist that nothing fundamental has changed and that, in Hugh White’s words, we must still be prepared to fight conventional nation-state wars. It is not necessary to postulate that such wars will not occur in order to see that, as a matter of practical reality, they are extremely unlikely to occur in ways that directly threaten Australian sovereignty in the conventional sense of the term.

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of princely states, kingly states and territorial states between the 16th and 19th centuries. Just as earlier epochal wars were resolved by major international settlements—Westphalia, Utrecht and Vienna—so the Long War was resolved by the 1990 Peace of Paris. This settlement, setting the seal on the victory of the liberal parliamentary nation-state over fascism and communism, encouraged Francis Fukuyama to declare the ‘end of history’.

Bobbitt offers a more challenging and realistic appraisal of what had actually happened and a far more complex prognosis as to what possible futures we now face. At the heart of his prognosis is the claim that, having resolved the great constitutional issue of the 20th century that had divided them, nation-states of the early 21st century are ‘uncertain as to how to configure, much less deploy, their armed forces’. The uncertainty has arisen, because the traditional answers depended ‘on certain assumptions about the relationship between the state and its objectives that the end of this long conflict has cast in doubt’.

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paradigm of threat, deterrence and retaliation must be replaced by a new one based on vulnerability, pre-emption and resilience. This will require fundamental rethinking of strategic doctrine, force structures and international law. Such rethinking has barely begun, but must accelerate or be overtaken by events in possibly catastrophic ways. The fourth inference is that international institutions, now in large measure discredited, will be necessary, but will have to be transformed or reinvented if they are to play the constructive role required of them.

Stated broadly in this manner, these inferences of Bobbitt’s may seem quite common fare. Certainly, variations of them have been in circulation for some time. What he has put together, however, is a powerful synthesis, with historical and conceptual roots that give it considerably more leverage than other, more superficial reflections along similar lines. Taken together with his other premises and inferences, these elements of his worldview offer, I suggest, quite a powerful set of lenses through which to re-examine both recent developments and future prospects.

Bobbitt called his Postscript, the only part of his book written after 9/11, ‘The Indian Summer’. The phrase, he wrote, ‘usually evokes a pleasant sensation of warm autumn weather that gives us a second chance to do what winter will make impossible’. Its origin, however, ‘is more menacing. The early American settlers were often forced to take shelter in stockades to protect themselves from attacks by tribes of Native Americans. These tribes went into winter quarters once autumn came, allowing the settlers to return to their farms. If there was a break in the approaching winter—a few days, or weeks of warm summery climate—then the tribal attacks would be resumed,

and the defenseless settlers became their prey. Once again, the settlers were forced to band together or to become victims, attacked one by one’.

He went on to argue that we are now in such an Indian summer and must look to our defences. If these first attacks ‘inspire us now to deal realistically and creatively’ with the emerging dangers of the 21st century, then the sacrifice of thousands on 9/11 could yet be turned to our common advantage. But if we disregard the implications of those attacks, he warned, we could find ourselves confronted by ‘a world-rending cataclysm’ as global institutions fracture, states lapse into turmoil, weapons of mass destruction proliferate and are used, and civil law is warped by fear into new authoritarian forms. For, he concluded, ‘we are entering a fearful time, a time that will call on all our resources, moral as well as intellectual and material’.

Why does he apprehend such a cataclysm? First, because, in his own words, ‘War is not a pathology that, with proper hygiene and treatment, can be wholly prevented. War is a natural condition of the state, which was organised in order to be an effective instrument of violence on behalf of society ... On 11 September 2001, the nascent community of market-states came to this knowledge as every society that preceded it has: through violence’. Second, because the nature of the war that hit home that day is something existing laws and strategic doctrines are not equipped to deal with. Third, because the cascading consequences of not being so equipped could trigger crises far worse than most people can readily imagine.

Immediately after 9/11 and for some time thereafter there was a vigorous debate about whether it should be responded to as a crime or an act of war. Bobbitt is not in doubt that it was an act of war. The problem is that it was not an act of war by a nation-state and therefore put customary usage of the laws and machinery of war out of their reckoning. Al Qa’eda is a virtual state, not a territorial one, not a nation-state, ‘which means that our classical strategies of deterrence based on retaliation will have to be rethought’. They cannot be effective in these circumstances, because ‘what threatens the states of the world now is too easy to disguise and too hard to locate’.

We are, Bobbitt believes, on the cusp of a new epoch of war, the nature of which will confound those who think of war merely along the lines given by 20th century experience. The liberalism that emerged triumphant from the 20th century will have to reshape itself to cope with what is coming and most of its citizenry are unprepared for what this will entail. Their very concepts of security are outmoded and confused. Most fundamentally, ‘National security will cease to be defined in terms of borders alone, because both the links among societies as well as the attacks on them exist in psychological and infrastructural dimensions, not on an invaded plain marked by the seizure and holding of territory.’

‘In such a world’, Bobbitt tells us, ‘we must move our thinking from threat-based strategies that rely on knowing precisely who our enemy is and where he lives, to vulnerability-based strategies that try to make our infrastructure more slippery, more redundant, more versatile, more difficult to attack. ... There will be no final victory in such a war. Rather, victory will consist in having the resources and the ingenuity to avoid defeat. So long, however, as states rely on a deterrence and retaliation model for their strategic paradigms—that is, a model that requires a threat-based analysis—they will inevitably neglect those steps, including enhanced intelligence collection, pre-emption, the development of defensive systems (including sensors), vaccinations, the pre-positioning of medical supplies and advanced methods of deception, that provide the basis for operating within a different paradigm, one that relies on a vulnerability analysis’.

Against such a background, what are we to make of the strategic policy debate in Australia? First, that the debate looks narrow and ill-informed against the deeper conceptual understanding of world affairs Bobbitt provides. Second that those who continue to defend the old strategic doctrine, Paul Dibb most of all, appear to dismiss with scorn even preliminary

‘Australia is faced by growing problems in maintaining its defence force, because of budgetary constraints. The expensive nature of contemporary advanced platforms and the lure of the marketplace on Service personnel both contribute to this budgetary squeeze.’

attempts to rethink matters. They need to be confronted by something as formidable as Bobbitt’s thesis in

order to be forced into a serious debate. Third, that, while some tinkering with the force structure has taken place in the past four years, it would appear to have taken place on an improvised basis, an ad hoc basis, not on the basis of deep and consequential thought.

Australia is a nation-state evolving into a market-state for the reasons identified by Bobbitt. As much as any such state, though with our own peculiar variations on the common themes, we are becoming more and more implicated in world order and global infrastructure security challenges, less and less likely to be threatened by conventional territorial invasion. Yet the Defence of Australia doctrine still postulates territorial defence and denial of the so-called sea-air gap to a notional major adversary as its absolutely central priorities. Those priorities take the lion’s share of defence spending allocations.

Even as our actual military and security commitments more and more resemble those that Bobbitt’s worldview would anticipate, the defenders of the old doctrine insist that nothing fundamental has changed and that, in Hugh White’s words, we must still be prepared to fight conventional nation-state wars. It is not necessary to postulate that such wars will not occur in order to see that, as a matter of practical reality, they are extremely unlikely to occur in ways that directly threaten Australian sovereignty in the conventional sense of the term.

Australia is faced by growing problems in maintaining its defence force, because of budgetary constraints. The expensive nature of contemporary

advanced platforms and the lure of the marketplace on Service personnel both contribute to this budgetary squeeze. The contradiction between a force structure configured for continental defence in depth, and the realities of constant overseas deployments requiring more and different capabilities than have been developed under the existing doctrine, exacerbate funding problems. All of this was true in the 1990s. The emerging strategic environment of terrorist threats and economic volatility has accentuated these problems. Yet still we are told that the force structure must be essentially maintained as it is.

Bobbitt's paradigm and his scenarios would have us thinking long and hard about what our vulnerabilities are, instead of what threats we face; about how resilient we can make ourselves, rather than about how we can retaliate against some notional conventional aggressor; about how we can best contribute to the security of international economic and informational infrastructure, participate in pre-empting emerging dangers and build new alliances against unconventional dangers, rather than about whether we can blast an imagined conventional enemy out of the so-called sea-air gap between our northern shores and the archipelagoes further north.

These are fairly radical thoughts. But it is thinking that we are in need of right now. The tinkering that we have done since 2001 has been reasonably intelligent, but the paradigm seems hardly to have shifted, hardly, indeed, to have been perceived as a paradigm at all, but rather as if it were simply an unchanging reality. What has not taken place is a truly thorough, scenario-based reconsideration of the assumptions built into the Defence of Australia doctrine. If the Dibb Review made eminent sense in 1986,

because the ADF had been drifting conceptually since the end of the Vietnam War, a similarly fundamental review would now seem to be in order.

If Bobbitt is even approximately correct in his diagnosis of the new strategic environment and in his prognosis for the epochal struggle ahead between market-states and anarchic forces, we shall be compelled to undertake such a radical rethinking of our strategic policy and force structure in the not too distant future. What will it take to prompt such thinking? We have certainly had a good deal of early warning about what is brewing. But, sunk in old paradigmatic ways of seeing our security, we lumber on, tinkering and tarrying, rather than thinking hard and coherently about where we are heading. We have always had the luxury of living in a continent-sized country remote from nation-state threats. Like our rich natural resource endowment, this encourages a certain complacency that in this Indian summer we cannot afford. For the dangers that are now looming are, in their own way, every bit as great as those of the past century. We must prepare ourselves to deal with them, or run the risk of coming to grief in grimly unfamiliar ways. ♦

Dr Paul Monk is a co-founder of Austthink, a Melbourne-based critical thinking research, training and consulting group specialising in complex reasoning and argumentation. Previously he was a senior intelligence officer with the Defence Intelligence Organisation. His forthcoming book, 'Thunder From the Silent Zone', is a sustained critical reflection on the rise of China and what it portends. The paper on which this article is based was originally delivered to a colloquium at the Land Warfare Development Centre at Puckapunyal, and may be found, together with detailed footnotes, at <www.austthink.org/monk/Dangers.htm>.

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Battlefield Digitisation 27–29 April

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Principles of Avionics 04–06 May
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Modern Communications Systems 12–13 May
Introduction to Systems Engineering 16–18 May
Software Project Management 16–18 May
Systems Thinking and Modelling 18–20 May
Systems Engineering Practice 19–20 May
Introduction to Aircraft Certification 25–27 May

JUNE

Requirements Engineering 02–03 June
Introduction to Satellite Communications 08–10 June

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OCTOBER

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Danger on our doorstep:

Organised crime takes hold in PNG

Mark Forbes

The shock of the Japanese advance in World War II graphically demonstrated the strategic significance to Australia of its nearest neighbour. Today a radical, \$A1.1 billion program to restore law and order in Papua New Guinea illustrates the ongoing interdependence of stability in both nations. The Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP), placing Australian officials in key administrative positions, bolstering the judiciary and putting more than 200 Australian police on the beat, is probably Australia's most ambitious Pacific intervention. It is also a recognition of the importance of broader human security and stability concerns in the post-September 11 strategic environment.

Revitalising the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) has been recognised as the first step in ensuring the struggling nation does not become a failed state, thereby exposing Australia to a litany of transnational threats. Official Australian assessments have recognised organised crime in PNG as the most immediate and serious of these threats, with newly established Asian crime gangs targeting key officials, especially in the demoralised and corrupt police hierarchy. Privately the Howard Government admits the scale of the ECP is motivated by the fact that Australia would inevitably be drawn into an overall social-political collapse across the Torres Strait. According to one senior adviser, 'if we don't act now, the place could degenerate over the next five years, and we wouldn't have the capacity to do anything about it'.

With a population of five million, crumbling infrastructure and inhospitable terrain, a full-scale crisis across PNG would severely test Australia's ability to respond. The ADF, for example, simply does not have the personnel to respond to a widespread crisis across PNG and this is the nightmare scenario for Australian contingency planners. Even the evacuation of Australian citizens and those from other countries in times of trouble—which would be our responsibility—would be very difficult if it had to be undertaken from a large number of localities or from a much smaller number of complex ones, such as Port Moresby, Lae and the Highlands towns.

Such matters have been discussed at length during various Australian parliamentary committee inquiries and academic conferences over the last 15 years. In late 1998, for example, the then Australian Defence Studies Centre

at ADFA in conjunction with the AFP, the PNG National Research Institute and ANU's State, Society and Governance in Melanesia project, convened a major conference on crime and the bilateral PNG-Australia relationship. For the last decade the Australia Defence Association, in which experienced 'old PNG hands' have long been influential, has regularly counselled that relying primarily on financial assistance to PNG was not tackling the steepening decline in governance standards and law order across the country, and was probably worsening it. Last year, an Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) report into PNG's stability warned a weakened PNG could allow drug, people and arms smuggling into Australia. 'There is evidence that the presence of transnational criminal groups in PNG is growing, taking advantage of PNG's weak immigration controls and poor policing. The bigger transnational crime becomes, the more government itself might be corrupted and undermined,' ASPI noted.

Recent inquiries over several weeks in Port Moresby indicate that this scenario has already arrived. There is clear evidence of links between 16 of PNG's most senior police and Asian criminals involved in people smuggling, money laundering, prostitution, illegal gambling, fraud and theft. Several of these police are paid by front companies controlled by major crime figures. A secret RPNGC investigation into, 'Corruption and Illegal Activities Within the Police Force', names senior officers, in the ranks of inspector to commissioner, allegedly involved with Asian crime figures. Australian authorities fear that PNG's police are so compromised that the country could be used as a staging post to traffic people into Australia.

Organised crime has deeply established itself in the past five years, taking advantage of corruption and lax law enforcement. Senior PNG police confirm such organisations have begun recruiting Port Moresby's notorious raskol gangs—heavily armed, disaffected young men—to commit armed robberies, thefts and assaults. From the ramshackle bars housing poker machine-like horse racing machines at ten cents a pop to Port Moresby's private casinos, gambling's pulse of cash is the lifeblood of organised crime syndicates. Nat Koleala, chairman of the PNG National Gaming Board, says he has a \$700,000 price on his head for demanding crackdowns on the Asian syndicates. The board has already seized hundreds of the

horse-racing machines, but more than 1000 are believed to be still in use.

Koleala calculates that the machines are earning the syndicates \$20 million a year. 'This is well-organised crime. Before this, crime in PNG did not have sponsors; now it has sponsors.' He says it is obvious police are compromised by the syndicates. 'It is a serious problem. We have the company records of three horse-racing machine operators; they are staffed by relatives and wives of senior policemen.' He has 'no doubt' that the ultimate destination of the crime bosses, and the thousands of illegal migrants they have smuggled in to PNG, is Australia. 'They are here for a rest and fattening period, they want PNG passports and want to pay their way into Australia. I know I may be killed, but I owe it to my country to speak out.' Koleala says he was interviewed by an Australian officer about the gangs in January, and said it was essential Australians helped pursue them. 'If they don't do it, then this whole law and order program is a waste of time.'

Barry Turner, commander of the Australian police in PNG, agrees 'there is a significant, growing problem with Asian organised crime entities in Port Moresby and PNG'. He says his officers are preparing to crack down on the gangs and, with PNG police, have begun raiding Moresby's more notorious nightspots to send a message to crime bosses. 'We are working together to try and address these issues, we have bolstered the transnational crime team and will be putting extra staff into internal affairs.' The expansion of transnational crime groups is a concern not just for PNG and Australia, but the whole region, Turner says. 'It could hit anywhere, but PNG is a vulnerable new country. We look through Australian eyes, but its to the benefit of us all to address these regional transnational crime problems.'

PNG Police Minister Bire Kimisopa says he is fearful of the growth in the Asian gangs. 'The Chinese mafia have bought off officials throughout the system', he says. 'They are operating illegal businesses, they are siphoning money out, corrupting government officials, colluding with police and making attempts to kill officials as well.' According to Kimisopa, several officials who refused to cooperate with the gangs had been threatened with murder. The syndicates have also recruited Port Moresby's raskol gangs to rob and intimidate, loot containers on the wharves and commit armed robberies across the city. Kimisopa also noted a secret investigation he ordered 'implicates a number of senior policemen; it goes right to the top. In all fairness they should have rights to rebut, these are allegations, but they are credible.'

Kimisopa refuses to discuss details as they are subject to ongoing investigations, however, the closely guarded report of the corruption investigation includes allegations that one of PNG's most senior officers received \$10,000 from an Asian business figure and has personally issued firearms licences in breach of the current moratorium on

arms sales and licences. 'As a result a number of firearms were confiscated by Southern Division detectives ... this investigation, however, was suppressed', the report states.

It also details how the force's legal officer, Chief Superintendent Sam Bonner, attempted to pervert the course of justice by interfering with an investigation into illegal horse-racing machines last year at a venue owned by alleged crime figure Albert Khoo. Sing Enterprises, a company run by Khoo, has at least four senior police on its payroll. Company searches reveal Irene Kei, wife of chief inspector Mens Kei, is a director and shareholder of Sing Enterprises. Bonner rushed to Jackson international airport earlier this year to try to block the deportation of six illegal Asian migrants. The men were involved with the Econ Trading company, a key financier and organiser of people smuggling and illegal gaming. At least two other senior officers are on Econ's payroll. Another chief superintendent has been living in a unit provided rent free by one of the operators of the horse-racing machines.

A recent raid on a gambling den in PNG's second largest city, Lae, embarrassed RPNGC Deputy Commissioner Tom Kulunga. He owns the house where horse-racing machines were operating and stored. To the surprise of some colleagues, he has been cleared by Commissioner Sam Inguba after an internal inquiry. Kulunga stated he did not know his tenants were operating a gambling den and he did not see the machines when he visited the house last August.

'The over-riding question for Australia remains what may be required next if the governance and law and order problems in PNG continue to deteriorate, effectively undermining the state.'

Well-placed sources have told of an assistant commissioner associated with at

least one Asian crime syndicate but not included in a police report arising from the continuing corruption probe. This senior police officer has intervened to disrupt investigations into organised crime figures twice over the last year. The police report also states that a superintendent was bribed to provide a police boat to Indonesian smugglers to transport marijuana and vanilla into Indonesia. 'As a result, Sergeant Bruno Kaib of Wewak prosecutions section and others were caught by Indonesian police and are currently imprisoned in Indonesia,' the report says.

People smuggling is a growing concern. Foreign Minister Sir Rabbie Namaliu estimates 10,000 illegal immigrants have been smuggled into PNG, mostly ethnic Chinese. Once in PNG, many try to buy citizenship before seeking to migrate to Australia. In June, only a last-minute intervention from Sir Rabbie halted the granting of citizenship to Lin Wan Xin, notorious locally as a 'snakehead' (people smuggler). He boasted character references from the previous deputy prime minister, Allan Marat, and several senior officials. Lin is understood to have relocated to the island of Daru, a short speed-boat ride from Australia.

Milne Bay Province Governor Tim Neville caused uproar in Parliament last November by naming the director-general of immigration, the director of foreign affairs operations and a member of the Prime Minister's National Security Advisory Committee for 'deporting' two principals of Econ

Trading out of PNG before charges could be laid against them. One of the men said he had spent tens of thousands of dollars on school fees for the officials' children. Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare insisted he did not sanction the officials' actions saying the pair were ostensibly deported to 'isolate them from the rest of the known operators and to ensure they are not using their contacts in the community, including some government officials, to frustrate the ongoing investigation'.

Econ Trading continues to operate in PNG and one of the deportees is rumoured to have since slipped back into the country. Police Minister Kimisopa is frustrated at the overall lack of action, complaining that even though he has directed Commissioner Inguba to dismiss two senior officers due to their associations with Asian syndicates, the directive has not been acted on. Kimisopa believes the growing number of illegal migrants from China's Fujian province and Malaysia are using PNG to make a fast buck and in the process corrupting virtually every official, including the PNG police. '... people in responsible positions need to stand up. Their silence can only mean they are condoning illegal activity or support what is going on.'

Hugh White, now the Professor of Strategic Studies at the ANU, who co-authored ASPI's recent PNG report, says revelations of the influence of organised crime over the police in PNG are 'shocking, but not surprising'. 'It raises the risk of transnational crime in PNG being a conduit into Australia for a range of activities, including people smuggling and drug trafficking. It shows how deep the problems are and how hard it will be for Australian police to make a real difference, it will require a sustained effort.'

The over-riding question for Australia remains what may be required next if the governance and law and order problems in PNG continue to deteriorate, effectively undermining the state. In PNG, many of the honest politicians, officials and police also see the ECP as the last chance to turn things around before a new generation of crooks and carpetbaggers is propagated by dysfunctional systems and a corrupting political and social culture. Just how prepared they, and the Australian police, are prepared to undertake a clean out that should extend to the top will become clear over the coming months. ♦

ECP backgrounder

The \$A1.1 billion five-year plan to help restore law and order in Papua New Guinea is Australia's most expensive and ambitious overseas aid initiative. Australian police began patrols in Port Moresby in December 2004.

One hundred Australian police are on active duty in Port Moresby, helping the RPNGC patrol crime hot spots, and more will be posted to other areas. Another 18 police are on the island of Bougainville.

In all, 210 police will join the program to bolster the capacity of their PNG colleagues—in a police force acknowledged as dysfunctional and riddled with corruption. Another 36 Australian public servants will be placed in key administrative positions and 18 legal specialists will join PNG's judiciary and public prosecution system.

Despite controversy about the supposed insult to PNG's sovereignty in granting Australian police a degree of legal immunity, the program has been widely welcomed by a population weary of increasingly violent crime. However, a constitutional challenge against the immunity by a provincial governor has cast a shadow over the program's future.


Mark Forbes is the foreign affairs and defence correspondent for the 'Age'.

The Definitive History

Based on extensive research in Australia and Japan, and including previously unpublished documents, *Kokoda* intimately relates the stories of ordinary soldiers in 'the world's worst killing field'. Paul Ham captures the spirits of those soldiers and commanders on both sides who clashed in this war of exceptional savagery, and tells of the brave souls who risked and often made the ultimate sacrifice.

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Matching performance to promise:

Rebuilding the army reserve

Warren Glenny

The Army Reserve has long contributed vital capabilities to the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The contribution of the army's part-time component has changed over time and will continue to do so but there is still a vital and fundamental role for the Army Reserve. This fundamental fact was recently emphasised by the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, in an article in the October 2004 edition of the *Australian Army Journal*. General Leahy acknowledged that the collective and individual contribution by reservists to the modern ADF is by no means fully developed and that more must be done to bring the individuals and force elements involved to the optimum point of 'relevance and readiness'. In reaching this unexceptional end point, General Leahy attempted to describe the magnitude of the task involved but his article fell short on specifics—with the discussion primarily involving a circumnavigation of perceived inadequacies and a survey of the legislation covering workplace protection for reservists first promised in 1983 (but not delivered until 2000).

Greater effort needs to be applied, and applied urgently, to the real development of capabilities maintained by the Army's reservists. This effort must become a top priority if ever the full potential of the Army Reserve is to be realised and its benefits to the defence of the nation maximised. If the ADF is really serious about bringing the Army Reserve to the standards necessary to meet the force allocation, reinforcement and rotation tasks required of the overall land force by the government, then positive and speedy action is needed. Words are not enough and performance must match promise. Action is needed now and must not be left as a legacy for the next Chief of Army who will presumably be appointed in July. Unless a start is made now, it is unlikely that there will be a reserve component sufficient to fill the inevitable gaps in the full-time ranks when the need arises in future crises.

It is interesting to note the comparative reliance placed upon reserves by the United States of America. One third of all US forces presently deployed in Iraq are reservists. There are 1.2 million reservists in the US defence forces representing approximately 46 per cent of the total. The cost of the reserve forces represents about 8 per cent of the US defence budget.

This article concentrates on the situation and problems of the Army Reserve but much of it, and many of the recommendations as to action required, also apply to the reserve components of the RAN and RAAF.

Balancing roles and motivation

Extant Australian government policy, such as the *Defence 2000* white paper, requires that the ADF maintain the capability to sustain a brigade on operations for extended periods and, at the same time, maintain at least a battalion group ready for deployment. Once you take the force rotation aspects of sustainment into account the ADF cannot meet this obligation without a strong, well-trained and properly equipped reserve component. Despite this undeniable fact, however, the strength of the Active Reserve component of the land force has been allowed to decline dramatically over the past five years.

Following the recruiting collapse in 1998, the civilian recruitment contractor now handling such matters has been unable to meet ADF recruiting targets and unit strengths have continued to fall, often precipitously. The failures and inflexibility of the civilian recruiting contractor are well known and have been articulated to various parliamentary and official inquiries. A full return to unit-based recruiting for the Army Reserve, supported by specific-to-unit local advertising, is critical. Reservists are 'of and from their communities'. They generally know of, and join, local units and are not attracted by remote, even if seen, national advertising. A return to unit-based recruiting is the obvious commonsense solution and would not mean any diminution of common quality standards, such as aptitude, health and security checks.

In addition to the recruiting collapse, and despite the best efforts of some, reservist access to training courses (now mandated to be conducted by regular Army schools), including recruit courses, has been restricted. Courses have frequently been cancelled or postponed at short notice with complete disregard for the adverse effect such action has upon the employment, training and family circumstances of the reservist (and potential reservist). Consequently, the effectiveness of the Army Reserve has been significantly reduced and the need for restorative action is now critical.

Overseas deployments from East Timor onwards have demanded substantial support from a resource-starved Army Reserve. As a result of outdated conditions of service, inadequate training, a seriously depleted cadre, and an often less than positive government attitude, the Army Reserve has been left seriously short of adequately trained personnel. Given the lack of support to reserve units, it is a wonder that their attrition rate is not even higher. Being 'twice the citizen' involves a part-time occupation not an extra-curricular or second interest. Reserve duty is not lightly undertaken by the professional reservist. The Defence bureaucracy, both uniformed and non-uniformed, must recognise that the reservist is a volunteer who is not looking necessarily for a full-time military career but serves because he or she wants to. Consequently, reservists will not and should not tolerate a second-class status, nor should they be offered one, just because their military service is part time.

Deteriorating conditions of service

Conditions of service for reservists fall well short of what could be considered reasonable when compared with their full-time counterparts and with general labour market forces and norms. This assessment takes full account of the tax-free status of reservist pay. Reservist remuneration is so low that it is far from equalised even when the benefit of tax-free pay is fully recognised (see table p. 29). The basis upon which reserve conditions are calculated deserves public re-examination. Elements such as superannuation (now common for part-time workers elsewhere), dental and medical care, Service allowance, long-service entitlements, increments for part-time service and the like must be considered for inclusion in a total reservist remuneration package. The ADF's reserve component has to be made competitive, and attractive, in seeking to enlist and retain service from young people who are exposed to a multiplicity of competing choices as to how to spend their available and often precious free time.

The low priority afforded the Army Reserve over many years has resulted in neglect and this has severely impacted on its effectiveness. Falling strength, low morale, inadequate and out-of-date equipment, and an inflexible training regime, have combined to reduce the Army Reserve to a force that does not have the capabilities needed and that are expected of it. From long experience we know the Army Reserve must not be subject, yet again, to an inquiry that recognises conspicuous shortcomings but is then accompanied by political and military indolence about correcting them. Past experience shows this just leads to regression in competencies. The Army Reserve also relies much more than the regular component upon informal networks and community links. This vital social infrastructure is easily disrupted and can only be restored with protracted and painstaking effort. To enable the Army Reserve to deliver the capabilities implicit in its task list, it must be nurtured, encouraged and supported with earnest, non-partisan and genuinely purposeful national attention.

To begin to shape the Army Reserve so that it is able to shoulder a fair share of responsibility for Australian Defence Force tasks, matters of recruiting and training, equipment, funding, conditions of service and new roles and tasks must be urgently addressed.

Training

Reservists expect that training will be realistic, demanding, challenging and progressive. They also expect that achievement of individual competencies will be recognised and, where appropriate, rewarded. In addition, their training should be delivered at a time, a place and in a manner that will not cause unnecessary hardship or inconvenience to their other life as a citizen. The present requirement of a six-week continuous course for Initial Employment Training has had the twin effects of encouraging students and the unemployed who tend to leave the service when their circumstances change, while discouraging employed members of the community who are the very recruits most likely to continue to serve over an extended period.


One of the most far-reaching consequences of the present recruiting policy is that by denying the broad cross-section of the available community access to military service, the reserve components, and consequently the ADF as a whole, are cut off from the optimum range of civilian skills and experience. Modern methods are available to enable training to be delivered over time in modules, and via distance-learning techniques and simulation. Unless higher priority financial or operational considerations apply, face-to-face contact should be limited to training that can only be delivered in that way. Army training methods must be rigorously examined to ensure that the reservist member has both individual and collective training provided in a manner that is comprehensive and efficient.

Adequate recognition should be given to the reservist's civilian qualifications, skills, and experience so that individual and collective capabilities maintained in the reserve component are extended and enhanced. In particular, the pervasive and critical shortage of Non-Commissioned and junior Commissioned Officers in the reserve component must be addressed by the establishment of accelerated promotion training streams. Failure to rectify this ongoing shortage of instructional capacity at unit level will continue to adversely impact training within Reserve units.

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of 11,725 Army reservists over a five-year period—a number equivalent to 46 per cent of the Regular Army strength as at 30 June 2003. Not surprisingly, Active Army Reserve strength fell by 24 per cent over the 1998–2003 period. This result was predicted in expert research prior to CIT’s introduction but the Army chose to ignore the warning.



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The problem with this recruit-training concept is not the course standard but in the Army-created difficulty confronting potential recruits, especially the difficulty in obtaining 45 days continuous leave from employers or academic institutions. The Army has responded to this situation by accepting that individual recruits can now elect to complete their initial training in two separate 3-week or three separate 2-week modules while at the same time stressing the importance of completing the course in one 45-day continuous period wherever possible. Consequently, few if any recruits are accepted to complete recruit training in two or more separate periods and thus many potential recruits are deterred and lost.

Furthermore, CIT is conducted in a remote location, away from the recruit’s unit, home town and district, and is generally undertaken without any involvement of unit staff with links to the recruit’s locality. By definition, a reservist’s roots in his or her local community are usually stronger than for their regular compatriots and reserve units collectively often have very strong links to their locality, its people and their history. Managed well, such bonds

maximise personnel retention, especially in the early days of reserve service, where the recruit undergoes new and strange experiences and where continuity and mateship can be important. A particular problem with CIT for reservists in a remote locality is that no bond can be established with the reservist’s unit. The vital introduction to the *esprit de corps* that nurtures continued reserve service is at best delayed, and too often not established sufficiently and early enough to bolster retention.

Finally, the Army’s capacity to meet the total recruit training commitment over the summer months, when both regular and reservist recruit numbers peak, is clearly insufficient. Course panels are frequently full over the preferred periods when many businesses prefer their staff to take holidays and when high schools and tertiary institutions have their longest breaks. This results in a reservist recruit’s attendance being postponed to later courses, often at short notice, and at more inconvenient times of the year for employers or educational institutions. Recruits unable to obtain further leave and are frequently then lost. It is of fundamental importance that recruits are able to attend the course of their choice. The problem has even spilled over into officer training (for reservist lieutenants) resulting in the cancellation of important reserve courses at the Royal Military College in 2003–4.

The disastrous impact of CIT on the strength of the Army Reserve demands urgent action. The Active Army Reserve is now far too small to provide the personnel required to the total land force. It is noticeably small when compared with the reserve components maintained by comparable countries such as the UK and Canada.

Directions for future training

Reserve recruits should be able to complete their recruit training in a phased program of regional and national modules conducted over a maximum period of two years. The delivery of training by Army Reserve unit instructors (assisted by Army Recruit Training Centre (ARTC) staff where appropriate) has worked very successfully in the past and offers an efficient training system that falls within the ‘mobile training teams’ model described by the Army as an acceptable concept.

While a new recruit training regime is imperative, the opportunity for reservist recruits to undertake the 45-day continuous course can and should be preserved. However, the new entry stream would ensure that Army Reserve staff from the reservist’s unit are involved with the recruit at least in the first phase of training, just as they should be involved during the recruiting and induction process.

The RAAF presently conduct recruit training on such a phased basis, with preliminary training undertaken regionally, and the final three weeks continuous training undertaken centrally at RAAF Edinburgh. Recruit training is completed within two years of enlistment. Similarly, Army Reserve officer and non-commissioned officer training is conducted regionally by staff from regular component training detachments

Matching performance to promise:

Rebuilding the army reserve

Warren Glenny

The Army Reserve has long contributed vital capabilities to the Australian Defence Force (ADF). The contribution of the army's part-time component has changed over time and will continue to do so but there is still a vital and fundamental role for the Army Reserve. This fundamental fact was recently emphasised by the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, in an article in the October 2004 edition of the *Australian Army Journal*. General Leahy acknowledged that the collective and individual contribution by reservists to the modern ADF is by no means fully developed and that more must be done to bring the individuals and force elements involved to the optimum point of 'relevance and readiness'. In reaching this unexceptional end point, General Leahy attempted to describe the magnitude of the task involved but his article fell short on specifics—with the discussion primarily involving a circumnavigation of perceived inadequacies and a survey of the legislation covering workplace protection for reservists first promised in 1983 (but not delivered until 2000).

Greater effort needs to be applied, and applied urgently, to the real development of capabilities maintained by the Army's reservists. This effort must become a top priority if ever the full potential of the Army Reserve is to be realised and its benefits to the defence of the nation maximised. If the ADF is really serious about bringing the Army Reserve to the standards necessary to meet the force allocation, reinforcement and rotation tasks required of the overall land force by the government, then positive and speedy action is needed. Words are not enough and performance must match promise. Action is needed now and must not be left as a legacy for the next Chief of Army who will presumably be appointed in July. Unless a start is made now, it is unlikely that there will be a reserve component sufficient to fill the inevitable gaps in the full-time ranks when the need arises in future crises.

It is interesting to note the comparative reliance placed upon reserves by the United States of America. One third of all US forces presently deployed in Iraq are reservists. There are 1.2 million reservists in the US defence forces representing approximately 46 per cent of the total. The cost of the reserve forces represents about 8 per cent of the US defence budget.

This article concentrates on the situation and problems of the Army Reserve but much of it, and many of the recommendations as to action required, also apply to the reserve components of the RAN and RAAF.

Balancing roles and motivation

Extant Australian government policy, such as the *Defence 2000* white paper, requires that the ADF maintain the capability to sustain a brigade on operations for extended periods and, at the same time, maintain at least a battalion group ready for deployment. Once you take the force rotation aspects of sustainment into account the ADF cannot meet this obligation without a strong, well-trained and properly equipped reserve component. Despite this undeniable fact, however, the strength of the Active Reserve component of the land force has been allowed to decline dramatically over the past five years.

Following the recruiting collapse in 1998, the civilian recruitment contractor now handling such matters has been unable to meet ADF recruiting targets and unit strengths have continued to fall, often precipitously. The failures and inflexibility of the civilian recruiting contractor are well known and have been articulated to various parliamentary and official inquiries. A full return to unit-based recruiting for the Army Reserve, supported by specific-to-unit local advertising, is critical. Reservists are 'of and from their communities'. They generally know of, and join, local units and are not attracted by remote, even if seen, national advertising. A return to unit-based recruiting is the obvious commonsense solution and would not mean any diminution of common quality standards, such as aptitude, health and security checks.

In addition to the recruiting collapse, and despite the best efforts of some, reservist access to training courses (now mandated to be conducted by regular Army schools), including recruit courses, has been restricted. Courses have frequently been cancelled or postponed at short notice with complete disregard for the adverse effect such action has upon the employment, training and family circumstances of the reservist (and potential reservist). Consequently, the effectiveness of the Army Reserve has been significantly reduced and the need for restorative action is now critical.

Overseas deployments from East Timor onwards have demanded substantial support from a resource-starved Army Reserve. As a result of outdated conditions of service, inadequate training, a seriously depleted cadre, and an often less than positive government attitude, the Army Reserve has been left seriously short of adequately trained personnel. Given the lack of support to reserve units, it is a wonder that their attrition rate is not even higher. Being 'twice the citizen' involves a part-time occupation not an extra-curricular or second interest. Reserve duty is not lightly undertaken by the professional reservist. The Defence bureaucracy, both uniformed and non-uniformed, must recognise that the reservist is a volunteer who is not looking necessarily for a full-time military career but serves because he or she wants to. Consequently, reservists will not and should not tolerate a second-class status, nor should they be offered one, just because their military service is part time.

Deteriorating conditions of service

Conditions of service for reservists fall well short of what could be considered reasonable when compared with their full-time counterparts and with general labour market forces and norms. This assessment takes full account of the tax-free status of reservist pay. Reservist remuneration is so low that it is far from equalised even when the benefit of tax-free pay is fully recognised (see table p. 29). The basis upon which reserve conditions are calculated deserves public re-examination. Elements such as superannuation (now common for part-time workers elsewhere), dental and medical care, Service allowance, long-service entitlements, increments for part-time service and the like must be considered for inclusion in a total reservist remuneration package. The ADF's reserve component has to be made competitive, and attractive, in seeking to enlist and retain service from young people who are exposed to a multiplicity of competing choices as to how to spend their available and often precious free time.

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
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Equipment

In his article, the Chief of Army called upon the Army Reserve to be ready to contribute to initial deployment forces, required often at very short notice. This means such reservists need to be trained and equipped to a similar standard as the regular troops first deployed. How this can be achieved with Army Reserve units training on equipment passed to them only when regular units are re-equipped with updated or new models? This shortcoming will be increasingly apparent in the 'hardened and networked' Army as equipment becomes more sophisticated and requires more training for users to become proficient in its use. For too long the needs of Army Reserve units for up-to-date equipment have been regarded as low priority. Cost over-runs in equipment purchases (both new equipment and upgrades) have resulted in acquisition programmes being curtailed and equipment allocations to reserve units being too often limited or lost. Collective and individual interoperability between regular and reserve components is automatically limited by such policies, and a key capability of the Army Reserve in the area of relevance and readiness severely and adversely affected.

The recent M113 A1 Armoured Personnel Carrier upgrade project is a case in point. The bids for this project included a number of upgraded vehicles sufficient to equip regular units and a supplement for training purposes that would allow reserve units to be at least familiarised with the updated features of the vehicle. As is not uncommon, however, the cost per vehicle upgraded was underestimated and the number of vehicles upgrades reduced to make the overall cost meet the funds allocated. The inevitable followed with the training supplement being removed and with it the issue to the Army Reserve of any upgraded armoured vehicles. The purchase of the new Abrams tanks also sees the demise of the sole Army Reserve tank squadron.

Such decisions were made without any input or involvement from the part of the ADF most affected. No reservist representation exists at the level of the Defence Capability and Investment Committee or the Army Capability Management Committee. These are obvious and serious organisational omissions bearing on important and far-reaching decisions as to the capability of the reserve component. This case history is by no means isolated. Variations with the same devastating results for the Army Reserve have occurred persistently over many years.

Funding

Historically, funding for the Army Reserve has generally not been defined or even identified within the overall Defence budget. It has been a source of wry observation that prior to the end of each financial year, training days are severely restricted or funds for some other budget account such as travel and accommodation have run out. However, as soon as the date is passed when any practical remedial action can be taken, available funds are mysteriously found. This circumstance has been well known at

organisational levels where funding can be diverted, and there has been a recurring temptation to misuse funds intended for the training of reservists to cover project cost overruns.

Such disregard for the integrity of funding allocated for reservist training must not continue. Under-spending of Army Reserve training day allocations will remain a feature as long as Army Reserve numbers continue to fall, unless proper 'commercial quality' fiscal management is instituted. Funding for the reserve component should be identified and quarantined within the Defence budget and spent only on the training of reservists. Budget management of such funds should be placed under the command of reservists to ensure that they are fully utilised in the delivery of a well trained, properly funded and accountable Army Reserve in accordance with the dictates of government policy.

Conditions of service

How the conditions of service for reservists are structured has been unaltered for many years. This process has also proved quite unresponsive to fundamental changes in the role and nature of the reserve component. In particular, insufficient recognition is given to an individual's achievement of recognised competencies and to their individual level of readiness. A 2001 Retention Survey clearly shows the following areas and weights of dissatisfaction amongst reservists:

- lack of access to full medical and dental services (50 per cent)
- low pay (47.4 per cent)
- lack of retention incentives (43.8 per cent)
- inequitable allowances (43.1 per cent)
- no Defence-sponsored superannuation (36.6 per cent)
- inadequate financial support for fitness activities/equipment (26.1 per cent).

None of these concerns have really been addressed and the profound effect this lack of action has had upon reservists is plain to see in any examination of current unit strengths. Well-directed conditions of service are fundamental in promoting retention and in supporting the enhancement of the reserve component.

Reserve salaries. Reserve salaries are presently calculated using the following methodology:

- 85 per cent of the equivalent annual salary in the regular component (90 per cent for second lieutenant to major)
- divide by 365 (ignoring leave benefits, sick leave, weekend leave, etc.)
- reserve pay is tax free.

The following table compares the salaries of full-time and part-time Army personnel and shows the salary disadvantage suffered by the reservist as a percentage.

A more rational approach and alternative methodology for the determination of Reserve salaries would be:

- 100 per cent of the equivalent annual salary for a full-time member
- divide by 225 (reflecting the normal working days in a year and disregarding the entitlement to 10 days annual sick leave)
- reserve pay taxable.

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AFTER-TAX SALARY COMPARISON—OTHER RANKS

| | PTE | LCPL | CPL | SGT | WO2 |
|--------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Permanent Salary (1) | \$32,156 | \$33,434 | \$36,385 | \$41,779 | \$49,297 |
| Less Tax (2) | \$6,344 | \$6,760 | \$7,696 | \$9,360 | \$11,752 |
| Permanent Net Salary (3) | \$25,812 | \$26,694 | \$28,689 | \$32,419 | \$37,545 |
| Permanent Net Salary ÷ 225 (4) | \$114.72 | \$118.55 | \$127.50 | \$144.08 | \$166.87 |
| Reserve daily (5) | \$74.88 | \$77.86 | \$84.73 | \$97.29 | \$114.80 |
| Reserve / Permanent (6) | 65% | 66% | 66% | 68% | 69% |

AFTER-TAX SALARY COMPARISON—OFFICERS

| | 2LT | LT | CAPT | MAJ | LTCOL | COL | BRIG |
|--------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|-----------|
| Permanent Salary (1) | \$39,288 | \$41,843 | \$49,737 | \$62,692 | \$88,104 | \$103,097 | \$118,542 |
| Less Tax (2) | \$8,580 | \$9,412 | \$11,908 | \$16,536 | \$28,475 | \$35,763 | \$43,253 |
| Permanent Net Salary (3) | \$30,708 | \$32,431 | \$37,829 | \$46,156 | \$59,629 | \$67,334 | \$75,289 |
| Permanent Net Salary ÷ 225 (4) | \$136.48 | \$144.14 | \$168.12 | \$205.14 | \$265.02 | \$299.26 | \$334.62 |
| Reserve daily (5) | \$96.87 | \$103.17 | \$122.64 | \$154.58 | \$205.17 | \$240.09 | \$276.06 |
| Reserve / Permanent (6) | 71% | 72% | 73% | 75% | 77% | 80% | 82% |

(1) Pay rates as at 04 November 2004 disregarding Service allowance, superannuation and recreational and long-service leave entitlements.

(2) Current taxation rates with tax-free threshold and leave loading, and disregarding benefit of deductibility of work-related expenses.

(3) After allowance for taxation.

(4) 225 dividend represents a year of 5-day working weeks less public holidays.

(5) Tax-free pay rate.

(6) Rounded to nearest whole percentage.

While a Reservist on the top marginal tax rate may be slightly advantaged under the present method, all other reservists are detrimentally affected—most notably those at lower pay levels and marginal tax rates. This circumstance renders reservist service less attractive to many categories of male and female employees as well as students. In addition, no recognition is currently given to the essentially casual nature of reservist service. The most marked impact of the existing salary arrangements is on recruitment, and on the retention of junior non-commissioned officers and base-level reservists.

Reform of reservist salary rates would also provide stronger encouragement to members of the regular component to transfer to the Active Reserve on completion of their full-time service. These trained and valuable soldiers should not (as now) be subject to a significant reduction in salary level on transfer to equivalent duties in the Active Reserve.

Long service, annual and sick leave. Reservists are currently entitled to long service leave but inadequate records result in reservists being unaware of this and consequently in many not taking up their entitlements. A functioning long service leave system for reservists is urgently required. Annual and sick leave entitlements are now included in virtually all classes of civilian employment. If these allowances are not to be a part of the remuneration package for defence force reservists then due allowance for this significant exclusion should be made.

Allowances. Many allowances are rightly paid to both full-time and part-time ADF personnel. Such allowances include Higher Duties, Clearance Diving, Flying, Paratrooper, Seagoing, Special Action Forces, Submarine,

Field, Separation, and Hard Lying. However, when allowances are paid to reservists their tax-free environment means they receive a larger sum than their full-time counterpart whose pay is subject to tax. This anomaly is not fair and supports the general proposition that the pay structure for reservists should be reformed.

Superannuation. The Military Superannuation Benefits Scheme (MSBS) mandates a five per cent member contribution, and an employer contribution consistent with the superannuation guarantee employer levy, but neither currently applies to reservists. There is every reason why the superannuation guarantee legislation should be applied to defence-force reservists just as it now is to all other part-time employees in Australian society.

Trainees' dependant allowance. This allowance, presently available only to full-time trainees who are supporting a dependant, should be extended to reservists who are similarly placed during a period of recruit or induction training. There is absolutely no reason for any distinction in eligibility between full-time and part-time personnel in this regard.

Access to medical and dental services. Full-time ADF personnel are justifiably provided with free medical and dental treatment to maximise their availability for deployment at short notice and for potentially long periods where such support may be minimal. Members of the ADF High Readiness Reserve are also required to be similarly available and could be similarly deployed. There is no justification for commensurate free medical and dental treatment to be denied to reservists required to be on high rates of readiness.

High readiness reserve bonus. When the high readiness reserve bonus was originally introduced the recommended level was \$1500. It is presently paid at the considerably lower level of \$600 on the completion of a minimum service obligation of 50 days per year. This incentive should be kept under constant review for adequacy and an ongoing 'length of service' survey established in the high readiness reserve (including the counter-terrorism support Reserve Response Forces) to ensure that all members complete a minimum of five years service.

Attendance allowance. Many Reservists travel considerable distances to attend training. Recompense for this expense should be re-introduced so that reservists, particularly in regional areas, are not disadvantaged by their willingness to serve.

Competency, completion and retention bonuses. A high retention rate of trained reservists is essential if the Army Reserve is to achieve the contribution to ADF capability required by the Chief of Army. A carefully implemented and adequately resourced system of competency, completion and retention bonuses would elevate retention levels. This would reduce the considerable cost involved in constantly training new recruits enlisted to replace departing trained members. Bonus rewards for the achievement of competency milestones, such as initial employment training and first appointment training, could also be considered in this regard.

Compensation. A comprehensive military rehabilitation and compensation system is essential for reservists as it is for all ADF members. Reservists must receive compensation for injury, disease or death caused by defence force service and this must reflect due recognition of impacts on military and civilian employment. The new *Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004* makes specific provision for the calculation of the lost earning capacity of reservists having regard to both military and civil earnings and is to be commended. The treatment of reservists and their families under this legislation, however, must be closely monitored for equality.

Promised reserve capabilities

Finally, following lessons learnt from the ADF's commitment to East Timor in 1999, an array of new capabilities was heralded as being embedded in the defence force's reserve component. As but one example, is the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) unit established in Brisbane fully equipped, viable and functional? If so, why was it not committed to the Solomon Islands when the need arose? What has become of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle delivery unit, reinforcement holding unit, and the military police, terminal operations, civil affairs, intelligence, linguist, and logistic capabilities considered for the Army Reserve following the East Timor deployment?

Performance has not matched promise and these much heralded, publicised and important new capabilities have not been delivered. Such disappointments do nothing to enhance effectiveness, morale and retention in the Army Reserve, particularly when the significant skills base required, and the

part-time nature with which it is required, make such specialist units a natural and valuable reservist contribution to the ADF. In many cases too these are joint and not just land force capabilities.

Action this day needed

The attention at last being paid to the ADF's reserve components is positive even if the reason for it is the inevitable realisation by the ADF that the government's task list cannot be met without significant contributions from the reserve component. These vital elements of the ADF must now attract the focus they have desperately needed for many years. Ever-increasing demands upon the ADF mean that more and more is going to be expected of the reservists serving throughout its ranks. The capability of the reserve elements of the force must be elevated in strength, in competency and in availability if the prospect of the ADF faltering under commitment overload is to be avoided.

The Army Reserve is the largest of the ADF's reserve components and the one most integrated with the wider Australian community on a day-to-day basis. It remains, as always, available for duty and committed to backing up the full-time component and serving the nation as and when needed. Old prejudices on both sides of the regular versus reserve debates must be put aside. The earnest, genuine endeavour and the considerable intellectual capacity of the ADF needs to be harnessed behind an initiative to bring our part-time forces to the level of training and manning that will enable the capability contribution to which they aspire. This will not happen without effort. Cooperation from both full-time and part-time members of the ADF is essential if the welding of both elements into a cohesive total force is to be achieved.

A good beginning would be urgent action on the following steps:

- Army Reserve recruiting be unit-based not contracted out.
- Prospective Army Reserve recruits complete their recruit training over a period of two years through a mix of centrally and regionally conducted modules that best suit their civil employment circumstances, personal education program and availability throughout each year.
- The Army Reserve be formally and directly represented at all levels of equipment acquisition so capabilities mainly or partially supplied by reservist members and units are not diminished by ill-informed or poorly considered decisions.
- Reserve component budgets be quarantined.
- Conditions of service for reservist personnel be completely overhauled. While the improvements recommended above will involve a considerable cost burden, this will be more than offset over time by the compensating savings in training costs through improved retention.
- The capabilities to be maintained by reservist personnel promised over recent years be raised and equipped to full strength. ♦

Major General Warren Glenn, AO, RFD, ED, (Retd) served with the Army Reserve 1950–1994, including command of the 3rd Division 1990–91 and the 2nd Division 1991–94. He is the national president of the Defence Reserves Association.

Going down to the sea

in big enough ships

Billy Ruffian

Oh the irony

One of the great ironies about strategic debate in Australia is that the modern Australian Defence Force (ADF) largely now argues instinctively from a joint perspective whereas much of the civilian defence bureaucracy, most academics, much of defence industry and many journalists are still often bogged down in the stove-piped, operating environment-based thinking that just assumes the Navy, Army and Air Force are only loosely related entities. This type of narrow thinking often addresses equipment procurement issues only from separate or loosely connected Navy, Army and Air Force perspectives, rather than the integrated models, perspectives and stances adopted by the modern ADF.

Recent criticism of the longstanding plan to finally re-equip the Navy with destroyers capable of providing an air defence umbrella for a deployed force—maritime, land or joint—has again highlighted this unfortunate trend. The great bulk of this criticism has centred on trying to argue the relative values and costs of capabilities based on one or other of the Services alone, rather than making a case for an integrated joint-Service and effects-based approach involving capabilities provided by two or all three Services.

A related aspect is that after a long period when advice from the government's professional military advisers was often sidelined, or not given appropriate weighting, by the public service dominated Defence bureaucracy, the last two to three years has seen the system move back towards some form of balance. Military professional advice is no longer excluded from, or diluted during, strategic policy making and capability development, but is increasingly weighed appropriately against complementary or competing advice from other quarters. This situation has not been accepted by those bureaucrats, both serving and retired, long accustomed to ignoring military professional considerations and monopolising advice to the government on strategic and other defence matters.

Some academic and quasi-academic input into defence debates also seem to reflect legacy protection imperatives concerning past bureaucratic decisions, rather than a truly objective stance and a forward-looking perspective. Renewed public debate on the project to re-equip the Navy with three new destroyers exemplifies several of these trends.

A little background

It is intended that the new destroyers will be capable of providing sophisticated means of early warning, control and defence against air and missile attack across a wide area. A

frigate, in contrast, has an air-defence capability limited to point defence; that is they can only defend themselves or a vessel in relatively close proximity. In contrast, the new destroyers will be able to protect large areas containing multiple ships and, in some cases, areas of adjacent land. In particular, they will be able to protect and directly support land forces ashore during littoral and archipelagic operations. They will also have a much greater capacity to handle multiple, simultaneous aerial attacks against the forces they are protecting. These are important considerations based on recent, and (likely) future, ADF operational experiences in our region.

Just as importantly the new destroyers will be larger vessels capable of far more than the provision of a deployable area air-defence capability. The term Air Warfare Destroyers (AWD) is really a misnomer and the ships should be more accurately referred to as Future Surface Combatants or Sea Control Combatants. The ships will be a significant node in the ADF's developing network-centric warfare concept. They will enable a powerful fusion of air, surface and subsurface sensor and engagement data from units of all three Services, from remote sensors, and from imagery and other intelligence data ashore. Apart from employing this data, they will offer another option for command and control of a deployed joint force.

Given their anticipated size (6–8000 tonnes full load displacement), the intended anti-submarine and anti-shipping capabilities are expected to be significant. In short, these ships will reintroduce a significant sea-control capability into the surface combatant force, and they will form the cornerstone on which future ADF littoral operations can be built.

A little history

In the case of area air defence, the three ships planned will replace and modernise a capability the ADF possessed from the mid 1960s to 2001, when the last of the Charles. F. Adams class guided missile destroyers (DDG), HMAS *Brisbane*, was withdrawn from service because its engines had worn out. The decade-plus gap until the first of the three new ships comes on line in 2013–14 means a degree of strategic risk. This is especially so should the ADF be deployed outside the range of yet to be delivered land-based airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft and our land-based fighters. This would also be the situation

should such aircraft be unavailable or outclassed, unless the area air defence capability could be provided by allies—as much of it was by the US and British navies during the initial stages of the 1999 East Timor crisis.

This at least 12-year gap is the result of fundamental political and institutional problems underlying capability development in Australia. If such a ship-based capability was still considered necessary, the first of the new ships should have been ready before at least the last of the old ships was scrapped. This effectively meant the decision to replace and modernise the capability provided by the three DDGs should have been made in the mid 1980s to early 1990s period. The then government, with little thought for the future and their long-term responsibilities, perpetually postponed such a decision in order to cut defence spending even further for essentially political purposes.

One of the supporting reasons this occurred was because some politicians and key advisers in the Defence civilian bureaucracy were devotees of the contentious theory that modern air power was the panacea for most strategic dilemmas. Critics of such ideas have described this as a derivative of the ‘silver bullet theory’, where objectivity is lost in the pursuit of technical solutions alone to strategic problems that really require a balance of capabilities and forces to solve.

In 1999–2000 the US Navy withdrew four Kidd-class destroyers (configured for the air defence role) from service and was prepared to sell them to Australia (they have since been purchased by Taiwan). Although old, these ships remained capable and would have filled the gap for the decade or so until the new vessels came into service.

Project Sea 4000 seeks to provide the ADF with the maritime component of a comprehensive, layered area air defence capability. The design phase of the project will be undertaken in 2006–07 with the three new ships scheduled to enter service in 2013, 2015 and 2017 respectively. Tenders for their local construction closed in December 2004 and a decision is due to be made in April, with the preferred design selected around mid year.

The cost of the three ships, spread over a 12-year period is estimated to be in the range of \$A4.5 to 6 billion. This is not high for the effectiveness of the capability delivered, especially in comparison to other principal defence projects with similar timeframes such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

Recent criticism

Any plan to provide the ADF with air-defence capabilities not centred on fighter aircraft is, of course, always likely to engender opposition from the industrial, academic and Service-zealot wings of the financially well-resourced ‘air power lobby’. Given the actual and emotional investment involved with replacing the F/A-18 Hornet with a new generation of fighter aircraft (JSF), it is not surprising that at least some within the ‘airpower lobby’ see the cost of the new ships as a threat to their pet hobbyhorse, even though the cost of the ships pales in comparison with that of acquiring 80-100 JSFs at \$A12–15 billion.

Criticism of the plan to procure three new destroyers

was thus always inevitable. What has surprised many is its timing and the source of some of it has aroused much stronger feelings.

On 14 February this year the *Sydney Morning Herald* published an opinion article by Professor Hugh White, from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at ANU. He questioned why the new destroyers were necessary and posed the idea that land-based fighters alone could do the same job. The article was necessarily short, in word length, historical accuracy and argument, but it summarised common claims from the ‘air power lobby’.

More importantly, the article completely ignored the principle of strategic redundancy, which, in summary, is that a country should not put all its eggs in one basket—such as we did with the disastrous ‘Singapore strategy’, imposed on the country, against professional military advice, during the 1930s. In any crisis or conflict, a wide range of environmental, geographic, climatic, geostrategic and operational influences interact and change constantly. Maximising flexibility and adaptability in the configuration of the defence force necessarily means not being solely dependent on any one type of force element for the execution of defence strategy and its constituent operational tasks. In other words, a professional and commonsense approach would be for Australia to spread its area air defence effort across a range of mutually supporting capabilities, including ground-based, airborne and satellite surveillance and control systems, and a layered response provided by land-based fighters, destroyers armed with missiles, and land-based missiles.

Professor White’s article also inferred that the decision to build the ships was taken merely to replace some of the Navy’s existing frigates (rather than to replace a lost capability) and that the decision had not been the result of rigorous analysis of alternatives. This suggestion has puzzled many, first because it is not factually correct and second because White, a deputy secretary in the Department of Defence 1995–2000, was intimately involved with strategic policy matters, and was the drafter of the *Defence 2000 White Paper*.

For example, in a ministerial press release during preparation of the White Paper (dated 24 May 2000), the then Minister for Defence, John Moore, noted:

‘... the Defence Capability Committee has formally decided that the US Navy Kidd-class destroyers will not be acquired by the ADF [as an interim air warfare capability]. The DCC reached this decision on the basis that, in the present environment, they do not provide longer term value for money ... The Kidds were only one option for Navy’s long term Air Warfare capability and they were closely examined. ... Although they will not be acquired, the examination of the Kidd option proved a useful exercise in exploring issues relevant to the acquisition of an effective Air Warfare capability ... a joint Defence and industry team has been established to determine the most effective way to acquire the capability for the ADF.’

The 2000 White Paper itself noted that the new destroyers would need to be significantly larger and more capable than the ships they nominally replaced. Subsequently,

in 2002–03 the all-party defence subcommittee of the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade undertook an inquiry into Australia’s maritime defence strategy. The inquiry was wide-ranging and took evidence from ADF experts, Defence officials (including the then Mr White) and, during public hearings, heard other views from academics, public-interest groups, professional experts and representatives from industry and commerce. The committee’s June 2004 report, *Australia’s Maritime Strategy*, recommended:

‘The Government decision to purchase three air warfare destroyers for delivery by about 2013 is supported. The Department of Defence, however, should explain how adequate air protection will be provided to land and naval forces before the air warfare destroyers are delivered in 2013.’

Carving a joint approach instead

The argument that the destroyers are unnecessary and should not be procured is invalid on a number of grounds. This is particularly so when it is alleged that one of the tasks expected of these ships, area air defence of a deployed force, can be provided entirely by land-based fighter aircraft.

- The protection of a continental-sized landmass and one of the largest EEZs in the world cannot be achieved with a navy possessing surface combatants no larger or more capable than frigates. The preservation of our sovereignty, especially the protection of our (largely seaborne) trade and interests, depends on an integrated maritime strategy employing elements of all three Services with the Navy and Air Force predominating. The application of maritime power requires the assertion of sea control. This function requires a particularly close partnership between the Navy and the Air Force to gain and maintain freedom of action of an area of sea, and the airspace above it, for our own purposes and, if required, deny its use to an adversary. Sea control on the scale required in the Australian context means at least some destroyers.
- Australia is not taking an unusual or divergent path in procuring a new generation of large destroyers for the provision of area air defence and sea control. Similar-sized, AWD-like ships are being brought into service by the navies of Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Norway Japan, South Korea and China. Australia is a medium-sized power with continental and maritime defence responsibilities greater than any other medium power. It is simply wrong to suggest these responsibilities can be met effectively with a navy possessing only frigate-sized surface combatants.
- The aversion of some critics to bigger ships seems more emotional than logical. Since the retirement of HMAS *Brisbane* the Navy’s surface combatants comprise only frigates. The Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates (FFG) are a 1970s design with four of the six built in the early 1980s and the remaining two in the early 1990s. They have been hard run and are effectively in the later phases of their operational life. The Anzac-class frigates (FFH), although newer (they were constructed from the mid 1990s onwards), and now being fitted with Harpoon anti-ship mis-

siles and eventually missile-armed SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite helicopters, currently have a single 127mm gun as their main offensive armament. All their other capabilities at present, including their anti-submarine warfare capacity, are essentially for self defence.

- A destroyer-sized vessel has greater sea-keeping abilities, especially in the Southern Ocean, greater survivability in combat and greater operational and logistic flexibility, range, endurance, speed and ‘presence’ than a frigate. Destroyers are multi-roled vessels capable of executing a wide range of peacetime and wartime naval tasks. The same cannot be said for frigates or for fighter aircraft. Even for diplomatic or implied force purposes, the actual or assumed ‘presence’ or deterrence to escalation of a powerful ship, with significant capability and endurance, cannot be duplicated by overflying combat aircraft. It also cannot be duplicated by the introduction of land forces without introducing considerable questions of national sovereignty.
- Attempted criticism through suggestions that the new destroyers are as big as World War II light cruisers is as misleading as it is irrelevant. Worldwide there is a trend back to larger maritime platforms as a result of improved countermeasures, a greater capacity to absorb battle damage (both of which reduce vulnerability), the introduction of truly networked task forces, and the significant financial savings to be made over the life of the vessel. Size is a plus not a minus.
- The larger hull of the new destroyers will provide far greater architectural and systems flexibility over the 30-year life-of-type (LOT). While electronic systems tend to get smaller over time there are more of them, and weapon systems are generally as bulky as they always have been. New types of threat necessitating reconfiguration of vessels also emerge regularly. A larger hull with adequate margins for future growth allows significant technical changes to the configuration of the ship to be made over its LOT without them automatically necessitating changes, often expensive and time-consuming ones, to other systems on board. The same cannot be said for frigates where both the FFG and Anzac-class vessels are essentially full. In the former case, the combat system is being replaced during the current round of refits because the ships’ architecture is insufficiently flexible to accommodate newer capability requirements and space needs to be freed up for other systems.
- The destroyers will enter service without the capability to fire anti-ballistic missile missiles. The larger hull does, however, offer much greater capacity and potential for theatre missile defence configurations in the future should this become necessary.
- Various scientific and professional experimentation, wargaming, exercises, desktop studies and operational research by the ADF, and the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, have consistently highlighted the need for complementary capabilities for the provision of persistent and area defence of joint forces against air and missile attack. The destroyers will be the critical maritime component of a network-enabled ADF air-warfare system and should not be considered in isolation.

- Australia is never going to be able to afford a large number of modern fighter and AEW&C aircraft. With each generation of fighter introduced the numbers bought are smaller, often by significant amounts. Modern precision weaponry has brought an increase in the roles and tasks of fighters without necessarily reducing operational workload per aircraft and pilot. Australian military history is replete with numerous examples where land-based fighters have been required for higher priority tasking elsewhere, were out of range or endurance, or were not able to obtain access to suitable bases, and have thus not been available at all or in sufficient numbers to protect maritime task forces or ground-force operations. It would be an unacceptable operational and moral risk at best, probably even folly, to configure the ADF so our entire area air-defence effort in all circumstances was invested solely in land-based fighter aircraft.
- Destroyers of the size and type envisaged, on the other hand, will provide the operational (and in some cases strategic) flexibility to provide a high level of autonomous area air control and defence, against aircraft and missiles, 24 hours a day even in the absence of continuous land-based air support.
- Destroyers of the size and type envisaged offer significantly greater flexibility and mission versatility in meeting out-of-region tasking and the interoperability with allies this generally involves. The likelihood of such tasking was highlighted in the *Defence 2000* White Paper, reaffirmed in the 2003 *Defence Update on Australia's National Security*, and agreed in the 2004 Parliamentary Joint Committee report, *Australia's Maritime Strategy*.
- Destroyers would allow a self-contained Australian task force comprising destroyers, frigates and amphibious ships to operate independently of allies when required. At the moment, for example, during higher intensity operations, our frigates must plug in to US and British task forces where the command and control, area surveillance and air-defence capacity to cover them is provided by US or British destroyers. Improved interoperability with allies is also a major tenet of defence policy. The reverse side of this interoperability coin is that destroyers are far more interoperable with allies, both technically and operationally, than smaller vessels. Destroyers therefore give us greater strategic flexibility in choosing when and where we join coalition operations, they free us from going cap in hand to allies at times, and they allow us to undertake a share of leading major task forces.
- Finally, destroyers of the size and type envisaged maximise Australian self-reliance and offer Australian governments the ability to exercise a range of diplomatic and strategic influences, ranging from the benign to the coercive, without challenging another country's sovereignty or perceptions of their of interests in the way that the deployment of land forces or over-flying combat aircraft do.

Thinking big and flexibly

The new destroyers, while necessarily having a strong air warfare bias, will not only be used for area air defence. They

will be the Navy's primary surface combatants and will deliver a range of capability options to the ADF in the configuration and deployment of balanced forces. They will be capable of rapid deployment and sustained joint and/or combined operations in the execution of our strategy and the pursuit of our national interests. While capable of operations at the high end of the conflict spectrum their utility over the full spectrum of maritime and joint operations, from diplomacy to combat, will be a significant capability multiplier for the whole ADF. These multi-role destroyers will be the mainstay of our sea-based strike and air-control capabilities, as well as providing significant command and control, anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare and electronic warfare capabilities.

Many critics of the destroyers are perhaps more motivated by what the ships will be able to do rather than any genuine belief that they cannot fulfil the purposes assigned or that other force elements alone might do it better. These ships pose an obvious deterrent to potential adversaries and, ironically, a real threat to those prone to pushing single-issue hobbyhorses. ♦

Billy Ruffian is a pseudonym for a retired ADF officer, and may or may not be based on the 74-gun ship of the line, HMS Bellerophon, which was part of Nelson's command during several major sea control operations.

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ADF tactical airlift options

Ian Bostock

In parallel with the high-profile acquisition of new multi-role fighters, maritime patrol aircraft, air-to-air refuellers and unmanned aerial vehicles, the RAAF is set to receive a significant boost to its tactical airlift capabilities over the next decade that will prove every bit as operationally vital.

According to the 2004–2014 Defence Capability Plan (DCP), the light and mid-weight elements of the RAAF's future airlift capabilities reside in Project Air 8000. Phase 1 of this project aims to put the RAAF's 25-year-old H model C-130 Hercules through a comprehensive refurbishment programme to extend life-of-type (LOT) to at least 2020. It has yet to be determined whether all 12 aircraft will undergo the refurbishment.

At a cost of \$A450–\$600 million, the refurbishment is expected to include work such as structural repair, upgrades and modifications to ensure the structural integrity of the basic airframe out to 2020 and further. Selected avionics and systems would also be upgraded and/or replaced in line with global air traffic management regulations. It is unclear whether an engine replacement would be attempted, with any decision on this hinging on the amount of residual life remaining in the original powerplants and their supportability from a maintenance and spare parts point of view. The refurbished aircraft will re-enter service around 2013–2015.

In late December 2004, Tenix Defence was awarded a \$A25 million contract to install and integrate an electronic warfare self-protection capability and satellite communications for the H-model fleet. To be undertaken as part of the badly delayed Project Echidna, the work is scheduled for completion in March 2008.

The H models belong to No 36 Squadron and are tasked predominantly with short-to-medium range, low-level tactical operations in support of ground forces. The 12 recently introduced C-130J-30 Hercules tend to fly the longer haul strategic mobility missions. Even without new engines, the post-refurbishment H models will remain very capable and versatile aircraft. Together with the J-30 models, they will be key capabilities in supporting and sustaining ADF operations, especially land force ones, irrespective of how distant from the Australian mainland these may be conducted.

Australia is not alone in seeking to extract maximum longevity out of its H-model Hercules, with the New Zealand Ministry of Defence signing up L-3 Spar Aerospace of Canada

to extend the LOT of its six H models by another 15 years. This work will be conducted in parallel with upgrades to the Kiwi fleet's navigation and communications systems and is due to begin next year. The first upgraded aircraft will re-enter Royal New Zealand Air Force service in late 2007.

Phase 2 of Project Air 8000 seeks to introduce a capability described in the DCP as a Battlefield Airlifter (BFA). For observers who have monitored the progress of the RAAF's long-touted interest in acquiring an outsize airlifter along the lines of the C-17 or A400M, the BFA is not it. Rather, it will provide a capability to transport troops and light, compact (but tactically important) loads over moderate distances from an airhead to forces in the field, where there may or may not be a dedicated airfield. To this end, the BFA will enjoy a high level of rough-field performance to ensure it is able to operate from rudimentary airstrips, thereby expanding exponentially the number of locations in which it can operate.

Specifically, the ADF sees the BFA fulfilling the inter-theatre and intra-theatre airlift roles, operating at predominantly lower altitudes (below 10,000 ft for intra-theatre operations). Even though over \$A50 m was expended on AIR 5190 Phase 1 by Defence and Industry, it is understood the functional specifications for the BFA are yet to be finalised. Consideration will need to be given to the interaction between what the BFA can do and the respective roles and capabilities of the Army's CH-47D Chinook and MRH 90/Black Hawk helicopter fleets in the joint tactical environment. Phase 2 of Air 8000 has been allocated funding of \$A750 m to \$A1 bn, with the BFA to enter service between 2010 and 2012.

While the DCP gives no indication one way or the other, the BFA is likely to replace the capability provided by the extant fleet of DHC-4 Caribou short-haul transports, themselves currently the subject of a limited LOT extension to ensure viability out to 2010 (Phase 1A of Project Air 5190 with an estimated budget of \$A100–150 m over the DCP period 2001–10). Strictly speaking, this still leaves open the possibility that the fixed-wing aspect of the BFA capability could be provided by a further upgraded Caribou fleet. Re-engining with the popular Pratt & Whitney PT6 turbine (running AVTUR not AVGAS) was proposed by industry back in 2000 and reportedly can be done within the budgetary envelope of Air 5190 Phase 1A—with the cost of the modification recovered

within five years from the ownership cost or capability improvements gained. The airframes of the 14 in-service aircraft are still structurally sound and the type's light footprint and short take-off and landing (STOL) prowess remain unchallenged by newer and more advanced (but larger, heavier and vastly more expensive) light tactical airlifters such as the CN-235, C-295M and C-27J Spartan.

This latter attribute is of particular relevance to operations right across Australia's northern front, where monsoon rains quickly turn grass and dirt airstrips to mud, ruling out the use of medium-size fixed-wing transports. The Caribou has repeatedly demonstrated the worth of its remarkably light footprint and STOL performance, often ending up as the only fixed-wing aircraft type in the ADF's inventory able to work under such conditions. The ADF's experiences in East Timor and more recently in Solomon Islands confirm this.

This capability—delivering cargo on small, undeveloped and weather-sensitive airstrips that resemble little more than jungle clearings or double as the local footy oval—will be an enduring one due to Australia's geographic location in the world and the nature of such infrastructure in many regional countries. It is a capability that will be required across a broad spectrum of operational scenarios and conflict intensities, from the islands of the Southwest Pacific to the western reaches of the Indonesian archipelago.

How completely the BFA will be able to replace the capability void left by the eventual departure of the Caribou remains to be seen, but is very much dependent on the aircraft type/s selected. From the ADF's perspective, the problem with the latest crop of so-called light tactical airlifters is their size and cost, especially unit cost.

The C-27J, for instance, is shorter but not much smaller around the middle than a C-130. So it carries bigger, bulkier loads and has a much higher payload than the Caribou (10,000 kg versus 3900 kg) but at its maximum take-off weight (MTOW) of 30,000 kg, the manufacturer claims the C-27J can take-off and land on unprepared strips of about 500m. In Australia's case, a 500 m airstrip would be considered a major airfield in many parts of the region, let alone the New Guinea highlands.

The next largest on the list, the C-295M, has a MTOW of 23,000 kg (compared to the Caribou's 12,500 kg) and a maximum payload of 9200 kg. Its STOL performance is only marginally better: a take-off run of 840m and landing run of 420 m.

Even as the smallest of the three (MTOW 15,000 kg and 6000 kg payload), the CN-235 has a set of STOL performance figures that are anything but: take-off run of around 800 m and landing run of 220 m.

A cursory evaluation of this performance data reveals a startling and operationally important difference in the STOL performance of these probable BFA contenders compared to that of the Caribou, which has a take-off run of 290 m and can land inside 180 m.

As the BFA capability requirement and budget allocation appears to mirror that of the ill-fated Light Tactical Airlift project that came within a whisker of selecting a Caribou successor in 1999/2000, but was cancelled for reasons that

remain unclear, it is unlikely that more than 12 to 14 examples of the types mentioned above would be ordered (or could be afforded).

Even without the aid of a registered CPA, it is clear that up to \$A1 billion for a dozen or so aircraft is, quite frankly, a poor return for such a massive investment. It is not surprising that there are many who believe these aircraft, while arguably very capable, are not quite the right ones for the ADF.

The final composition of the BFA capability may well hinge on the recommendations emanating from the recently completed ADF Strategic Lift Study. No one is certain, but one of the options canvassed to fulfill the BFA requirement may include a mixed solution involving the procurement of additional Army-operated Chinooks (the six at present are consumed almost entirely by lugging around fuel bladders for the Black Hawks) and an upgraded Caribou fleet. Then again, a new fixed-wing light tactical airlifter, such as the latest version of the well-proven C-212-400, or revolutionary aircraft such as the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor, may be preferred.

The option of acquiring additional Chinooks as part of a mixed fixed/rotary-wing BFA solution has undeniable merit. In addition to its proven reliability and versatility, the 12,000 kg payload Chinook is a transport aircraft in the prime of its life, rather than nearing its twilight as some might expect. The US Army, for one, has recruited Boeing to modernise its huge CH-47 fleet to the even more capable F model and plans to keep its Chinooks in service for another 30 years.

Given that the ADF's embarrassingly small fleet of D-model Chinooks is only going to get busier in support of a land force that will become more deployable and responsive in the years ahead, its doubling would prove affordable, sustainable and an ideal adjunct to an inexpensive and truly light tactical airlifter.

With the introduction of the two big-decked LHDs in the next decade there is also scope for the additional Chinooks to replace in part the heavy lift side of the utility role fulfilled by the Navy's aging Mk 50 Sea King maritime helicopters. Apart from the addition of a rotor brake, there is little required in the way of modifications the current D model Chinook would need to operate safely and effectively from these ships.

By the time the refurbished C-130H fleet and BFA capability enter service, the ADF will also have at its disposal the strategic air transport capability inherent in the five Airbus A330-200 Multi Role Tanker Transports (MRTT) ordered in April 2004 under Air 5402. When not undertaking air-to-air refuelling duties, each A330-200 MRTT will have the ability to carry close to 300 personnel and meaningful quantities of mostly palletised cargo on the freight deck at speeds and ranges far in excess of the J-30 model Hercules.



Ian Bostock is an independent defence analyst and the Australian correspondent for Jane's Defence Magazines. He is also on the Board of Directors of the ADA.

Ancient Warfare: A Very Short Introduction

Harry Sidebottom

Reviewed by Dr Malcolm Kennedy

In sighting this review the reader might naturally ask how a book on ancient warfare could be of relevance or interest to people interested in Australia's national security. Even a dip into this text and the answer is clear.

The book is complemented by a selection of excellent maps and illustrations, a chronology, detailed index and an outstanding bibliography. The twenty-page bibliography is organised around each chapter of the text and features extensive notes.

Professor Harry Sidebottom, a highly knowledgeable and skilled historian, has written a very short introduction to warfare in the ancient era. The book is an outstanding example of condensation of extensive scholarship and detail. Moreover, he writes with a light, highly readable touch and is not afraid to challenge 'haughty truths' or prickly scholars.

The book is an amazing resource. There are 128 pages of crisp text, which provide a surprisingly detailed account, principally of the Greeks and Romans, but also of their enemies the Arabs, Carthaginians, Germans, Huns, and Persians. The text focuses on the debate over the existence of a 'Western Way of War' (WWW). Many scholars are lined up for combat on the opposing sides of this debate.

Sidebottom, in mocking fashion, takes a sharp pin to the scholarly balloons that have been puffed up on this issue. His exposition of the history of ancient warfare provides a vast wealth of material covering the major and minor aspects of warfare in the 900-year period to AD 650. He swiftly sketches the most important campaigns and battles, but also adds an expert summary of the many exceptions to the supposed rule.

Sidebottom shows that the 'Western Way of War' is: 'the desire for open, decisive battle, which aims at the annihilation of the enemy. Ideally, it is conducted by heavily armed infantry fighting hand to hand. The battle is won by courage, which is instilled part by training and discipline. This is often linked to the combatants having political freedom and being landowners—so-called 'civic-militarism'.

He notes that it is claimed that the WWW was invented by the Greeks, inherited by the Romans, passed on through the Middle Ages, rediscovered during the

Renaissance and then applied in the modern West. The book is an exercise in examining the many and various wars throughout almost a millennium to determine if this form of warfare was the norm or if it even occurred.

One revelation is that the so-called WWW was used by non-Mediterranean nations and that the Greeks and the Romans often did not apply their invention,

but rather adopted indirect methods or relied on hired troops to fight for them, or actually used other forms of warfare including sieges and naval campaigns.

The seven chapters of the book examine the Western Way of War, thinking with war, war and society, thinking about war, strategy, fighting, and a discussion of the question of the reinvention of the WWW.


Sidebottom compares the Greeks with their main adversaries, the Romans and their enemies, and then he demonstrates that there were significant variations in the actual nature of the wars fought. He describes the ironic result of the shift in power from the Greeks to the Romans, whereby the Greeks no longer exhibited the WWW; rather they are seen as using inferior 'eastern' methods.

The chapter on 'thinking with war' reveals how the ancients used war to understand and order their world. This chapter ranges over culture, gender and the individual, and raises issues which are completely relevant to our own concerns. The Greeks were convinced that war should remain the preserve of men.

In thinking about war, Sidebottom shows that intellectuals in ancient times had deep concerns about the nature of war, its causes and the justification or lack of justification for civil and national wars. Indeed, this chapter offers a rigorous debate on war that could improve the quality of current discussions.

The chapters on strategy and fighting contain a great deal of information and repeatedly highlight there is little new in our concerns about national security. The ultimate lesson of this fine book is that war is a changing phenomena and a society's survival depends upon its flexibility in reinterpreting the emerging nature of war—and in having the will to make the necessary sacrifices to deter or defeat the enemy.


Harry Sidebottom, *Ancient Warfare A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, 2004, 165pp., Softback, RRP \$22.95.



Quinn's Post, Anzac, Gallipoli

Peter Stanley

Reviewed by Mike O'Brien



Another book on Gallipoli! I wonder how many of them there are now: hundreds at least, with more being published each year. Is this one worth it? My reply is a resounding yes.

Peter Stanley belongs to that recent generation of Australian military history writers who get it right. This group of gifted authors know their subjects well because they have researched them in exacting detail. They tell their story with balance and clarity. The context is clear, yet the feeling of the battles and their toll on individuals and units is also told with factual sympathy. In many cases, they let those who took part carry the narrative at first hand. They express the limitations of their book clearly and yet often understate its manifest advantages. They have an eye for detail but the detail adds to the story rather than obscures it. And they avoid acronyms and abbreviations! None of this is unexpected from the pen of Peter Stanley because his earlier books have met this high standard.

Quinn's Post is probably the first book on the Gallipoli campaign based on a place. The Post was always a key one, close to the Turkish trenches (and there's an understatement), always seen by the allies as a most important position in what they saw as a campaign of siege warfare. It was also overlooked by other Turkish positions, and continually under rifle fire from snipers, bombers throwing what we would call grenades and sporadic Turkish artillery. It was called 'the key position of the Anzac line'. Charles Bean evocatively said that 'men looked upon it as they would a haunted house'. Stanley is one of the few who have read Bean's extensive notes and he tells us that the man who wrote this did so with more than the usual depth of feeling: he had his hand blown off and was blinded when he was throwing a jam-tin bomb at Quinn's.

My first knowledge of the Post was gained from an article in a 1971 *Australian Army Journal* by Alf Argent entitled 'Quinn of Quinn's Post'. Not many essays remain in my memory for more than 30 years, but this one deserved it. Because Peter Stanley has chosen to put his footnotes on the Australian War Memorial website (they are not yet there as I write) I do not know how much information flowed from the article to Stanley's book. Quinn and the men of the 15th Battalion AIF are important to this story, but Stanley goes much further.

One of the many refreshing aspects of the book is that it treats the occupation of the Post by New Zealanders with equal attention to that given to the Australians. Too many

studies of Anzac ignore the 'NZ'. Dr Stanley is even-handed and does not resile from relating those examples where Kiwi soldierly virtues

exceeded those of their brothers. This aspect of *Quinn's Post* is a fascinating account of the close teamwork and gentle rivalry that is typical of operations by Australians and New Zealanders.

Peter Stanley is one of the very few historians to have related the actions of commanders and troops in this campaign to the military doctrine of the period. He has examined the 'bible' of *Field Service Regulations*, noted the lessons from the Russo-Japanese War and tells how these rules were applied. His comments on the training given to those occupying the Post, particularly the negligent attitude taken to the preparation of the Light Horse for this task, are worth noting.

The climax of the story of Quinn's is perhaps that of the Turkish attack of 29th May. This is the moment when it was felt that a retreat of only six inches might have driven all the Anzacs from the peninsula

The book is full of interesting detail. Here you will find the story of Lieutenant McSharry, the first Australian winner of the newly instituted Military Cross. You might be surprised to know that the present Quinn's Post cemetery at Gallipoli is not located at Quinn's Post but at Bloody Angle. The maps of the trenches and particularly the tunnels at Quinn's are especially valuable. Perhaps the most valuable and rewarding aspect of the book is the careful use made of the many documentary sources. Not only has Peter Stanley mined the rich vein of letters and diaries held by Australian and overseas institutions, but he has also carefully sifted through those notes of Charles Bean that underpinned his Official History.


Quinn's Post was to be held 'at any cost'. It was a key to the defence line at Gallipoli and the deadliest position on the peninsula. Quinn's has now almost disappeared physically as the weather has eroded its fabric. Peter Stanley's book ensures that its memory will not disappear. ♦

Peter Stanley, 'Quinn's Post, Anzac, Gallipoli', Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest NSW, 2004, Softback. 226pp., RRP \$29.95.

The Royal Australian Navy in World War II

David Stevens (ed.)

Reviewed by David Campbell



The first edition of this book appeared almost a decade ago, as the proceedings of the 1995 Naval History Conference held at the Australian National Maritime Museum in Sydney, as part of the 'Australia Remembers 1945–95' commemorations fifty years after the end of World War II. This second edition is more than a reprinting in response to public demand (particularly at the Australian War Memorial's shop); David Stevens has taken the opportunity to expand the book by some 50 per cent (by page count) with the inclusion of additional material from other sources both before and after 1995. The result is highly satisfying.

The 1995 Conference was nicely structured with papers on strategy and operations, infrastructure and personnel, and there was a pleasing symmetry of objectivity and subjectivity. However, this was constrained by the need to fit everything into two days. The second edition of this book is freed from these limitations and is now about as good a coverage of the RAN in World War II as you could reasonably expect in a single volume. It's still not a comprehensive history in the conventional sense. Rather, twenty-one disparate chapters, each a stand-alone essay, combine to faithfully capture the essence of those six years of global conflict at sea. It is, as the editor says in his introduction, 'a few brief scenes from a substantially greater canvas'. What I especially like about the book is the retained mixture of dispassionate and professional analysis on the one hand and the very personal observations of those who were there on the other. It makes for a very flexible and lively book—one you can read determinedly from cover to cover or simply dip into from time to time. Of course, Gill's two-volume official history remains as the definitive account.

Now, for the changes. David Stevens has added a chapter on the exercise of naval diplomacy through the actions of Captain H.A. Showers in HMAS *Adelaide* at Noumea in 1940, a role, he notes, that the RAN regularly continues to undertake. Eric Grove's original paper on the Mediterranean is fleshed out by a personal account by Bill Reeve on the Scrap Iron Flotilla in 1940–41. The much neglected subject of Australians in midget submarines is rectified by Ray Worledge, who tells of their harrowing exploits from the *Tirpitz* in Bergen to cable-cutting off Hong Kong. Peter Hore (a new face in Australian naval history) has contributed a fresh study of HMAS *Sydney*.

Incidentally, the *Sydney-Bartolomeo Colleoni*

engagement is featured as the somewhat lurid front cover illustration—it's the sort of picture you used to see on J.E. Macdonnell's novels—and is the only aspect of the book that strikes a jarring note.

There is a chapter on Vice-Admiral Sir John Collins from the 1993 conference, 'Reflections on the RAN', to balance the first edition's paper on Rear-Admiral H.B. Farncomb, 'First to a Flag', also by the late Tony Grazebrook. Frank Broeze's original final chapter (a summary of the conference's proceedings) has been deleted and is replaced by an invaluable piece by Joe Straczek on further reading within the historiography, which is growing at an impressive and very satisfying rate.

There is a new and useful appendix on ships and personnel facts and figures, taken from the RAN volume of the *Australian Centenary History of Defence*. The book is well illustrated and amongst the 53 scattered halftones are a number I've not seen before—always a gratifying experience—such as that of HMAS *Hobart* in Sutherland Dock after her torpedoing in 1943, the scrapping of HMAS *Moresby* and, particularly, those from the personal collections of Bill Reeve and Ray Worledge. Finally, the book is strongly supported by notes and acknowledgements and a workmanlike index. All that's missing is a chapter by the ubiquitous Tom Frame, and that's a pity.

The book is dedicated to those who served with or alongside the RAN. It is a fitting tribute. Lest we forget: more than 2000 lives were lost in naval service, proportionately more than those of the Army or Air Force.

A reviewer would be remiss in his duty if he didn't detect at least one error. There is indeed one: John F. Kennedy was commissioned into the USNR, not the USN (p. 267). That triviality aside, this is excellent book—a thoughtful and improved second edition—and well worth the modest price. And would whoever has my first edition please give it back? ♦

David Stevens (ed.), *The Royal Australian Navy in World War II*, 2nd Edition, Allen&Unwin, Sydney, 2005, Softback, 316pp., RRP \$39.95.

Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan

David Oakman

Reviewed by Dr Malcolm Kennedy

The author's assertion that there was a need for a good general history of Australia's role in the Colombo Plan cannot be disputed; however, the resulting work does not provide a balanced or fair account of this remarkable program. This book's emphasis is largely and naturally, on the post-war period; however, there is an unfortunate set of ahistorical assumptions, which inform the work's thesis, on the long-term nature of Australia's relationships with South, Southeast and East Asia.

Four important problems arise. First, the notion, implicit in the book, that Australia and Australians, in the pre-federation period had no meaningful knowledge of Asia is false. A number of historians have demonstrated an extensive web of travel, trade and employment between Australia and Asia. Indeed a sampling of city and rural newspapers from the 1850s to early 1900s provides convincing evidence of such an interest in and interaction with Asia. Second, the author could have given greater consideration, to the events in Asia from 1880 to 1900, so as to understand the intensity of political leaders' views of the region at the time of federation. A study of Australia's economic experience during the 1890s would better inform any explanation for the emergence of the cross-party 'White Australia' policy advanced by the likes of Deakin and Hughes. Third, while the author focuses on a number of key players in the Colombo Plan story, such as Spender and Casey, he seems to have given little time to discovering the views of the many Australian civil, diplomatic and military personnel who had extensive pre- and post-war experience in and of Asia. A few are mentioned, but no evaluation is made of the quality of relations that they had established and maintained across the region.

Finally, the popular assertion that the Australian government, and by extension most Australians, were highly racist and xenophobic for most of the period up to the 1970s is unproven. The crimes committed against Australian Prisoners of War created much anger toward the Japanese; however, even this quickly faded. Moreover, the war created a strong sympathy for the people across the region who had suffered even more than Australians.

It is also important to challenge the author's fixation with the White Australia policy. This government policy was not unlike immigration policies held, and still held, by most nations across the region. He notes the criticism of the policy by a few opinion makers in Asian nations, but fails to note the nature of the views held by the majority of the elite in these nations. Colour was not, but race and nationality were and are, used by Asian nations to prohibit inter-regional migration.

Historians need to explain the past in terms of the ideas, beliefs and values held in each particular era. In this volume what could have been an exciting and instructive account of one of Australia's first major attempts to give aid to our neighbours has been lost to the interjection of a leftist ideological world-view to the past.

This tone is set by a lengthy, but largely irrelevant apologia for

Bert Evatt's idealist view of the UN, contrasted with the more sceptical position taken by Spender, and later, by Casey. In addition, the repeated bagging of the anti-communist position taken by many Australian leaders and the simplistic argument that the Colombo Plan was essentially a weapon in the Cold War fail as historical explanations. The failure of communism to provide democratic freedoms and economic wellbeing to Asian nations appears to have escaped the author's notice.

The central contradiction, for the author, is the official policy of the Australian government, which he admits was progressively changing over the period, and the extremely positive experiences of the Colombo Plan students. Made welcome as equals and not subject to any form of racial regulation, most students established long-term friendships with Australian families and individuals that have been maintained for the rest of their lives.

There are a number of rather odd omissions. Comparative statistical material is limited to one table of expenditure over a short part of the program. The economic theory on which the Colombo Plan was based is described, but there is no evaluation of its actual successes or failures. In particular, the Australian emphasis on education has proven to be a key element in successful economic development in the countries assisted.

Pandanus has produced a volume that offers readers a full complement of scholarly apparatus. The book has a good index, by current publishing standards, and a valuable bibliography. The abbreviations and endnotes' key would be better placed before the text. The pictures are valuable but appropriate maps need to be included. Part of Oakman's conclusion states 'Full of quasi-imperial intent, the Colombo Plan was a defensive response to a particular construction of Asia and the anxieties, threats and promises that lay within that region'. Apart from the promises that lay in the region during the period, for most of those who were involved in the Colombo Plan, his other premises are largely false. ♦

Daniel Oakman, 'Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan', Pandanus Books (ANU), Canberra, 2004, 323pp., Softback, RRP \$34.95.



Asian Alternatives: Australia's Vietnam Decision and Lessons on Going to War

Garry Woodard

Reviewed by Professor Peter Edwards

In recent weeks, the media has been full of commentary by pundits and politicians arguing whether Iraq will prove to be another Vietnam. Among the leading participants in this debate was Garry Woodard who asserts the validity comparison, and the Prime Minister who rejects it. Woodard's *Asian Alternatives* concludes with a list of 50 points where he considers Australian decision-making on Iraq resembles that on Vietnam. Including this passage is unfortunate, as it is the weakest part of the book. We can learn from historical comparisons, but to do so requires more thought and subtlety than a staccato list of points of similarity, ranging from the potentially significant to inconsequential. It would be regrettable if this book was seen only in terms of its contribution to the Iraq debate. It is, in fact, a detailed study of Australian decision-making—or more accurately aspects of Australian decision-making—that culminated in the decision to send a battalion of combat troops to Vietnam in 1965.

The book is the product of substantial archival research carried out by Woodard as a Frederick Watson Fellow at the National Archives of Australia. The National Archives deserve congratulations for instituting this fellowship, as does Woodard for undertaking this substantial piece of research, rather than simply relying on his memory to write on his own time in External Affairs. Not that a volume of his memoirs would be uninteresting. As he mentions in *Asian Alternatives*, he was Policy Planning Officer in that department in the 1960s. He was later ambassador in Beijing and Rangoon, and later again President of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Woodard was one of the 43 retired diplomats and former ADF officers who publicly criticised the Iraq commitment before the 2004 election, but he is no 'doddering Daiquiri diplomat'. This is a serious and substantial piece of historical scholarship, flavoured by Woodard's quirky style.

The book covers similar ground to the volume of official history, *Crises and Commitments*, that I published in the early 1990s. Like that volume, *Asian Alternatives* discusses the extensive and complex interaction in the early and mid 1960s between Australian policy-making on Indonesia's *Konfrontasi* (Confrontation) policy towards the new federation of Malaysia and the deepening crisis in South Vietnam. It ought to be, but unfortunately is not, impossible now to conduct any major discussion of the commitment to Vietnam without making some reference to *Konfrontasi*. That is one major contrast between Iraq and Vietnam, as far as Australian policy-making is concerned. If you can imagine the East Timor crisis of 1999 coinciding with the Iraq debate of 2002–03, you will have a better idea of the dilemmas facing Australian policy-makers in 1964–65.

One major difference between Woodard and the others who

have trodden similar ground is his attitude towards Garfield Barwick. A principal theme of *Asian Alternatives*, developed in a chapter at its conclusion, is a counter-factual argument, concerning the replacement of Barwick by Paul Hasluck as Minister for External Affairs (renamed Foreign Affairs in 1970) in April 1964. Woodard contends that, if Barwick had remained Minister in 1964–65, Australia would

not have undertaken the commitment to Vietnam, or at least would have made the commitment in a far more prudent, less open-ended manner. There is nothing wrong in engaging in counter-factual arguments, and this one is as valid and as fascinating (for Australians, at least) as the longstanding American contention that, if President Kennedy had not been assassinated in November 1963, American policy towards Vietnam would have been vastly different. But I would not go out as far as Woodard on this particular limb.

One reason is that Woodard concentrates heavily on the involvement of External Affairs, at both ministerial and departmental levels, in policy-making on Indonesia and Vietnam. He makes much of a particular Cabinet meeting in December 1964, but generally his focus is on Barwick, Hasluck and the senior officials in their department. (Apart from Barwick, the other outstanding figure in this account is the departmental secretary, Sir Arthur Tange. Readers of this journal, aware of Tange's term as Defence Department Secretary in the 1970s, may be bemused by Woodard's description of Tange as tolerant, even encouraging, of dissent, but so he was in his External Affairs days.) Woodard develops, at greater length than I did in *Crises and Commitments* but with a similar conclusion, the argument that Vietnam was not, as several writers have alleged, the war of the diplomats. But he gives much less attention to Sir Robert Menzies and the other politicians and officials (including senior military officers) involved in the story. One could offer an alternative counter-factual, in which Barwick and External Affairs put up more of a fight over the Vietnam commitment, but were still 'rolled' by Menzies and his senior Cabinet colleagues.

However contentious, Woodard's arguments have to be considered. This is a valuable and substantial contribution to our understanding of the policy decisions that led to Australia's third largest military commitment of the twentieth century. ♦

Garry Woodard, *Asian Alternatives: Australia's Vietnam Decision and Lessons on Going to War*, Melbourne University Publishing, Carlton, 2004, Softback, 355pp., RRP \$39.95 for an electronic copy, \$49.95 for a print-on-demand hard copy and \$4.99 per individual chapter electronically.

Professor Peter Edwards was Australia's official historian for *Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–72 including the Vietnam War*.



The Cruel Legacy: The HMAS Voyager Tragedy

Tom Frame

Reviewed by Ian Pfennigwerth

This is the second book by Tom Frame on the collision of the destroyer *Voyager* and aircraft carrier *Melbourne* during night-flying exercises off Jervis Bay on 10 February 1964. Eighty-two men died and the accident spawned two Royal Commissions, neither of which established with any certainty the cause of the tragedy. It also opened the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) to trenchant criticism, mostly uninformed, from politicians, the media and the public. Some, including Frame, have claimed that it also ushered in a period of much-needed and somewhat overdue change and realignment within the Navy.

Frame's first book on the collision, *Where Fate Calls*, was based on his Masters thesis written while he served on the staff of the Chief of Naval Staff. It was compiled with enviable access to official and unofficial records and his perspective on the tragedy and its aftermath is thus unparalleled. However, *The Cruel Legacy* throws no new light on either the collision or its causes other than to state the obvious—something went very wrong on the Bridge of *Voyager*. Nor should revelations be expected, as the bulk of the text and all but a handful of the references come from *Where Fate Calls*, and as the intervening forty years have dulled memories and culled many of the drama's chief actors.

The Cruel Legacy follows Frame's first book in describing the circumstances of the collision and the manoeuvrings of the Australian Naval Board and government in deciding how to investigate the accident and to determine the facts. Frame shows how the government stumbled into convening a Royal Commission, despite the acute observation of the Attorney General Garfield Barwick that 'the only resemblance between a Royal Commission and a Court of Justice is the furniture in the courtroom'. Barwick was vindicated by the findings of the first Royal Commission, where forensic sparring resulted in each of the QCs representing the various parties finding it expedient to criticise the Commanding Officer of *Melbourne* and his Bridge staff. The Naval Board and other senior naval officers seem to have displayed a striking lack of objectivity, let alone loyalty to officers under their command, throughout.

Melbourne's Commanding Officer's resignation in protest at not being restored to his sea command engendered great sympathy for his cause within and outside the Navy. Parliamentary supporters seized upon an exaggerated account of the transgressions of *Voyager's* Commanding Officer by his former Executive Officer to engineer a second Royal Commission. While explicitly not in its terms of reference, this did produce a plausible

explanation for the collision, but one that has been challenged by Frame amongst others. *The Cruel Legacy* contains several very useful diagrams to help readers understand the sequence of events and facts bearing on the accident.

The 'cruel legacy' of the book's title appears to be Frame's reflections on the Australian government's reluctance to adequately


compensate those who suffered in the collision. It is difficult to be sure as there is no introduction to the book in which he might have explained his reasons for revisiting the subject. Puzzlingly, Frame suggests monetary compensation would be an inappropriate recompense for *Voyager* survivors, while he also deplores that catch-all disease: post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). He relates several examples of alleged PTSD sufferers whose stories were patently untrue. One part of the 'cruel legacy' was that Frame himself fell foul of officialdom over the publication of *Where Fate Calls*. The confrontation hastened his separation from the service—he might count his naval career as one of the final casualties of the accident.

Although there is little that is new in *The Cruel Legacy*, it still makes confronting reading; even those who were only bystanders to the tragedy became involved in its aftermath. The events surrounding and the conduct displayed during the two Royal Commissions evoked only general disrespect for, and suspicion of, senior officers and deep cynicism about politicians, the media and the legal profession in many naval officers.

Frame's contention that the disaster precipitated change in the outlook, nature, ethos and standards of the Navy could be challenged. It certainly accelerated a trend to assert the RAN's independence from its British roots. The 1960 decision to re-equip the destroyer force from US sources saw officers recalled as witnesses for the second Royal Commission from one of these ships off Vietnam—a conflict in which the British were not involved and from ships wearing a distinctive Australian White Ensign. While the performance of many senior naval officers over the *Voyager* collision was lamentable Frame does them a disservice in asserting that it took the disaster to set in train the forging of a modern RAN.

As a concise account of the *Melbourne-Voyager* collision *The Cruel Legacy* would be a useful read for those who do not have access to or have not read *Where Fate Calls*. However, I do not believe it matches Frame's original effort. ♦

Tom Frame, *The Cruel Legacy: The HMAS Voyager Tragedy*, Allen&Unwin, Sydney, 2005, Softback, 235pp., RRP \$29.95.



In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia

Sally Neighbour

Reviewed by Tony LeRay-Meyer

Sally Neighbour has written a worthy contribution to research on the evolution of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the targeting calculus behind the attack in Bali. Her book also places JI coherently within both a regional and global context, and is one of the few works that includes analyses of the 'Islamisation' and 'radicalisation' of key JI players. Neighbour also brings 'us' an awareness of the kernel of JI—the life and networks of the Indonesian exiles in Malaysia. Clive Williams has rightly noted, 'if you only ever intend to read one book about JI and Bali, this is the one I would recommend'.

Neighbour, a reporter with ABC TV's *4-Corners* program, is a highly experienced journalist who has worked as a correspondent in East Asia and travelled extensively in Southeast Asia. Her motivation to investigate JI was both personal and philosophical, and began on assignment within hours of the Bali bombing observing first hand the scenes along Legion Street, Kuta Beach, and in the 'chaotic corridors' of Denpasar's Sanglah Hospital. Soon after, she attended a sermon in Solo, Central Java, given by the alleged spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Bakar Bashir. His words, the first response to Bali, were directed at the 'West': 'between you and us there will forever be a ravine of hate'. Sally Neighbour asked herself the crucial question, how had it come to this? As with Jason Burke's book on al Qa'eda, *Casting a Shadow of Terror*, she addresses the critical question—why?

The genre of 'tracking' organisations and networks can often be weighed down in complexity, especially in the trails of names, aliases and associations. The detailed books by Rohan Gunaratna and Sidney Jones are cases in point. One of the key strengths of Neighbour's book is that the journalist in her is never far beneath the surface, resulting in a narrative style that is both authoritative and eminently readable.

Her basic premise was to discover 'what was the 'ravine of hate' and why did it evolve? The book is structured to sequentially analyse the key JI players and their motivations and contribution to the movement. This sequential structure is particularly effective but the scope of the book is perhaps too broad, especially where Neighbour's attempts to place the evolution of JI in both its regional and global contexts is covered too lightly.

She also attempts to place JI and its undercurrent of Muslim humiliation in a broader Islamic historical context. To grasp '... this profound sense of grievance it is necessary to delve back 1500 years ... and the rise and fall of the glorious empire that he [Muhammad] founded on Islamic


faith'. While some historical context is essential, much of this Islamic history has been well covered by Jason Burke, by Giles Kepel's *Jihad: Trail of Political Islam*, and in John Esposito's *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* and his *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*. Neighbour may have been better just integrating their key findings into her narrative rather than attempting her own

historical summary. The result of her 'skimming' in this regard is the missing of detail or the inclusion of inaccuracies. As an example, the development of the Wahhabist movement in Saudi Arabia is not considered in her historical chapter—'Striving in the Path of God'. While her summary of Islamic history is not a crucial weakness in the book, it is one that may leave an uninitiated reader with an inaccurate understanding of the historical complexity.

Neighbour's research includes primary interviews with members from the families and communities of key JI individuals. Her fieldwork includes visits to these communities, thorough research, the use of court transcripts and a willingness to cite authoritative commentary (such as Sidney Jones from the International Crisis Group). The book's major contribution to the understanding of JI is in its analysis of individual lives and its insights into the personal motivations and development of key JI operatives. Individuals such as Muklas and Amrozi are considered in detail, with an eye-opening view provided of their diverse paths to 'radicalisation'. Neighbour reveals the complex web of personal and/or ideological grievances, and the often profound sense of political dislocation in Suharto's Indonesia. In contrast, recalling the broader sense of grievance felt by many Muslims, her analysis of Dr Azahari Husin reveals an educated and 'Westernised' person whose radicalisation was less spiritual and more motivated by a general 'disillusionment about the plight of Muslims'. For many in JI, the contemporary manifestation of this grievance was Suharto's Indonesia. Neighbour answers the 'how' and 'why' by noting that JI represents both a community of shared grievance and a means of response.

In the *Shadow of Swords* is highly useful for both the intelligence analyst and general reader. Sally Neighbour's insights into the 'why' question provide a path to better understanding both 'who and what' JI is and, crucially, the rationale behind the targeting calculus of attacks such as Bali. Of course this leads to the unanswered questions of 'what next' and 'how to respond' to JI. ♦

Sally Neighbour, *In The Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia*, Harper Collins, Sydney, 2004, Softback, 374pp., RRP \$29.95.



Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton

Martin van Creveld

Reviewed by George Yacoub

Martin Van Creveld, a professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, is the author of numerous books on military history and strategy. In this book, first published in 1977, Van Creveld studies an area that had until then been largely ignored by military historians, the influence of logistics on military campaigns. He undertakes a number of case studies of land-based campaigns commencing in the 1560–1660 period and concluding with a review of the 1944 campaign in Western Europe. For this second edition Van Creveld has also provided a useful postscript of what has changed since he originally wrote the book some thirty years ago.

Each of the eight chapters is well researched and presented. The early chapters are particularly instructive as they provide a chronology of the impact of logistics on the changing nature of warfare. We see in this period, for example, the development of reserve stocks and block scales outlining the expected consumption requirements of each element.

During the 17th century, Europe's large standing armies met their logistic needs during mobile operations primarily through living off the land (supplemented by limited horse-drawn or riverine resupply). They kept moving because they could not otherwise gather supplies. Ammunition requirements were low and could accompany the troops. This period also saw the development of magazines designed for storing basic essentials that could not be met through foraging, especially those needed to mount sieges. Napoleon's campaigns in the early 18th century depended on dispersed (but still continual) movement of large forces, but were backed up after a fashion by a formal and organised system of supply reliant on a line of communication and the establishment of logistic reserves. Where the weather or an adversary interdicted his line of communications, this had a profound effect on his campaign objectives.

The rapid demographic, economic and industrial expansion that occurred in Europe between 1871 and 1914 changed forever the logistical complexity of warfare. Armies now needed greater stores, particularly ammunition (and later fuel), and the daily consumption requirements significantly increased. While railways could carry large holdings they could not store them and were often in the wrong place or vulnerable to enemy interdiction and technical failure. Van Creveld provides the reader with a rare insight into such developments. His review of the Schlieffen Plan is a timely reminder for those who currently advocate the reduction of organic third-line military logistic resources in favour of the use of contracted civilian transport assets.

Van Creveld's study of Germany's campaigns in Russia in 1941 and in the Middle East 1941–44 further illustrate the nexus between strategic and campaign planning and their underlying logistic considerations. The German

campaign in Russia predominately failed due to the inability to supply forces at critical junctures because the planners had placed excessive reliance on invalid assumptions about captured stocks and Russian rail transport networks. Similarly the campaign in the Middle East failed because Rommel, in his endeavours for a quick and decisive victory, ignored the advice of his logistic planners and extended his lines of communications beyond the capacity of his logistics system. While enough supplies could usually be shipped to the few axis-controlled ports with sufficient capacity to handle them, these were well behind his front lines (and further away as he advanced), and insufficient organic transport or other means existed to move the supplies forward.

Rommel's predicament in the Middle East provides a reverse echo of the challenges faced by the ADF in East Timor. Deploying initially at light scales, the force concentrated around Dili before pursuing further operations across the territory. The ADF did not swiftly experience large supply shortages only because minimal combat was involved and only limited consumption of consumables such as ammunition, fuel and medical stores was required. In addition, the close proximity of Dili to Darwin (an unusual advantage unlikely to be repeated in future), the relatively small distances involved in supporting the troops in-country, and the (again unusual) unhindered use of air and sea transport, allowed the ADF logistic shoestring to eventually meet most operational demands.

The chapter on operations in Western Europe in 1944 and the level of meticulous logistics planning conducted is particularly instructive. Van Creveld asserts that had allied operational planners effectively reacted to the information they received from the battlefield, instead of sticking to an orchestrated plan, the campaign may have ended by the end of 1944.

In the Postscript, written some 30 years after the first edition, Van Creveld highlights the changes that have occurred since this book was first published. Key amongst these is that warfare has become more complex and that the logistics support requirements of modern weapon systems have become more demanding. In this regard Van Creveld provides a useful but short analysis of the 1991 Gulf War and the role that logistics played in its success. This remains a book well worth reading, especially for those involved in force structuring and policy development. ♦

Martin van Creveld, 'Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton', Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2004, Softback, 131pp., RRP \$59.95.

