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OUR COVER

According to many pundits, the world changed on September 11th with the terrorist attacks on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington.

In our lead article beginning on page 6, Michael O'Connor suggests that in fact this is not so and that treating these events as something revolutionary may in fact play into the hands of the terrorists.

Elsewhere, terrorism expert, Clive Williams, suggests that bio-terrorism is not all that it's cracked up to be by some of the pundits.

Our cover photograph of New York firemen at the so-called Ground Zero at the World Trade Center emphasises the role of many of our social institutions in defending society against such attacks.

Washington Post photo

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EDITORIAL

Defence Overstretch

The ADF is currently being pushed toward a crisis point. It manifests clear signs of being over committed. Too many different tasks in too many different places are being demanded of the ADF which, over the last decade, has been systematically reduced in size.

Improved weapons and equipment have increased combat capacity to some extent, however, acute shortages of basic gear and equipment add to the lack of mass due to the reduction in personnel. Technology alone, unlike military forces, cannot seize and hold ground or deal with attacking ships or aircraft.

The over-stretching of the ADF is revealed in its declining ability to sustain force numbers, levels of equipment and stores, and a reserve capacity in units. The reorganization of DoD and various ADF headquarters has not given any significant increase in the teeth to tail ratio. Preoccupied with yet another reorganization, it is small wonder that the rank and file have little respect for the hierarchy.

The RAAF is unable to maintain one aircrew for each F-111 and F/A18 – a level that is totally unacceptable for even ‘peace-time’. The RAAF is not capable of providing sustained support to a serious regional engagement. The simple mechanism of offering short service commissions to maintain numbers and build a pilot reserve has been rejected on the specious basis of the cost of flying time and the problems of rank.

The Army, which has been given loud public praise for its work in East Timor, is in a precarious state. Even the deployment of 5,000 troops to Timor could only be maintained for four months. Many units, such as those which have continued to be rotated through Timor, face burn out. Most units are significantly under strength as personnel take accumulated leave, training courses, complete exercises, and move to new positions on promotion.

The government restrictions on recruitment mean that replacements fail to fill the gaps and the idea of a reinforcement battalion is a cruel joke. Indeed, the current structure of a brigade each with only two under-strength battalions contradicts the meaning and purpose of a brigade.

The Navy is currently undergoing one of the worst forms of overuse. Seven of nine frigates are deployed on operations. This means that both ships and their crews are getting inadequate care. Repairs and maintenance of the ships are out of cycle while crew leave, training and postings are largely on hold. We must either increase the number of warships or decrease the number of operations.

Moreover, the major political parties must return to the proper use of our naval forces. The navy’s role should be restricted to the use of lethal force in war, deterrence of threats and rescue of those in danger at sea.

One of the best ways to sap morale is to turn naval crews into bullies and quasi-police. The contradictory picture of Australian policy, which has been projected across the region, has destroyed the humanitarian good the navy had done in saving ‘boat-people’.

Government must reaffirm the fundamental purpose of the ADF. It is for the defence of Australia and Australia’s interests. The neglect of our military forces and their equipment, coupled with the bureaucratic strangle-hold exercised by the department, has left Australia in this time of regional and global conflict under strength and ill-prepared to meet future demands. The ‘Just-in-Time’ managerial conduct of defence is not an appropriate or clever way to protect this nation. The ADF should not perform non-military operations on the whim of government, as if it were some local volunteer fire brigade. ■

AUSTRALIA DEFENCE ASSOCIATION

The Australia Defence Association is a company (ABN 16 083 007 390) limited by guarantee and registered under the Corporations Law. It seeks to promote, foster and encourage the best form of defence for Australia.


The Association seeks the development and implementation of a national security policy based upon deterrence and directed at:

- a security strategy based on the protection of identifiable national interests, including the security of our region;
- the development of adequate forces-in-being capable of supporting that policy; and
- the development of an Australian manufacturing industry capable of sustaining Defence Force operations.

The Association seeks the support by subscription of all Australians.

The Association has a number of local chapters throughout Australia. It publishes a quarterly journal, a monthly briefing and a site on the Internet’s World Wide Web as well as occasional papers. It makes regular submissions to the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade as well as to other parliamentary and external inquiries.

The Association corresponds and co-operates with a number of individuals and institutes in 12 allied and friendly nations in the Pacific Basin.



LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

None of us will forget the events of the September 11th World Trade Centre tragedy, coupled with what quickly followed, as Australia committed its military resources to an American-led coalition. This disaster ignited a personal curiosity as to whether the Australian military could fulfil its obligation in its capacity to respond. Using the Internet, I was able to locate the resources necessary to satisfy my inquisitiveness. The countless documents and briefs published by both past and present governments and civilian organisations, most notably the Australian Defence Association, were freely accessible. What I found left me with the disposition of vulnerability and insecurity. I must admit, I have taken little interest in our military capabilities and resources, until now.

The ADF appears to have been strangled in its ability to prove a strong deterrent and protector of our nation and national interests. Where are our aircraft carriers and destroyers, which provide essential air and landing cover for our troops? I don't need to remind you that Australia is the 6th largest country on the planet and the Royal Australian Navy seems to have been stripped to a bare bones fighting force clearly inadequate to patrol and protect our coastline, trade and shipping corridors. Our Army also seems in a state of decline. Having reviewed their recent operations in East Timor; it would appear that there is an extreme shortfall of combat troops, equipment and logistic support. To think, in order to sustain operations, our small-deployed force needed to draw on our reserve units to bolster our regular enlistments. This in itself highlights the need to immediately address critical shortages in all areas of the Army. In addition, the Royal Australian Air Force also suffers from tactical and forward planning deficiencies.

Surely, a country as wealthy as ours that cannot maintain even a nominal military force begs answers to many questions. I realise that we rely on our allies to support us in any military involvement, be it peacekeeping or otherwise. However, we must be able to stand on our own two feet first. Are we relying too heavily on our military alliances? Are we able to support our allies in their time of need? It would appear a token offering at best. From the many documents and briefs publicly available, the information presents an ADF that lacks the necessary resources, funds and federal government commitment for it to operate as an effective unit and, I might add, the primary unit responsible for our regional security. I will not support any policy that subjects the ADF to cutbacks and fiscal constraints because an imminent threat is not foreseeable in the near

future. The truth is, no one can foretell the future nor can we simply ignore our destiny. The fact remains, only a strong and robust ADF presents itself as a regional deterrent. It also provides the basis for measured international political clout when the need arises. The time for action is immediate. Procrastination is now our greatest enemy. The motto 'Be Prepared' was coined for a reason. It is disgraceful that after two world wars and many smaller intense conflicts involving the Australian military, we have yet to learn from the lessons of the past. Give me a government that pursues this crisis with vigour, determination and resolve and I will pledge my loyalty as I suspect many Australian citizens would.

Whilst I have no military training, nor am I versed in military strategy and analysis as such, my views and comments are my own, a civilian perspective. Those views may differ from the wider community perception but I am surmising that most people have no idea or are less informed than myself. I hope that changes. By nature, I am no alarmist either, however, my deep concern for the state of the ADF has prompted me into some form of action, such as this letter, to ensure that my children and the generations that follow them will have faith in the knowledge that a strong and resourceful ADF will ensure the pursuit of regional peace and security.

Michael Lacey
mlacey@iprimus.com.au

Here are some observations about the Arabic/Islamic culture I believe are relevant to our current war. It is said by those of the East that "We have honour, the West has honesty" It is impossible to interact successfully with the Arabic/Islam culture without grasping the importance of face and reputation. Until the counter culture in the West also "clothes maketh the man" this is still true in the Middle East where there is a culture built on class differences (In some ways it is feudal. It is also impossible to understand Islam without understanding the centrality of gracious hospitality. Is this important? I believe it is. I am of the view (a view checked against the perceptions of Muslims I know) that the Taleeban went as far as they were able within the confines of the Arabic/Islam tradition when they stated that they would ask Bin Layden to leave. I believe at this

DEFENDER welcomes readers letters but reserves the right to edit any more than 300 words in length.

point they were looking for a “face-saving way out”. This decision was made by the council of Muslim clerics.

I would at this at this point mention the example of Syria’s treatment of Erchalan the leader of the PKK. Turkey asked Syria to hand him over. Syria said no. They also said that they would “ask him to leave. Erchalan went first to Greece then to Italy were the waters were further muddied and finally to Kenya were he was eventually captured by Turkish agents. It has been put to me that this was all largely orchestrated to protect Syria’s face

With respect to our current strategy - that of pressuring national governments to crack down on terrorists - I believe it is important to recognise that the role of the state in many of these societies is much less that it is in the West. The person’s family is in effect the person’s state. The family provide for its members in unemployment and when aged, the persons family has the right to discipline unto death its own and traditionally the state didn’t interfere. In this respect its instructive to explore the fate of Saddam Hussein’s sons-in-law. They returned to Iraq after being given assurances that Saddam Hussein would not punish them. He didn’t. Their own families killed them for if they hadn’t the family’s honour would have suffered and the family’s status within the community destroyed. It follows that the role of the state in peoples lives is much less than in the West and therefore the tools available to the state to track down and root out terrorism is less.

It follows that in some circumstances punishing regimes for a failure to address terrorism will hurt our friends and have little or no impact on terrorists.

**Cr Kevin Walsh RFD
Keysborough, Vic**

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has rebuffed a sounding out of Australia to contribute troops to a stabilizing peace-keeping force for Afghanistan. His response is both inevitable and tragic. Inevitable because successive governments from both parties have, for two decades now, whittled away the combat size of the Australian Army whilst allowing the parasitic defence department to grow and the officer corps likewise.

This reduction in core combat capability was extensively documented in last year’s Parliamentary Report, *From Phantom to Force, towards a more efficient army*, a report which the government has

studiously ignored.

Mr Downer’s response is also tragic because it again reveals his patent failure to articulate and implement a long term strategy to advance Australia’s interests. Those interests include the spread and implementation of democratic values and institutions wherever possible, especially in those countries which are currently brutalized and providing the bulk of Australia’s refugee problem.

The Australian Defence Force is one of the most skilled, respected and experienced peace- enforcing institutions in the world. In terms of training and operations, it could, if sufficiently resourced, play a useful role in bringing not just stability, but also democratic freedom to Afghanistan. In the world of instant communications such a development would not only reduce the flow of refugees from that area – it would increase pressure throughout the Islamic world for similar freedoms. It is the growth of such freedoms that will ultimately remove the poverty, ignorance and corruption that spawns followers for the likes of Osama Bin Laden.

It may be that the bulk of any U.N. force should comprise forces from other Islamic countries. But it is a matter of shame that Australia does not have the capacity or will to make any contribution at all.

**David Forbes
Melbourne, Vic**

The full report referred to above can be found on the Internet at:

<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/Army/DEFARMYrptindx.htm>

Prime minister Howard said that Australia would commit armed forces to the US-led coalition in the war against terrorism “to the limit of our capabilities.”

Does 1550 personnel, a handful of aircraft and three ships with no more than 150 SAS personnel actually likely to see combat represent “the limit of our capabilities”? Two months later, the SAS soldiers are still in Australia.


Even allowing that we still have 1500 troops in East Timor plus a large proportion of the navy chasing asylum seekers, this says more about our lack of capabilities than anything else. If this is what last year’s White Paper and community consultation promised, what a waste of effort it all was.

The simple fact is that we do not have a defence force capable of defending this country or its interests against a serious adversary. I am concerned, too, that the Defence Association has become a prisoner of the political orthodoxy instead of a fighter for a real defence capability.

**Stan Wallace
Kensington SA**



*The Editorial Board and
their volunteer assistants
wish all readers of
Defender a very happy
Christmas and a peaceful,
secure 2002*



COMBATTING TERRORISM

by Michael O'Connor

Michael O'Connor is executive director of the Australia Defence Association

If one were to believe some of the more excitable commentary, the events of September 11th in New York and Washington have had a dramatic and lasting effect on life in the West. Our societies are now faced with an immediate threat of a new kind of warfare which has permanently transformed our way of life. Terrorism is a new kind of enemy and we are not well equipped to deal with it. A degree of panic on stock exchanges is offered as evidence for the change.

In reality, our society has not been weakened. Most human societies and their individual peoples are actually very resilient. Whether they are natural or man-made, shocks have an immediate effect but are relatively speedily overcome. Terrorism is not a new weapon; rather it has a long if dishonoured history in human affairs. Coping with terrorism, however, demands that we understand its nature and how best to defeat it.

Defining terrorism

A common saying is that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter". Usually used in the context of stifling or distracting genuine debate, it is nevertheless a difficult assertion to counter without an agreed definition of terrorism. As usual, the Oxford Dictionary offers a good guide with its core definition of 'terror' being 'extreme fear'. Almost everything else derives from that.

Following that definition, a terrorist is one who seeks to generate extreme fear while terrorism is the deliberate generation of extreme fear as a matter of conscious policy. Fear, of course, is a normal human emotion. It arises largely from life threatening or apparent life-threatening circumstances over which, as individuals, we have limited control. In many cases, it can be a valuable emotion. It can be psychologically strengthening as well as physically protective.

That loss of control is a key element in any examination of terrorism. Fear is an environmental phenomenon. A Papua New Guinean villager translated to a large Australian city would feel he had lost control trying to cross a busy street, something most of us take in our stride. On the other hand, an ordinary Australian suburbanite dumped without prior experience in the Papua New Guinea jungle at night would most certainly feel a similar loss of control over his personal security.

A trained soldier will experience fear on a hostile battlefield but, through his training, will normally be able to overcome that fear but our same untrained suburbanite, especially if he is unarmed, will experience extreme fear or terror.

All this leads towards a core definition of terrorism. Terrorism is a weapon used by the terrorist who targets the ordinary person who is faced suddenly with the loss of control over his comfortable environment. It is not a weapon to be used against the trained soldier, an armed individual trained to take control of his environment to defend himself and to defend others.

To focus the concept a little more, the IRA bomber who sets off a car bomb in a shopping or business centre is a terrorist. His target is the defenceless civilian going about his or her daily life and feeling secure. The same IRA member who ambushes an army or armed police patrol is not, by that act, a terrorist whatever the propaganda machines may claim. He is in fact a guerilla or freedom fighter who is taking on an armed and trained enemy. In practice, he is only called a terrorist if he is successful in his ambush. If he's unsuccessful, he is called a loser or an idiot!

What of the assassin, the individual all too often classed as a terrorist? If he kills a protected target such as a president or prime minister, can he be regarded as a terrorist? To do so confuses the issue because a terrorist is defined as much by his target as any other factor. His motivation is unimportant except to the extent that it guides his strategy.

So then, a terrorist is a person who attacks the defenceless with the aim not only of generating extreme fear but also sowing a loss of confidence in the agencies of government whose task it is to provide security. More importantly, terrorism is a tool of those whose real target is the stability of the existing social order. The cause does not matter all that much. It may be a good or a bad cause depending upon your point of view. The important characteristic of terrorism is the nature of the tool; arguing about the cause or even the purveyor is pointless because it does not and can never justify the use of the tool.

Furthermore, it is - or may be - legitimate to attack a state apparatus which is oppressive, especially where the normal political or military means of eliminating that oppression are not available. To draw on the Western and mainly Christian tradition of the just war, there are a number of conditions that must be met if armed assault or war is to be justified. Briefly, and drawing upon the Catechism of the Catholic Church (whose tradition is followed by most Christian churches and mainstream Islam), these are:

- the damage inflicted by the aggressor must be lasting, grave and certain;
- all other means of ending the conflict must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective;

- there must be serious prospects of success; and
- the use of arms must not produce evils graver than that to be eliminated.

There is a further condition which is that “the evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgement of those who have responsibility for the common good.”¹

Clearly, acceptance of these conditions which have governed the principles if not the persistent practice of civilised communities rule out any question of the legitimacy of terrorism, whether that weapon is used by a state, a sub-national organisation or an individual. It is of no matter whether the cause is legitimate; use of the weapon can never be legitimate because of the nature of the immediate target. Terrorism is terrorism because it attacks the defenceless.

Resisting terrorism

A lady of my acquaintance expressed concern to me recently that it would be better if the United States and those other allied countries including Australia were to refuse to seek out those responsible for the attacks on the United States on September 11th because of the damage they are doing. This was a lady of impeccable moral character and she was expressing concerns felt by many good people. Is she - are they - right? In response, consider the following.

The terrorist aims to generate extreme fear as a means of attacking social stability. It is the role of government - in any society - to provide and protect social stability. In the recent election campaign, we heard a lot of promises about hand-outs to various sectors of the community but these are only made possible because of a general agreement that the Australian government, regardless of party, has met its first responsibility, that of ensuring and protecting social stability to a satisfactory degree.

No government that wishes to remain legitimate can stand aside from the events of September 11th without doing all in its power consistent with the just war rules to bring to justice those responsible for the deaths of some 6,000 of its citizens going about their daily business. The US government not only has the right to do so but is constitutionally and morally bound to do so. If it did not, it would abandon any claim to legitimacy.

We may argue about the methods - whether they are effective, unduly destructive or whatever but these are arguments over process, not objectives. In this context, President Bush's first address from the White House on September 11th when he said that the US response would be led by intelligence and law enforcement agencies was a precise and valid statement of process as well as objective.

That situation changed when the Taliban so-called government of Afghanistan offered support and protection to Osama bin Laden to ensure that he was not brought before a criminal court with legitimate jurisdiction. In so

doing, it aligned itself as a state sponsor of terrorism and therefore as a legitimate enemy of the United States and its allies. It may be possible to criticise Bush for his use of the emotive word ‘war’ but there can be no doubt that the use of military force will be necessary if ordinary law enforcement organisations are insufficient.

Consider the contrast with that other serious terrorist attack in the US by Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma bomber. He was tracked down by the law enforcement agencies of the state and brought before a criminal court, tried, convicted and punished according to law. The same happened with the culprits of the earlier bombing of the World Trade Center.

In the case of Osama bin Laden, the fact of the protection if not sponsorship provided by Taliban, the *de facto* government of Afghanistan, has converted this affair from one of terrorism to one of war between two states. The US-led coalition can no more turn its back on this conflict than was possible in Hitler's war.

Could Australia stand aside? Leaving aside the legal effect of the ANZUS Treaty, terrorism is as much an attack on Australian society as on American. Here in Australia, we saw with the lunatic hoaxes derived from the biological assault on the US that the potential for generating fear in our comfortable society was very real. For a number of reasons, it is doubtful whether Australia is a very rewarding target but there can be little doubt that we are a target because we are what we are - a stable, sophisticated, well-governed and comfortable society that is vulnerable to fear precisely because we are stable, sophisticated, well-governed and comfortable.

Defeating terrorism

Despite the enthusiasm of the media for lots of bombs, bodies and blood on our nightly television or morning papers, defeating terrorism is all about solid and unspectacular security and law enforcement. That arises from one fundamental principle. Whether the terrorist kills one innocent person or ten thousand, he is a criminal and must be treated as such.

Moreover, because his act is fundamentally a crime, the normal systems of crime prevention will insulate society from terrorism if they are implemented effectively.

That means that the war on terrorism will be fought primarily by police and even private security firms but also by a range of systems that we tend to take for granted. Take for example the response to the recent hoaxes that arose from the anthrax scare. Both here and in the United States, the emergency services and public health systems went into action smoothly and efficiently. If the attacks had been real biological warfare attacks, our society would have coped. The cost of these defence systems is considerable but, as with all social defence mechanisms, they are a form of social insurance far more critical to a working society than many of the social welfare programs by which we measure political success.

¹ Catechism of the Catholic Church 1994 (official English edition) Art 2309

There is a further insurance premium. As we increase security protective measures - at airports for example - public resistance will grow because of a perception of interference with our treasured freedoms or simple convenience. The test here is for the security services themselves. They must balance the need for security with the need to protect the freedoms. In general, the intensity of security measures will vary according to the current assessment of the threat and that assessment must come from the intelligence services which in turn must have the ability to collect information and analyse effectively the data collected.

Two problems are faced by security services. First, there is an all-too-human tendency to overstate the threat partly to play safe and partly to protect and expand the bureaucratic interest. That is natural and normal and will be dealt with not merely by a healthy degree of scepticism but also an engagement by the political level of government that treats these systems as something essential to social security even if they are not politically sexy.

Secondly, there is the inevitable tendency on the part of security personnel to complacency. Procedures become routine and all too often neglected because the threat is considered somewhat remote, even unreal. Security personnel require training not merely in the processes they carry out but also to enhance their judgement and personal alert levels.

What of the media? This is a very tricky area. A free media is one of the strongest social security systems we possess. But to be truly effective, people working in the media need to be better informed and educated. Too many rely uncritically on handouts, leaks and misinformation. They have a tendency to extrapolate from limited incidents to wide and generalised assumptions. Moreover, they depend heavily on imagery, colour and sensation to attract the attention their proprietors and editors demand. These tendencies have the capacity to reinforce fear - to multiply the terrorists' effect. In that sense, the media become actors rather than reporters or observers. Solving this problem has to begin within the media organisations themselves, the schools of journalism and so on. It is not something that can be imposed from outside but governments do have a role to play in being more free with the information they disclose because the best defence against fear is knowledge.

Conclusion

Finally, let me offer some thoughts on the direction in which some would wish to push this conflict - a kind of 'holy' war between the (nominally) Christian West and the Islamic world. It is an exercise in misinformation where the terrorists are finding too many gullible supporters in the West.

Islam is not the enemy in this war. True Islam is a religion of peace, humanity and tolerance. Like Christianity, however, it has its extremists. Osama bin Laden and the Taliban are representatives of one of the most extreme sects in Islam - the Wahabis. Their claim that they are implementing the will of God is blasphemous in the true Islamic faith as it would be blasphemous in a Christian. Their principal target is less the West itself than the governments of Muslim countries. Moderate Muslim countries like Indonesia and Malaysia face a greater threat from the Muslim extremists than any country in the West.



Police are the first line of defence against terrorism

On the other hand, to blame the West for the injustices suffered by those living under nominally Muslim governments is to adopt the pseudo-intellectual fad of blaming others for your own irresponsible or criminal acts. Take for example the issue of infant mortality in Iraq. There are many in the West who agree with Saddam Hussein's claims that the West's

imposed economic sanctions are responsible for however many thousands of deaths. Personally, I do not support those sanctions because economic sanctions never work against a repressive government. But it is a fact that Iraq has a national income that is more than adequate to support a prosperous and healthy community. But it can't do that and spend vast sums on weapons including weapons of mass destruction. The solution to Iraq's infant mortality problem - if in fact it does exist as more than a work of misinformation - lies in Baghdad, not in New York or Washington.

For a society such as ours, defeating terrorism is easy. We have the systems in place and do not need to restrict normal freedoms. But because the aim of the terrorist is to generate extreme fear, we can only lose if we lose confidence in our society, its structures and ourselves. ■



CURRENT COMMENT

by *AUSTRALIS*

AUSTRALIS is a collective name for a number of individual contributors to *Defender*

■ *The RAN and the asylum seekers*

Twenty five years ago, young Australian sailors were rescuing Vietnamese asylum seekers who have since contributed much to our peaceful and tolerant multicultural society. I personally have vivid memories of burly Australian sailors hoisting Vietnamese babies into HMAS *Swan*.

For anyone with an understanding of a new generation of Australian military personnel, claims by navy doctor Duncan Wallace that naval personnel involved in intercepting asylum seekers were increasingly demoralised are perfectly understandable.

Young Australians who join the navy know that their primary tasks are to fight wars in the defence of their country or to help those in peril on the seas. In recent years, they have been increasingly misemployed as policemen.

But arresting lawbreakers and bringing them to trial in Australian courts is one thing. Here they are being directed to enforce a law of dubious validity and constitutionality.

There is no doubt that many Australians have serious reservations about accepting the current flow of asylum seekers into Australia. But that is not the issue and the Australia Defence Association does not have a policy on that point because it is not our business as an organisation. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that the government does not purport to exclude from normal processing those asylum seekers who make it to Australian territory, Australian national vessels or the new Australian-funded refugee camps scattered around the Pacific. Many of these people will be cleared for permanent settlement in Australia so the policy the navy is required to enforce achieves nothing.

The fundamental flaw in the current policy is the assertion that, by preventing these asylum seekers from landing on Australian territory, we have somehow solved the problem. That is only true if the problem is defined as keeping the electorate happy. The policy descends into high farce with the pretence that Australian territories such as Christmas Island or Australian national vessels are somehow not part of Australia for the purposes of the Act.

Similarly, suggestions by the Opposition that a coastguard would fix the problem or that some deal should be done with Indonesia to stop them coming are

meaningless. The problem is an immediate one and, with the best will in the world, a coastguard is simply not available.

As for Indonesia, no one seems to recognise two practical realities. Indonesia wants to get rid of these people because they are a drain on Indonesia's resources and, secondly, the Indonesian government is manifestly incapable of controlling its own corrupt government agencies.

The policy of attempting to force asylum seekers in their leaking, overcrowded and decrepit vessels back to the open ocean and away from Australian territory is contrary to both their personal ideals and naval tradition. They know - far better than their comfortable shore-bound fellow citizens - that the sea is a dangerous and hostile environment, one not lightly risked by the asylum seekers.

They also know that they did not join the navy to man prison ships as happened with the amphibious ships, *Manoora* and *Tobruk*. Despite government propaganda that the asylum seekers transported to Nauru and elsewhere were not imprisoned, the sailors know otherwise.

They also know that they are bound to comply with the law which is currently uncertain. They know that they may be imprisoning or detaining people unlawfully. They know they will not be protected by the fact that they are following orders if those orders are later shown to be unlawful.

When those orders also conflict with their normal humanitarian instincts, Dr Wallace's claims of harmful effects on their psychological health and moral development are understandable.

Of course, the navy will do what the government orders it to do. If there were a serious threat to Australia's security, there would be no hesitation. But to see the typical asylum seeker as a threat who must not be allowed to land on Australian soil is stretching credulity for the sailors who actually deal with them.

At the other end of the scale is the fact that some sailors have had to cope with hostile, aggressive and insulting behaviour by a small proportion of the asylum seekers, especially when these are being transported to the Pacific island camps. They are required to deal with these people without proper training or equipment in ships ill-suited for the control of aggressive and hostile people. They too will feel resentful of the task they have been

given, clearly with little thought for the difficulties or consequences.

Their resentment will manifest itself in a number of ways, one of which will be an increased rate of departures from a Service already at crippling low staffing levels.

Another manifestation of their concern which may already be in evidence is the seeming difficulty of repairing broken down engines on the refugee boats. Given the technical expertise of our sailors, one is entitled to wonder whether their resentment is not being displayed in a degree of constructive incompetence.

At this moment, around three quarters of the Australian navy is committed to operations in one sphere or another. This is a navy kept short of ships by successive penny-pinching governments.

The navy is supposed to have fourteen frigates. Currently it has nine and seven of these are committed to a range of continuing tasks including intercepting asylum seekers, the war on terrorism and peacekeeping.

Over committing this diminutive fleet threatens the navy's ability to meet its commitments for the next decade. Maintenance and modernisation programs will be delayed, crew training will be set back and training for our submarine force will also be crippled.

The present government is not unique in using the armed forces as some sort of obedient response force to do its political dirty work. But it should not be surprised if the troops themselves rebel in whatever ways are legally open to them, either now or in the future. The navy, indeed the whole defence force, is characterised not merely by its competence but by its loyalty. But that loyalty is a sensitive plant which has to be nurtured rather than exploited. ●

■ Election 2001

For what too many commentators were calling a 'khaki' election, there is little evidence that any of the political parties in the 2001 Federal election have more than a passing interest in defence. Of course, the political journalists are in even worse case because they are limited to displaying their ignorance rather than any familiarity with defence policy.

A measured response 'within Australia's capabilities' to the September 11th attacks on the United States may have offered a tinge of khaki to the political campaign but when there was no comparison made to what Australia should be capable of in the event of a direct attack on this country, it is hard to perceive any political interest in defence.

Of the minor parties, the Democrats failed to publish a defence policy. Similarly, the Greens and One Nation appeared totally uninterested while the City and Country Alliance limited itself to an irrelevant call for conscription. In any case, the minor parties had no chance of forming government and, therefore, have little interest in producing whole policies.

Inevitably, the main parties' policies spent some space tilting at each other's performance. Thus, the Coalition's policy correctly pointed out that Labor, in 13 years of government, cut the size of the ADF by 15,000 (or 20.5 per cent) but avoided pointing out that the Coalition oversaw a cut of some 9000 (or 15.5 per cent) in just five years.

The Coalition policy also - equally correctly - noted that Labor cut the proportion of Federal outlays devoted to defence from 9.4 per cent to 8.0 per cent without noting that the Coalition's outlay fell to 7.4 per cent of a markedly smaller (as a proportion of GDP) total Federal Budget.

The message was that neither party should stand on its record. Indeed, they should have explained not only how they would do better but also how they would sustain their commitments.

Coalition

The 48 page Coalition policy raised the possibility of substantially expanding the responsibilities of the Defence organisation and widening the scope of ADF operations especially in such areas as law enforcement (or border protection) and defence against terrorist attacks including those involving radiological, biological and chemical weapons. At first glance, this seems to be a rational response to the recent attacks on the United States and the growth in people smuggling directed against Australia.

Nevertheless, there is a sense that, while these moves may not constitute an over-reaction, they do tend to further dilute the capacity of the ADF for combat operations. They reflect a utilitarian tendency to see the ADF as some sort of asset just waiting to be used in many different non-combat situations and, all too often, at the expense of combat capability.

The proposed expansion of Defence responsibilities tends to take the department even further away from its principal external defence task. Perhaps the opportunity should be used to separate the department and its expanding role from the ADF whose primary task is war fighting.

That said, considerable care must be exercised to avoid using the ADF in law enforcement. If law enforcement operations are required, they must be placed in the hands of properly authorised and well resourced law enforcement agencies.

One highlight of the policy is a significant reform of the acquisition process that will save costs for Defence and stabilise industry by assigning specific production responsibilities to a small number of 'Tier 1' companies. This proposal which will select prime contractors to specialise in specific areas of equipment production - such as frigates, for example - will transfer both risk and project management tasks from the Defence department to the contractor. Properly managed, it should result in greater efficiency, both in cost and productivity terms.

Labor

Apart from the Coastguard commitment (which is closely modelled on a 24-year old ADA proposal), Labor indicated that it would have carried out a significant reform of the higher defence organisation and at least cast a jaundiced eye over the iconic diarchy between the CDF and the Secretary. Again, this followed a core policy of the Association and was much to be welcomed.

Labor's proposal for a ministry of Home Security seemed sensible. It was intended to take control of the Coastguard as well as a range of other new tasks which the Coalition proposes to place under the Defence Department. In fact, the policymaking functions of the Defence Department could usefully be transferred to the Home Security ministry, leaving the rest to provide support such as procurement and financial management for the ADF, allowing that organisation to get on with its proper task of ensuring the military defence of Australia and military support for our foreign policy. The re-elected government could do worse than adopt these Labor (oops, ADA) policies and weather the inevitable copy-cat accusations.

Conclusion

The biggest problem at any election for the voter interested in defence issues is to garner confidence that electoral promises will be kept. As we have pointed out over the years, defence is only marginally governed by legislation. Defence policy and its implementation is essentially a matter for the executive government. It cannot spend more than is approved by Parliament but it can spend less and it can change programs within the global allocation, almost at will.

More to the point, it has to abandon the notion that Australia cannot spend more than about 1.9 per cent of GDP on defence at a time of considerable strategic volatility. Defence must be measured by capability outputs rather than fiscal inputs. ●

■ *Blaming the United States*

It is remarkable that even well educated and intelligent people have a strong, even, obsessive desire for simple explanations of complex human affairs. The opportunity to find someone to blame for any unpleasant event also rarely attracts critical evaluation. The most preposterous conspiracy theories are repeated as being accurate explanations.

Perhaps no nation in recent history has been the subject of such a huge number of wild and hostile criticisms. They range from the US being too generous in aid to being the most extravagant users of resources.

A result of the long and dynamic history there has emerged what is termed the 'American way'. This is an attitude that difficulties can be overcome and a solution can be found to all problems – no matter their nature.

Americans apply this 'can do approach' to virtually all facets of life. It has many positive consequences. These can readily be identified in areas such as medicine, inventiveness, large-scale production in agriculture and industry. The impact of the massive productive wealth of America, its high standards of living for a majority of its citizens and the unmistakable exercise of its economic and military power cause many people in other nations to feel resentful, envious and inferior.

The American drive to do things their way is a direct reflection of the human and economic costs they have had to pay in involvement with Europe and other nations. The US isolationist sentiment is strong – many Americans would like to ignore the rest of the world and enjoy the riches of their own. In their struggle to become a free democratic nation, and as part of their development as a powerful and rich nation, the US has become convinced that it has found the best ways to achieve objectives.

The US thus promotes democracy and human rights as a central part of foreign policy. Yet there is no absolute consensus in the US about the degree to which these aspects of policy should be pressed on other nations. Americans are their own greatest critics and they too have real concerns about how to treat other nations.

Should the US have one standard of human rights for all nations? Should economic and democratic development be given priority with the hope that human rights will in turn improve? Indeed, the US is one of the most open and critical societies, however, it will seek to further its national interests, as do all other nations, but it will also spend much of its treasure assisting others. The greatest fault, probably, is that the US does not act on the world stage in the way the others feel it should. The US should be more like them.

The comments by some intellectuals and political activists in Australia that the US had brought the 11 September attack upon itself or that it deserved the attacks goes beyond the undergraduate political sneer. These comments, which have been common amongst university staff, and others, reveals a deep and sickening lack of values. To ignore the loss of lives, of people from many nations, including Australia and to claim without any evidence that the destruction of the WTO was deserved is a demonstration of willful ignorance and amorality.

The terrorists who planned and sanctioned the attack by their comrades, which killed over 5,000 innocents on 11 September, committed a criminal act of premeditated murder and should stand trial on the basis of the crime. To ignore the role and attitude of Bin Laden and his followers to Western civilization is a form of psychological denial, which gives the terrorist more power.

The US may not always have been the ideal international actor, however, it has sought to do good and is guided by a democratic system of government and a practice of human rights. In contrast to its attackers the evidence for blame in this case is overwhelming. ●

■ *Don't argue, just kill them!*

No, this is not some strident appeal to the bloodthirsty to deal with Osama bin Laden or any other terrorist. It is the political response in a neighbouring country to critics. Nor are we talking about some primitive dictatorship but about that gem of Western civilisation known as New Zealand.

Until recently, New Zealand boasted a small but capable Centre for Strategic Studies. Based at Victoria University in Wellington, it was largely and necessarily funded by the New Zealand government.

The problem was that CSS was independent and critical of the Clark (Labour) government's new 'defence' policy. It was accused of being run by an Opposition (National Party) stooge.

Can't have that in a civilised country, especially one that does not believe in defending New Zealand, except at Australia's expense. Solution: kill it. Method: cut off the funds. Result: victory.

Or is it? For Mrs Clark, maybe. For New Zealand, yet another step backwards into irrelevance. ●

■ *Who defends Australia - the ADF or the Defence organisation?*

A strange question? For most people, yes. For the hierarchy of our new 'integrated' defence organisation, not at all. In recent months, a string of circulars and instructions emanating from Defence has emphasised that this is an 'integrated' organisation with almost an incidental military or war fighting flavour.

Take for example a recent circular announcing the "new defence corporate identity. This, we are told, is designed "to enhance our public image as an integrated organisation". Thus, "for the first time Defence has an identity, a symbol which represents Defence as a whole and provides a way of visually linking the military and civilian elements of the organisation."

The circular goes on to make some extraordinary claims. For example, it states that: "This integrated approach to corporate identity management will strengthen the individual Service identities providing an environment in which their traditional 'brands' can be enhanced."

It argues - sorry, asserts - that: "The need to understand how our external audience sees us is fundamental to the introduction of the new corporate identity." According to the authors, the "external audience" (that's the taxpayer and citizen) sees Defence as a single entity rather than as the three Services and their "support" organisation.

That actually sounds more like justification for the move rather than, as is claimed, the product of research and analysis. What is significant in our view is the use of the term "support". The department is a support organisation for the ADF, not a core element of a war-



fighting combat force designed for the defence of Australia.

Of course, a central element to this exercise is just another example of the belief, strong in the top levels in Defence, that the ADF and its support organisation is just another civilian business corporation. The Public Affairs and Corporate Communications branch which has launched this exercise is another conventional corporate image-building machine. Consider this gem:

"A well managed visual identity is an important part of building a more coherent Defence reputation. Defence must take an integrated and proactive approach to defining and influencing its corporate identity. Having a concise and commonly shared understanding of that identity is fundamental to effective reputation management."

And again, this time from that integrated entity, the Secretary and CDF:

"Defence has four main corporate identities that coexist: Navy, Army, Air Force and Defence. The Navy, Army and Air Force corporate identities are strong and the Services are acting to enhance and protect them. The corporate identity for Defence as a whole and its civilian components, however, lacks focus suggesting that Defence is a less than cohesive organisation."

The corporate logo (nothing like an expensive image-making logo to fix things) is designed to inspire. You be the judge. ●

■ *Not too much - just a fair share*

If you believe that Defence has been getting too much of the government's largesse at the expense of health, education and welfare, read on. You might learn something. If, on the other hand, you reckon that Defence has not been getting its fair share, don't read on if you fear apoplexy.

Over the past 30 years, revenue acquired compulsorily by all levels of government in Australia (Federal, State and local) has grown from 27.5 per cent of GDP to 43.9 per cent of GDP, that is from somewhat more than one-quarter of the national wealth to more than two-fifths.

Over the same period, GDP - the national wealth - has grown by 176 per cent in real - adjusted for inflation - terms. That is, the pool from which governments derive their income has almost doubled. Taken with the increased proportion of the pool grabbed by government, all government spending has grown over the 30 years by 268 per cent in real terms.

Where does it all go and, more particularly, where has the extra gone? The following Table drawn from Australian Bureau of Statistics figures shows where the 30 year growth in outlays has gone.

PURPOSE	PER CENT
General public service	176.0
DEFENCE	46.6
Public order and safety	417.5
Education	280.4
Health	481.6
Social security and welfare	537.4
Housing and community amenities	145.3
Recreation and culture	498.0
Transport and communications	261.4
Other (industry, debt interest etc)	137.8

The growth in Defence outlays has averaged less than 1.5 per cent per annum over those 30 years even though real wages which make up around 80 per cent of direct and indirect costs have grown by more each year. This is not a bad measure of the decline in defence capability from a base level which was nothing to write home about anyway.

Copy this item and send it to your local member of parliament and demand an explanation. ■

■ *Women in combat*

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The real problem is the vulnerability of men! When recruiting rates were low for the US armed services following the Vietnam War, Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird directed the services to employ more women by mid-1977. Female-friendly policies were initiated. In the different international circumstances of the 1980s, under President Reagan, America regained its sense of national purpose, and male recruiting rates soared. Now they have plummeted again, and there is a demand for women to be integrated into combat units.

One of the critics of this proposal is anthropologist Dr Anna Simons, associate professor at the Naval

Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. She believes there are powerful military reasons against placing women in combat. And one of them, paradoxically, is not so much the vulnerability of women, but the vulnerability of men. Of that, more later.

Writing in *Parameters*, the quarterly journal of the US Army War College, Dr Simons says there are at least two reasons why the women in combat proposal is being advanced. One is essentially an extreme feminist argument: the only important war to be waged is the gender war, and so women must not be excluded from one of the last all-male occupations, military combat. But she thinks the more relevant reason may be the desire for promotion by female officers. They want the chance to compete directly against men for higher command positions.

Meanwhile there is a conspicuous silence about whether women would actually improve combat effectiveness. What would women contribute to a rifle platoon, asks Simons. "The short answer is: distraction, dissension, and distrust. The longer answer has to do with cohesion, bonding, and the vulnerability of men."

Muddled thinking about combat

One reason the women in combat proposal is discussed seriously arises from muddled thinking about the nature of combat itself. Simons says women and men work together, under stress, in tight quarters, on construction sites, in operating theatres, in the corporate world, and in risky and demanding jobs throughout the military

Does combat represent simply a more intense version of these other occupations? No, says Simons. Combat is not a workplace, and no other environment is so unforgivingly relentless. In the military, front line units differ in kind, not degree, from other units.

Dr Simons observes that despite the usual comparisons that are made, nothing in the civilian world replicates the hazards of combat, or its demands. "Members of police and fire departments may come close in terms of the risks they run on duty But 'on duty' means they work in shifts. War doesn't occur in shifts. Neither does military training."

Police have the luxury of being able to escape from their work colleagues for predictable, guaranteed periods of time. Even when they work excessive hours, their families know where they are, and see them on a regular basis.

Combat soldiers are different. On field training exercises they will be out of touch with their families for days. On deployment, they may be away from home for months. They are stuck with each other for company.

Chemistry matters

And that brings us to the question of military cohesiveness in a combat unit. Under the conditions of enforced togetherness that combat soldiers experience, the

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“What men can't say too loudly is that, when it comes down to it, they know they can't always trust themselves. In the end, this unspoken truth is reason enough to keep combat units from being mixed, and it renders worries over women's weaknesses (whatever they might be) largely irrelevant. It's the vulnerability of men which proves the real stumbling block. Not only are men weak when it comes to women, they're partial too. This isn't just elemental; it's immutable.”

But there is a more positive way of looking at the vulnerability of men. Dr Simons suggests we consider the character of Captain Miller, played by Tom Hanks in the film *Saving Private Ryan*. “Being able to picture his wife at home in her rose garden not only kept Captain Miller sane, but noble.”

“Truth be told, men are more dependent on women than they often dare admit. Soldiers in combat seem especially dependent. We see this over and over again in written memoirs, and can hear it in Veterans' accounts.”

It also is clear in the way mail matters to soldiers; in the photos they cherish, and in the way memories and dreams sustain them. Making these contrasts with the horrific world in which they are

chemistry of the group matters, according to Simons, “more perhaps than anything else.”

“Without meaning to, women automatically alter the chemistry in all-male groups. As soon as the first soldier acts protective, defensive, flirtatious, or resentful, he initiates a dynamic which causes others to do the same, to do the opposite. or to do something else in the name of setting themselves apart.”

In a close-knit combat unit, this completely subverts the idea of individuals working together, and not at cross-purposes. Combat units, says Simons, require unquestioned mutual trust, to a greater and different degree than any other type of organization.

Simons sketches out some practical situations, which could occur. A male and female soldier are together in a foxhole, shivering and shaking, waiting in the dark for long periods. Even if there is no emotional connection between them, not everyone else in the unit may believe that. The potential alone is corrosive, giving rise to conjecture about what really happened. Conjecture breeds doubt, doubt breeds suspicion, suspicion breeds mistrust and mistrust is infectious.

placed, says Simons, may be crucial to their mental health.

They are in the world of combat, in the fog and confusion of battle where they might be killed or maimed, surrounded by filthy, smelly, foul-mouthed males. Yet they are conscious there is a far more ideal world, which places women above the fray. “All the more reason then, to treat the idea of women - girlfriends, wives, mothers, sisters, daughters - as sacrosanct.”

Despite the graphic banter about sex that goes on, women mean much more to soldiers. “Rather, they represent a contradictory bundle of things, and when [women are] absent what they evoke includes home, family, the future, and everything that's worth fighting for -nonviolence especially.”

That is reason enough, says Simons. to keep women out of combat units. ‘Combat veterans know this, but no one seems to place any importance on their views. In the women in combat debate. she says, experience seems to count for little.

For those who advocate placing women in combat units, she says, there is always the expectation that all that is required is a little more time, just a few more

enlightened males in positions of power, the filing of some better legal briefs, and final acceptance will be achieved. That expectation will continue, she believes, unless men speak out more frankly. Her comment tells us much about the air of unreality in which the debate is being conducted. ■

■ *Peacemaking in Afghanistan?*

With the apparent collapse of Afghanistan's extremist Taliban government, there will now be a bitter, probably bloody, struggle for control of the country. Given its history, any sort of stable outcome is problematic.

Afghanistan is one of a number of recognised countries that is, by any measure, a failed state. In effect, it is another Somalia, writ large. Furthermore, with the Taliban's support for Osama bin Laden's Al Q'aeda terrorist network and the widespread production of opium, it has many of the characteristics of an outlaw state. As such, it presents a serious challenge to the more conventional international community that is prepared to submit to a degree of international law.

Afghanistan is not a normal state if, by that term, we mean a community of peoples who accept a constitution that defines a system of government for all the peoples of the country. In fact, Afghanistan is a collection of often mutually hostile tribes living within a border recognised by other countries as the limits of the state of Afghanistan. Many of the tribes have no such concept and treat borders and border controls as an unwarranted interference with their 'legitimate' freedom.

In the aftermath of the collapse of Taliban and the escalation of the civil war that has been endemic in its modern manifestation at least since the early 1970s, the United Nations has decided in typical fashion that "something must be done".

As this is being written, the UN has sent a special representative to Kabul to try to negotiate the formation of a stable coalition government from all the warring factions. Given previous experience in such unstable environments, the value of any peace agreement on paper will be problematic at best. Experience rather than cynicism suggests that no faith be placed in any such agreement unless it is based upon a coalition of interests.

There is also talk of an international stabilising force similar, presumably, to the NATO-sponsored SFOR in Bosnia. Assuming a minor outbreak of commonsense, the stabilising force would have a powerful peace enforcement mandate to put a stop to fighting in the country.

After settling things down, the establishment of a more conventional peacekeeping force to supervise the implementation of a peace agreement among the factions.

This is UN peacemaking at its conventional worst. It assumes that a stable peace agreement can be negotiated - under threat if necessary - and that the local warlords will accept an international force, whether with a peace

enforcement mandate or a simple peacekeeping force. Given Afghanistan's traditions, the only difference likely between the two types of forces will be their relative vulnerability to guerilla warfare in an intensely hostile political and geographic environment.

That the UN itself is alive to the difficulty was made apparent by Secretary General Kofi Annan's statement that the UN could not afford the task and would be looking for a member state to lead - and pay - as Australia did with Interfet in East Timor.

The only country that has shown any enthusiasm so far has been Britain whose prime minister, Tony Blair, clearly knows little of his country's disastrous engagement with Afghanistan during the era of the Raj in India.

Without ruling out any commitment, Australia has reacted with considerable and worthy caution.

Any international force (for simplicity's sake, let's call it an occupation force) sent into Afghanistan will face a population, large parts of which will be hostile and with a strong warrior tradition of resistance to outsiders. Moreover, all, even those who welcome the force, will be strongly Islamic and conditioned to suspicion of 'Christians'.

This suggests that a stabilising force should comprise professional combat troops from moderate Muslim countries. Those that come immediately to mind include Turkey, Jordan, Malaysia and Bangladesh. Other possibilities would be Egypt and Nigeria. Pakistan would be ruled out because of its considerable and not always helpful engagement in Afghanistan while any Indian involvement would be seen by Pakistan as an attempt at encirclement.

Many of these are already committed to peace operations in other parts of the world and certainly none are capable of paying for the operation although there are plenty of oil-rich Middle East countries that could be pressed to put up the cash.

Undoubtedly, the United Nations is hoping that the United States will underwrite the operation and take the lead, if only because the rest of the world tends to look to the US to solve the problems they can't manage themselves. Whether the US could effectively do so, however, is very much open to doubt. Certainly it could pay but its experience in Somalia and elsewhere suggests that its people are not very good at peace operations.

In any case, an at least nominally Christian American-led force would set out with at least one strike against it.

For its part, Australia should remain uncommitted. There may be a case - if the circumstances suggest stability - for some limited Australian technical support such as medical, engineering, air transport to be provided. But Afghanistan is not by any stretch of the imagination within Australia's area of strategic interest and our limited capabilities are severely stretched now and for the foreseeable future. Australia is not - and should not be - expected to provide the odd band-aid for every trouble spot in the world especially since we have enough on our own doorstep. ■



NUTS & BOLTS

Current Facts and Figures on Australian defence

ADI Designs New Landing Craft For Navy's LPAs

A new water craft intended to supersede the existing LCM8 landing craft has been designed by ADI Limited and offered to the ADF for the Navy's amphibious transports - HMAS *Manoora* and HMAS *Kanimbla* - and believes it will be at least 60 per cent more efficient than the present craft. At least two water craft are required for each of the amphibious transports.

The Navy has demanded that the replacement be at least 30 per cent better than the LCM8s in landing a Battalion Group.

ADI believes this has been achieved by a craft that has significant new concepts such as bow and stem ramps which enable a drive-through capability thus eliminating the slow loading liability of the LCM8 which has bow-only access necessitating laborious vehicle movement.

Its small, light engines provide greater speed and are so fuel efficient that two craft could move a battalion from each amphibious transport up to 48 kms out to sea without refuelling. As well, its dual cargo lanes more than double the available cargo space while its water jets achieve a twofold purpose - fine control when moving slowly and give protection from grounding.

ADI's watercraft is robust yet simple. Its corrugated aluminium hull offers the best possible strength-to-weight ratio, is damage resistant and easy to repair. For loading, it has a specially constructed pontoon which can support up to 45 tons of transferring cargo.

ADI are offering a full training package and a comprehensive in-service support plan utilising

experience gained on their in service support program for the Navy's minehunters. ■

Command system for LPAs

The amphibious ship HMAS *Manoora* has now been fitted with an advanced command support system compatible with shore-based systems that allows a Joint Task Force Headquarters to operate from the ship in close communication with the Headquarters Australian Theatre.

The system developed by ADI Limited in Australia is compatible with allied systems and will be installed later on board HMAS *Kanimbla*.

The upgrade establishes both ships not just as amphibious transports but as a core element of a force deployed offshore for a wide range of operations including combat, peace operations and disaster relief. This marks a further step in the break from a cringing continental defence strategy. ■

Eurocopter's Tiger selected for ADF

Former defence minister Peter Reith announced on 10th August that Eurocopter's Tiger has been selected for the ADF's Air 87 Project to acquire armed reconnaissance helicopters for the ADF. The 22 aircraft projected are to replace the elderly Kiowa and Iroquois aircraft that have been in service for more than 30 years at an estimated cost of \$1.3 billion.

The new helicopters were foreshadowed in the 1994 defence White Paper to be in service by 2000. Under the proposed new arrangements, delivery will commence in 2004 and be complete by 2006.

In the hope that the already extended decision process can be reduced during the contract phase, the former minister has decided to short circuit the tendering phase by selecting Eurocopter as the sole tenderer, the assumption being that a satisfactory arrangement can be negotiated with the company with contracts signed within 12 months. The government intends that the aircraft will be assembled and maintained in Queensland. Eurocopter have indicated a willingness to assemble civilian helicopters at the same plant for sale in Australia and the region.

Three versions of the all-weather Tiger are available but the Australian model is likely to be configured according to the ADF's requirements. It is unlikely to resemble the HAC anti-tank version but will be similar to the HAP or UHT models described below.

FACT BOX

The principal operational characteristics of the Water craft can be summarised thus:

- Length 25m x beam 7.6m.
- Mean draft at full load 1.0m.
- 133 tons full displacement.
- Unloading displacement 60 tons.
- 14 knots depending on cargo and sea state.
- Twin water jet propulsion.
- Bow and stem ramps.
- Two lanes of traffic.
- Transfer pontoon.
- Foredeck cradles.
- Vehicle tie down system.



The Eurocopter Tiger armed helicopter

is operable in NBC environments. Three basic parameters were taken into account right from the start of the development phase: low (visual, radar and infrared) detectability, which provides excellent survivability on the battlefield, maximum efficiency of the weapons and the associated fire control systems without heavier workload for the crew, and an optimized logistic concept offering minimum possession costs.

Tiger HAP

The Tiger HAP is an air-to-air combat and fire support medium-weight (6 tonnes) helicopter fitted with 2 MTR 390 engines. It is daytime and night combat capable and

The Tiger HAP is fitted with a 30-mm gun turret; 68-mm sub-munition rockets, and air-to-air Mistral missiles. It also features a firing sight with 3 sensors: infrared, TV camera and direct optical channel. The complete avionics suite includes multi-purpose colour displays and radar/laser warning receivers.

Tiger UHT

The Tiger UHT is a multi-role fire support helicopter. The Trigat 'Fire-and-Forget' missiles and/or the HOT missiles it carries offer anti-tank capability, while 68-mm rockets ensure air-to-ground fire support. A 12.7 mm air-to-air gun pod and air-to-air Stinger missiles can also be installed.

The helicopter also features a mast-mounted sight with a second-generation IRCCD infrared channel and a TV channel, as well as a nose-mounted IRCCD control FLIR for the pilot.

Countermeasures include radar/laser/missiles, launch/missile approach warning receivers and decoy launchers. ■

Non-Lethal Weapons

by Malcolm Kennedy

The first part of this article appeared in the Spring 2001 issue of *Defender*

The major developer of non-lethal weapons (NLWs) doctrine and equipment has been the United States. The need for NLWs has been drawn from the recognition that the use of deadly military force in many conflict situations is counter-productive and may in fact cause violence to escalate.

Characteristics (Sea Level, ISA)	Tiger
Maximum weight	5,925 kg Alternate gross-weight 6,000 kg
Capacity	1 pilot.+1 gunner
Useful load	HCP (roof sight) 1,800 kg U TIGER (mast sight) 1,650 kg
Maximal operational weight with external load	6,000 kg
Power plant	2 MTR 390
Take-off power (A.E.O.)	958 kW
Maximum continuous power (A.E.O.)	873 kW
Fast cruise speed (at maximum weight)	HCP (roof sight) 280 km/h U TIGER (mast sight) 260 km
Maximum range with standard tank(s)*	800 km

*With take-off at maximal weight

There are no proposals that NLWs are likely, in the mid- or long-term, to totally displace lethal weapons from the US armed forces. One of the major drives has been the powerful negative imagery against the military that the media has been able to create in conflicts where civilians have been killed, wounded or made refugees. The military, limited to the application of deadly force, are disadvantaged and put at risk in civil conflicts when they cannot use their firepower.

NLWs are nearing the stage where they can be an option for commanders to use in ethnic unrest, civil violence and peacekeeping operations. These weapons give more flexibility to a commander to reduce the casualties among noncombatants and combatants, and to limit the destruction of private and public property.

The successful deployment of effective NLWs will enable military leaders to apply force consistent with or proportional to the threat.

It must be stressed that NLWs are an addition to the existing weapons range of the armed forces. They would be applied in situations where success would be greater than if deadly force were applied. Sun Tzu argued strongly that to defeat a foe without combat was the highest goal of leadership. NLWs coupled with normal systems increase that possibility.

There are a great many ideas being examined as possible NLWs, however, I have selected those that are moving into the proving and production stage. I have also listed some of the most interesting possible NLWs:

- The **Modular Crowd Control Munition** is a non-lethal version of the Claymore mine. The mine is filled with rubber balls to provide blunt impact in crowd control. The MCCM can be fired from the ground or from mountings on a vehicle.
- The **Crowd Dispersal Cartridge** is fired from a M203 40mm grenade launcher. It too produces blunt trauma from rubber balls.
- The **Portable Vehicle Immobiliser** is a device designed to capture vehicles travelling up to 72 kilometres per hour. The system is portable and the netted part prevents the occupants from leaving the vehicle.
- The **Bounding Munition** has the capacity to fire rubber balls, a sting net and a dye marker. The marker is considered to be very useful in distinguishing friend from foe.
- **Canister Launched Area Denial Systems** are intended to rapidly disperse a range of non-lethal area denial agents, including tear gas, bounding and marker munitions. The US Army and Marine Corps are adopting this system.
- **Foam Application** is under test with the intention to provide a range of shoulder- and vehicle-carried dispensers which will be able to spray on foam to seal doors, windows, culverts, stores or vehicles, and may be further developed to deal with mines.

These examples give some idea of the considerable potential of NLWs. In addition, the following programs

are under consideration: a vessel stopper system, an electromagnetic vehicle stopper, odorous substances, spider fibre nets, an overhead chemical dispersal system for crowd control, acoustic barriers and disabling weapons, and high intensity light systems.

Although these NLWs systems have obvious application in non-combat situations, some may have a dual use. The ADF, which has been so successful in peacekeeping operations due to training, leadership, and individual self-discipline, should be given the opportunity to acquire the most useful of these new systems to provide greater protection and effectiveness. ■

This article draws on data from the US Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program Reports, 1997-; the Marine Corps Reports, The Joint Non Lethal Weapons Program News, 1998 --; and a number of WWW sources. The author owns any errors

The UAV program


Defence is planning to spend “between \$100 and \$250 million” on the Global Hawk ‘Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle’. Leaving aside the inordinately clumsy but politically correct terminology (what’s wrong with ‘pilotless aircraft’?), the UAV capability represents a substantial force multiplier through its ability to provide all-weather, real-time intelligence over a wide area.

Whether Global Hawk is the best solution is an open question. The United States has made extensive use of the smaller, cheaper but very effective Predator system. Predator is currently being upgraded to enhance its speed and range. It is already more stealthy than the bigger Global Hawk. Moreover, it is now able to direct Hellfire missiles fired by itself or other Predators.

But perhaps that is too warlike for our Defence Department? ■

The danger in the belief that technology will offer us total battlespace and foreign policy dominance in the next century does not lie in the technology itself. Technology can indeed offer us substantial leverage against future opponents. What is dangerous about the new technocratic view is the same thing that was dangerous about the older version; it is wholly disconnected from what others think, want and do. Precisely because we Americans have a long track record of overestimating our technological superiority and underestimating the ability of our opponents to short-circuit our advantages, this is a form of hubris we cannot afford to indulge again.

- Williamson Murray *Clausewitz Out, Computer In in The National Interest*, Summer 1997



Defeating Terrorism

by Major Furphy

Barney was in an odd mood when he stomped into his office. He waved me to follow as he disappeared into his sanctum without even asking for his coffee and bun.

(Barney in case you've not met him before is Air Marshal Barney Stoush, the Vice Chief of Defence Force and my boss.)

"I didn't know you spoke Pashto", was his abrupt greeting.

I didn't know either. I wasn't even sure what Pashto was. It sounded like a brand of foreign (sorry, imported) motor car but the idea of speaking a motor car sounded a bit odd. Not only that but I didn't want to appear ignorant so I said nothing and waited.

"How fluent are you?", he demanded. Modestly, I shrugged my shoulders.

"If you can get by, you ought to be promoted to lieutenant colonel", he muttered. I pricked up my ears at that. Perhaps a quick refresher course could at least tell me who did actually speak Pashto.

"I want you to go to Kandahar and keep an eye on things for me", Barney said. "We're sending some people there to work with the UN and some of them - ours and theirs are a bit strange."

I hadn't heard of Kandahar either but Canberra is producing new suburbs so fast that it's difficult keeping up with the new areas and not worth buying a new street map every six months. Perhaps the new UN embassy is there.

"D'you want me to use my own car", I asked, "or should I get a vehicle from the pool?"

Barney looked at me a bit strangely and said nothing for a moment. He was clearly thinking hard and I wondered if there had been a new directive about motor transport that I hadn't seen. As usual, he set me straight in his normal direct manner.

"Kandahar, you bloody fool, is in Afghanistan. There is to be a peacekeeping force there and we are sending some troops to show the flag. I'm not too happy about the planners' ideas so I want you to be my special liaison officer at the UN headquarters." He paused. "You do speak Pashto, don't you? It says so in your personal file."

Of course, personal files are always right so, even though I didn't know what he was talking about, I nodded.

He looked at me a bit suspiciously but went on. "Now look, ACGREEN wants to send some people to persuade the Afghans not to plant opium poppies. They are supposed to give up the income and live on UN welfare." I must have looked a bit disdainful because he went on.

"Yeah, I know it's stupid but it gets him out of my hair for some months and, who knows, he might trip over a land mine or something.

"For the same reason, I'm going to send General England as the Australian force commander. I know you don't get on with her so you'll just have to keep out of her way."

This was an understatement. Major General Mary England tried to court-martial me one for insubordination but Barney got me out of it. She's never forgiven him - or me.

"How many troops are we sending, sir?", I asked.

"Big force, but within our capabilities, he replied. "First, there will be a patrol boat. If we can get the Yanks to provide the air lift, we'll fly it in on to one of their lakes. I suppose they do have them. I've asked intelligence to find out.

"Also, I'm sending some naval intelligence people. They are Indonesian linguists so you'll have to help them with the local language."

This was starting to sound a bit tricky but I suddenly realised that Pashto must have been the local language around Kandahar. By now, though, it was too late to correct Barney who was in full flight. I'd better do that refresher course. At least, it might teach me to order a meal in a restaurant. Still, it was time to show Barney that he didn't know everything.

"Sir, isn't Afghanistan land-locked. Why send naval intelligence people?"

"That's just the point", he said. "If they don't have any naval intelligence and the UN don't either, we'll be contributing something they lack."

"What about combat troops?", I wondered aloud.

"Can't do it", he replied. "For a start, most of them are still tied up in East Timor and, in any case, the minister says we must have no casualties. The government can't afford the compo."


"What about funds?", I asked.

"What do you want money for?", he demanded. "You'll get your pay and the tax-free per diem for overseas service has gone up to \$500 a day with double time on weekends and holidays."

That sounded a bit better but a thought struck me. I decided to risk it.

"It might be better if I had an office away from UN headquarters, I suggested. "That way, I won't upset General England." Subtle, I thought. "And what about the promotion?"

Surprisingly, Barney agreed but he looked at me searchingly. "Are you sure you speak Pashto?" ■



FEATURES

Articles of special interest

The Convertible Container Carrier (CCC)

A Commercial / Military Multi-purpose Ship for the Australian Defence Force

by Captain Alan Thom

Alan Thom is a Master Mariner & International Maritime Consultant. The following is an edited version of a private initiative proposal developed in conjunction with SSI, USA

The purpose of this Private Initiative Proposal (PIP) is for providing the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with an efficient addition to its maritime operations capabilities. With the shrinking of Australia's merchant fleet, particularly from the demise of the ANL, the importance of ready and available vessels that could be military-useful increases each year. There can be no future reliance on Australian flagged ships, that is, commercial-off-the shelf (COTS) assets suitable for transport of vital military cargoes. It does not make sense to rely on foreign-flagged ships for this role.

The CCC is a "commercial off the shelf" Australian ship on offer now that could be acquired by ADF, under a (similar *Jervis Bay*) charter acquisition arrangement – primarily, an alternative upgrade replacement that can uniquely multi-function as a fast multi-purpose sealift ship and as well, deployable as AOR and LPD capabilities that would cost-effectively complement and enhance existing amphibious and afloat support capabilities. This ship (or ships) could be delivered new in 2004.

The CCC acquisition would provide the ADF with a substantial long-range force projection asset, providing a capability that would contribute a depth of vital maritime support diversity and role flexibility for maritime interdiction, defending Australia and, the demands of UN and growing regional commitments – and contribute greatly to Australia's self-reliant military and coastguard capabilities.

The CCC is a practical proposal that would deliver an innovative maritime solution supporting national security objectives. Additionally, given its unique flexible design enabling a multi-role versatility, the CCC is suitably ideal to serve a secondary purpose as an interim or bridging capability that could effectively serve as the lead-in ship for the five LPD/AOR type ships that will eventually be

acquired, as articulated in the Defence 2000 White Paper, to be delivered between 2008 and 2016.

Conveniently, this forward acquisition plan would allow close strategic evaluation of the CCC for the future designs of the three dedicated-military LPD type ships and two AORs planned. Or, it may well be the case that the CCC, as a very versatile and flexible capability will be evaluated favourably to be a cost-efficient and cost-effective acquisition for the ship roles.

Summary

The Convertible Container Carrier (CCC) is a versatile, multi-purpose commercial/military ship, a design originally sponsored by the United States, Carderock Division Naval Surface Warfare Center (CDNSWC).

In summary, the CCC is uniquely an all-in-one:


- Container ship (commercial/military)
- Heavy-Lift, Semi-Submersible Ship
- Load-On/Roll-On (LO/RO), Self-Sustaining Ship
- Docking Ship/Mobile Dry Dock Facility

As a non-combatant Fleet Auxiliary it could operate as a:

- Sealift Ship (AKR)
- Float-On/Float-Off Cargo Ship (AKF)
- Fleet Replenishment Ship (AOR)

In strictly military roles, it could serve in the classifications of a:

- Landing Platform Dock (LPD)
- Landing Helicopter Amphibious Assault (LHA)
- Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD).
- Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH). (V/STOL Air-Support Version fitted with ski-jump for helicopter and/or Harrier aircraft)



The CCC – Military Sealift Ship

The CCC is primarily a ‘Large Non-Combatant Ship’. An innovative ship design that can perform all the basic sealift functions similar towards that of a Large, Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Ship (LMSR) Sealift Ship that is operated by the United States Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC).

The CCC AOR

In addition to its sealift capabilities, the CCC could function as an Auxiliary Fleet Replenishment Ship (AOR). It could meet the broad operational requirements outlined in the Maritime Environmental Working Group’s (MEWG) ‘Amphibious & Afloat Support Issues’ document. That is, by design, it:

- could provide replenishment to two naval task force units simultaneously
- could provide replenishment support to a coastal ADF base/airstrip or township
- can have air-capability for carrying at least 2 medium-lift helicopters
- it could carry the same mix of cargoes and in larger quantity than HMAS *Success*. From the basic design, it has the design flexibility, with its existing double-hull feature, for easy conversion and building-in tankage of about 17,000m³ in the hold. Or, in its present basic design, by carrying shallow draft, float-on/float-off (FLO/FLO) oil (dumb) barges that can be used as on-board storage tanks for at sea replenishment, and/or for floating-off for supplying (coastal/offshore) ADF shore-based facilities, or fleet ships moored/berthed in harbour. Workboats can be carried for transporting/shuttling the barges if necessary - alternatively, the ship can carry a self-propelled bunker barge or barges.

The CCC – LPD

In a strictly military role, being a semi-submersible ship with an air-capable design, the CCC could also perform the basic functions of a Landing Platform Dock (LPD) type of ship. It could meet the broad requirements outlined in MEWG’s ‘Amphibious & Afloat Support Issues’ document, that is to say:

- it can have facilities to command and control a naval task force unit or brigade size force, with broad links to HAST

- it could uplift, transport and sustain a battalion size force with their equipment, including vehicles from the sea and provide substantial helicopter/air support. This is achieved with the CCC RO/RO Version with a purpose-designed floated-on, Roll-On/Roll –Off (RO/RO) Module (LPD-RRM) (see ship plan).
 - The LPD-RRM is loaded-up and outfitted by rolling-on (from an out-lift base), purpose-outfitted standard sea containers in the form of Mission Module Units (MMUs) for purposes of communications, habitability/hospitality, survivability, self-defence, munitions etc. Alternatively, the RRM can be permanently converted to serve as a dedicated outfitted module (an LPD cartridge)
 - The LPD-RRM with its purpose-configuration to include a dock-well space section, allows the ship to operate a range of amphibious types of, float-in/float-out, crafts and vehicles such as LSMs and AAVs/AAVs and fly-in/fly-out LCACs
 - The top deck of the RRM forms a natural flight deck. This feature allows the ship to carry up to 24, including garaging up to 12, helicopters
 - Additionally, the ship can carry a variety of tracked and wheeled vehicles that can be loaded into water craft on board ship, or direct onto pier
 - Innovatively, the RRM can be used operationally, both as an internal (on-board the CCC) facility, or independently as an external floating-base (dynamic) facility in dropped off on-site by the CCC
- Effectively, the CCC is a simple or basic “no-frills” LPD model, an economy LPD/LSD - a cost-efficient military platform commercially built with military-useful features.

The CCC - Future LPD/AOR Planned Acquisitions

The CCC can be designed in a dedicated LPD/LSD configuration (similar in profile to the French *Foudre* class LSD type, although in its present design it is a larger version of) can be designed as:

- Dedicated Military (DM): a conventional type LPD ship with permanent in-hull-built standard features and facilities such as accommodations, hospital facilities, aircraft deck and hanger, maintenance areas, dock well and cargo oil tankage etc.
- Semi-Dedicated Military (SDM): Commercial/Military purposes built. To maintain ship versatility for productive deployment, the float-on/float-off Roll-on/Roll-Off module (LPD-RRM), of the CCC RO/RO




Figure 2: General Arrangement and Profile of CCC Baseline Container Ship

version, as afore mentioned, can be specifically designed and permanently configured to accommodate the same standard facilities – the LPD “cartridge” concept. (Mission readiness: Fill-up the tanks – clip in the LPD cartridge – load-on/float-on the equipment – fly-on the aircraft - embark the troops – and set sail!)

The CCC can be designed for a LPD in a smaller version. The CCC can also be a designed as a dedicated AOR ship.

Effectively, with a LPD and AOR combination design, one CCC acquisition could deliver a two-ship capability for flexible deployment in either role as desired.

Capability Conclusion

The CCC can be developed with any combination of features on the same, common, basic commercial hull and diesel-electric propulsion plant.

CCC – COTS Acquisition Proposal

- The CCC vessel, and subsequent ships, would be specially new-built and can be delivered to the ADF, under a Private Financing Initiative (PFI). On the basis of a long-term Charter Agreement or lease being granted, there would be no major upfront costs to DOD (and the Australian taxpayer) until the ship is formally delivered.

- A proposed long-term time charter/lease arrangement can be for an initial 15 years with options of 5 + 5 years. Full ship-management provided by Owner (CCC Project), ship Australian flagged and civil-mariner technically manned. A longer charter period of 25 years is preferred which would cost-effectively reduce charter-hire rates.
- Indicatively, the first ship could be delivered within two years of contractual formalities being concluded (Charter Agreement).

Cost Comparisons:

- Charter: Indicatively, based on HMAS *Jervis Bay* charter cost information received and current new-building market cost estimates, the annual bare-boat charter cost of a basic CCC – RO/RO Version designed for LPD capability, would be around same as that paid for HMAS *Jervis Bay*. On an overall capability and running expense comparison, the value-for-money of the CCC is obvious.
- New-building: The indicative new-building cost of a military-useful CCC, basis current market, foreign-built and for a one-only building, would be less than the unit cost of a second-hand converted LPA, HMAS *Kanimbla/Manoora*.

Cost-recovery Plan




Figure 9: General Arrangement and Profiles of CCC RO/RO Version

- **Charter-In and Charter-Out Program (optional):** To recover some of the ship charter hire costs and operational expenses, and thus assist in minimising total budget costs, the ship/s can be offered for commercial employment if/when desired.
- Sub-chartered out to a liner container service operator trading into Australia (eg Australia/SE Asia) that would allow convenient and quick re-access to the ship when needed for emergency or crisis situations.
- Being a modern, efficient commercial containership of a substantial 2432 TEU “eco-box” capacity, such a charter arrangement should be achievable. An indicative charter rate is between US\$9,000 - US\$17,000 per day depending on the market at the time. Relevant discussions will be held with major operators should there be serious interest expressed in response to this proposal. Potential client targets are identified, including P&O/CGM.
- A bi-lateral charter agreement could also be seriously explored/pursued with the U.S. Military Sealift Command (MSC) as the CCC is the ship designed specifically for it.
- U.N. charters also.
- Additionally, as a heavy lift semi-submersible, the ship can be offered for spot work carrying commercial load-on/float-on project cargoes. This would ideally provide practical training opportunities.

CCC Design Overview

The CCC is an innovative ship design for a state-of-the-art hatchless container ship with unique strategic sealift features sponsored by the Carderock Division Naval Surface Warfare Center (CDNSWC). In addition to being a highly competitive commercial container carrier, the ship is also easily converted to a RO/RO or heavy lift ship for military use in the event of a national emergency.

The CCC has been developed as a commercially viable container ship (and project cargo ship), readily convertible to a military useful sealift ship (MUSS) with a high degree of utility and versatility.

CCC - Container Ship

The baseline, purely commercial, (load-on/load-off) designed ship has capacity for 3080 TEUs - in its enhanced MUSS design the ship has capacity for 2432 TEUs/1216 FEUs. The ship can also be equipped with a 25 – 45 ton capacity rolling gantry crane so it can unload itself (LO/LO) – and with the portable tri-position stern ramp for RO/RO operations, the ship is therefore self-sustaining (LO/RO).

The commercial CCC is designed so its container cell guides can be easily relocated fore and aft to accommodate different container lengths. By making the guides removable, adding a stern gate (transom door) and enhancing ballast capability, the CCC can rapidly convert

to a semi-submersible heavy lift ship to take a range and type of vessels drawing up to 4.25m draft.

CCC - Heavy-lift Ship

As a semi-submersible heavy lift ship the CCC can carry a wide variety of floating civil and military equipment including landing craft, for example a homogeneous loading of:

- 24 - LCM-8s
- 10 - 40m x 10m dry/liquid barges
- 6 – MSO minesweepers
- 4 – MCM minesweepers
- 9 - Cyclone Class patrol boats
- 10 – tugs
- 2 - LCUs
- 2 – 83m x 18m LSVs
- 2 – A-Delong piers of 92m x 25m

Operationally, a mix of various types of floating equipment, including the above, to suit the mission can be loaded/floated on. The ship needs a 16m minimum depth of water to ballast-down to a depth of 3.4m over the sill – additional cargo weight or fixed ballast (steel plates) of 3000 LT is needed to ballast down for 4.25m over the sill (for MCMs and LSVs) in which case a minimum water depth of 17m is required. Greater sill drafts are possible with additional cargo deadweight or fixed ballast, however, with the latter the ship's total cargo lift capacity will be reduced. Flooding or de-ballasting time is around 6 hours.

CCC - Docking Ship / Dry Dock Facility

In addition to its heavy lift capabilities, the CCC can be productively used as a (civil/military) dry dock and repair facility with its large electrical generating capacity and the ability to add any number of containerised offices, work shops, store rooms etc. on the wing walls.

In the heavy lift configuration, the ship has a usable rectangular lift area of 195m x 25.3m or an area of 4780m². The entire usable area has a 2.5 mt/m² load bearing capability with additional heavy load bearing at each of the cell guide supports in the hold and on the aft well deck.

CCC - Roll-on/roll-off Ship

This heavy lift capability also allows the CCC to be converted to a Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) ship having 17,109m² to 25,290m² of reinforced deck area by the ship submerging and floating a purpose-designed and built, four deck, RO/RO barge module (RRM) (Dims: 188m x 25m), or separate purpose-module sections, into the open cargo space.

A portable stern ramp is carried which can facilitate straight astern or quarter RO/RO cargo operations. Cargo is rolled-on from the shore via the appropriately positioned stern ramp over the lowered transom door/stern

gate and distributed to the decks via an internal ramp system right up to the open-top deck

The Roll-on/roll-off Module (RRM)

In military mode, the RO/RO barge module can be partially loaded (pre-prepared with light units) prior to floating it on. Say with aircraft and Mission Module Units (MMUs): Habitability, Survivability, Medical, R&M and Self-Defence. Heavy trailers and wheeled/tracked vehicles roll on when RRM or RRM's in place.

The RRM is a useful platform by itself. When not required by the CCC, the RRM can be moored in the homeport (lift-out base) harbour and functionally serve, for example, as a helicopter landing platform and/or maintenance facility, for equipment warehousing, or as an accommodation barge. The CCC can drop (float-out) the RRM at a mission site thereby freeing up the ship so that it can return to base for uplifting additional or other needed equipment.

For the LPD role, the RRM can be specially configured for deck structure and layout and so designed to enable fit-out of all the features of an LPD/LSD ship – LPD-RRM.

Including a well-dock at the aft 50m x 25m well-deck section, for the operations of float-in/float-out amphibious craft such as LCMs and AAVs/AAAVs or, fly-in/fly-out LCACs. The fit-out can be either in the form of roll-on purpose-designed Mission Module Units (MMUs) leaving

Principal Characteristics of the CCC

LOA:	236m
Beam:	32m
Draft:	8.23m
Depth, Main Deck:	19.21m
Depth, Well Deck:	11.13m
Cargo Deadweight:	20,000 tonnes (about) – no gantry crane
Displacement:	44,470 tonnes
Speed:	22.3 knots @ 15 per cent service margin @ 7.3m draft 21.8 knots @ 15% service margin @ 8.23m draft
Main Engine:	Sulzer ZA4OS, 3 x V16 (MAN/Wartsila V12s options)
HP installed:	48,700 HP
Bow Thruster:	1 x 1,750 HP
Propellers:	2 fixed pitch
Electrical:	3 x 6600 volt 3 phase shaft alternators 2 x 1500kw diesel generators (port use)
Range:	16,901nm @ 21.8 knots @ D8.32m 17,288nm @ 22.3 knots @ D7.3m
Crew:	18 – 26

open the mission flexibility of the RRM, or dedicating space on the RRM for permanent ship-like outfitted sections (LPD cartridge).

The 4400m² open top deck of the barge module can be utilised particularly for aircraft transport, and as a flight deck for helicopter/VTOL operations. The RRM can be configured to carry and garage, operate and maintain an air-group up to 12 medium lift helicopters. The adequate VTOL area enables launch and recovery spots for 6 helicopters. The deck space could transport about total 24 aircraft. An angled ski-jump can be fitted to enable V/STOL aircraft to operate.

Ship Conversion

The conversions from containership to cargo-ready fast sealift RO/RO ship is about 53.5 hours (and vice versa). The conversion from containership to semi-submersible heavy-lift ship is about 32 hours. Conversion from RO/RO ship to semi-submersible is accomplished by simply ballasting down and floating off the RRM.

Stability

The double hull configuration of the CCC combined with the intact and damaged stability requirements of the USCG, MARAD and IMO regulations for open-top container ships, make the CCC's survivability unique amongst sealift ships. The CCC with all open holds flooded also meets the proposed stability regulations for HCLCS of the latest IMO regulations. There is no need for the CCC to carry ballast of any type to meet stability requirements.

Power Plant

The CCC is powered by a medium speed diesel-electric propulsion system and has twin screws, twin rudders and a bow thruster to give a high degree of self-manoeuving.

The three main engines models chosen are of proven design with extensive shipboard, heavy fuel experience. The basic fuel rate of these modern medium speed engines approaches that of slow speed diesels.

Conclusion

It can be concluded, that the CCC is indeed a unique ship design with versatile features - a fast, long-range ship and a very useful platform for a variety of civil/military purposes. ■

Further detailed information on the CCC is available from
CCC PROJECT

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Tel: (02) 6021-0272

Email: alanthom@rm.quik.com.au

Bio-terrorism and Panic Attacks

by Clive Williams GM

The author has specialised in terrorism for more than 20 years. This is an edited and revised version of an Op-Ed piece first published in *The Australian*

Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network are in the comfortable situation, from a terrorist perspective, of not needing to do very much at all, if anything, to cause paranoid responses, verging at times on mass hysteria. The anthrax scare in the US was quickly linked publicly to Al Qaeda operatives; simply on the basis that such a link could not be discounted, and because they have become the usual suspects.

Bin Laden has certainly said that he would *not* consider it a crime to use such weapons. Indeed, his operatives have tried to obtain biological and chemical weapons - and may even have trained to use them at their training camps in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda's preferred option, presumably, would be to cause mass casualties, but to use biological and chemical agents transnationally is extremely difficult.

Potential biological agents are derived from pathogens and toxins. Pathogens are naturally occurring micro-organisms that cause disease. Pathogens include bacteria, viruses, fungi and parasites. About 30 pathogens are believed to have utility as biological weapons. Among these are *bacillus anthracis*, the organism that causes anthrax and *yersinia pestis*, which causes plague. Because pathogens are living organisms they are self-replicating. Only a small number of pathogens are transmissible person to person. Anthrax is not contagious and only those directly exposed (via ingestion, inhalation or skin contact) to the released spores are likely to become infected.

Toxins are poisonous chemicals produced by living organisms. Among the best known are botulinum toxin, produced by the bacteria clostridium botulinum, and ricin, which is extracted from the seed of the castor bean plant. There are also anti-crop agents, such as wheat stem rust.

Few terrorist groups have demonstrated an interest in bio-terrorism and fewer still have tried to acquire biological agents. One of the few was Japan's Aum Shinrikyo. The Aum had biochemists among its members who tried to develop biological weapons using anthrax. Less convincing are claims that they also tried botulinum toxin, *coxiella burnetii* (Q fever), and tried to acquire Ebola. They reportedly had nine unsuccessful attempts at disseminating biological agents, including at the US Navy base at Yokosuka. No casualties were reported. In an attack on the Tokyo subway system the group used the chemical agent Sarin instead. (There was an Aum Australian connection in that the group is believed to have experimented at their Banjawarn sheep station in Western Australia.)

Confirmed cases of illicit biological agent activity, based on data from the US National Defence University, indicate that there have been two criminal incidents for every terrorist incident. The criminal activity has been mainly extortion related. The acquisition of biological agents was in most cases by purchase from legitimate suppliers. In addition, they were obtained by theft, self-production, or were naturally available.

The main motives for terrorist interest in biological agents have included:

- Mass murder, for example, a group called RISE wanted to wipe out most humans so the world could have a fresh start and the Aum to seize control of Japan;
- Assassination of individuals by several groups and state actors;
- Incapacitation without death in 1984 by the US Rajneeshee attempt to incapacitate local voters;
- Political statements, by a group called Dark Harvest, which collected UK anthrax-contaminated soil and dumped it at a Defence research facility; and
- Opposition to agriculture by attacking animals and crops.

It has been extremely difficult to cause mass fatalities, so far only four people have been killed in a single biological attack.

No terrorist group has successfully cultured a virulent agent capable of causing mass casualties, and it is likely to be some time before this capability exists. One of the most contagious and desirable biological agents for this purpose is smallpox, yet the difficulty of gaining access to existing stocks, held officially only by the US and Russia, even for state parties, makes its use difficult. Such a virulent agent would be no respecter of religions and would inevitably be indiscriminate in its spread. A disincentive to Al Qaeda releasing a virulent agent in Australia could be the proximity of populous Muslim Indonesia, where it would have devastating consequences.

Biological agents, which are not contagious, must be disseminated to make them effective. Possible methods are aerosol dissemination, water contamination, food contamination, or direct application through insect vectors. Aerosol dissemination is technically complex and was never mastered by RISE or the Aum. It is not simply a matter of producing a biological agent and spraying it from a crop duster, as some accounts would have us believe. Water contamination has in most past cases been defeated by dilution, and through the existing filters and chlorine in municipal supplies. Food contamination is usually identified and isolated fairly quickly. Japan experimented with insect delivery during the Second World War but found it extremely unreliable.

There is little point in people buying protective suits and the most effective, Level A, suits are not available to the public. We, however, can be confident that, in part, because of the preparations for the Sydney Olympics, Australia's agencies are of world standard in dealing with any biological threats by terrorists.

Back to where we started - the \$64 million question is who *is* responsible for the anthrax attacks in the US? Based on the public information available, I will wager that the most likely suspect is a mentally disturbed person, of similar mindset to the Unabomber rather than Al Qaeda agents. ■

Latent Reserves

by Russell Miles

Typical Australian army Reserve units comprise personnel who on average have a little over two years part-time service (which is actually an improvement over recent years). Most reserve officers are graduates of university regiments or former full time NCOs. Graduates of the Australian Defence Force Academy are rare within army reserve units. However, a reasonable proportion of commanders and NCOs have undertaken extended full time service. Of late a significant number have served in Bougainville or East Timor.

Compare this with one US National Guard tank unit, as described in *What makes a National Guard tanker?* by 1st Lieutenant J. Sosidy (*Armor*, July-August 2000). A majority of senior officers had prior active service experience, four were West Point graduates and 90 per cent of one company were former active service personnel. Most of this unit's members were veterans of the Gulf War.

While this unit might be exceptional, the US armed forces are some 1.4 million strong (even with the draw-down of 30 per cent over the past decade). This means that there is one uniformed person for every 225 citizens. This compares with Australia's defence force of 50,000 or 1:400. Thus there is a greater proportion of former full-time personnel in the US from which to draw reservist.

As another comparison, the US armed forces have the equivalent of one combat aircraft for every 37,000 citizens, compared with 1:110,000 for Australia. This means that the US trains proportionately at least 2 ½ times as many aircrew as does Australia. The number is actually greater because the US has a higher proportion of large aircraft. Consequently, they have a greater number of trained aircrew from which to draw for reserve units. It should not be surprising that the US is able to delegate air defence of continental USA to reservists. Following the recent terrorist attacks in Washington and New York, most of the pilots assigned to patrol over American cities were from the Air National Guard and naval aviator reservists.

Over recent years the Australian Defence Force has considered a number of ways to strengthen its reserves. This included the Ready Reserve, which sought to engage personnel for 12 months full-time training and then part-time training for five years. This scheme was partially successful in recruiting good quality people, but retention

was as abysmal as with the general reserves. This is not surprising as it placed a template of a national service scheme onto a voluntary enlistment ethos. More recently, army reserve recruits have been required to undertake the same six weeks initial full-time training as those enlisting for full-time service. This is similar to the system used in the US and NZ. However, the number of reservist recruits fell by half, presumably because fewer were able or willing to take six weeks out of employment and other commitments. Equally, a significant number of reservists volunteered for 12-18 months full-time service to supplement units deployed to East Timor.

What can be learnt from this experience? Firstly, reductions in full-time numbers have an impact on the quality of reserves. For example, the conversion of air field defence units, infantry and other operational units to reserve status may have reduced the readiness of reserves. Reserves should be a supplement, not a replacement.

High separation rates from full-time service should be of less concern. An individual leaving after 5-6 years will retain considerable potential as a reservist, whereas someone with 10-20 years service offers minimal potential due to declining fitness, rigidity of learning and other factors.

Moreover, the proportion of officer to other ranks is 24 per cent in the regular ADF and growing (compared with 6 per cent for the USMC). The proportion of NCO and civil administrators is similarly bloated. The ADF should welcome a higher separation rate of middle level officers. Perhaps education grants could be offered to full time personnel willing to enlist in reserve units. At present such support tends to be offered to those remaining in full time services as a retention bonus. Civil job placement services could also be offered to those who convert to reserve units.

Thirdly, utilisation of former full-time personnel needs to be more flexible. The Ready Reserve scheme of concentrating those with initial 12 months full-time service within a few selected units may have contributed to its low retention. Many former United States Marines serve within the US National Guard. This is because the army offers a wider range of reserve units that can fit in with civil career and lifestyle changes.

Fourthly, reservists are obviously willing to commit themselves to extended full time service, but not necessarily during initial training. These opportunities should enhance individuals' competency and thereby contribute to the readiness of reserve units.

Fifthly, training must be focussed in the time available. For example, army cooks receive short initial training before being assigned to operational units and then, over time, are given opportunities to attain civil-recognised competency. Infantry training has always emphasised developing cumulative expertise from basis weapons handling and field craft to mountaineering, unarmed combat, urban combat, advanced first aid and explosives handling with repeated cycles of more intense training.

Equally, the technical competence required in some fields is intense. Information technology, avionics and medical specialists require considerable investment in time and money for training. There have been suggestions of more flexibility so that such specialists can undertake full and part time service throughout their career. For example, pilots seeking a higher paying civil career might be willing to commit themselves to maintaining their competencies in flying combat aircraft. Medical specialists may be willing to return to periods of full time service to take up advanced educational or management opportunities.


Finally, more creative use should be made of the human resources that reservists represent. For example, Australia brigade groups only have 3,000 personnel and 2-3 manoeuvre units compared with NATO formations which have 6,500 and 4-5 such units. Australian brigades should be able to operate with much smaller headquarters staffs that are supplemented with reservists during major exercises. ■

While poor, powerless and 'wannabe' groups demand sovereignty, the most powerful and economically advanced states of all are losing theirs. Even the most powerful governments and their central banks can no longer control their own currency rates in a world awash in unregulated tidal waves of electronic money. They cannot even control their borders as they might have in the past. Even when they try to slam the door shut to imports or immigrants - both painfully hard to do - the high-tech states find themselves increasingly penetrated from outside by flows of money, terrorists, guns, drugs, culture, religion, pop music, ideology, information, and much else besides. The old hard edges of the nation state are eroding...

For all of us, civilians and soldiers alike, survival at the dawn of the twenty first century will take a profound understanding of the revolutionary new linkage between knowledge, wealth and war...

The kind of warfare (special forces) wage is also the most dependent on the intangibles of combat: intelligence, motivation, confidence, resourcefulness, emotional commitment, morale, and individual initiative.

- Alvin & Heidi Toffler *War and AntiWar*



BOOK REVIEWS

Michael Evans and Alan Ryan *The Human Face of Warfare: Killing, Fear and Chaos in Battle*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000, 265pp., soft cover, \$35.00

There exists a vast literature of the human experience in warfare from the records of ancient history to the present. We must also add the future since this book, while concerned with the past, also focuses on the possible nature of future combat. The memory of the past is short and highly selective, especially where death and injury are involved. To the modern mind the graphic details of victory in the ancient world as an orgy of rape, pillage, slaughter of men captives and the enslavement of women and children are almost too horrible to admit as acts of people like us. Yet, the total deaths resulting from war in the last century are estimated to be over 200 million.

An examination of the classic accounts like Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* to recent accounts of by individual combatants or observers shows that the nature of combat and the human experience of it have changed little in two thousand years. Obeying the dictates of an honourable warrior's code, however, is often made extremely difficult in the real world of combat. The Laws of War and UN conventions have been developed to limit the ruthlessness of war and to give greater protection to military captives and civilians. In the last 100 years, however, the death rate for civilians has dramatically increased and in most recent wars have been far greater than military casualties.

The contributors to the *Human Face of Warfare* have all attempted to come to grips with some aspect of the nature and experience of combat. The collection is eclectic, ranging from women in combat, post-traumatic stress disorder, stress on senior commanders, the future role of technology and combatants to preparing for the possible future types of warfare.

Many, especially in the Western World, have become convinced that the brutality and ruthlessness applied during many of the campaigns in World War II have become a thing of the past. This wishful thinking was swept aside in the recent spate of ethnic wars in Africa and Central Europe where there has been a resurgence of brutal and unlawful warfare. The causes and solutions to the problem of ethnic cleansing are little understood and the danger to peacekeeping forces deployed to end such wars is extremely dangerous. It is perhaps made worse that the rules of engagement often prohibit normal military responses to attack.

The very wide range of disciplines and views represented here make for a volume which offers considerable ambiguity on killing, fear and chaos in battle. The case of those who suffer psychological illness after combat has been given a great deal of emphasis but what makes for a satisfactory return to civil life and what are the personal, military and civil factors that assist in this are given inadequate discussion.

The treatment of those who were highly decorated fails to get to the heart of why some people thirst for combat. The heightened awareness, the prickling of danger, the ecstasy of killing the enemy - the Maslowian peak experience - is for some only to be found in combat. Later civil life cannot provide this type of peak experience. Moreover, the authors seem rather squeamish in accepting the fact that some combatants thoroughly enjoy killing the enemy.

The role of women in combat is shown to have been extremely limited, except in the urgent situation of the USSR during World War II when all-female units were formed and fought. Soviet women showed considerable skill in all types of military work - as pilots, tankers and especially as snipers. Dr Hancock shows that the role of women in other armed forces has been strictly limited and only likely to change in extreme circumstances. The notion that combat is some sort of civil right for women needs to be debated more strongly.

Hugh White provides a challenging chapter in an analysis of the apparent distaste in western nations for military casualties. He raises important questions about the role the media plays in shaping the public's view of a war and what it is prepared to pay. He points out that in the US forces accident and illness are major causes of death. Between 1980 and 1997, 60 per cent of all active duty personnel deaths were from accidents and 18 per cent from illness while 14 per cent were self-inflicted. Smith notes that casualty aversion has a high potential to cause unnecessary deaths due to a unit lacking an ethos of being fierce. A final thought to ponder is whether casualty aversion is just a current phase which will change?

Allen and Unwin, in this volume, have produced a fine collection of profoundly important essays. The book is the result of the Australian Army's Land Warfare Studies Centre inaugural international conference. In March 1999 the National Conference Centre in Canberra was filled to capacity with civil and military attendees drawn to discuss this core aspect of the profession of arms.

Each chapter has much to inform the reader and something to make them think or argue. The concluding essay by Michael Evans is an excellent overview of the issues and some of the findings. The very extensive notes

to each chapter and the long and current bibliography make this an excellent reference on this topic. The index is unfortunately too brief. This book must be given a very high recommendation.

reviewed by Malcolm Kennedy

Terry O'Farrell *Behind Enemy Lines* Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001, 250pp., soft cover, \$29.95

One of the features of recent military writing - both fiction and fact - has been the plethora of books - some good, most pretty ordinary - featuring the British Special Air Service Regiment. Whether this was a result of publishers' judgements that the subject was saleable or whether, as has been alleged, it was a product of the SAS's own propaganda machine is uncertain. What can be said is that the Australian SAS is now getting its share of the genre.

Terry O'Farrell joined the regular army in February 1966 as an infantryman. By October, he was a trooper in the SAS. Subsequently, he served two tours in Vietnam with SAS. Later, he was RSM of the Regiment before being commissioned and serving for much of his subsequent career in special operations.

This book takes the reader through his life as a soldier although, understandably, the greater focus is on his tours in Vietnam. He writes less of his much longer post-Vietnam experience than he does of the lead up to that conflict. This is a pity; a career extending over 35 years including deployments to the Sinai and East Timor deserves a fuller treatment from a capable and experienced professional soldier. The gap is reinforced, for example, by a few off-hand comments about the difference - especially in the context of bastardisation - between the 'old' army that he joined with the one in which he serves today. It would have been worth hearing more from a man of O'Farrell's experience.

To call this book earthy would be an understatement. For many readers, the use of soldiers' language and other crudities in a book of permanent record where most of the same soldiers would be careful not to offend does detract from what is otherwise a good read. It may be the sort of realism that a publisher wants but a little goes a long way to offend the reader and adds nothing to the picture of a powerful soldier in a very professional fighting unit. For all that, O'Farrell writes well and engages the reader closely. His descriptions of contacts in Vietnam are very clear and give the reader a good appreciation of the tactical situation.

Among other aspects, his explanation of the almost inhuman endurance and self-discipline needed by soldiers in their covert operations should be required reading for the pretensions war correspondents with their self-aggrandising descriptions of the 'risks' they run in getting

the news to our breakfast tables. In a couple of near asides, too, he contrasts that discipline and endurance with the macho toughness of the SAS's American counterparts.

After a struggle through the first couple of chapters, I enjoyed this book immensely. But it still didn't answer the question of whether it was a true personal memoir or a boost for the SAS. What is certain is that the Australian SAS is a very professional outfit whose soldiers are, on the evidence of their writings, much less vainglorious than their British counterparts.

reviewed by Michael O'Connor

Marshall Barr *Surgery, Sand and Saigon Tea* Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001, 252pp., soft cover, \$29.95

In contrast to Terry O'Farrell, Marshall Barr was almost an accidental soldier. A reservist doctor in Western Australia, he volunteered for twelve months full time duty as a specialist anaesthetist in 8 Field Ambulance at Vung Tau.

Barr went to Vietnam with the expanded Australian Task Force in mid-1967. 8 Field Ambulance was part of the Australian Logistic Support Group at Vung Tau. Given the Army's rapid expansion for Vietnam as well as its traditional disdain for logistics (usually supplied by allies), the unit was perennially short of qualified personnel as well as adequate equipment. It was dumped in the sand dunes where an even bigger threat to its efficiency seems to have been the mountains of wind-blown sand that penetrated into all areas of the unit, including the operating theatres.

Because it was so small, the unit was limited in the range of tasks it could perform and many of the more serious casualties went to American hospitals. At times, Barr worked in these both in Vung Tau and elsewhere in Vietnam and his descriptions of the contrasts between the well-resourced Americans and the improvising Australians are almost repeats of a well-worn theme in Australian military history.

Barr's descriptions of medical and surgical procedures and techniques in dealing with casualties will be valuable for medical personnel who have never had the experience. But the lay reader will also easily follow his explanations which are an essential element of the book. These aspects should especially be read and absorbed by defence planners, especially those besotted with cutting costs.

Barr pays tribute to his army-trained soldier assistants who were able to perform professional tasks with great skill. He is less complimentary of some of his professional colleagues, not, it must be said, for their medical skill so much as their insistence on the hierarchical structures which, learned in their training hospitals, were reinforced by the army.

On the other hand, the reader can sense the great relief felt by all ranks - and probably the patients - when the unit

belatedly received its first batch of nurses. Apart from adding some tone if not glamour to the unit, Barr considers that their greatest contribution was to bring order out of a male-tolerated chaos.

Inevitably, the unit was heavily involved with civic action programs that provided something of a culture shock to both sides.

Today, Marshall Barr is a senior consultant anaesthetist working in the UK. For a young specialist working in difficult conditions with sketchy equipment on some horrific injuries (especially those involving land mines), Vietnam must have been a major item in his professional education. If on the evidence of this book, he and his colleagues played pretty hard in the process, there are many Australians and Vietnamese who owe their lives to the professional skill and dedication. Would that Australian governments and the community rely less on that and more on providing adequate resources of money, equipment and, above all, people.

reviewed by Michael O'Connor

**Roger Donnelly *The Scheyville Experience*
University of Queensland Press, St Lucia
2001, 302pp., soft cover, \$30.00**

Some ten minutes drive from the historic Macquarie towns of Richmond and Windsor lies the Scheyville farm. It was converted into an Officer Training Unit (OTU) for national servicemen and from 1965 to 1973 graduated 1971 officers. There is a whimsy in the fact that William Schey established the farm to train young men in farming skills so that they might better themselves in Australia. This precedent gave little comfort to the OTU cadets.

Scheyville was an excellent choice as a training location with sufficient land and buildings to accommodate a unit the size of OTU. Although the remote location probably did little to comfort the cadets who found their lines rather cool in winter and very hot in summer. The sergeants' and cadets' messes were as comfortable as possible and given a strong martial appearance. The historic building used for the officers' mess and single officers' quarters, and the headquarters buildings gave the unit a sense of continuity and history.

The first commandant, Colonel Ian Geddes, worked tirelessly to make OTU a substantive unit with a special ethos and rapidly established traditions. The parade ground, 25 metre range, sports grounds and leadership reaction course were all constructed at considerable expense but they gave the unit exclusive use of these essential facilities.

Donnelly notes that an instructor from Scheyville would visit the training battalions and give a presentation which gave a very positive picture of the unit. Those who imagined that life at Scheyville would be like a country

club were disabused of this as soon as their bus arrived on the parade ground. The selected cadets were subject to the most demanding officer-training program in Australia. There was no time to mature in the program – it had to be mastered within 22 weeks – or removal took the cadet back to a regular unit for the rest of their national service commitment.

This book is a very readable account of the unique physical, organizational and human factors which created Scheyville. Staff and cadets all acknowledge that their time at Scheyville had a profound impact upon them. Donnelly gives a good account of the physical, mental and social pressures faced by cadets. Assessment of performance was spread as broadly as possible with all members of staff submitting assessments of a defined set of qualities at regular intervals. The cadet's guidance officer provided support and used the results to pin-point areas needing improvement.

Formal examination of knowledge-based subjects, tests of oral presentation skills, and leadership roles in the widest possible range of tasks gave a further dimension to the training. The failure rate was about 40 per cent, comparable with other officer training units here and overseas. The pace and intensity of the training was fierce beginning at 5am and ending at 10pm. The cadet's day was a constant rush from one activity to the next. As a staff officer at Scheyville, I considered one of the great strengths of the program was doing whatever you might ask of another. Thus, all staff took part in sport, route marches, field exercises and shoots.

The graduates were posted to every corps apart from the Chaplain's Department. Their service as platoon commanders and as Army flyers in Vietnam was distinguished and many won decorations for courageous actions. The inculcation of the Scheyville ethos – a determination for excellence – was carried into post-service life as scores of Scheyville graduates made their mark in society.

This is the first attempt to provide a history of Scheyville and in general it provides a large number of interesting and acute insights. Unfortunately the book is poorly structured, there is too much repetition, it lacks a basic map of the area and the unit, there is a great deal of anecdotal material the author could have tested by using more authoritative sources, and, given the existence of the Scheyville Association, it is surprising the author relies so much on the video material. Many graduates have been outstanding in their subsequent careers, however, it would give the book more balance if we heard more about the less notable. The use of the term Scheyvillians for graduates is an unfortunate one and the direct conversion of pound sums into dollars is unforgivable. A value index must be applied. The book needs a thorough editorial clean up and a more clearly defined story line.

As a book of record, this volume provides six appendices of great value. They include an account of life at Puckapunyal, the syllabus at Scheyville, Scheyville gallantry awards, the OTU Association, a list of all

graduates, a list of all officer staff (NCOs are not listed), and an account of the eight graduates who were killed in Vietnam. This is a good introduction to one of the Army's most effective training units, however, the subject is worthy of a more definitive account.

*reviewed by Malcolm Kennedy
aka 'Colonel Duc Thue'*

Barrie Pitt *The Crucible of War: Montgomery and Alamein* Cassell Military, London, 2001, 267pp., soft cover, \$35.00

For the British and their imperial allies battling to survive, the battle of El Alamein in October 1942 represented a turning point. Prime minister Churchill noted in his history of the war that: "Before Alamein we never had a victory. After Alamein we never had a defeat." For the other Allies, the battle was less important. Stalingrad had the same flavour for the Russians while Guadalcanal and Kokoda were equally significant for the Americans and Australians. Of course, the Americans had set the scene with the major naval victory of Midway four months earlier.

For Australians, of course, El Alamein was important for the key role of the AIF's 9th Infantry Division. The fourth raised in World War II, the 9th had already distinguished itself in the siege of Tobruk and was the last representative formation of the Australian Army in the Middle East. The 6th and 7th Divisions had returned to Australia to confront the Japanese but, somewhat reluctantly, the Australian government had agreed to the retention of the 9th in the Middle East.

Barrie Pitt is an experienced military historian and served in the Middle East. He has written widely and well on both world wars and writes well with occasionally tart comments to flavour his work.

The battle of El Alamein is significant for other reasons and Pitt covers them all in considerable detail. It came as the final turning point in a campaign which had ebbed and flowed across the North African desert for two years. In the first phase, a small imperial army which included Australian and Indian divisions had decisively defeated the Italians. They were rescued by German forces just as the British were diverted unsuccessfully to defend Greece. The Germans drove the British back but had to cope with trying to besiege Tobruk on their lines of communication. After more to-ing and fro-ing, the British were driven back to the El Alamein line, barely a stone's throw from the major British bases in the Middle East as well as the Suez Canal. There, with secure flanks and logistics, they held the Germans.

Apart from the logistic difficulties that plagued both sides having to supply forces over poor communications and ever greater distances as they advanced, the British had been plagued by importunate politicians, very ordinary generals and vastly inferior equipment, especially armour and anti-tank artillery.

The British army stopped the Germans although the impact of the latter's supply difficulties aggravated by aggressive naval operations based on Malta cannot be underestimated. Nevertheless, the government in London demanded scalps. Enter a new batch of generals, notably Alexander and Montgomery.

Montgomery, the field commander, was cautious. Defying London, he insisted he would not move out of his heavily defended fortress until he enjoyed overwhelming superiority in men and materiel. With good intelligence and anticipation, he let his German opposite number, Rommel, waste much of his armour on an attempt to break through. With new tanks and anti-tank guns, he prepared his armour for pursuit after he had crippled the Axis forces in a set piece battle that had all the hallmarks of a Western Front battle of attrition 20 years earlier.

Montgomery depended for his victory on powerful artillery and infantry to win the battle. With good reason, he did not trust his armoured divisions. Pitt suggests that the most effective of the British armour was a tank brigade that was placed under command of the New Zealand Division. The rest was poorly trained and seemingly unable to learn the hard lessons of the previous two years. Despite receiving large numbers of American Sherman and Grant tanks, superior to the Germans and Italians, they still possessed too many of the under-gunned British medium and light tanks. Moreover, they seemed to be incapable of avoiding ambushes by the powerful German 88mm anti-tank guns.

Pitt describes the battle in great detail and emphasises the crucial role of the Australian 9th Division which suffered heavy casualties as they broke through the minefields and chewed up the German and Italians. Above all, he emphasises the role of the artillery which was always responsive to calls for accurate fire support.

After the battle, the Germans retreated but the British found it difficult to cut them off. Pitt merely sketches this part of the campaign in which the 9th Division played no part. Indeed, Pitt is somewhat critical of their withdrawal to return to Australia with a hint that, if it was good enough for the Kiwis to remain, why not the Australians.

This is a very readable book with good chapter notes, illustrations and an index. One excellent feature is an order-of-battle for both sides.

El Alamein was a battle the British could not afford to lose. More than that, it was essential to win because, for the first time, they enjoyed massive superiority in both men and materiel. By contrast and thanks to the RN and RAF, the German and Italian forces were desperately short of armour and supplies. For the British, a draw at El Alamein would have been equivalent to yet another defeat. The ever-cautious Montgomery was determined that victory would be the only result. In that, he was a marked contrast to his principal opponent, Field Marshal Rommel, who was an inveterate gambler but, in this battle, had no cards.

reviewed by Michael O'Connor

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