

# defender

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● Opposing views on Iraq

this issue

● John Howard  
on staying in Iraq

● Labor's view  
on withdrawing  
from Iraq

● Keeping the  
US alliance in  
perspective

● Intelligence  
agency reform

● Nearing the  
end of the road  
in PNG



- Operational lessons from Iraq
- Structuring the defence force for regional manoeuvre

## Credibility overboard again

Despite entrenched suspicions in some quarters as to the integrity of the Howard Government, the latest information flow bungle in the Department of Defence would probably have also happened under a Labor administration. As with the so-called ‘children overboard’ reporting debacle in October 2001, the major problem did not occur within the frontline ADF elements involved. Nor was either really due to the passage of information from the frontline units to intermediate headquarters, or between those headquarters and Russell Offices. In both cases the information was received in Canberra but then sidetracked or otherwise confused, diffused or misused as it threaded through the tortuous Defence (and wider) bureaucracy at the strategic level.

Two fundamental problems are involved. First, operational matters that are a wholly military professional responsibility are wrongly perceived by some within the Defence civilian bureaucracy to have ‘policy’ implications, or even worse, to be ‘higher policy’ matters. This results in much unnecessary bureaucratic meddling rather than true teamwork between the defence force and the department. Second, there is no longer a clear military chain of command (and of professional and legal accountability) from the most forward-deployed ADF element up to the Government’s principal military adviser—the Chief of Defence Force (CDF)—through his supporting strategic-level military staff (including specialist civilian advisers).

A strategic-level joint military command structure for the ADF was recommended from the early 1950s onwards. Headquarters Australian Defence Force (HQADF) was, however, not created until 1982 owing to decades of determined civilian bureaucratic opposition. It was not until HQADF took over responsibility for all defence force operations overseas in 1989 that strategic oversight and joint integration of such operations improved dramatically. There was a clear military chain of command, and appropriate accountability by any professional, disciplinary, command, constitutional and moral line of authority or standard.

In 1997, as a result of the so-called Defence Efficiency Review, HQADF and the policy bureaucracy of the Department of Defence were merged to eradicate some areas of perceived duplication. The resulting amalgam, Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ), is neither fish nor fowl. Its structure and practices ignore several of the principles of war (and general sound management in any type of organisation). ADHQ suffers from five main deficiencies:

- it is too big and complex and frustrates effective Ministerial grip of the ADF and the department
- civilian bureaucratic structures, practices, agendas and cultures are interposed in the military chain of command
- perpetual working-level conflict results because of the two different institutional cultures involved (both generally suitable for their respective purposes individually)

### contents

#### Comment and information

|                                  |    |
|----------------------------------|----|
| Editorial                        | 3  |
| Letters                          | 4  |
| Current Comment                  | 8  |
| Major Furphy                     | 14 |
| The Sharp End                    | 32 |
| Association Update               | 23 |
| Conference Calendar              | 19 |
| Subscriptions and Privacy Policy | 13 |

#### Articles

|  |    |
|--|----|
| The Government perspective on Iraq <i>John Howard</i>          | 15 |
| The Labor perspective on Iraq <i>Chris Evans</i>               | 20 |
| Keeping the US alliance in perspective <i>Tony Parkinson</i>   | 24 |
| PNG: On the road to nowhere or somewhere <i>Mark Forbes</i>    | 27 |
| Reforming our intelligence apparatus <i>Warren Reed</i>        | 30 |
| Archipelagic manoeuvre warfare for the ADF <i>Paul Hendley</i> | 32 |
| Combined-arms teams: Lessons from Iraq <i>T.E. Shaw</i>        | 35 |


#### Reviews

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea | 38 |
| On the Warpath: An Anthology of Australian Military Travel                  | 40 |
| Krazy Hor: A Soldier’s Story  | 41 |
| Redcoats to Cams: A History of Australian Infantry 1788 to 2001             | 42 |
| Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime              | 43 |
| Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the Brink of Catastrophe         | 44 |
| Terrorism Explained: The Facts about Terrorism and Terrorist Groups         | 45 |
| Living by the Sword: The Ethics of Armed Intervention                       | 46 |

- much effort is wasted in pursuing the chimeras of a ‘unified’ institutional culture and organisational approach
- bureaucratic meddling in military professional matters is entrenched rather than prevented.

Now when ‘children overboard’ occurred the fact that the structure was largely at fault was generally overlooked in the ensuing party-political furore. The personal failure and/or moral weakness of key individuals involved also obscured the structural failure.

This time the real causes must be tackled. ADHQ must be abolished and HQADF clearly re-established as a stand-alone, strategic-level, joint military headquarters. This would enable the CDF to respond effectively to Ministerial direction and command defence-force operations along constitutionally and professionally correct lines. It would also mean failure could be swiftly and correctly identified, rectified and punished when it occurs. ♦



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**The letters pages are an important part of *Defender's* role in furthering public debate on national security issues. Letters to the Editor of *Defender* are submitted on the condition that the Australia Defence Association as publisher may edit all letters and reproduce them in electronic form. Emailed letters should be sent to <defender@ada.asn.au>. All writers must supply their name, address and daytime telephone number. Identification of writers will be withheld where justified. Letters should be kept to a maximum of 250 words (ideally 150) and avoid personal attacks.**

Sir: The letter from a puzzled naval officer in the last issue of *Defender* concerning the recent Defence Capability Review states that he '... could never understand why we purchased the FFGs'. Let me tell him.

At the time Navy was seeking to get approval for series production of an Australian designed and built light destroyer. The idea was a production run to turn out a destroyer every year for the following twenty years. This probably terrified the money men in Defence and they told the Minister that it was not on. At all events I remember the shock in Navy Office when we got the word from the Minister's office that we could have four FFGs instead. So, as far as I am concerned, it was the Minister (personally?) who made the decision.

Our puzzled letter writer seems to imply that the decision to buy the FFG was made by Navy. I can assure him that this was not so. But, having been stuck with four of them, it did make good sense to build another two here because, when you have six ships of the one class you get greater efficiency in logistic and maintenance support.

He goes on to remark that 'we spent money on upgrading these largely useless vessels'. But of course we had to spend money on them because of the philosophy behind their origins. The US Navy's then chief (Admiral Zumwalt) had conceived of the idea of the FFG as part of his 'high-low mix', a means of reconciling his strategic responsibilities with the limits on his resources. He also wanted 'Gary Hart Carriers'—sea control ships (SCS) or light aircraft carriers in layman's terms—and it had been calculated that he could have eight SCS for the price of one CVAN. But the aviator's lobby beat that project. As to the FFG, they were designed to price and the figure set for an FFG was \$US50 million. To achieve that figure some shonky deals were done. For instance, the ships' communications outfits were made up out of obsolete sets lying around in stores (costing little or nothing) because Admiral Zumwalt knew he already had funding for a separate project for a fleet-wide replacement of ships' communications outfits.

Zumwalt saw his 'low mix' ships being used in two distinctly different ways. In times of tension in inshore waters he would send in the Sea Control Ships and the FFGs. And if the war turned hot and they got attacked and sunk it would not be so costly as if they had been 'high mix' ships. In a full-on hot war with the Soviets the Low Mix ships would be employed (only) on open-ocean convoy escort duty. I feel sure that whoever made the decision to

buy the FFGs was not at all aware of the philosophy behind their design and the need to spend money on them to make them effective.

**Alan Robertson  
New South Wales**

Sir: I am intrigued by the way the Hugh White-led, government-funded and financially well-endowed 'Australian Strategic Policy Institute' (ASPI) is increasingly advocating longstanding ADA policy positions.

Last year we had the excellent paper by Dr Elsinia Wainright, which highlighted the need to assist Solomon Islands before it became a seriously failed state. This ably bolstered argument to this effect by the ADA since 2000 when the Solomon's government first requested such assistance.

In early 2004 this was followed by a well-argued paper from Dr Mark Thomson noting the urgent need to restore to the Service Chiefs control over capability development and equipment procurement in order to reintroduce fiscal and operational efficiency to these processes. Again this paper supports various arguments made strongly by the ADA over many years, invariably in the teeth of much abuse from the civilian (and military) bureaucracy at Russell Hill.

Now we have a paper by Peter Jennings calling for a new and integrated national security white paper rather than separate defence, foreign affairs and internal security ones; and criticism of proposals for a Department of Homeland Security. These too back up forceful ADA calls in this regard (and for a national security council) since 2001.

Finally, ASPI also appears to have picked up on the point, made in detail by the ADA since the attacks on 11 September 2001, that transnational terrorism cannot be defeated without addressing the various international cause célèbre that allow the terrorist groups to recruit.

To satisfy my suspicions I visited the ASPI website and checked out the staff photos. What I want to know is, what they have done with the real Hugh White?

**Kris Fairleigh  
New South Wales**

Sir: I am writing to offer my thanks for the ADA's unswerving support for the ADF over the years and in particular over the last couple of months. It can be a frustrating experience trying to achieve the capability development goals that we, as military professionals, know are required for a balanced and modern defence force.

All too often public discussion of defence issues is limited to the red-faced, hysterical diatribes printed in the editorial or opinion sections of the newspapers. To have at least one measured voice willing to be heard amongst the clamour of ignorance, political correctness and wishful thinking goes some way to reinforcing this staff officer's will to continue.

**Name and address supplied  
Australian Capital Territory**

Sir: In his 19 May speech to the Institute of Public Affairs in Melbourne [see article pp.14–18], the prime minister offered a powerful and reasoned defence for the deployment of 850 defence-force personnel to support the process of stabilisation and democratisation in Iraq. He denied that the commitment was symbolic but one can only wonder what the Americans and British really think.

Meanwhile the opposition continues to insist that the defence of Australian territory needs those 850 troops. Mr Howard has said on more than one occasion that Australia does not have the capacity to send more, however strongly he believes in the cause. After almost nine years in government marked by continuing strategic uncertainty, increased operational tempos and growing budget surpluses, this is an appalling admission. That the opposition does not seem to think so simply disqualifies them as well from any pretence of providing for adequate national security.

One might also wonder what sort of advice is getting to the government from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and why the media is not bellowing scandal.

**Michael O'Connor  
Victoria**

Sir: There is much talk about supposed parallels between this country's military commitments to South Vietnam in the 1960s and to Iraq now. Most of those I have read and heard, from both sides of politics, have been specious point scoring advanced for short-term electoral purposes rather than the results of robust strategic analysis or genuine political or moral principle.

Surely the main resonance of the current situation with the Vietnam War period is the intellectual poverty and faux moral outrage of so many of our politicians. The conservatives claim the war in Iraq is vital but balk at backing up this assessment with a commensurate and real boots-on-the-ground commitment. Labor/Democrats/Greens in turn oppose an overseas ADF combat deployment (yet again) but cannot articulate a coherent or forward-looking argument, instead falling back on what generally appears to be just visceral isolationism spiced by anti-American historical grudges. Another real resonance with Vietnam is that the defence force are again the meat in the Australian political sandwich with the party bread on each side crusty, stale, thin and suffering from insufficient (moral) fibre to rise to the occasion.

**Bruce Wright  
New South Wales**

Sir: I think I share the disappointment of many with the Air Force's reluctance to answer the detailed criticism advanced by Dr Carlo Kopp in the Autumn 2004 issue of *Defender*. Subsequent to this, Air Force Headquarters did present some arguments to a Canberra commercial seminar. One wonders why they ducked the opportunity to do so in *Defender*. Perhaps it was because of the ready comparison of argument integrity involved?

At the seminar the Chief of Air Force made several non sequiturs, errors of fact and plain illogical arguments. The biggest of these is that the main reason for early retirement of the F-111 fleet was that the aircraft's survivability in the post-2010 strategic environment would require fighter escorts for all strike missions.

This presumably, though not clearly stated, would be to protect them against attack from defending fighters. This appears to ignore the simple fact that the intended replacements (F/A-18A to 2015 and then JSF), together with their tanker support (to get the range), would also require fighter escorts to carry out effective strike missions. What's the point of a strike mission if you have to jettison your strike weapons in order to defend yourself.

Another point advanced at the seminar is that Air Force future operational concepts now envisage beyond-visual-range (BVR) engagements only. They exclude within-visual-range engagements (classical 'dog fighting') because this would lead to 'mutual destruction'.

This is somewhat confusing given that the aerodynamic performance, fuel capacity and weapon load of the F-111 make it an ideal BVR platform.

Moreover, if the RAAF were to undertake the long-delayed upgrades to its radar system and some off-the-shelf improvements to its self-protection suite and 'low observability', the F-111 would be even more superior and cost effective in the BVR role when compared to either the F/A-18A or JSF.

The cost of such upgrades to the F-111 is a better return on investment (and a pittance) when compared to the money being spent and planned to be spent on the F/A-18, which most pundits agree will be strategically irrelevant after 2010 and scrapped around 2015 anyway.

**Name and address supplied  
New South Wales**

Sir: In light of Air Force reluctance to really answer the comprehensive criticism by Dr Kopp concerning the early retirement of the F-111, and given the Chief of Air Force's obvious confidence and hyperbole about the JSF, will this not make it very difficult for people within his organisation to be objective and follow a proper risk-management ethos?

Who in uniform is going to make the career-limiting move of reporting any bad news? Has the ADF learnt nothing from the A21 debacle, where a proposal with many faults was dramatically worsened when professional debate was viciously suppressed and critics of the deeply flawed concept openly punished?

**Andrew Symons  
Queensland**

Sir: With regard to the latest controversy concerning our intelligence agencies it would be a rare bureaucracy that could claim to be an open and flexible organisation. Clearly, the Department of Defence is far from being a learning machine. It is a reasonable truism that most people are reluctant to admit that they are wrong and even more reluctant to change.

This latest contretemps is an opportunity for leaders in the department and the defence force (not managers) to seize the opportunity to implement change ... but only if they step up to the mark as leaders.

I suspect that the small section of the public who might be interested or concerned would be happy to turn to the next crisis du jour if the lead characters were to admit that there were mistakes and clearly explain the changes that they are making. In Queensland, Premier Beatty does this on an almost daily basis and survives crisis after crisis.

**Paul Burgess**  
**Queensland**

Sir: I enjoyed the coverage of the Lance Collins controversy in *Defence Brief* and in the op-ed article in the *Age* [7 May 2004], as I have for a number of other ADA articles on defence and associated issues I have read in the past year or so. I don't have much to add to the informed debate about Australia's intelligence and security services, other than I view many of the things happening with horror. In your articles you mentioned six reasons for employing professionals. I would like to add a seventh, although it does slightly overlap with others you mentioned.

When teaching purchasing, and ethics in particular, I inform students that research suggests that purchasing professionals, who have a sound grounding in purchasing (and ethical standards), are more likely to act ethically and in the long-term interests of their organisation and professional body.

This is because they have a career interest not just a passing one as does someone just raising the odd purchase order. If the purchasing professionals 'stuff up' it's their career whereas a non-professional just moves on to something else. I think this may have some relevance to your argument concerning the obviously too large a number of outsiders in management positions in our intelligence and security agencies. Keep up the good work.

**John Oska**  
**Victoria**

Sir: I was recently asked by a friend who is in charge of risk management in a big bank (not NAB), what I thought about the Lance Collins case.

I replied that many of his allegations accorded closely with my professional experience. The Jakarta lobby is a state of mind in some circles rather than a huge conspiracy as it is being portrayed in the media. It is held by those that think going to great lengths to appease Indonesia (or at least not upset them) is the key to a stable future. I do not hold that view. Yes we must work closely with Indonesia and try as much as possible to be partners, but when push

comes to shove our interests must come first and the Indonesians must be left with no doubt about where we stand. The failure of the common security treaty with Indonesia in 1999, at the moment it was most needed (and for which it was allegedly designed), is a very important example of the blowback that can occur if biased policy analysis is allowed to take hold.

This is not unlike a big bank countenancing certain high-risk business practices that in time slide into illegal or unwarranted risk taking. The parallels are quite strong and show the perils of groupthink in any large organisation.

**Paul Beaton**  
**Victoria**

Sir: My observation is that many of the most outspoken denials of the existence of a 'Jakarta lobby' in our government apparatus have come from those comprising it. In at least some cases this appears to result from genuine delusion rather than just hubris.

**Julie Hill**  
**Victoria**

Sir: I have much appreciated recent ADA comment in *Defender* and in various newspapers concerning structural and cultural problems in our intelligence and security agencies. I note that your basic point seems to be that senior level 'amateurism' (due to backgrounds limited to policy-making or diplomatic issues), rather than any particular political orientation, is the cause of problems in Australia's intelligence community, especially in the quality of intelligence assessments.

I draw your attention to the conclusion reached by Professor Richard Mulgan from ANU, that the loss of professional competence was more important than loss of neutrality ('Politicisation of Senior Appointments in the Australian Public Service', *Australia Journal of Public Administration*, September 1998).

*Towards Good Government in Queensland*, based on Queensland's experience of how public-sector 'reform' theories over the past two decades have led to loss of senior-level professional knowledge and skills explained the problem in terms of: misunderstanding the causes of the Whitlam Government's problems by Peter Wilenski who developed the influential theory of how to overcome apparent bureaucratic 'resistance' to change; the effect of the 'Yes Minister' school of populist public administration theory; managerialism—a theory that management is a generalist activity and one does not need to know anything about a subject to manage it; the adoption of a 'commercial' focus in public administration, which reflected a poor understanding of the nature of government, and undermined government's ability to really 'govern'; and the inability of starry-eyed and inexperienced 'reformers' to understand that reality is more complex than their political rhetoric—and that, without the tacit knowledge that experience brings, 'reform' could not lead to practical outcomes.

**John Craig**  
**Queensland**

Sir: As a member of the Australian Intelligence Community for the last couple of decades, thank you for your stance highlighting the troubling and marked decline in professionalism within some elements of the community.

The analytical side of intelligence and security agencies requires a careful balance in their skills and experience sets. Roughly a third have to be long-term, older, very experienced and or specialist staff, who have been watching a target for many years. About another third have to be a mix of civilian and military or police personnel with around 10 years of experience, who have preferably served with a variety of intelligence agencies and staffs, and who bring the broader perspectives that complement the narrower but deeper-level specialists.

The remaining third are the fresh-faced 'newbies', both civilian and military or police, in the early stages of their career learning curve. Aside from being the future, they bring the latest academic, operational and technical viewpoints. They also fulfil the absolutely vital role of challenging orthodoxy by asking the 'stupid questions' that are, of course, anything but stupid because they help stop the whole process ossifying.

In the case of our largest analytical agency, DIO, the balance is well out of whack due to the departure (forced, according to the allegations of some) of far too many of the most experienced desk-level analysts. They have been replaced in too many cases with 'bright young things' spending a tour with DIO before going on to promotion elsewhere.

This increasingly disastrous experience and credibility imbalance, and the associated decline in professionalism, is not even recognised by DIO senior management although DIO's customers and peers are growing very restive. There are two clear indications of this professional decline. DIO, as an institution, no longer knows the difference between intelligence analysis and an intelligence estimate. As one senior DIO manager waffled recently: 'The organisation does not do estimates because they are not important. If they were important we would do them because we do all the important things. But we don't do them so they must not be important. Therefore, as they are not important, we do not need to do them'.

The other sign of worsening decline is DIO's too-often indifferent support to the ADF, for both warfighting and capability development/maintenance. While many current intelligence tasks are handled satisfactorily there has been a distinct falling off in the quality of longer-term or more comprehensive analyses. Operational intelligence demands from the ADF are too often met with blank incomprehension from seriously inexperienced analysts or those with personal interests elsewhere. On one memorable occasion, I was told that the particular desk 'no longer did that military stuff, we focus on political and economic matters—as we all have postgraduate qualifications in those areas ...'. In that case we had to obtain from allies the information we needed to support that part of an ADF deployment.

All intelligence and security agencies go through an irregular cycle of ups and downs. In the early 1990s (after it formed) JICPAC product declined badly, followed into ineptitude by elements of MODUK. Major sections of DIA then followed as dinosaur *de jour*. These agencies are now all producing very well. As ever, it is merely a matter of replacing those responsible for the mess, and restoring the professional balance in both management and the pool of analysts employed.

Perhaps DIO is due for such an upswing but I suspect not. My American and British compatriots too often now set their search trees to dump DIO product into the bit bucket. They don't read much of it, and regard it as poorly developed and watery classified news. Some even prefer open-source blog sites from people in relevant geographic areas. The exceptions, as always, are where they know the product is from someone they personally know and trust. Unsurprisingly, these tend to be the remaining older and/or technical analysts.

These professional remnants now carry the reputation of DIO. They ruefully note several symptoms of the decline: low average experience levels, high staff turnover in many (but not all) areas, the increasing frequency of high-level directives to improve product quality and, recently, the product emanating (for once) from senior managers not previously noted for their original analysis.

**Name and address supplied  
Australian Capital Territory**

**(Letters—cont'd p. 37)**

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## Debate balanced only by reciprocal flaws

In this issue of *Defender* we publish articles on the war in Iraq from both the Government and Opposition perspectives. This issue also includes an article on the importance of Australia's alliance with the United States because this remains an essential component of any debate on Australia's current and future strategic challenges. This latter aspect was also the subject of an ADA submission to the current parliamentary inquiry into Australia's defence relations with the United States. Both the Association's written and oral submissions may be found on the Australian Parliament House web site at: [http://www.gov.au/committees/inquiries\\_comm.htm](http://www.gov.au/committees/inquiries_comm.htm).

The ADA shares the concern of many Australians that aspects of current Labor national security policy, especially concerning the war in Iraq and relations with the United States, appear to lack vision, coherence and perspective, and smack too much of old-fashioned, ideology-driven isolationism. There is also no doubt that some of the strongest concern in this regard is within the ranks of the Labor Party and its supporters, particularly among those with long experience and interest in defence, foreign policy and international humanitarian matters.

On the other hand, if the war in Iraq is as important as the Coalition parties maintain, almost in Manichean terms, then it seems incongruous that we have not substantially increased our commitment to the multi-national effort in that country. This is especially so when our increased help would appear most needed by our principal allies and the majority of the Iraqi people. Our straitened defence capabilities would, of course, only permit a larger commitment of ground forces for a strictly limited duration. This is, however, an excuse rather than sufficient reason to duck such a challenge if the situation is as bad as the Government apparently believes.

Perhaps the flaws in the respective positions of both parties are a temporary aberration due to perceived concerns about electoral gains and losses in an election year. We certainly hope so. ♦

## More gambling with our future

As expected, the 2004–05 federal budget was mainly targeted at buying swinging votes in marginal electorates. This was to be expected in an election year where a close race is likely and where, despite occasional rhetoric to the contrary, both parties are naturally reluctant to draw attention to their long and indifferent records of insufficient and inconsistent national security spending.

The overall allocation for defence is \$16.3 billion

comprising an appropriation of \$15.9 billion and other revenue (asset sales, etc) of \$400 million. This is about \$725 million (or 2.4 per cent) more than last year. Defence spending is about 8.5 per cent of the total federal budget (\$192.3 billion) and is estimated to be around 1.8 to 1.9 per cent of projected GDP. The non-defence intelligence and security agencies also received an additional \$56 million. It is worth noting that the opaque accounting methods used meant the nation's main newspapers again all quoted different figures for defence spending in their budget analyses.

Purely for comparison, social security (\$82.6 billion) is about 43 per cent of the budget, health (\$35 billion) around 18 per cent, and education (\$14.2 billion) about 7.5 per cent. Given that defence is wholly Commonwealth funded, but these other three areas also receive significant inputs from the states and territories, this budget again puts paid to the myth that we are somehow 'wasting' too much on defence and not allocating enough for social spending.

These days, as long as the overall defence allocation is not cut, the budget night detail is not as important as it once was. The funds necessary to run our defence efforts fall into three broad categories: people, operating costs and capital investment. Most public interest is in the latter category and government press releases tend to emphasise the monies allocated to 'shiny new kit' for the ADF, and new base facilities—generally described, funnily enough, by federal electorate as well as geographic locality.

Equipping the defence force requires phased investment over time, not least because of the long periods taken to procure weapons and equipment, but also because many of the larger items (ships, aircraft, etc) or fleets of equipments remain in service for two to four decades (or longer when the phasing is cocked-up or otherwise delayed). In basic terms the capital-investment component each year tops up the first year of the rolling Defence Capability Program (DCP). This runs out to around 25 years in some cases but only the first 10 are budgeted in detail for project funding. This year's DCP top-up included \$2.9 billion for major equipment, \$421 million for facilities and \$518 million for minor equipment, repairs, rent and intangibles.

As per normal, around 41 per cent of this budget, some \$6.7 billion, will be spent on personnel costs (pay, allowances, health, housing, superannuation, etc). One in five dollars goes on Defence's public servants and the remainder on the defence force. The remaining 30 per cent of budgeted funds (around \$5.7 billion) goes on a wide range of operating and other one-off costs, including about \$132 million for another year in Iraq.

The capital-investment program has not been cut to subsidise personnel and operating costs, however, because Defence was unable to spend some \$600 million of capital-

investment funding last financial year, there has been some deferment of projects in the DCP to later years in the program. This will be a problem if those funds are not made available, as scheduled, in subsequent budgets.

The 2004–05 budget largely continues the sustained underinvestment in defence of the last three decades and further postpones or limits much-needed ADF modernisation. Our short-term-focused allocation of national resources to defence still fails to match the long-term strategic challenges we face. The small real increase in defence funding this year still lags well behind both GDP and general expenditure growth. As a nation we could and should spend more on defence but we choose not to in an uncalculated gamble on the future. ♦

## Trooplift helicopter selection and LHD survivability

A considerable amount has been written about the two contenders for Project Air 9000, the initiative to equip the Australian Army with a new fleet of trooplift helicopters. Little of it, however, has provided significant depth in analysing the respective capabilities each aircraft being considered would bring, and how these might integrate with other key ADF capabilities.

Defence's own capability analysis has already established that the Eurocopter MRH 90 is superior to the M-model Black Hawk when it comes to amphibious operations. This is of great consequence as there is little doubt that amphibious operations are the way of the future for the defence force.

Also important is the impact that the choice of helicopter will have on the survivability of the Navy's new landing helicopter dock (LHD) amphibious ships, the first of which is planned to enter service in 2010. For example, the time taken to fold or unfold a helicopter's rotor blades is critical. The longer the time taken to prepare each helicopter for flight, the longer the LHD is exposing its position—thereby increasing the risk of attack from air and/or surface-launched anti-ship missiles, coastal artillery, asymmetric threats, etc. With each LHD required to be capable of launching six helicopters simultaneously, the infrared and radar signatures given off by all this activity are enormous. This 'bloom' telegraphs the LHD's location and intent.

It is understood that the MRH 90 takes about 15 minutes to prepare for flight and the M-model Black Hawk takes at least 45 minutes. This effectively means that an LHD embarking M-model Black Hawks would be exposing itself for three times longer before a flight can be launched than if it embarked MRH 90s.

There is much riding on the selection of the new trooplift helicopters under Project Air 9000 and not just for the Army. This decision is, to a very significant degree, really about the way the ADF expects to do its joint expeditionary business in the future—and protect its limited numbers of associated high-value platforms and their crews. ♦

## Sinking subjective analogies on Iraq and Vietnam

The consolidation phase of the collective intervention in Iraq continues to present significant challenges. As the interim Iraqi government takes over and Iraq begins to resume its sovereignty, there will continue to be opposition by those dispossessed of power. To some extent this will be supported by those of Iraq's neighbours uncomfortable with any example of genuine popular sovereignty.

Many of the critics of the coalition effort in Iraq have been making comparisons with the allied involvement in the second Indo-China War, 1962–1975. Interestingly, most such critics have been drawing incorrect or exaggerated points and ignoring some real ones. It is also worth noting that most of those drawing comparisons between Iraq and Vietnam have been either political opponents of the current Australian government and/or those with little apparent knowledge or understanding of either of the two wars (or war in general). This has generally not assisted the objectivity or intellectual integrity of the proposed comparisons. On most important comparisons, there are major differences in the situations between Iraq and Vietnam.

First, the Vietnam War occurred within an overall 'Cold War' paradigm that long predated and post-dated it. The North Vietnamese were sustained by superpower-level support from the Soviet Union and significant support from the regional communist power, China. This support continued for decades. None of these conditions, or analogous ones, apply to Iraq.

Second, South Vietnam fell because it was progressively invaded by 17 North Vietnamese divisions over the 1968–1975 period not through internal insurgency. Up until the dying days of the South Vietnamese polity around 90 per cent of South Vietnamese chose to live in areas outside the so-called 'liberated zones', and voted with their feet by becoming refugees fleeing ahead of the North Vietnamese Army's push south. It was, after all, a North Vietnamese tank not popular resentment that knocked down the gates of the presidential palace in Saigon in May 1975. South Vietnam's vulnerability to invasion was exacerbated because overall strategic conditions in the Cold War effectively prevented an allied pre-emptive or counter-strike invasion of North Vietnam to force North Vietnamese withdrawal from the South. There are no equivalent forces to the North Vietnamese Army opposing the coalition and Iraqi forces in Iraq.

Third, South Vietnam was a long, thin country territorially. The original communist insurgency in South Vietnam and the eventual supporting North Vietnamese invasion were largely sustained by the use of major supply routes and sanctuaries in neighbouring countries (Laos and Cambodia). These lay along South Vietnam's entire land borders, were quite close to major population centres in South Vietnam, and were relatively immune to attack (at least until 1970) because of the overall 'Cold War' paradigm. Iraq is not a long, thin country and its borders are not mainly in mountainous areas of primary jungle

where infiltration across frontiers is relatively easy. The opposition to the coalition-led rebuilding of Iraq does not have the sustained support of neighbouring countries, nor the geographical advantages of major sanctuaries close to Iraq's main centres of population along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.

Fourth, the insurgency in South Vietnam was completely and centrally controlled by the North Vietnamese although an allegedly non-communist front group, the National Liberation Front (NLF) and a Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) were nominally in charge in the South. Despite considerable propaganda throughout the Vietnam War, the NLF and PRG were swiftly disbanded and suppressed once Saigon fell. The opposition in Iraq is only loosely coordinated across the country, is confined to minority segments of the population, and is not led by any organisation with a pretence to (or capability of) being an alternative national authority.

Fifth, the Vietnam War was fought over most of the country and for a prolonged period. In Iraq, much of the country is relatively quiet, especially in the Kurdish-dominant north and most of the Shiite-dominant south. With a few relatively minor exceptions, such as the Iranian-backed 'would-be cleric', Muqtada al-Sadr, in Najaf, the active opposition to the coalition occupation forces is largely concentrated in only parts of the country and among one segment of the population—the dethroned Sunni ascendancy class (some 20 per cent of the population). Most importantly, the Kurdish and Shiite leaderships may not like the coalition occupation, but they know it is temporary. They recognise that a coalition withdrawal before a popularly elected (and probably federal) government has consolidated its hold on the country would result in civil war. Furthermore, even if in the worst case the opposition to the occupation worsened, or lasted until the coalition forces withdraw after the Iraqi elections next January, the timescales and force scales would be much shorter and smaller respectively than in Vietnam.

Finally, it was always difficult for either side in Vietnam to achieve their desired end-states, understand each others' end-states or keep to timeframes. Furthermore, both the North Vietnamese (and their Soviet and Chinese backers) and the Americans became locked into a cycle of escalation through the 1960s. Neither could afford to quit without conceding major strategic and ideological advantages, with worldwide and long-term consequences, to their adversary.

The situation in Iraq is quite different as everyone knows that the endstate, either way, will occur quickly following the elections in January 2005; and most agree that whatever government emerges from the elections will mean the effective end of large-scale military intervention by outsiders. In addition, the strategic and moral consequences of failure in Iraq, while uncomfortable, would be nowhere near the scale of those in Vietnam. Even success is likely to be qualified at best, especially in the short term. Any failure is likely to be, at worst, only relative. Moreover, if the situation in Iraq ever became untenable, the coalition could withdraw knowing that they had done their best and that Iraq and the region were still better off than they had

been under the regime of Saddam Hussein—even if many refused to openly concede the fact. ♦

## Real and useful analogies

There are, however, some key similarities between the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, especially concerning wider strategic, operational and moral lessons about resolve.

In retired Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew's words, the allies may have lost in Vietnam but they brought a vital 10 years for the rest of South-East Asia. The free world had vital interests in preventing communist domination of the region and these were largely successfully protected even after the falls of Saigon and Phnom Penh. Similarly, at least in the US, there is general agreement on what is at stake in Iraq and Afghanistan following attacks such as September 11. The campaign in Iraq is simply part of the wider fight between civilised international discourse, political pluralism and personal and religious liberty on the one hand, and apocalyptic and bigoted Islamist terrorism, with which no meaningful negotiation is possible, on the other.

The war in Vietnam was the second of four Indo-China wars over the 1946–1994 period. The loss of Vietnam was a setback to regional stability, led to further regional conflicts (Vietnam–China and Vietnam–Cambodia) and, directly, to the Khmer Rouge-initiated genocide in Cambodia. These tragedies would probably not have occurred if the allies had successfully defended South Vietnam. The current war in Iraq followed the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War and the 1991–92 Iraq–Kuwait War.

The toppling of the Baathist regime in Iraq may have been messy, but it probably signifies the end of Iraq as a threat to regional stability rather than the opposite. While Saudi Arabia grows progressively more unstable this is the culmination of an internal process that long predates contemporary events in Iraq, and which may be ameliorated by the influence and example of a democratic Iraq. ♦

## Glass houses and stone throwing

In early June, during Prime Minister Howard's visit to the White House, President George Bush was asked the following question by an Australian journalist: '... you would be aware the alternative prime minister in Australia, Mark Latham, has promised to withdraw Australian troops from Iraq by Christmas—what signal would that send to the Iraqi people and the other members of the coalition?'. While President Bush kept his answer in the abstract in terms of personalities, few Australians who keep up with international current affairs were genuinely surprised by the vehemence of his answer:

'I think that would be disastrous, it would be a disastrous decision for the leader of a great country like Australia to say that we're pulling out. It would dispirit those who love freedom in Iraq. It would say that the Australian government doesn't see the hope of a free and democratic society leading to a peaceful world. It would embolden the enemy, who believe that they can shake our will. See,

they want to kill innocent life because they think the Western world, and the free world, is weak; that when times get tough, we will shirk our duty to those who long for freedom, and we'll leave'.

President Bush's forthright statement of his views has attracted some criticism as somehow interfering in Australian domestic politics. Unsurprisingly, most of the advocates of this line are Australian politicians and commentators who have not been backward about sinking the boot into President Bush and announcing their hopes for a Kerry victory in the November US presidential elections.

Much of the critical commentary concerning President Bush has also failed to acknowledge the big picture. The Americans, justifiably, see themselves as being at war and are well aware that war is ultimately a clash of wills. They are therefore not really inclined to dabble in the type of diplomatic pussyfooting that generally features in peacetime discourses with the international public. This is not well understood in Australia, often, it appears, because people do not want to have to understand.

Also not surprising is what leading US figures view as the hypocrisy and subjectivity of Australian critics of President Bush's comments. After all, the tone, tenor and circumspection of President Bush's remarks strike a stark contrast with Mark Latham's early 2003 description of President Bush (before Mr Latham's elevation to the Opposition leadership) as 'flaky' and 'the most incompetent and dangerous president in living memory'.

Also not unnoticed in US circles is that the criticism of Bush in Australia has often been made by those who do not appear to realise that Democrat presidential contender, John Kerry, has certainly not been advocating a precipitate withdrawal from Iraq. Given a similar situation in future such as that in Iraq now, it is likely that a President John Kerry would make very similar remarks and very similar judgments to those made by President Bush.

It is also quite possible that President Bush's remarks were meant as a warning, that Australia would be making a serious mistake if it adopted the type of isolationist thinking, and limited commitments to wider international security, that have bedevilled New Zealand's political and economic relations with the rest of the Western alliance over the last 20 years. ♦

## Sea-change stirring across the ditch

Recently in New Zealand there has been much controversy about possible revision of opposition National Party policy concerning New Zealand's ban on visits by nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered warships. In mid May, the party's new defence spokesman, Simon Power, made a speech forewarning of policy reform in several areas. Some of this was swiftly disavowed by the party but it seems certain that the Nationals will eventually pluck up the courage to confront one of the great shibboleths of modern Kiwi politics.

During a recent visit to New Zealand, US officials met with new National Party leader, Don Brash. Unknown to

Dr Brash, and apparently the US delegation, a representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) was present and took notes. In a clear breach of Westminster system propriety, the notes were demanded by Ministers in New Zealand's Labour government and quoted in parliament in an attempt to embarrass Dr Brash. According to the notes Dr Brash made an off-hand remark that if the Nationals won the next New Zealand election the ban 'would be gone by lunchtime'. Dr Brash has denied making the remark, none of the US officials can recall it, and Dr Brash forbade MFAT officials to sit in on meetings during his visit to Washington DC in June.

The New Zealand political spectrum is markedly to the left of Australia's across the board. This is exacerbated by New Zealand having only a one-chamber parliament largely elected by proportional representation. Most recent governments have been coalitions or minority governments dependent on support from fringe parties. This has tended to make major political reforms in New Zealand difficult to achieve and many Kiwi politicians wary of confronting vocal but not necessarily large sections of the electorate.

The bottom line, however, is that over the last six months the National Party has come from well behind in the opinion polls, to a strong lead, by finally having the courage to tap growing popular resentment of the (second-term) Clark government's penchant for politically correct favouritism. While this has mainly involved tensions across New Zealand's bi-cultural divide, the same fundamentals largely hold true on the nuclear bans issue. The National Party is obviously treading carefully but abolition of the ban might also be a vote winner, especially in the longer term. Five developments and trends contribute to this:

- nuclear weapons have not been carried on US and British warships for many years so the main purported reason for the ban is ever-increasingly irrelevant
- more and more Kiwis appear to agree with the 1992 Somers Committee (Royal Commission equivalent) report which comprehensively demolished every argument about the supposed dangers of visits by nuclear-powered ships
- the ban is widely seen internationally as a failure, has not been copied by any important country, and is clearly not the innovative and world-leading example it was trumpeted as when introduced
- most Kiwis understand and approve of New Zealand's participation in the war on terror and note the partial thaw this has brought in strategic relations with the US
- many, probably most, Kiwis now realise that their sustainable economic and social future can no longer be divorced from wider strategic and political considerations, and that the isolationism of the ban has proved counter-productive.

With New Zealand also facing an election this year, it may not be too long before ANZUS again is the fully tri-national alliance needed in the present strategic circumstances. It may be that New Zealand might soon resume contributing its fair share to the collective effort of securing its own region and the wider international order. ♦

## Blown into proportion

The threat from transnational Islamist terrorism and consequent homeland defence matters are topical themes in the defence capability debate. In particular, the threat from bombs is resurgent. The 2003 US Department of State Report notes that 67 per cent of international terrorist incidents comprised bombings (with 27 per cent being armed attacks and less than one per cent involving hostage taking). The Australian Bomb Data Centre (ABDC) reported 348 bombings, hoax devices and attempted bombings in Australia during 2002—mostly criminal in origin. For over 40 years the ADF maintained an Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (IEDD)—more commonly referred to as ‘bomb disposal’—capability in each State and territory. In the late 1980s the primacy for IEDD operations was transferred, quite correctly, to the State police services with the ADF maintaining a surge capability to support the one or two bomb squads that each police service could deploy. Since then, the ADF IEDD teams in the ACT and Tasmania have been removed and numerous bomb technician positions in other regions have been either axed or replaced by civilian ammunition logisticians. In the last few years the RAN, RAAF and the Army’s Incident Response Regiment (IRR) have improved their IEDD abilities but they have no specific domestic security role, nor are they centrally coordinated or regionally based to provide timely support to the police.

The new National Counter Terrorist Plan still requires Defence to maintain an IEDD capability. Now appears to be a suitable opportunity to determine if the deficiencies in ADF regional IEDD capacity should be remedied or the capability removed from the ADF. Deficiencies include command and control, equipment, training and intelligence support.

Regional IEDD operations, including operational tasking, previously under command of the defunct Military District structure are now undertaken by the Joint Ammunition Logistic Organisation (JALO) as an adjunct to its ammunition and ordnance inspectorate functions. Despite discussion on IEDD tasking since 1976, and the obvious advantages of a centralised command centre for an operational function common to the three Services, there is no single IEDD tasking headquarters. JALO is outside the normal command structure for responding to terrorist incidents. The IRR is under Headquarters Special Operations (HQSO), which would appear to be an obvious location for an ADF IEDD command centre. The UK centralised tasking model is worth studying.

The Echidna robots used for remote approaches to a device so as to reduce exposure by bomb technicians are now 16 years old and beyond their extended shelf life. Although a capability statement has been raised no

approved project to replace them is yet in train. The primary IEDD demolition weapon, while still effective, is 30-year old technology and newer systems are available. Of greater concern are the bomb suits; the first fleet of Canadian suits are now some 11 years old and the second fleet about eight years old. The protective armour has an expected life of seven years and the planned program of inspection testing was never implemented. While new suits were purchased for the Olympics, most of them did not find their way to the regions. The operators are being asked to wear protective equipment that is out-of-date and probably ineffective. The risk to bomb technicians is obvious, as are the moral and OH&S liabilities of the ADF.

The Army ammunition technical staff on call in the regions for IEDD tasking undergo extensive initial training but there is no formal retraining or re-qualification. The onus for training apparently rests with the senior representative in each region and they organise what they can with little or no resources. It is surely unusual that military personnel authorised to conduct high-risk explosive operations and to deploy weapons in an urban environment are not required to undergo regular retraining and re-certification. The training regime of the counter-terrorist tactical assault groups makes an interesting comparison.

**... the deficiencies in ADF regional IEDD capacity should be remedied or the capability removed ...’**

Finally, there is no direct formal link between the ADF’s regionally based

IEDD teams and IED intelligence systems. The links between the ABDC and DIO are primarily via JALO which does not have a dedicated intelligence or IEDD cell. The regional IEDD teams do not have appropriate secure communications or data systems. They are usually outside the counter-terrorist briefing program and often have to rely on local contacts with the police for current intelligence. Transferring operational control for IEDD tasks to HQSO, which does have a dedicated intelligence cell, would assist.

Senior ADF commanders and Defence officials, other government departments and probably the Government, believe that the ADF maintains an effective IEDD capability in the States and territories to assist the police if or when the most likely form of terrorist attack occurs. The reality is that there are fewer teams, they are lightly staffed, equipped with old and possibly dangerous equipment, and have poor intelligence links and an inappropriate command structure. Even if new equipment is procured to provide a materiel solution, the aspects of role, function, resources and position within the ADF’s counter-terrorist capability need to be addressed.

A policy decision needs to be made, on a capability level. Do we maintain and resource the regional IEDD capability or close it? ♦



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# Major Furphy



## The war within

The phone call came in at 0630, an ungodly hour. Normally I would not be in the office so early but now that Barney is Chief of Joint Operations, as well as VCDF, life grows ever more interesting. Luckily Barney and I will only have to sit it out until the next change in ADF command and control is announced. On past form this should be in about three weeks.

The caller identified himself as the Chief-of-Staff to the prime minister and asked to be put through to CJOPS. I immediately wondered whether Barney had been ambushed by reporters during his morning walk with his dog. Needless to say, Barney was not in yet. However, the caller was very polite and asked that Barney return a call to the PM ASAP. When Barney rang back, I thought it best to listen in on the conversation. It went something like this:

‘Stoush, did you see *Mateline* on the ABC last night?’ That was a bad start; Barney never watches television apart from war movie reruns. He claims films like *Tora Tora Tora* or *Midway* are more informative and accurate as well as entertaining.

‘I missed that one, prime minister. I was representing the CDF at one of those endless diplomatic receptions’.

‘Well, according to *Mateline*, there has been a coup in Upper Kunjingini. I’ve asked ONA about it and they say they’ve never heard of the place so it must be a defence matter. Find out why we weren’t warned and let me have a report’.

To cut a long story short, Barney set up a committee to investigate the affair with himself as chairman and me—you guessed it—as secretary. The first meeting was a bit of a farce. Foreign Affairs did not send anyone because no deputy secretaries were available to represent them, at an appropriate protocol level, at a meeting chaired by an ADF three-star. International policy division in Defence was represented by an acting EL2. The lad in question was really a newly qualified graduate trainee who had been no further afield than a post-exam holiday in Fiji. Barney assumed he had been sent because of his unusually detailed expertise on the region within IP.

The DSD rep said that Upper Kunjingini had no external communications. Their radio transmitter had broken down and their telephone had been cut off for failure to pay the bill. ASIO’s rep said it had nothing to do with them because it was a foreign country. The ASIS rep said their closest thing to a man on the spot, in next door Lower Kunjingini, had been expelled because his cover as a Maserati salesman was exposed when he declined to hand over a new model to the president for a mere \$LK250.

The relevant DIO area desk officer—a newly transferred-in Arabic (not Kunjingin) linguist—was not yet completely across all the countries on her new beat. She did, however, produce an email referring to a briefing that had been organised some years previously for a military mission to the Kingdom of Upper Kunjingini. The two ONA reps were triumphant (they now always attended meetings in pairs to ensure a witness to any advice offered). Their hands were clean. It was truly a Defence matter—and they could tell the prime minister so. Barney scratched his head a bit at all this. I could see that, accustomed as he was to bureaucratic buck-passing (and not a bad exponent of it himself), he was faced with the awful prospect of explaining yet another apparent INTELLIGENCE FAILURE to the prime minister. That was when I won my CSC. I whispered to Barney that an analyst from the Theatre Joint Intelligence Centre in Sydney had just arrived. Perhaps, I told the VCDF, our new arrival could solve the problem.

Some present expressed scepticism. Probably because they had read the recent voluminous opinion articles in the newspapers by retired senior officials claiming ADF intelligence specialists can never know anything about strategic intelligence matters.

Sergeant ‘Bulldog’ Drummond was duly summoned. Despite the name, Drummond was slight, clerkly looking and not very smartly presented. Barney, being an air force type, was not too concerned about appearances.

‘Do you know anything about this coup in Upper Kunjingini?’ he asked. ‘What coup, sir?’ The confident query stunned the gathering. ‘*Mateline* said there has been a coup’, posited Barney, ‘and that a new bloke called Akepa is in charge’. ‘How would you know anyway?’, sneered one apparently inveterate newspaper reader.

Being an analyst, Drummond was silent momentarily as he pondered, but then smiled at the doubting bureaucrat. ‘Well, ladies and gentlemen, when I interpreted for the military mission to Upper Kunjingini, I became pretty friendly with the King who enjoys a beer or three. I later looked after his son some weekends when he started at Canberra Grammar’.

‘He told me recently that his father wanted a bit of time off to go hunting. Following an old Kunjingin custom he called in all his brothers and cousins to draw straws to work out who would stand in as King for three months. Cousin Akepa drew the short straw. There hasn’t been a coup, gentlemen.’

Barney had the last word. ‘Perhaps’, he suggested, ‘the committee could recommend an inquiry into the operations of *Mateline*’.

# The government

## perspective on Iraq

John Howard

### A contest

Iraq is caught in a complex and crucial contest of values and ideals. It is a contest between the majority of Iraqis who want to establish a viable democracy, and a violent and determined minority who want to install a new dictator or a Taliban-style regime. It is a contest of will as the terrorists and insurgents try to use fear and intimidation to drive the forces that support the democratisation of Iraq—the coalition forces—out of Iraq.

Ultimately, it is a contest of conviction—whether the free world is prepared to protect and encourage democratic values. Those values Australians cherish—tolerance, opportunity, security and respect for one's neighbours.

A wide range of contending forces in Iraq have demonstrated they are prepared to use violence, against both coalition forces and the Iraqi people, in order to achieve their political objectives. Their motivations and their ambitions are complex, sometimes rooted in the old divisions between Sunni and Shia, or in ethnic and tribal tensions.

The jihadist terrorists—taking their inspiration from organisations like Al Qa'eda—are driven by a bigoted and distorted ideology that is the complete antithesis of our own and, we should remember, the vast majority of Muslims. But we also need to understand that this contest in Iraq represents a critical confrontation in the war against terror. We recognise this and so do our enemies.

### Why we must stay

I find it astonishing when people claim that Iraq is a diversion from the real war against terrorism. The reality is that international terrorism has invested an enormous amount in breaking the will of the coalition in Iraq. Not only are organisations associated with Al Qa'eda operating in Iraq but each and every turn of the Iraq struggle is interpreted by spokesmen for international terrorism as part of the ongoing campaign against the United States and her allies.

Whatever may have been the origins of the horrific attack in Madrid, Al Qa'eda and its associates opportunistically associated that attack with Spain's

participation in the military operation in Iraq. The terrorists have recorded Spain's subsequent decision to withdraw from Iraq in the victory column against the West.

With that in mind, it is incontestable that a failure of will in Iraq by the coalition would be seen as an enormous propaganda victory for international terrorism. This would be a victory with far-reaching consequences. Any weakening or retreat by the coalition in Iraq will not appease the terrorists. Those who imagine that respite from future terrorist attacks can be purchased by withdrawing or temporising could not be more wrong.

International terrorism is an enemy of Australia because of who we are not what we have done. Australian withdrawal from Iraq would not buy immunity from terrorist attacks. International terrorism treats weakness and retreat with contempt. Countries, and their citizens, which have suffered terrorist attacks over recent years include those who have opposed as well as those who have supported coalition action in Iraq.

It will be a heavy blow to the terrorist cause if democracy and all that it offers is successfully brought to the Iraqi people. That is why the ferocious campaign of recent times to derail not only the transfer of power on 30 June, but also the establishment of a democratic infrastructure for Iraq, has been so determined.

The terrorists know that if democracy is installed in Iraq they have lost. Iraq is the key to creating new hope for the people of the Middle East. It will be a great encouragement for them to see democracy take root in Iraq, to witness a more equal distribution of wealth, and greater opportunity for ordinary people to live peaceful and independent lives.

It was very sobering during my recent meeting with William Shawcross, the well-known commentator on international events, to be reminded that out of the seven regions of the world, the UN Development Programme found that the Middle East region had the least freedom of all—fewer civil liberties, fewer political rights and less free media. Women's lives, in particular, are more restricted than anywhere else in the world.

Sadly, the appalling abuse of Iraqi detainees in Abu Ghraib prison will have caused many in the region to

question whether democracy will make a difference. They need to see that difference in action—that the victims of abuse are not only able, but encouraged to speak out, seek redress and find justice. We share their sense of outrage. The Australian Government unreservedly condemns any abuse of prisoners of war. We remain profoundly shocked and disturbed by the terrible images of wanton acts of cruelty and degradation—behaviour which dehumanises all those involved. Australia expects the American and British forces to observe the highest standards of discipline and conduct—just as we do of our own defence force personnel. We therefore welcome the statements by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair that there will be a full investigation with those responsible being brought to account through an open and transparent process.

It is important that these reprehensible actions of a few do not, however, overshadow the careful, disciplined and courageous behaviour of the overwhelming majority of the coalition forces. Their work in Iraq is too important. Their professionalism is too admirable. The stakes are too high. We should reject the line that the moral basis of coalition action in Iraq has been destroyed by the unacceptable behaviour of some of its personnel.

Helping Iraq build a democratic future represents not only a challenge but also an important opportunity for the whole region. That is why, irrespective of views held as to the wisdom of the original campaign against Saddam Hussein, it is overwhelmingly in the interests of not only the coalition but the cause of freedom around the world that the forces opposed to democracy in Iraq are overcome.

During my recent visit to Baghdad, I discussed the current situation with representatives of the Iraqi Governing Council. They asserted strongly that the majority of Iraqi people want a democratic future. But I was also reminded that that future hangs in the balance as events are passing through a critical phase. Iraq is poised between the establishment of a new democratic order and the resurgence of chaos and tyranny.

There is a job to be done in Iraq. My view remains that Australia should be contributing to that effort—if anything it has been strengthened and reinforced by the experience of my recent visit. I am more determined than ever that Australia should stay the distance and finish the tasks for which we have taken responsibility.

## Why we went

We could spend a great deal of time revisiting the merits or otherwise of Australia's military commitment as part of the coalition of the willing. I do not intend to revisit in detail the events surrounding that decision. I would remind those who now want to rewrite history, however, that disagreement then centred on how the international community should respond to Iraq's continued non-compliance with UN resolutions. In the lead-up to coalition action, there was never any argument about the existence of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.

The Australian government remains steadfast in our view that it was the right decision, taken in the long-term national interests of this country. The firm stand taken by the coalition against Saddam Hussein has contributed already, in my view, to some very significant improvements both for Iraq and for global security.

As a result of the coalition's action, Iraq is no longer ruled by a loathsome and homicidal dictator, and potentially hundreds of thousands of lives have been saved. Understandable anger at abuse and other wrongdoing by some coalition personnel should not result in our forgetting that, if the advice of last year's critics of coalition action had been taken, Saddam Hussein and his regime would still be brutalising Iraq.

Through its actions in Iraq the coalition has sent a clear signal to other rogue states and terrorist groups alike. The world is prepared to take a stand against actual and potential proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. This has already had some resonance. There is little doubt that the firm stand taken against Iraq has influenced countries such as Libya to give up weapons of mass destruction. I am not arguing that it was the sole motivating factor but I think it certainly conditioned the circumstances that resulted in Libya's change of heart.

But regardless of the positions people might have held in relation to the coalition's actions against Saddam Hussein, it is time to recognise that the situation in Iraq has moved on. Iraq, along with the caves of Afghanistan, the hills of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province, and the haunts of Jema'ah Islamiyah in South East Asia, is now the front-line in the global fight against Islamist terrorism.

Violence and brutality, often against innocent civilians, are being used as a deliberate tactic in the ongoing campaign to undermine Iraq's hopes of representative government and a free society. If they succeed it will send out a very bad message not only through the Middle East but around the world. It will dishearten those who struggle for democracy and give confidence to repressive regimes and terrorists everywhere.

## Friends and allies

If we lose heart, if we abandon our friends, if we choose to give the wrong signal to the terrorists, this will not only make the world a less safe place but also damage the reputation of this country around the world. We must remember it is in times of adversity that the value of friendship is most keenly felt, and it is in times of adversity and challenge that that friendship is tested.

Our presence in Iraq is read as an important and valued demonstration of Australia's support for her allies (not least the United States and the United Kingdom who continue to carry the major share of the burden). It is often forgotten, however, that close friends and partners of Australia in the Asia Pacific region, such as Japan, Korea and the Philippines, are also valued members of the coalition.

Our alliance with the United States was, unapologetically, a factor in the decision to join the

coalition. And it should be a factor in any consideration of our continued participation in the coalition. For Australia, there is nothing comparable to be found in any other relationship—nothing more relevant indeed to the challenges of the contemporary world.

Our view on Iraq is not, however, dictated by the United States. It is determined by consideration of Australia's national interest. This consideration has led us to the same conclusions as the Bush Administration: a stable democratic Iraq is important for world security and stability. Given the commonality of values and interests, it should come as no surprise that we have reached the same conclusions. Alliances are two-way processes and where we are in agreement—where we recognise a commonality of interest, we should not leave it to the United States to do all the heavy lifting just because it is the world's superpower. To do so would undermine the most important security relationship we have.

We understand, as do our other allies, that the United States is the only country that actually has the power to change the world for the better. That is what they are trying to do in Iraq. Surely even the most passionate opponents of our involvement in the Iraq war, even the greatest sceptics about the American alliance, can see that right at the moment, when the threat posed by terrorism is so potent, we should be aligning ourselves strongly with countries like America and Britain, and other proven friends and allies. In this context, the actuality of our presence in Iraq is very important.

## Not symbolism

I felt very privileged to spend ANZAC Day this year with the Australians currently serving in Iraq and to be able to convey to them, personally, the thanks and good wishes of the Australian community. They are engaged in very important, dangerous work and our recognition and support are very important to them.

There was nothing symbolic about the attitude and demeanour of the men and women I met on ANZAC Day—they take their role seriously and so does the government. Surely no thinking person could describe the crew of the HMAS *Stuart*, for instance, as merely symbols as they fished American personnel out of the water following the suicide attacks on Iraqi oil refineries last March. I am sure the staff of the Australian diplomatic mission in Baghdad do not regard the detachment of ADF personnel assigned to their protection as symbolic. To view the ADF presence as symbolic is not only factually inaccurate—it is insulting.

## The current situation

While in Baghdad, I also had the opportunity to talk to Ambassador Paul Bremer, the Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator, and American field commanders, about the reconstruction effort and the current security environment. The recent outbreak of

violence has been very serious but we do need to keep a sense of proportion. We have to remember that while the situation has deteriorated in certain areas, it has improved and continues to improve in others.

The coalition is making progress in restoring order in those areas affected by violence. This lawlessness is not indicative of a mass uprising. Media reports of widespread loss of control across central and southern Iraq are, in fact, an exaggeration and misreading of a complex situation. The north of the country remains relatively peaceful and most of the south is now reasonably stable.

But violence and brutality are deliberate tactics in the campaign to undermine Iraq's hopes of representative government and a free society. We must expect that the insurgent and terrorist groups, including foreign Islamist militants and jihadists, former regime elements, disaffected Sunni nationalists and political opportunists, will continue to use violence in a bid to disrupt the political transition and reconstruction.

The fight against the insurgents and illegal militias is not easy. They have shown complete contempt for Iraqi civilians. They routinely launch their attacks from mosques, schools and markets—using innocent people as cover and knowingly exposing them to danger. As so brutally demonstrated in Basra—a busload of children on their way to school are of no account provided the target is hit. Civilians are, in the dreadful language of terror, the 'soft targets'.

But despite these serious security challenges, significant progress has been made over the last year to rebuild Iraq. The coalition has made steady progress in restoring basic services and infrastructure and reviving the Iraqi economy. Electricity, water, telephone and sanitation are gradually being restored to pre-war levels or above. Peak power production is greater than it was before the war, as well as being much more equitably distributed. Six major water-treatment plants have been rehabilitated. More than 15,000 mobile telephones are sold each week—under Saddam Hussein mobile phones were outlawed. Total telephone subscriptions have now passed the one million mark—20 per cent higher than under Saddam Hussein's regime.

All the universities are open and 2500 schools have been rehabilitated throughout the country. All 240 hospitals as well as 1200 health clinics are operating. More than three million Iraqi children under the age of five have been immunised against preventable disease. Public-health spending is now close to 60 times greater than under the Hussein regime—when it was virtually non-existent. Some 255 municipal councils have been established since July 2003. The Central Criminal Court is operating. Iraq has a single unified currency for the first time in 15 years.

Crude oil production is already around pre-war levels. The difference now is that the benefits flow directly to the Iraqi people. The Coalition has also invested in 18,000 reconstruction projects, providing thousands of jobs for local Iraqis as well as infrastructure for their

future. Inflation is stable at around 20 per cent after the terrible hyperinflation experienced during Saddam Hussein's regime. Real GDP is forecast to recover by 30 per cent in 2004. Another very positive sign is the return of government ministries to Iraqi authority, including the Ministry of Agriculture, an area where Australia is making a significant contribution.

Moreover, Iraq now has a growing and robust independent media, which is absolutely essential for the development and maintenance of a healthy democracy. Even the harshest critic of the coalition's activities would find it difficult to argue against the fact that, in large parts of Iraq, the situation is better than it was twelve months ago and measurably better than it was under Saddam Hussein.

## What is the outlook for Iraq

In April, the Iraqi Governing Council adopted a landmark Transitional Administrative Law, protecting the basic human rights of all Iraqis and laying out the roadmap for an elected Iraqi government. After 35 years of ruthless oppression and misrule, Iraq will have free elections and a representative government. The Iraqi interim government will be installed on 30 June 2004. It will be replaced in January 2005 by an Iraqi transitional government with broader powers, which in turn will be replaced by a new Iraqi Government following a referendum on a constitution and fresh national elections scheduled for the end of 2005.

The United Nations special envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi actively consulted a wide range of Iraqi groups to develop workable arrangements for the interim government. A new UN Security Council resolution expresses the support of the international community for the new political arrangements. In this context, we also strongly support the role of the United Nations in helping prepare elections for a transitional and then a permanent Iraqi administration.

In referring to this role for the United Nations, I note calls by the Leader of the Opposition for the coalition to withdraw from Iraq and be replaced by, and I quote, 'a UN force that has strong involvement of Arab states'. This suggestion ignores the facts. The multinational force in Iraq, composed of over thirty countries led by the United States, is already fully sanctioned by the UN Security Council. There are strong international precedents for this approach

It is quite unrealistic to suggest that this arrangement should now be replaced by a UN 'blue helmet' operation. Such an operation would depend on voluntary contributions but there is no sign of the required willingness on the part of a wider range of countries, including Arab States, to contribute peacekeepers to a UN force. Nor is it at all certain that the Iraqis would welcome the presence of armed forces from neighbouring countries.

Even when the Iraqi interim government is in control there is still likely to be a pressing need for a continued coalition presence. Iraq will continue to depend on

coalition forces to provide security and respond to threats of violence and terrorism. As General Abizaid of US Central Command has acknowledged, it will take time to establish credible and capable Iraqi security forces.

Progress is being made. Close to 200,000 Iraqi security personnel are already on duty and recent polling indicates that the general public's confidence in the Iraqi security forces is increasing rapidly. I am proud that Australia is assisting to build those forces.

No one imagined that the task would be easy. And perhaps the task is harder than we first thought. In the euphoria that followed the toppling of Saddam Hussein, some hoped that Iraq's post-war transition could be accomplished relatively quickly. The reality is that the transition period has been, and will continue to be, difficult and more difficult than we might have hoped.

The next few months in Iraq will be critical both politically and militarily if the timetable for transition to democracy is to be achieved. It is likely that the violence will increase as extremists, the supporters of the old regime and political opportunists try desperately to disrupt the process.

Nevertheless, 30 June 2004 represents an important milestone on the road to Iraqis controlling their social, economic and political future.

## What are Australia's objectives

One of Australia's key objectives in Iraq is to help achieve the stability needed to establish and support democratic institutions and processes. While the coalition forces currently provide the bulk of security, and will need to do so for some time, we know that this role will be assumed by a properly trained Iraqi military and police as soon as is practicable. That is why Australian Defence Force personnel are in Iraq helping to train Iraqi army and navy personnel. That is why Australian Federal Police officers will assist in the training of Iraq's new police force.

We also want to contribute to Iraq's economic rehabilitation. We have focused our effort on areas where we have particular expertise—agriculture, economic management, governance capacity building, donor coordination and human rights investigations. Australian advisers are working directly with Iraqis to build their capacity to take responsibility for long-term agricultural policy planning and providing expertise in agricultural research.

We have helped to re-establish the Ministry of Agriculture, set up a payments system for the 2003 harvest and used our experience to help Iraqi farmers bring in the bumper Summer grains harvest. Australian experts have also been deployed to help rehabilitate water and sanitation services, emergency services, oil production, update Iraqi law—including economic and commercial law, assist in the preparation of a credible budget—the first in 30 years, and provide expertise for the criminal investigation into human rights abuses during Saddam Hussein's rule.

Our ADF Air Traffic Control Detachment has also played an important role in ensuring one of Iraq's essential infrastructure installations—the Baghdad airport functions effectively. This year's budget included continued funding of our involvement in Iraq until 30 June 2005. That does not mean we are going to leave on that date, or any specific date, but simply means that we are making prudent provision for being in Iraq for a while yet.

When can our forces leave Iraq? The answer can only be—when the jobs assigned to respective force elements have been completed. It is impossible to be more precise than that. As each milestone along the path to a more democratic Iraq is passed, the time of coalition force withdrawal draws nearer.

## Iraq is a test

When the government announced on 18 March 2003 that we had committed Australian Defence Force elements to the coalition of the willing, we made a commitment to the people of Iraq. We undertook to help them build a new

nation, one which would respect the rights of all its citizens and one that was at peace with itself and with its neighbours.

We also made a commitment to our long-term friends and allies to stand with them in the fight against WMD proliferation and terrorism. Iraq is an important test for the world's democracies, including Australia. It is a test of values—whether the powerful call for freedom can overcome the destructive force of terror. Ultimately, it is a test of character and leadership—whether we possess the necessary determination and resolve to meet our commitment to the Iraqi people or whether we will retreat in a pointless attempt at isolationism. I know Australia, for its part, can meet this test, because denying terrorists their victories and playing our role in ensuring global stability is something that I believe the Australian people, whatever their politics, overwhelmingly want. ♦

*John Howard is the Prime Minister of Australia. This article is based on his address to the Institute of Public Affairs in Melbourne on 19 May 2004.*

## Conference Calendar

ADA members and other *Defender* readers may be interested in the following public conferences and activities:

### Defence Materiel Organisation

#### *Defence and Industry 2004*

21-23 June 2004, National Convention Centre, Canberra

Enquiries: (02) 6265-5638 or <[www.defenceindustry2004.communicationlink.com.au](http://www.defenceindustry2004.communicationlink.com.au)>

### Land Warfare Studies Centre Rowell Profession of Arms Seminar

#### *Ethics, Moral Values and the Australian Military Profession in the 21st Century*

15 July 2004, Telstra Theatre, Australian War Memorial, Canberra

Enquiries: (02) 6265-9890

### Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies Conference 2004

#### *Internal Drivers for Security Policy: Looking to the Future-Australia in 2025*

06 August 2004, Blamey Theatre, Australian Defence College, Canberra

Enquiries: (02) 6266-0652

### Australian Defence Force Academy and Engineers Australia

#### *Homeland Security Conference 2004, Safeguarding Australia*

24-25 August 2004, National Convention Centre, Canberra

Enquiries: (02) 9420-2020 or <[www.homelandsecurityconference.org.au](http://www.homelandsecurityconference.org.au)>

### Royal Australian Air Force Conference 2004

#### *The Future of Air Power: Network-Enabled Air Forces*

16-17 September 2004, National Convention Centre, Canberra

Enquiries: (02) 6287-6563

### Land Warfare Conference 2004

#### *Weapons, Webs and Warfighter*

27-30 September 2004, Melbourne Convention and Exhibition Centre

Enquiries: (08) 8259-5455 or <[www.dsto.defence.gov.au/corporate/conferences/landwarfare](http://www.dsto.defence.gov.au/corporate/conferences/landwarfare)>

### Chief of Army History Conference 2004

#### *Battles Near and Far: Operational Deployment in Theory and Practice*

14-15 October 2004, National Convention Centre, Canberra

Enquiries: (02) 6266-2744 or <[www.army.gov.au/ahu/events](http://www.army.gov.au/ahu/events)>

### Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers 13th Annual Conference

#### *Success involves more than luck. It requires intelligence*

19-21 October 2004, Hilton-on-the-Park, Melbourne

Enquiries: (03) 6234-1424

**Chris Evans**

It is true to state that there has generally been a healthy level of bipartisan support on the fundamentals of Australia's defence policy during the last 15 years or so. When the government of the day and the opposition agree on an acceptable basis for a defence policy, advantages accrue to all. Without violent swings in policy, military strategies can be honed, force structures can be developed or refined, new technologies can be more efficiently employed, and the education and training of our ADF can be more usefully accomplished.

These are constructive and worthy outcomes for our community. Defence remains one of the most expensive national undertakings with its financial and human cost shared by all Australians. Bipartisan support did emerge over the fundamentals of the Government's White Paper, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, which was tabled in Parliament in December 2000. Labor continues to support the White Paper's priority tasks for the ADF:

- defend Australia without having to rely on the combat forces of other countries
- control the air and sea approaches to our continent
- contribute to the security and stability of our immediate neighbourhood
- contribute to coalitions of forces in our wider national interests beyond our immediate neighbourhood
- undertake occasional tasks in support of peacetime national tasks.

That Labor supports these tasks should not be a surprise. Labor played an influential role in their development, particularly through the intellectual efforts of successive Labor Foreign and Defence Ministers during the 1980s and 1990s. The tasks signal the common sense of a maritime strategy for Australia, the importance of self reliance, the value of a secure and stable neighbourhood, and a commitment to international operations led by the United Nations and Australia's key allies in the pursuit of broader national strategic objectives. For Labor, there is no hidden intent for defence isolationism. Without reservation, Labor champions all five ADF tasks in the pursuit of our national interests. Bipartisan support, however, is even more important when the government of the day authorises the deployment of Australian men and women in harm's way—the fourth of the ADF's priority tasks. In recent times, for example, bipartisan support was achieved before forces were committed to the 1991 Gulf War, Cambodia, East Timor, Bougainville, Solomon Islands, and in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. Bipartisan support was not realised for the commitment of forces to Iraq.

In 1989 Gareth Evans enunciated Labor's approach to the demanding question as to the extent to which the ADF should be used in pursuit of security objectives beyond Australian territory. This approach has guided Labor policy-making ever since. Labor concluded that all situations would be treated on a case-by-case basis with due regard given to the following particular and cumulative criteria:

- the agreement of the recognised domestic authorities, except, of course, where an unfriendly government is supporting actions immediately detrimental to Australian nationals
- a manifestly direct threat to major Australian security interests
- a finite time for the military operation
- a clear and achievable operational objective
- consultation with, and if possible the cooperation and participation of, other states in the region.

In 1999, in response to a request for a military commitment to East Timor, Foreign Minister Downer detailed the process that the Howard Government would undertake. Decisions on how to respond would need to take account of the following issues:

- whether the operation has a clear and achievable mandate, clear and achievable goals and clearly defined termination and review points
- whether there is a prospect for a satisfactory outcome given the commitment of UN resources and the political nature of the situation
- what other resources are likely to be available for the operation
- what Australian interests are engaged, including regional, alliance and humanitarian interests and community attitudes
- what costs the contribution might incur, including the effect on the ADF's or AFP's capacity to undertake other tasks, including national defence
- what our commitment to other operations is at the time
- what the risks are for personnel involved in such operations.

Although Mr Downer was referring to East Timor, his framework of principles holds true for Iraq and any other combat deployment by Australian forces. His principles provided a solid framework to guide decision-makers. They generated high levels of confidence through the comprehensiveness of the decision-making process on 'clear and achievable goals and clearly defined termination and review points'. The outcome offered the best prospect

in balancing military risk with the national interest. And, of course, they remain comparable to those first enunciated by Labor in 1989. So what happened in the case of Iraq? When the Prime Minister committed over 2000 troops in March 2003 he did so at the request of President Bush, arguing that military action was legal under United Nations Security Council resolutions, particularly Resolution 1441.

What is sometimes forgotten is that ADF units were pre-positioned in the Gulf area, well before Mr Howard's public announcement that he had responded to the United States request and some two months before he permitted parliamentary debate on the commitment. The Howard Government told the Australian people that the pre-deployments were undertaken to provide 'adequate time to prepare ... should military action become necessary'.

We now know that Mr Howard gave in-principle support to President Bush on several occasions between 13 September 2001 and September 2002. This in-principle support was offered without the benefits of scrutiny by Cabinet or the Parliament, and the Australian people were kept in the dark. In Parliament on 18 March 2003, Mr Howard boldly stated that Australia could not 'walk away from the threat of Iraq's continued possession of weapons of mass destruction'. This was Mr Howard's prime and public justification for committing Australian troops.

Labor never accepted the Government's decision. Labor argued that UN weapon inspectors ought to have been allowed to finish their job and strongly disagreed with a military commitment without explicit UN backing. The United Nations Security Council refused to pass a new resolution to support military intervention and was ultimately bypassed. Australia joined with the United States and the United Kingdom as an aggressor in an act of pre-emption—an unsatisfactory war of choice, which contradicted the proud history of Australia's overseas military contributions. In any analysis of right and wrong concerning the invasion, the doctrine of military pre-emption without UN backing could not be justified in the circumstances. An active doctrine of military pre-emption that shows contempt for the UN undermines the order and security of the contemporary world.

Based on the Government's briefings, Labor did support the objective—to remove weapons of mass destruction from Iraq. But in the context of the time Labor believed a war of pre-emption, conducted for the purpose of removing weapons of mass destruction, without explicit UN backing, was a disproportionate response and wrong.

No weapons of mass destruction have been found; and even the then CIA Director, George Tenet, eventually admitted that Iraq never posed an 'imminent threat' to the United States. Iraq was certainly no threat to Australia. The Howard Government still refuses to acknowledge its exaggerated use of intelligence concerning weapons of mass destruction, even after a bipartisan parliamentary committee found at least 12 instances of such exaggeration in its pre-war comments. Its shame, now that none have been found and the

changing justifications for the war, illustrates the want of strategic prudence. The Howard Government stands condemned by its subservience and capitulation.

As time passes, more information is becoming available on the selective nature of the Howard Government's pre-war considerations. Based on the available evidence, it seems that the Prime Minister did not seek wide-ranging inter-departmental advice on the social, political and economic costs of the war. Nor was independent advice sought on essential coalition post-war plans that could have ameliorated the difficulties of occupation that we now witness. Where were the contrary options or the robust debate and reasoned consideration of possible outcomes? Where was the 'clear and achievable mandate', or the 'clear and achievable goals' and 'clearly defined termination and review points'? Sadly, they seem to be non-existent.

The Prime Minister decided unilaterally to participate in the United States-led coalition, and Cabinet appeared to follow the Prime Minister's lead. Is this the strategic policy process that Australian Prime Ministers and Cabinet should follow when considering a commitment of Australian troops to war?

## The commitment

After President Bush declared that combat operations had ended in May 2003, most of Australia's combat troops were withdrawn so that, by June 2003, all that remained were the personnel and niche units in Iraq and nearby countries—about 860 personnel in total. Of these, some 260 remain in Iraq comprising: an air traffic control detachment and support staff, with combined air operations staff of about 60, who operate Baghdad International Airport; an embassy security detachment of some 90 personnel; about 90 Australian staff at coalition headquarters; the military adviser to the UN Special Representative in Iraq; four ADF officers and three civilian policy advisors with the Coalition Provisional Authority; four ADF personnel working with coalition military assistance and some 15 Australians in the Iraq Survey Team still searching for weapons of mass destruction.

The remaining in-theatre personnel include those Australians aboard HMAS *Stuart* in the Persian Gulf, and the AP-C3 Orion and the C-130 Hercules detachments, which are both located and operate from outside Iraq. Since the end of the combat phase, the Government announced the additional deployments of a Navy Training team, of some 12 Australians, who will be committed for about eight months from early March 2004, and a 53-strong Army training team, tasked to assist in training the new Iraqi army.

The Prime Minister made sure that Australia didn't commit peace-keepers in the post-combat phase, even though he was under enormous pressure from the Bush Administration to do so. Just as he is now in the circumstances where both US and UK commanders are calling for more combat troops. Mr Howard is disingenuous when he argues the seriousness of the present situation while Australia's contribution is not concerned with direct peace-making or peace-keeping.

## Labor's position on Iraq

As Mark Latham said in his recent speech at the Lowy Institute, Australia's participation in Iraq has been 'one of the great debacles of Australian foreign policy—a war conducted for a purpose that was not true' having 'sent young Australians to war based on a hunch'. No weapons of mass destruction have been found. The intelligence was badly wrong and, contrary to the utterances of the Prime Minister, his Government's policy has led to an increase in the terrorist threat to Australians and Australia.

When Labor made it clear that troops would be withdrawn by the end of the year, this was based on two clear conditions: on having a 30 June 2004 handover to a sovereign Iraqi interim government, and Labor having won the federal election. Those two conditions have to be met. When these conditions are met, Labor will implement a clear and well-defined exit strategy that permits a change-over from military deployments to one of enhanced civil reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people.

The inconsistencies of the Howard Government's approach to a clearly defined exit strategy cannot be ignored. In February 2003 Mr Howard described the Iraqi deployment to be of a 'short, specific duration.' In May he reiterated that the commitment would be short, not 'years'. Also in May the Minister for Defence signalled that the air traffic controllers would be replaced by civilians 'within a few months'. In March 2004 Senator Hill announced that the Navy training team would deploy for only eight months. The announcements were all indications of a limited duration of deployments.

Perhaps something happened; perhaps something changed in the political climate. The Howard Government now declares that there will be no exit until 'the job is done'.

The Howard Government has also been reluctant to accept the consequences of its actions. The Howard Government has refused to accept its responsibilities under the third and fourth Geneva conventions, the relevant Additional Protocols and the March 2003 trilateral agreement between Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom on the transfer of prisoners of war. Labor has always acknowledged the legal and moral consequences of Australia's participation in the war. Australia is an occupying power and, as such, has obligations.

That is why Mark Latham has made clear that the handover to a sovereign Iraqi interim government ends those obligations and defines the moment in time to proceed with the phased withdrawal of our troops. It is Labor's intention to withdraw all the troops who are deployed within Iraq and to withdraw the C-130 Hercules detachment which supports them. The 260 who are presently providing niche capabilities, useful and functional capabilities, are not part of the primary peace-making and peacekeeping operations. These operations are predominantly the responsibility of the 150,000 British and American combat troops, who are deployed across Iraq.

The niche commitments will have been completed by the end of the year. The air-traffic controllers are due to

handover Baghdad Airport responsibilities to civilian operators in late May. The Iraq Survey Group has not discovered any weapons of mass destruction. The Howard Government had always intended to replace the 90-strong security detachment that is currently protecting our eight officials in the Australian representative Office in Baghdad with a private security firm. This is an acceptable practice. Recent British newspapers describe how the UK Foreign Office is spending over £25 million on hiring private bodyguards, armed escorts and security advisers to protect its civil servants in Iraq. Labor remains firmly committed to the safety of our diplomats in Iraq and will seek advice from the CDF and DFAT security staff at the appropriate time.

The Iraqi Interim Government will gradually accept more responsibilities as it establishes its own administrative and governing organisations. Once our personnel return to Australia, Australian military liaison officers will not be required at the various headquarters or with the new Iraqi civil authorities. As to the deployment of HMAS *Stuart* in the Gulf and AP-3C Orion operations in the region, these should continue because of their positive contribution in the wider war against terrorism. HMAS *Stuart* is currently involved in the multinational interception force, and the AP-3C Orions continue to conduct maritime patrol missions. Labor supports these commitments but makes the distinction between the ongoing war against terrorism and the post-war environment in Iraq.

The lack of a UN sanction for the war in Iraq and a bipartisan approach to the war has also raised questions of legality. In representing Labor at the many farewell functions, welcome-home parades, and in one-to-one conversations with ADF personnel, I have stressed the legality under the Australian Constitution for the government of the day to commit military forces overseas. It was Labor's objective to reassure our people that their deployment to Iraq was legal.

Labor is thankful that there have been no casualties. We remain, however, concerned with the safety of the forces deployed. Our people have carried out their tasks with professionalism and dedication. They have carried out dangerous work and performed admirably. It is now time for them to know when they will be withdrawn because they will have soon completed their niche functional responsibilities. The post-war environment in Iraq is now one of mutual suspicion and resentment. In Washington and London, a growing body of experts are questioning the management of the occupation. Many argue that it is in serious trouble and needs a comprehensive change in direction. Bitterness permeates parts of Iraq, exacerbated by the terrible mistreatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison. The actions of certain United States guards and the inaction of their supervisors were inexcusable. The consequences of their actions for the future of the Middle East and Iraq are immeasurable. The coalition forces seem to have lost their moral authority in the eyes of many. Iraq now needs the credibility of the United Nations, sooner rather than later, to assist the Iraqi civil administration.

Ironically, four weeks ago, the Prime Minister indicated that once the air-traffic controllers return to Australia they could be replaced by a 'slightly greater number of troops who would carry out other duties.' It now seems that the Prime Minister has talked himself into the position where he's determined to maintain the current number of troops in Iraq for reasons only he knows. If the new, and as yet unidentified, requirement is so pressing why hasn't it already been filled? The reality is Australia is not providing peace-keepers or peace-makers, and the present functional commitments will soon finish. Labor has always argued that Australia can best make a worthwhile contribution in Iraq through humanitarian assistance and economic reconstruction. This is exactly the same policy approach that the Howard Government took in Afghanistan. It was a policy approach that had bipartisan support. The war in Afghanistan was the first important phase in the war against terrorism. Labor strongly supported Australia's military commitment. Labor supported the Government's efforts because the defeat of Al Qaeda was and remains of overriding importance. In Afghanistan, Australia provided a strong military contribution. Troops were withdrawn quickly after the combat phase, and the SAS were home by Christmas 2002. Australia then commenced its contribution of civil and humanitarian aid. We in the Opposition lament, however, that the Government's commitment to civil and humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan has not been commensurate with its military activities.

In comparative terms, Australia is a small- to medium-sized nation with a small and well-equipped military.

## association update

### Vale Gerry Cudmore

Brigadier Monsignor Gerald Anthony Cudmore, AM, a long-time faithful supporter of the ADA, died on 21 April 2004 aged 71. Gerry was ordained priest in 1958. After serving in a number of Melbourne parishes, he became a chaplain in the Australian Regular Army in 1962. He was the first Australian chaplain to serve in Vietnam (1965–66) where his pastoral care for soldiers of all denominations became legendary. An anecdote in *The Cross of Anzac* tells of his using some forthright soldiers' language vowing vengeance against those responsible for the wounding of a young soldier whom he was comforting. In something of a role reversal, the wounded digger reproved Gerry for unpriestlike behaviour.

Widely respected by all ranks Gerry rose to become Principal Chaplain (RC) in the Australian Army. After reaching retiring age for rank in 1988 he was appointed a member of the order of Australia and returned to the Melbourne archdiocese. He was Vicar-General from 1993 to 1996 and subsequently served in a number of Melbourne parishes.

Melbourne's St Patrick's Cathedral was overflowing for his Requiem Mass and military funeral. The ADA was represented by retired executive director, Michael O'Connor, and a number of other Association members including Guy Boileau, Jack Lloyd and Gary Ward.

Australia cannot be expected to provide military support on an ongoing basis in every area of conflict where it is requested to do so. Our defence resources are finite. The ADF is stretched and is bearing the burden of multiple deployments. The demands on our military are now extensive. Standards of individual and collective training are now more difficult to maintain. Our capabilities are suffering. There are shortages of trained specialists.

We need to be more careful in managing how and when our military is committed. This should only be when it is in our national interest to do so. Labor's security priorities are closer to home, in our immediate region, in East Timor, PNG, Solomon Islands and in the wider war against terrorism. Dangers exist in the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand where social discord and uneven economic growth have thwarted local attempts to deal with nascent terrorist threats. The terrorist threat cannot be ignored. The ADF has a significant role to play through coordinated measures with our neighbours. Our neighbours look to us for leadership and assistance. It is now more likely that Australia will be called upon to participate in other phases in the war against terrorism. A Labor government would be so committed. This hopefully can be another fertile area for bipartisanship. Labor has a principled position on Iraq. It is a clear view, articulated over a long period, and Labor intends to continue to argue the case up to and including the election campaign. It is in our national interest. ♦

*Senator Chris Evans is the Shadow Spokesman for Defence. This article is based on his address to the Labour Movement Education Association in Perth on 21 May 2004.*

### A searing insight

In May 2004 the Association's Executive Director was invited to join the panel for the SBS discussion program *Insight* (broadcast on Tuesday 8 June). One of the program themes was 'can a fighting army reflect the social values of a society such as ours?'. That such a theme could be seriously considered by a public broadcaster bodes ill for the teaching of Australian history and civics in our schools.

Such a theme also appears predicated on the disturbing and naïve belief that the Australian Defence Force somehow does not generally reflect Australian society—both good and bad—or that our society can somehow divorce itself from the necessary labours of its defence force. More disturbingly, how can any Australian professing an educated or informed interest in current affairs even begin to believe that our pluralist liberal democracy somehow exists independently of the protection provided by our defence force—past, present and future.

Overall the program generated some useful public debate. But the complacency, ignorance or ideological prejudice of some participants testified to the continuing need for the Australia Defence Association as an independent guardian of the public interest on national security issues.

# Keeping the US Alliance

## in perspective

Tony Parkinson

According to Bob Hawke's memoirs, there was a sullen reaction among senior colleagues in November 1990 when, as a Labor prime minister, he signalled his intention to commit Australian forces to the probable American-led and UN-endorsed war to force Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. As Hawke recalls it, his deputy leader and heir apparent, Paul Keating, was decidedly unimpressed: 'What has the US done for us?' Those words reverberate today as a new Labor leader, Mark Latham, has pledged to withdraw Australian forces from US-led coalition operations in Iraq by Christmas, arguing that our security priorities lie closer to home. As if on cue, commentators from the Left have raised the familiar chant that Australia's close engagement with the world's only superpower is proving more trouble than it is worth.

Self-evidently, much of the passion in this debate is driven by the awful images of the security crisis in Iraq, arising from a war many still hold to have been illegitimate. The privations and setbacks of the US-led occupation—the siege of Fallujah, the sickening terrorist strikes, the Islamist resistance in Najaf and, perhaps most conspicuously of all, the 'chamber of horrors' revelations about the conduct of American prison guards at Abu Ghraib—have deeply shaken international public opinion about both the viability and virtue of the project to liberate Iraq. In Australia, too, there is rising anxiety about the Howard Government's involvement in this confronting and harrowing security agenda.

For a significant element of the Australian Labor Party support base, in particular, resentment towards the Government's stance on Iraq is acute. In an election year, it would be surprising if events in Iraq were not to feed into the partisan political debate. But Mark Latham, as the alternative prime minister, needs to be extremely precise in how he articulates his differences with the Howard Government.

There may be more at stake than meets the eye. Having withdrawn conspicuously from his plans to visit Washington, Mark Latham faces a higher-than-usual burden of responsibility to weigh the wider consequences of what he says and does about Iraq. He should bear in mind that New Zealand's 1985 fallout with Washington might have

begun as a single-issue, 'pebble in a pond' controversy over nuclear warship port visits. The ripple effect, however, had far wider consequences, with the US fearing the effect of the precedent of New Zealand's actions for defensive missile deployments in Europe. Just as that was a crucial moment in the Cold War test of strength with the Soviet Union, the outcome in Iraq is crucial to the wider US-led war on terror, with the political will of the US and its allies exposed to enormous strains and stresses.

Peeling off would be a big call. This is why Mark Latham must be very careful. A populist pitch to bring the troops back to Australia from Iraq could easily come to be remembered as a vote of no confidence in US policy, of an ilk with the decision by Spain's socialists to pull out of Iraq. Given his 2003 depiction of George W. Bush as 'the most incompetent president in living memory', it is conceivable that Mark Latham personally may be entirely comfortable with such a posture.

For never far beneath the surface in this debate is a sentiment of long standing in the Labor tradition, a mantra that says Australia should be less compliant in the strategies of 'great and powerful friends', and that wars in the faraway Middle East are really none of our business. Or theirs. On this view, reincarnated by Mark Latham, but borrowing from decades of antecedence within the ALP, a refusal to engage any longer in US-led operations in Iraq would signify a robust declaration of Australia's foreign policy independence. On another view, of course, it might just as easily be characterised as a murky brew of visceral anti-Americanism and head-in-the-sand isolationism that logic says can only lead to a downgrading of the alliance, symbolically if not substantively.

There remain important voices in Latham's Labor Party who, whatever their views of the rights and wrongs of the war, believe Australia has obligations to help secure better lives for the people of Iraq. There are also those who understand the critical relevance of what is happening in Iraq for the future of the wider war on terror, and for the capacity of the US political system to sustain its commitment and support for this gruelling agenda.

**'... Labor's most successful prime minister reflected frequently on the task he faced in educating the ALP to shed its 'ritual anti-Americanism and pacifist naivety'.**

sentiment of long standing in the Labor tradition, a mantra that says Australia should be less compliant in the

Will the counsel of these liberal internationalists be heeded? Or are we seeing the return of Lang Labor? In *The Hawke Memoirs* (William Heinemann, 1994) Labor's most successful prime minister reflected frequently on the task he faced in educating the ALP to shed its 'ritual anti-Americanism and pacifist naivety'. The book touches on the long history of foreign policy tussles within the ALP over the US alliance, in particular the attempts by the wartime NSW premier Jack Lang to disparage Prime Minister John Curtin's historic role in forging strategic links with Washington. Hawke believed Keating was too much under the sway of the 'contemptuous attitudes' of Lang, his mentor.

Lately, Bob Hawke has changed his tune. Like Paul Keating and Gough Whitlam he is supporting the Latham approach. It appears the echoes of Lang Labor worry him less these days. Today, sadly, the memory of too many in the ALP starts and stops with the feverish analogy of Iraq as Vietnam revisited: My Lai, the Tet Offensive—ah, those were the days. It is not hard to imagine Mark Latham as someone who looks in the mirror and sees a young Gough Whitlam. He certainly feasts on the folklore of Whitlam's surge to power in 1972. Labor mythology has it that a revitalised party under Whitlam was turbo-charged by an influx of young supporters desperate to end Australia's role in America's wars in Indochina.

The reality was some what more prosaic. By the time Whitlam came

to power, the McMahon Government had already withdrawn all Australian combat forces from Vietnam. It had been conscription as much as the unpopularity of the war that politicised these new Labor supporters. Promises of universal health care, free university tuition, and a raft of social reforms may also have had something to do with it.

Nonetheless, the mythology is powerful: a generation or more of party activists have been weaned on a world view that says US global strategy, if not inherently and irretrievably corrupt, is deserving of intense suspicion and scepticism. It is ludicrous to pretend this would not have implications for the state of the alliance if this undercurrent within the ALP was to be reflected in the attitudes and decisions of a Latham Government.

The United States has been Australia's most important bilateral partner for almost 60 years. The security relationship forms a key element in the balancing role played by the superpower in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. If not exactly part of the family jewels, the alliance is certainly a national asset. It is not to be trifled with. For a start, anyone who believes the alliance is dispensable had better come up with an explanation to the Australian taxpayer. The estimated cost of replicating the direct defence and intelligence capabilities Australia enjoys as a byproduct of its close ties with the US military could be as high as \$6 billion a year. In fact, without preferential access to US defence technology, some high-

tech capabilities would simply be irreplaceable.

In an emerging era of integrated warfare, America's technology edge is profound. Australian forces learnt its value during the East Timor crisis, in tracking the whereabouts of militias. In fact, since about the time of the Korean War, Australia's defence force has increasingly been trained and configured to work effectively alongside US forces. They work as well together as any other two armed forces. Hence, from the military as much as the political perspective, it is hardly surprising that, if and when the US is contemplating coalition operations, as in Iraq, Australia should be among the first approached. Yes, the alliance confers obligations as well as benefits. What alliance doesn't? And why shouldn't the burden be shared?

Australia cannot do a New Zealand. The Kiwis can flirt, if they like, with a foreign policy stance that casts them as some sort of non-aligned movement for rich kids. They can run tiny defence budgets, keep their heads down, and go out of their way to cause the least offence possible, in the hope that their remoteness—and the against-all-odds excellence of their down-sized defence force—will provide them with a buffer against the dangers of the world. Whether this is the wisest course to adopt given current global threats and moral challenges is highly debatable but, at a strategic level, New Zealand will always have the

fallback of the 'continental shelf' defence—that is, the comfort of friendly relations with a larger and more

powerful neighbour. It can be a Canada of the South Seas.

Australia has no such luxury. It occupies a vast landmass. It is the 14th biggest economy in the world. It is a significant regional player, militarily and diplomatically. And there are expectations—and not just in Washington—that it can be called upon to accept responsibilities beyond its own shores.

The so-called 'Defence of Australia' doctrine is not a cop-out clause for foreign policy. Certainly, it should never be used as an excuse to shrink or retreat. Independence is not, and has never been, synonymous with irrelevance. Surrounded by sea, both the US and Australia have powerful excuses for isolationism. In both cases, the geography provides a natural layer of protection afforded few other nations.

However, through the bitter experience of the global conflicts of the 20th century, and now the double dose of the September 11 and Bali bombings, both countries have learned that distance provides no refuge from the ills of the world. True, the primary role of Australia's defence force will always be to protect continental Australia from the threat of a conventional military attack by a hostile power. But this does not in any way relieve Australian governments of accepting their fair share of the burden in dealing with global challenges, whenever and wherever they arise—whether within the framework of the US alliance, or at a broader multilateral level.

In that context, it is always worth considering the statistical fact that one in every 20 Australians will, at any given moment, be living and working overseas. For these Australians, in the current global setting, 'Defence of Australia' is not much of a defence. Indeed, the emerging threats of asymmetric warfare targeting civilian populations demand a far more flexible response than that provided by strategic doctrine of the past 20 years. A stay-at-home defence force is not best-suited to the challenges of global terror. To put the equation slightly differently, it would represent a searing indictment of Australian governments, military, police and intelligence chiefs if our defence against terrorist operations ever came to depend predominantly on having frontline troops on the ground at home. It would be a sure sign not that we were any safer, but that we were too late—far too late—in understanding and responding to the dangers.

These are the changing strategic circumstances facing not only Australia but all the world's democracies. The US happens to be leading the global effort to counter the threat of violent, revolutionary Islamism because—frankly—there is nobody else who could or would. To be able to sustain this campaign, the US needs political and military support. As an ally and friend, Australia is an obvious candidate.

Critics of the alliance in Australia are often heard to complain that it's all one-way traffic, that the mutual obligation clauses are too ambiguous, that it's all very well for Australia to provide back-up for the Americans but that the alliance offers no explicit guarantee of US military support in the event of a serious threat to Australia's security. (Oddly, you never hear the same critics speak from the other perspective—does ANZUS guarantee Australian support for the superpower in the event of an attack on US interests?)

But even if we accept that there is ambiguity, it is an ambiguity that works to Australia's advantage. For although defence planners in Canberra might not necessarily be able to assume that in any and all circumstances the US would come to our assistance (indeed, the logic of the 'Defence of Australia' doctrine presumes Australia would accept for itself the responsibilities for dealing with immediate, regional threats) any potential adversary would have to ponder carefully what the superpower might or might not do in the event of a hostile act against Australia's interests or citizens. This is also true when evaluating the nightmare scenario of a nuclear threat, where the US provides extended deterrence to Australia and Japan alike.

The alliance also gives Australia blue-chip access to the most significant strategic councils in Washington. This intimacy works to Australia's advantage in the region—other countries know that governments in Canberra speak with unusual insight and understanding of trends in Washington, and can sometimes act as an intermediary. This is welcomed discreetly by neighbouring governments.

The US web of alliances and treaties in Asia provides a

'tripwire' that presupposes US intervention in the event of a critical security threat, and acts as a deterrent to potentially destabilising influences. Hence, most, if not all, countries of this region value the US strategic presence. In China, the only credible rival to US power in Asia in the long term, there are certainly ardent nationalists who suspect the US networks in Asia constitute a strategy of encirclement. Arms supplies to Taiwan are a constant irritant. Equally, though, there are key voices in Beijing who regard the US presence as vital. For example, were the US to pull back from its alliances in the region, would not Japan feel a need to spend aggressively on capabilities of its own, up to and including strategic missile forces and nuclear deterrents?

In the early 1990s, after the breakdown of the Soviet empire, it became fashionable to question the relevance of the US system of alliances. The Left, in Europe in particular, indulged in the 'beyond all wars' theory of global order, only to be reminded by gruesome conflict in the Balkans that they were a long way from ushering in a postmodern utopia. It would be wonderful if the international order could be maintained by consensus decision-making at the UN. But that is not the world as it exists, nor, sadly, a world that is foreseeable.

Saddam Hussein's Iraq raised a fearful dilemma for the international community, and, through the Security Council fiasco, the UN failed. It was another reminder—if one was needed—that without superpower involvement, there is no demonstrated capacity, militarily and diplomatically, to mobilise and lead campaigns to counter global security threats: either the readiness of terrorist networks to mount attacks on civilian populations, the preparedness of some regimes to monster their own people, or the unnerving proliferation of the shadowy trade in nuclear, gas or germ-warfare technologies.

The US, for all its wealth and power, cannot meet these challenges on its own. It needs broad international consent and support. Without this, the US public will start to ask why they—and they alone—should have to carry all the risks?

For this reason, among others, a joint commitment to global security is, and always has been, a pillar of the US–Australia alliance. Within the relationship, of course, it should always be possible to debate, strenuously, what range of responses, what mix of hard choices and careful balances, is most likely to reduce or eliminate common security threats.

It is not credible, however, to seek to dismiss or discount the nature of these threats, especially after the attacks of 11 September 2001—or, from Australia's perspective, to pretend the problems of the world are for someone else to fix. ♦

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# PNG: On the road to

## nowhere or somewhere

Mark Forbes

Lush glimpses of life flash through the wire-mesh windows of Highlands Highway patrol vehicle number 01. Metre-high, red powder nut cobs are stacked for sale and large, freshly caught trout are staked by the roadside. Women sell betelnut under multi-coloured umbrellas and a constant stream of locals walk their produce along this artery of the isolated, resource-rich Highlands provinces of Papua New Guinea.

The road from Lae up through the highlands is the lifeline of the nation, the only route to PNG's rich inland gold mines, oil fields and coffee plantations. But to the Royal PNG constabulary highway patrol, this bone-shaking, teeth-jarring journey is marked by ambush spots, murder sites, tribal battles and abandoned, Australian-funded, police posts. From the Highlands capital of Mount Hagen—still shocked by the recent, brutal, Sunday morning slaying of an Australian pilot—to the 'wild west' town of Mendi, a journey on the highway reflects the extent of the crime wave and general social crisis facing PNG. Many areas are reverting to violent tribalism. Self-styled warlords are heavily armed and rampant corruption diverts practically all funding from essential services such as education and medical care.

Later this year, plans call for more than 40 armed Australian police to assist with patrolling this lawless country as part of a 230-strong contingent of police funded by a \$1.2 billion Australian initiative. The five-year Enhanced Co-operation Program will supplement \$1.3 billion in existing Australian aid. Alongside the Solomon Islands intervention, the move to restore order and save PNG from probable collapse is Australia's most significant regional initiative.

The Australian assistance mission will face a volatile mix of greed and guns in trouble spots such as Port Moresby, Mount Hagen and Lae. They will be working in a young nation in an old land, where sorcerers are as feared as the criminals who rob and rape. The first task of the Australian police will be to revitalise a local police force that PNG Police Minister, Bire Kimisopa, concedes is dysfunctional and corrupt.

My highway patrol guide, Moses Makob, was a typical young, but embittered, constable. 'We are all sinners,' he said as the decrepit troop carrier thumped along the crumbling highway. 'The commanders, too, are corrupt; corruption starts from the top down.' Corruption helps support families trying to survive on the \$8 a day Makob and his fellow constables are paid. 'There wouldn't be corruption, law and order problems if the Government looked after the wealth of the policemen', Makob claimed.

The only reason the police could go out on patrol the day I accompanied them was because I paid for the petrol. But local criminals, such as the three men wielding bush knives who, earlier that day had stopped a crowded ute and raped a young woman, know there is little chance of being apprehended.

Parts of the highlands highway have deteriorated so badly that Shell has halted deliveries, thereby causing a fuel crisis. Mount Hagen trucking operator Andrew Rice warned his rigs are secure when moving but 'as soon as the truck stops they are all over you; you are a sitting duck'.

In Mendi, Southern Highlands police commander, Simon Nigi, admitted police have lost control of much of this vital region, with most posts having been abandoned during the widespread violence surrounding the 2002 elections. Arms smuggling connected to tribal power struggles and a booming marijuana trade have left his men heavily outgunned—they now face between 1000 and 3000 military weapons. Traditional tribal fights, once confined to bows and arrows, now wreak deadly havoc. 'We are heading for disaster' warned Nigi, the man handpicked to return a semblance of order to the province. About 400 rapists and murderers are still at large and they cannot be brought to justice because of 'logistics', he advised.

Standing in Mendi's leaking, thrice-condemned, fibro police barracks, Nigi maintained police wages and living standards must be boosted. His police vehicles are rationed to less than two litres of petrol a day. He advocates a Solomon Islands-style paramilitary

**... police have lost control of much of this vital region ...'**

knives who, earlier that day had stopped a crowded ute and raped a young

operation, backed by Australian soldiers, to sweep guns out of the region. 'I am keeping my fingers crossed and hoping the quicker the Australian program comes the better. We alone cannot fight this losing battle.' But the first aim of the package must be 'to do something about this sickness called corruption'.

Robert Posu, chairman of the local landowner council, fears the town is facing ruin. 'People become frustrated because there are no books in the classroom, no medicine in the hospitals; people are dying of curable diseases.' Mistrust of the police and courts has seen villages create their own militias armed with powerful guns. 'If it goes on like this, the people in the village might take over town, close it down, say go back to the old ways', Posu notes. 'We are the richest province in PNG. How can there be holes in the road? Where is the Government, where is the medicine, where are the books? It's coming to boiling point.'

Several villages in the area supported the guerilla campaign of self-proclaimed regional freedom fighter David Adini, who was slain in a roadside ambush by a police mobile squad in April. Nigi related his unsuccessful attempt to negotiate a surrender. The heavily armed Adini vowed to shoot any police who came after him, saying 'These guns of yours are just toys'. Adini told Nigi he was protesting against the lack of regional development, saying, 'I have no choice; by doing this the Government will see I mean business'.

A recent Price Waterhouse audit of the Southern Highlands provincial government revealed that senior officials, including national parliament MPs, were complicit in an 'astounding and sinister' diversion of public funds. Almost all of the province's \$A15 million revenue has disappeared.

The audit found that nearly \$A2 million went to a Queensland-based company linked to the provincial governor, ostensibly for work on hospitals, that was never carried out. It also criticised the local bank manager of an Australian bank for improperly clearing a cheque the recipient said was a pay-off for ballot-box rigging.

This kind of widespread fraud explains the lack of regional services, according to the minister responsible for local government, Sir Peter Barter, who stated the situation must change to avoid 'total anarchy'. Police Minister Kimisopa supported this by noting that the failure to charge those implicated 'is another classic case of the lack of capacity of the police force'.

An even bigger scandal is the looting of the country's superannuation nest egg, the National Provident Fund. Lawyer Jimmy Maladina, brother of the then deputy Prime Minister, is facing minor charges as a result. One of the lead investigators, however, believes he has been hobbled by political interference, with investigators reassigned to remote posts to halt their inquiries.

Police Minister Kimisopa wants the Australian police

to urgently assist because the case places 'a cloud of suspicion over the head of the police'. He believes Australia's Enhanced Co-operation Program could provide a much-needed solution to PNG's crisis. It could help restore law and order by repairing the malfunctioning court and prosecution system from 'the ground up'. At present, tribal traditions of compensation and escalating payback killings have taken over from the police, Kimisopa says.

In Minj, just two hours down the Highlands highway from Mount Hagen, police have been central players in the overthrow of law and order. In March, led by their station commander, they broke into the offices of both the Public Solicitor and of a law firm, and beat clients after an unfavourable court decision.

A court in Mount Hagen had released 19 men arrested by police after hearing details of a police raid on their village in support of rival tribal warriors. The Public Solicitor, Bosip Aipe, had questioned the conduct of police in a letter to their commanders. 'The police were assisted by rival tribes who posed a real danger to the people whose villages you were raiding', his letter stated. 'There were eyewitnesses saying that they saw those rivals in police uniforms and armed to kill. We do not question the police action, but why were rival tribe members burning and stealing with your support?'

In the Highlands' lush coffee plantations, opportunists have armed rival tribal groups and taken control of some of the most lucrative estates. One of the expatriate pioneers of the industry, Dick Hagen, told me he had been run off his estate after being kidnapped at gunpoint. Instead of the police arresting the culprits, Hagen found himself put on a bogus charge of attempted murder and believes local police simply run protection rackets for those prepared to pay. Only traditional tribal resolution of problems was preventing total anarchy. 'We are getting into warlord stakes, with this undercurrent of greed and political power', Hagen maintained.

Attacking such problems is hampered by the political institutionalisation of corruption, Kimisopa says. A combination of endemic political instability, a fragile economy dependent on commodity prices, massive unemployment and a lack of police capacity 'is leading to a total breakdown in law and order'.

Even the highest post in the land, the Governor Generalship, was widely perceived to be for sale to the highest bidder. The position is elected by MPs, but the vote was strung out for months due to legal challenges and administrative errors. One of the main contenders abandoned his bid in disgust after MPs from a leading political party extorted bribes in return for their support.

Corruption also fuels much of PNG's endemic political instability. Since independence no government has served a full term, with every leader falling victim

to a no-confidence vote when opportunistic MPs cross the floor for personal gain or advancement. Large bribes are offered to tempt supporters away from the serving Prime Minister.

Despite Ausaid claims that the billions in aid pumped into PNG by Australia since independence in 1975 have been productive, infant mortality has increased to 79 deaths per 1000 births. The economy is fragile, with most major revenue-generating mining projects to be exhausted by the end of the decade and precious few new projects on line. A limited economic recovery in recent years has been largely dependent on booming commodity prices—a bubble economists predict is certain to burst.

Some of PNG's most senior leaders appear to have quietly abandoned hope, secretly moving funds offshore and seeking Australian residency.

However, a diplomatic argument ostensibly over Australian preferences for blanket police immunity appears to have been resolved by a face-saving compromise and Police Minister Kimisopa is hopeful the ECP can begin without much further delay. Both jurisdictions will be recognised, but putting any Australian assistance personnel before PNG courts will require Australian agreement.

One senior Australian official bluntly advised that while Australian police would take casualties, the cost of inaction would be greater. But, he said, five years and \$1.2 billion will be 'nowhere near enough' to prevent a nation of five million people on Queensland's doorstep from becoming a base for crime, people smuggling and the emerging security threats of the 21st century.

John Davidson, the head of Ausaid in PNG, also believes the package is essential although the nation will not be turned around in his lifetime. 'A baby dies every nine minutes in PNG, 10 women die in childbirth each day; we have to make this work'.

As difficult as policing the Highlands will be, the key test of PNG political will for reform is the plans to place Australian officials in financial management positions in the major departments to staunch the illegal diversions of funds. 'The machinery of government is broken here', advised Davidson. 'This will take a long-term engagement'.

In Port Moresby residents are weary of constant, vicious crime. The violent crime rate is 10 times that of Australia. In April a leading Australian lawyer was bashed senseless by three thugs in a popular Moresby nightspot. The thugs are believed to have been hired by a rival firm following a court loss. Another expatriate was dragged from his family car by 'raskols' (criminals), surviving only because the homemade pistol put to his temple misfired three times.

Former PNG Defence Force chief, Major General Jerry Singirok believes the widespread presence of illegal weapons had brought PNG 'to the brink of breakdown ... What is required is decisive political will to address this issue. Failing that this country will end up in complete chaos and anarchy.'

One raskol leader, 'Bita', escaped from jail in April despite being shot and wounded in his left foot by police after an armed bank robbery. He is typical of the violent criminals who blithely ride roughshod over the rule of law and is even dismissive of those who commit small scale, petty crimes. 'We go for the big money—bank robbery, business houses', he claimed. His loose network of 10 gangs appears to have easy access to pistols, shotguns, M-16 rifles, even a machine gun, and claims to work in concert with corrupt police.

His claims were an interesting mix of boasting and social analysis. Waving a snub-nosed 38 special revolver he declared 'I shoot people, I kill them. When they get aggressive and try and fight back, I shoot them ... Government needs to come down to the ground, when you talk in the air it blows away'. Bita claims the nation's leaders are 'the great raskols; our leaders steal millions'. He believes providing jobs or the dole would halt crime in Moresby. 'We want a job so we can eat bread in the morning and have our dinner at night, that's the truth. Australian police, they can come, but still crime will continue. When we rob we don't care who you are, we take it. We are not scared. They come here to stop crime. How can they feed these guys, these youths on the streets?'

The Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands had to confront a failed state and the problems of widespread governmental collapse. Once on the ground the extent of the collapse was also found to be much greater than previously believed. But the administration and local population who lined the streets when Howard visited last August—bearing signs such as 'thank you uncle Howard' and 'thank you Australian and New Zealand taxpayers'—embraced the intervention which delivered respite from thugs and criminals. Furthermore, although police-led, the mission had the deterrent factor of 1700 military personnel.

While not yet a failed state, a failing PNG presents a much larger and more complex problem. Any assistance mission in PNG faces significantly greater problems in scale, geographical area, longevity of corruption and deterioration in social fabric—all of which have contributed to spiralling, random and commonplace violence. PNG's political class may also not be as receptive and cooperative as their Solomons counterparts have been, not least because they appear unwilling to confront their collective failure since independence and their complicity in entrenched corruption.

Four questions naturally arise. Do our police forces actually have the numbers and resources to handle the situation in PNG? If (when) they eventually require defence force assistance do we actually have enough troops for what might be needed? Have we calculated the long-term financial and political costs? Do we have any real alternative? ♦

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# Reforming our intelligence apparatus:

## The human factor over the institutional

Warren Reed

Renewed calls for a Royal Commission into our intelligence systems inevitably focus on existing institutional structures and how they interface with each other as well as with their political masters. While the overall effectiveness of our intelligence and security agencies certainly requires attention, the greater challenge currently facing Australia isn't one about which institutions should win and which lose in any new evaluation of performance. Rather, it's about the very lifeblood of the system—the human element—and about how we maximise output from the talent we have for the benefit of the nation and its security.

This is where things have been going wrong for far too long. There has been a continuing failure over decades to keep the upper half of our intelligence community well stocked with people who are appropriately skilled and experienced, and who have a proven—rather than claimed—track record. This is why we have been missing the vital signs of danger. For Australia to have overlooked the rise of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in neighbouring Indonesia, as well as the movement's implications for Bali and beyond, was unforgivable. David Farmer, a highly trained analyst in ONA and someone with a solid and practical background, came closer than anyone else to reading the future. If the intelligence community featured more people with his analytical and intelligence staff skills we would have the systems we need.

The Sandline debacle in Papua New Guinea—a country of vital strategic importance to Australia—provides more food for thought. While American intelligence agencies picked up the fact that something nasty was brewing in that country, we were blissfully unaware. The US questioned us more than once on what was going on in our front garden but we assured them nothing was happening—until it did. David Irvine, the then Australian High Commissioner to Port Moresby and subsequently ambassador to China—another country of key strategic importance—is now the Director-General of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS). While his skills in the diplomatic arena are beyond question, he has no practical experience or professional qualifications in intelligence matters. In fact, at the time of his appointment to ASIS,

many seasoned officers in various parts of the intelligence community raised the issue that he appeared well behind the starting line during the Sandline affair.

The appointment of David Irvine was also a giant slap in the face to career ASIS officers who were legitimately aspiring to the top job in their profession, especially as the previous Director-General had also been a diplomat. If it were true that there were no suitable candidates to take over from within the Service's professional ranks, who then—in simple human terms—should take responsibility for thus mismanaging the organisation in recent times?

On a broader front, this failure to concentrate the best human talent in the right places was evident in the 11 September 2001 tragedy in the United States. Those attacks highlighted drastic shortcomings in the human and institutional fabric of the American intelligence community. Equally, in a far less visible way, they also pointed to massive human failure within British intelligence systems. Britain's once formidable human resources—both in terms of operatives and stables of agents and contacts—in the Middle East and Central Asia failed the Western intelligence system badly in the lead-up to the World Trade Centre attacks. It was in those areas that Al Qa'eda was building up its strength. Where were MI6's traditionally impressive ranks of Arabists? This is a question that clearly begs the commensurate question where are *our* Asia hands?

The apparent British failure came from a nation that so mightily rallied the intellect and daring of its populace during World War II in order to, for example, crack enemy codes in both the European and Asian theatres. Britain's top intelligence and military thinkers assembled some thousands of mathematicians, scientists and others drawn from professions as arcane as watchmaking. The results of their joint endeavours went a long way to saving Britain (and Australia) from the Axis war machines. But what's happened today? As one old Australian Army officer, a Tobruk veteran, put it last Anzac Day in commenting on our own situation, 'it's as though the watchmakers have raided the Q-Store, stolen every uniform in sight with red flashes, then taken over the High Command!'

Such a situation is largely where we are at in Australia, although it is not just a problem of inexperienced people at

the top. There are also the deep-seated problems of bureaucratic inertia and of cronyism, the latter often nurtured by political masters bent on short-term survival, but which end up perpetuating mediocrity in the upper ranks. This in turn has led to the stymieing of the traditional checks and balances previously built into our system, which are supposed to guarantee that talent is not unnecessarily and unfairly wasted. The stark reality is that in the Australian intelligence community today the supervisory mechanisms and institutional controls that are meant to protect our best human talent, and steer it upwards, are not working. Even Blind Freddie can see that things are badly out of kilter. This is a tragedy, because if the umpire's decision is seen to be professional and objective, people who have been in the system for some time will instinctively accept it. But they do not nowadays, leading those seeking justice and to serve their country to become increasingly obliged to enter the public arena.

The office of the Inspector-General for Intelligence and Security (IGIS) was established some 15 years ago with the express aim of acting as such a neutral arbiter. It was structured to investigate and arbitrate sensitive intelligence cases in a secure manner and away from the glare of publicity. Yet IGIS has not only failed some officers who have gone to it for adjudication, it has also forced them to go public—something they would never have previously considered doing and which runs counter to all their professional instincts and training. A thorough audit of IGIS is called for. This is needed not only to gauge how much talent is being seriously 'burnt' inside the intelligence community, but also to look at how many officers taking their cases to IGIS consider they have received appropriate justice. Equally pertinent is the question of whether the intelligence community and its systems have been in any way cleansed or otherwise improved as a result of IGIS action. At the very least, IGIS needs to be restructured so it is far more independent and not so beholden to the executive government of the day. Solid grounds exist for constituting IGIS as an officer of the parliament in the same way as the auditor-general.

Not only are the formal avenues for redress sclerotic or stymied, but there is an increasing tendency for the government of the day to resort to the security apparatus within the intelligence community to crack down on dissent, rather than use that machinery to help cleanse the system. Indeed, it has been suggested that if the inordinate amount of time and energy devoted to the draconian measures to plug the 1998–99 leaks concerning East Timor had gone into monitoring the rise of Jemaah Islamiyah, we might just have managed to pick up the Bali tragedy before it occurred.

A Royal Commission into the intelligence community is urgently required in Australia, not so much to look into institutional negatives, but more into human positives. There are numerous pockets of excellence in the country's overall defence, intelligence and security systems, all of which—in one way or another—draw on our long Australian tradition of pragmatism. The

performance and international standing of our SAS regiment, for example, readily comes to mind, as do myriad examples from the closed world of intelligence—examples that, regrettably, can never be publicly acknowledged or explained. The Australian Federal Police showed us what they could do after the Bali bombings when they had just the right expertise and attitudes called for. A Royal Commission needs to look at how we nurture and replicate those pockets of excellence and clean out the gunk in the system. In effect, it should set about joining up the dots of human success. That would provide a blueprint for identifying and rectifying the points of institutional failure.

But to achieve this a Royal Commission will need wide-ranging powers to blast away the years of bureaucratic accretion that have hampered the development of what should be one of the Asian region's outstanding intelligence systems. Instead, it is in many ways a pale shadow of what many fine men and women working within it know it could be.

As ever in the way of human affairs, it is truth and accountability that are the key factors. We might not be able to change the human condition, but we can streamline our system to get the best out of what we have. If we fail to get it right this time there is no way we will be able to contend with the powerful forces now building up in our region, such as China's emergence. Sun Tzu said, in effect, that when you wish to conquer an enemy you exploit his weaknesses in order to commandeer his strengths. Through diligence and alacrity you suborn them in such a way that when he finally hits the dust he still has a smile on his face.

The choice is ours. It all goes back to harnessing human talent. Our problem is not that we have a shortage of this, but that we have for too long accepted a professional attrition rate that makes those in our region with more ancient traditions of strategic thinking and action, laugh at us. We are lucky we still have a chance to get it right.

But to succeed in reforming our intelligence systems we need to see the defence and security of our nation in a more holistic way. Many of our successes in recent decades have come from Australians who, without losing their own culture, beliefs and perspectives, have gone out into the Asian world around us and learnt the languages, cultures and thought patterns of the peoples who increasingly impact on our destiny. Yet Canberra has cut funding for a joint federal–State program that teaches Asian languages in our schools. That's where much of our next generation of intelligence officers and analysts would have come from.

Sun Tzu would scratch his head over that one. ♦

*Warren Reed is a former intelligence officer with the Australian Secret Intelligence Service. After training with MI6 in London he served for ten years in Asia and the Middle East.*

## Archipelagic manoeuvre warfare for the ADF

Paul Hendley

### At a glance ...

- Archipelagic warfare is likely to feature strongly in the ADF's future.
- The complex geography and terrain of our region favours the kind of grinding, attritional warfare Australia cannot afford to fight.
- True amphibiousness and 'jointery' are cornerstones of an archipelagic manoeuvre warfare approach.
- We need to establish a full-time authority for our joint amphibious capabilities.

Using White Paper 2000 terms, arguments over the priority of the Defence of Australia (DOA) and the Defence of our wider Regional (and global) Interests (DRI) has ebbed and flowed with successive governments. Military writers periodically highlight the adverse effects that shifting strategic guidance has had on our military capability over many years. They invariably overlook, however, how contemporary military leaderships have opportunistically exploited each new expression of strategic guidance in order to suit single-Service prejudices and agendas—at the expense of net strategic effect.

The fundamental differences between the force requirements of DOA and DRI are actually few. The strategic approach route to Australia is the 'region', therefore exactly the same geographical factors apply to both DOA and DRI.

Our northern and north-eastern approaches comprise the most archipelagic regions in the world. Archipelagos present different tactical and operational-level problems to those encountered in either continental or maritime geography. Less obviously, archipelagos present different problems to the interface between an ocean and a continent. Archipelagic warfare is a creature of its own with an interdependence of maritime, land, air and littoral warfare of an order of magnitude more intimate than in any other type of theatre. Consequently, existing doctrines cannot be simply run in parallel and expected to work.

Original military concepts tend to be treated with

circumspection in Canberra until they have had the stamp of approval from US or British military thinkers. Proposing that archipelagic warfare deserves its own categorisation might, therefore, be somewhat of an unrewarding task. Nonetheless, archipelagic warfare is ideally suited as a framework for the development of the three most topical operational philosophies in the ADF: network centric warfare (NCW), effects-based operations (EBO) and manoeuvre warfare.

In broad terms EBO is the overarching philosophy, archipelagic manoeuvre is the mechanism and NCW is the enabler. The limitations of each of these three concepts, when applied in a non-archipelagic scenario, have been brought into stark relief by recent events in Iraq.

The political and military undesirability of messy commitments is self-evident but difficult to avoid in what the Army describes, accurately, as complex environments. Densely populated urban areas, ethnic, tribal and religious tensions, and resource shortages, characterise the most violent areas of Iraq. Add jungle and mountains, limited infrastructure, poor education standards, widespread illiteracy and a culture of 'wontok' favouritism and you have the type of environment Australian troops would

**'Original military concepts tend to be treated with circumspection in Canberra until they have had the stamp of approval from US or British military thinkers.'**

generally face ashore when operating in the region. The longer the duration of a land operation, the more

likely the social and physical complexities of the operating environment will come to dominate military factors. In other words, the longer it lasts the greater the potential for a deployment to evolve into a quagmire.

This works against Australia from the strategic to the tactical level. Due to our numerically small forces, we have to employ manoeuvre in order to apply strength against enemy vulnerabilities—while avoiding the reverse. Until the warfighting is well and truly concluded we cannot afford to have our limited forces bogged down and unavailable for offensive manoeuvre.

Traditional manoeuvre theories at the operational (and tactical) level were largely conceived for the land environments of a bygone era. They produced some spectacular successes but frequently failed. Most of the failures were due to unsuitable terrain and/or insufficient forces. Blitzkrieg has a habit of coming unstuck in dense,

complex terrain such as cities and jungles unless very large forces are available. Complex terrain also favours numbers and determination more than technology. It encourages exactly the sort of attritional warfare that Australia cannot afford to fight.

From a land-centric view our region is a mixture of jungle, mountains, grasslands, lightly timbered plains and urban sprawl. It looks ill-suited to high-tempo manoeuvre operations but step back far enough to see the blue bits on the map and it is perfect. The objectives may usually be on land but the manoeuvre medium is the sea. Given Australia's limited resources it is necessary to be able to move freely between objectives, poise as required and engage and disengage at will. This is archipelagic manoeuvre warfare. If the Australian Government is looking for a niche capability that is of real value to its allies, while still central to our own security, this is it.

Throughout our region nearly all the key strategic infrastructure is within 25 kilometres of the sea. If we can control the sea we can wage as much or as little of the war on the land as we choose. By adopting archipelagic manoeuvre warfare we get far greater military value from our scarce infantry battalions and their even scarcer supporting elements. Once ashore, a combined-arms battlegroup is a minor tactical grouping but while it is manoeuvring at sea it represents more of an operational-level force. It can strike targets over such a wide radius of action that predicting its targets becomes very difficult. Such a mobile force can, therefore, tie down opposing forces many times its own combat power. It can pin forces simply by its presence yet can avoid or negate enemy strengths by going elsewhere. It follows, therefore, that the ability to re-embark and reconstitute such a manoeuvre force is one of its defining characteristics.

The joint-force package necessary to achieve such manoeuvre and combat power has some very specific requirements. The force demands a special type of agility, to exploit the natural isolation of archipelagic land masses, in order to bypass strong enemy forces, and to reach out and hit wherever necessary to achieve the required effect. In practical terms this requires the ability to achieve surprise and then maintain sufficient operational tempo to stay inside the enemy's observation, orientation, decision action-loop. Achieving this depends on designing the force for exceptional cross-environment agility otherwise the landing sites become too predictable and the tempo stalls at the sea-shore interface. This agility is as important for re-embarkation as for getting ashore in the first place.

The price of such a high degree of agility is a limit on the physical weight and operational mass of the landing force. There is no reason it should not have armour, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery and serious combat engineer and aviation support. What it cannot bring, however, is the logistic tail to enable long-term operations independently

of its ships. By keeping the bulk of its command, administrative and logistic functions at sea the force not only saves weight but facilitates rapid re-embarkation. This is quite different from the 'break in then pour it all ashore' approach that characterised many historical amphibious operations and is still an underlying theme in the Army's concept for Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment (MOLE).

In some circumstances, peace enforcement for example, a large footprint ashore is unavoidable but this is not a job for an archipelagic manoeuvre force anyway. Sea-lift assets would suffice for such tasks and it is important to make a clear distinction between an amphibious force and a sea-transportable force. The former emphasises force multiplication through manoeuvre while the latter provides weight but no force multiplication effect. Neither is a substitute for the other.

So how is Australia positioned to develop an archipelagic manoeuvre warfare capability? Most of the necessary equipment either already exists on inventory or is to be procured as per the DCP so the materiel transition should not be difficult. Unfortunately, the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) is neither culturally nor organisationally well equipped to handle development of something as essentially and intimately joint as an archipelagic manoeuvre warfare capability.

The fragmented way in which the ADO manages its current 'amphibious' (really more of an amphibious-lift) capability illustrates this perfectly. It would be easy to recount how non-management of the capability has historically resulted in a force that is less than the sum of its parts. There is no joint concept for amphibious operations, no joint amphibious tactical guidance, no joint amphibious command structure and no joint amphibious staff.

Chief of Navy (CN) is 'the lead authority' for amphibious matters in the ADF but he does not have a Joint Amphibious Staff to support and advise him. Furthermore, CN's effective authority to direct the other Services to develop in any way other than that which they have decided for themselves is questionable.

In tacit recognition of the lack of a point of focus the one-star level Joint Amphibious Steering Group (JASG) was created. It is a step in the right direction but does not go nearly far enough, primarily because it has no real authority. It can only recommend and the Services are free to disagree with, reject or ignore its recommendations. Furthermore, it relies, by necessity, on single-Service advice only, which inevitably comes with inherent single-Service baggage.

Each of the Services understands its conventional business very well but has only a superficial understanding of how it must adapt to become part of a cross-environment, joint manoeuvre force. It is highly improbable, for example,

**'If the Australian Government is looking for a niche capability that is of real value to its allies, while central to our own security, then archipelagic manoeuvre warfare is it.'**

the sharp end

that the Navy would entertain shifting a cent of Air Warfare Destroyer funds to buy better amphibious ships or that the Army would put a rapid blade-folding capability above C-130 transportability for its new helicopters. Objective analysis suggests, however, that both should do exactly that.

Even if the JASG had the requisite executive authority it would still not be a suitable mechanism for managing a true amphibious capability. A committee comprising busy one-star officers and meeting only quarterly is not suited to dealing with a capability that revolves around low-level detail.

Below the JASG the amphibious capability is stove-piped between and within the Services. Who, for example, is the Army point of focus for amphibious capability? The answer: no one. Who manages amphibious capability in the RAN, is it the Commander Amphibious Task Group (COMAUSATG)? No. COMAUSATG is an operational commander with a busy program and a skeleton staff, not a capability manager. The Amphibious and Afloat Support Group (AASG)? Good try, but again no. The AASG manages a disparate collection of ships, not a capability. It can't manage the capability because the capability is joint and the AASG, as part of Maritime Headquarters, has no joint authority or expertise.

The JASG lacks the authority, the time and the staff to resolve these deeply entrenched problems. A properly constituted, full-time joint amphibious authority would be better placed to do this. There is a precedent in the type of authority required in the form of Special Operations Command. Surely joint amphibious manoeuvre is as important as special operations to an archipelagic maritime nation? Amphibious manoeuvre operations do not stand alone but then neither do special operations. The same management and command logic applies to both. No nation with any serious commitment to amphibious capability tries to get by without a full-time 'owner'.

Despite making all the right noises the underlying single-Service cultures are still exactly that, single-Service. They see archipelagic manoeuvre operations, and amphibious operations in particular, as secondary to their traditional roles. Until the ADO recognises the significance of regional geography and creates an owner for our amphibious capability these core elements of ADF manoeuvre warfare capability will not realise their potential. Without this DRI and DOA will be more likely to be attempted (and perhaps resolved) by attrition rather than blitzkrieg. ♦

## How the Brits do it

Perhaps elements of the UK model are transferable to the Australian situation. COMUKMARFOR and COMUKAMPHIBFOR are CINCFLEET's deployable (two-star ranked) joint task force commanders. The former commands blue-water operations while the latter commands littoral operations. COMUKAMPHIBFOR has a joint staff split fairly evenly between green and blue uniforms. He has two subordinate one-star commanders, Commander Amphibious Task Group (COMATG) and Commander 3 Commando Brigade. These one-star commanders are the CATF and CLF as described in amphibious command and control doctrine. COMUKAMPHIBFOR is recognised throughout the British defence structure as the authority, 'owner' and advocate of amphibious capability. There is no ambiguity.

Given that Australian resources only run to a battalion group-based landing force, rather than the UK's brigade, the Australian equivalent structure would be set one rank lower. COMAUSAMPHIBFOR would be a one-star officer and, in the absence of a Marine Corps, would probably have to be a rotational post between Navy and Army. His subordinates, CATF and CLF would therefore be a naval captain and a colonel. This corresponds with doctrine and matches the existing COMAUSATG structure. The CLF and his small staff, however, would have to be created from scratch.

The COMAUSAMPHIBFOR model is by no means the only option and may not even be the best. The point is that the capability needs an owner who is not subordinated to single-Service agendas. The capability also needs staff who understand, in minute detail, the interrelationship between the maritime and land aspects of archipelagic manoeuvre operations.

## BEQUESTS TO THE ADA

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**If you have already made a will, you don't have to change it; you can simply make a codicil.**

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# Combined-arms teams: Lessons from Iraq

T.E. Shaw

## At a glance ...

- The highest level acceptance of a combined-arms focus for the Army is a key milestone.
- In complex terrain, the shorter the engagement range, the less chance a Light Armoured Vehicle has of detecting, reacting to and surviving hostile fire.
- US forces in Iraq are using the M1 Abrams tank as the nucleus of their combined-arms teams.
- Of the two land components, the USMC is having more success than the US Army in its approach to combined-arms operations.

## Acknowledgement at last

In November 2003, when Defence Minister Robert Hill announced the revised Defence Capability Review (DCR), most commentators focused on the government's decision to purchase a quite limited number of new tanks. But a more important point escaped many in the broader audience. Hill said:

'The Government has accepted recommendations that will contribute to the Army becoming more sustainable and lethal in close combat. The government has in particular accepted the advice of the Chief of Army that the combined arms approach ... remains the best way of achieving rapid success while minimising friendly casualties.'

This statement represents formal and long overdue government recognition of combined-arms in close combat as the basis of Army capability. This is new and important, reflecting a new awareness by the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC), in approving the DCR. The present committee is, incidentally, the most experienced and capable this country has had in recent memory, with experience from overseeing two wars and several major operational commitments. This familiarity with the actual business of warfare and peace enforcement (as distinct from the arcane theories of the armchair strategists who dominated Australian defence thinking in the 1980s and most of the 1990s) arguably contributed to the NSCC's decision to accept the Chief of Army's advice.

Former governments, and Defence bureaucrats of various shades, have previously said that the Army 'prefers to fight in combine-arms teams'. As the government now appears to have acknowledged, saying the Army 'prefers' to fight in combined-arms teams is like saying the Navy 'prefers' to fight in ships. Combined-arms teams are not some optional preference for how the Army fights—they

are how all modern professional armies fight. There is no other viable alternative.

Combined-arms combat is not new. It has been the basis for land warfare for millennia: Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar were all masters of combined-arms combat. As explained in an unclassified Army concept paper recently quoted in the *Australian Financial Review*:

A combined-arms team is a case-by-case mix of combat, combat support and logistics elements, scaled and tailored to perform a specific mission in a given environment. The combined-arms philosophy institutionalises versatility, agility and orchestration: it accustoms individuals and teams to tailored, task-specific, agile mission groups that can be rapidly reorganised, regrouped and re-tasked as a situation develops. The principles of combined arms are complementarity, where the strengths of each arm cover the vulnerabilities of the others; and dilemma, where in avoiding one arm, the enemy is exposed to another.

In essence, you engage in land combat with a balanced force: a mix of elements that support each other, covering each other's weaknesses and exploiting each other's strengths. Where one element of this team is faulty, the whole team fails. By having one weak link in the combined-arms team you create a gap that the enemy can exploit, increasing your casualties and reducing your chances of success. This seems to have been the Army's argument to the NSCC—that a vulnerable tank, such as the aging 1970s-era Leopard AS1—is a weak link that brings the whole Army combined-arms team unstuck.

## The tank tantrum

With all this discussion already in the public domain, it is astounding that some commentators—funnily enough, usually those with the greatest stake in the now deservedly defunct Defence of Australia 'concentric circles' mythology—persist in misunderstanding or misrepresenting the thinking behind the tank decision. Consider this bizarrely ill-informed editorial from the *Canberra Times* of 11 March 2004:

Tanks ... have no conceivable purpose in the defence of continental Australia under any contingency ever imagined at Russell Hill ... Were an enemy of the sort needing to be fought with tanks able to reach a point in open country where Abrams tanks would be useful, Australia (and any allies it had) would necessarily have been defeated at sea and in the air, in which case the tank commanders would be better deployed practising their copperplate for surrender documents.

... Abroad in our neighbourhood, Australian soldiers would be greatly assisted by armour, but it is doubtful whether tanks

of this sort would add any great value beyond what is available from our existing stocks of several hundred light-armoured vehicles.

Such commentaries are humming traditional 1980s-style hymns of praise to the vaunted 'sea-air gap', the supposed logic of which—as anyone who was in the Army during the Dibb Ages could tell you—is that land forces are a waste of money and can safely be left to atrophy because the tyranny of distance is its own protection. The reality has been and is rather different. During the latter 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the much-run-down land forces conducted one offshore operation after another, including operational commitments as far afield as Bosnia and Africa.

The first paragraph of that *Canberra Times* piece entirely misses the point. The phrase 'in open country' is the give-away. The author seems to imagine the tanks being only used in sweeping, blitzkrieg-like battles against other tanks. As the Army must be getting tired of pointing out, this is not how the Army intends to use them. Instead, they will form part of a balanced combined-arms team, working in the confines of built-up, probably urbanised terrain, with infantry, engineers, artillery and other assets. There will be no tank-on-tank open country manoeuvre—rather, a hard slog in complex conditions against a fleeting but highly lethal enemy.

The second paragraph shows an even more stunted understanding of land warfare. Light armoured vehicles (LAVs) are completely different from tanks, and provide a completely different range of capabilities. LAVs are exactly what their name indicates—lightly armoured vehicles. They survive because they have excellent sensors, high speed and a rapid fire weapon system. In open country, this allows them to detect the enemy first, then either move away from the threat or destroy it at long range. In built-up terrain, where the Army mainly expects to fight, this survival mechanism breaks down. Because of the 'terrain clutter', the LAVs cannot detect the enemy from stand-off range, and their light armour—which grants them their high speed—becomes a fatal point of vulnerability if overmatched. They can be picked off at short range by snap-shots from handheld anti-armour weapons such as rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).

By contrast, tanks survive because of their excellent armoured protection. Unlike LAVs, which survive primarily by not being hit, tanks can survive being hit. In built-up terrain they can sit in a street, taking fire, without being destroyed or even significantly damaged. They can then decide to engage the enemy using extremely powerful sensors and a large precision gun, or can withdraw or move position. These are tasks (and tactics) for which the US Army and US Marine Corps (USMC) are using their M1 Abrams in the streets of Iraq every other day.

Just as importantly the combined arms concept is not just an Army or land-force concept—it is a joint, and even a whole-of-government one. Joint combined-arms teams,

including air and maritime assets as well as a balanced land force team, are the norm in modern conflict. Inter-agency teams—as seen in the Solomons, Timor and Bougainville—where the team includes non-military elements to perform specialist tasks, are also becoming increasingly common.

## Combined-arms combat in Iraq

The commentators who continue to reprove the Army's tank buy and other pending acquisitions and enhancements for the land force would do well to take a good look at exactly what is happening in Iraq today. Lightly armoured vehicles—LAVs and (lightly) 'armoured Humvees'—have proven to be death traps for US troops. The Iraqi insurgents ambush them from concealed positions at short range, picking them off with RPGs, booby traps, roadside mines and improvised explosive devices (IED). The LAVs usually don't detect the enemy until he actually opens fire, which is usually too late.

A typical pattern is for insurgents to ambush road columns as they turn a corner in an urban area. The last vehicle in the column becomes exceedingly vulnerable as it approaches the corner—earlier vehicles have turned the corner already, and cannot protect it. As it approaches the corner, the guerrillas pick it off with an RPG or, sometimes, by initiating an IED. It often takes

considerable time before the main body of the column becomes aware they have lost someone

and turns back to assist—giving the ambushers time to escape.

By contrast, during the entire combat operations phase of the Iraq war in March–April 2003, no unit equipped with M1 Abrams tanks lost a single soldier to enemy fire while inside a tank, although many tanks were damaged and some destroyed once they had been immobilised—often by short-range RPG fire directed at the vulnerable areas of the tank. Unlike LAVs, tanks can survive a surprise attack and then decide whether or not to hit back.

This highlights another advantage of tanks over LAVs in Iraq. If you are in complex terrain, full of civilian bystanders, fighting a fleeting but well-armed guerrilla enemy—and if you are in a LAV—you cannot allow the enemy to fire first, or you will die. So your only option is to shoot first and ask questions later. This is exactly what US forces have been accused of doing too often, resulting in frequent innocent civilian deaths and alienation of the local population. It is hardly coincidental that one of the field commanders' constant demands has been for more tanks.

The Australian Army concept paper, quoted earlier, draws no specific examples from current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But its authors seem to have taken current conditions into account. Indeed, they seem to have been mainly concerned with the sorts of complex, dirty, ambiguous little street-fights that the Australian Army believes will become increasingly common in the near

future. According to the paper, this complex operational environment—which the USMC call the ‘Three-Block War’ or Small Wars—will involve urbanised terrain, overlapping population groups, an information environment with close media scrutiny, and a need for frequent close combat as well as a diverse range of other tasks.

Even though the paper makes no mention of Iraq, it would be very surprising if key staff in Army Headquarters were unaware of the lessons being learned by forces in Baghdad and elsewhere, where the operating environment is a close copy of the scenario described in the paper.

The concept of combined-arms has been less than fully applied in Iraq. According to the recently released Strategic Survey 2003–2004, issued by the respected International Institute of Strategic Studies, US Army forces typically operate in fast-moving columns of armoured vehicles that tend to move quickly down the centre of main roads with infrequent stops, little or no supporting foot patrols, and no interaction with the local population. Their base areas tend to be well-fortified locations outside of major built-up areas, providing physical protection but little situational awareness. Indeed, the entire approach represents more of a ‘raiding’ than a patrolling style—a tendency that is leading some units into difficulty. For some troops, their lack of situational awareness leads to poor human intelligence, resulting in raids that fail to net their intended targets, alienate the local population and create additional

**‘For some US Army soldiers, their lack of situational awareness leads to poor human intelligence, resulting in raids that fail to net their intended targets, alienate the local population and create additional casualties.’**

casualties. What is counter-intuitive to some—although not to Australian and British forces—is that moving on foot, on a regular basis, through dangerous areas, leads to greater situational awareness, contributes to winning over local populations and ultimately is less dangerous than passing quickly through in an LAV or Humvee. Importantly, the USMC (which has always maintained a different approach from the US Army when it comes to counter-insurgency) has adopted a more combined-arms approach, with foot patrols supported by air and armoured assets, good intelligence and capable civil affairs.

There are even plans to re-establish the extremely successful Combined Action Platoons of the Vietnam era—small teams that live in local neighbourhoods, raise and train local fighters to protect their areas, and coordinate intelligence and civil-affairs action to win over the population and keep them on side. All this is simply an extension of the twin principles of combined arms-complementarity and dilemma.

The use of balanced teams that can support each other and exploit fleeting opportunities, particularly in urbanised terrain and complex-operating environments, is the true basis for all effective land operations. It is particularly relevant to the types of conflict today’s ADF is getting involved in. It is highly encouraging to see that the government has finally acknowledged and understood this. It is about time others followed suit. ♦

*T.E. Shaw is a nom de plume for a serving ADF officer.*

### (Letters cont’d from p. 7)

Sir: The February issue of *Defence Brief* lamented the demise of the Defence and Industry Study Course. The DISC is indeed unwell but hopefully should recover.

The DISC has its roots in industrial mobilisation and can best be described as a course for managers majoring in the defence-industry relationship.

The importance of understanding the organisational cultures and sub-cultures involved in the defence-industry relationship cannot be over-emphasised. There are many cultural pairs involved: public sector–private sector, uniformed–civilian, federal–State, as well as Navy, Army, Air Force, Police and Emergency Services. These are represented within the 60:40, private sector–public sector participant mix on the course. Understanding and trust between individuals as fostered by the DISC are the basis of good relationships between organisations that enable the defence-industry relationship to operate smoothly and effectively.


As well as its program of lectures, seminars and visits the DISC is a mighty vehicle for networking. Participants also gain familiarity with Australia’s critical infrastructure and first-hand experience of the operating environment in Northern Australia.

The DISC can be improved by broadening its context to encompass the large additional areas that are now contracted to industry, not just acquisition but also corporate support, infrastructure and logistics. The mobilisation of certain sectors of industry to support the ADF during contingencies follows the outsourcing of support and increased reliance on reserves. Selective mobilisation of defence and industry should now be the prime focus of the course.

The evolved structure of the DISC as a part-time course run over a calendar year needs to be retained as it is fundamental to achieving cross-cultural understanding and is compatible with defence and corporate posting cycles.

The DISC needs to be refocused, revitalised and run in 2005. A new emphasis on selective—mobilisation could be reflected in a new name—the Defence and Industry Mobilisation Course. The outcome of the DISC is vital but intangible. Trust based on cross-cultural understanding, personal contact and friendship is the key to successful long-term strategic partnerships.

**Mike Rawlinson  
Victoria**



### Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea

**Robert K. Massie**

**Reviewed by Commodore Jack McCaffrie**

Robert Massie is a Pulitzer prize-winning author of biographies and naval history. *Castles of Steel* follows his earlier work *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War*, as an equally fascinating account of the naval war at sea between 1914 and 1918. *Castles of Steel* combines a generally chronological narrative with character sketches of many of the principal actors and personal descriptions of significant events. It is this approach which makes the book stand apart from the very many others that cover some, or all, of the naval aspects of World War I.

At 865 pages, the book is a substantial volume. But it is an easy and sometimes compelling read. The narrative flows very well and is certainly enhanced by the frequent personal accounts of battles—whether at sea or within the British and German war Cabinets.

The bibliography is extensive and contains many biographical and autobiographical works from both sides of the conflict. The author's approach to footnoting is somewhat unusual and perhaps unique. There are no footnotes as such; merely abbreviated quotes from the text, listed by chapter and page number at the end of the book, with brief descriptions of the source document and page number. Most readers will not be concerned by this, but those wanting to read more deeply will find it annoying.

*Castles of Steel* describes the significant aspects of the naval war between Britain and Germany, but with most emphasis on the British perspective. It begins in the Mediterranean, with the chase and escape of the *Goeben* in August 1914, and concludes with the ignominious end of the German High Seas Fleet; first with the mutinies at the end of hostilities, and then with the scuttling of the ships in Scapa Flow in June 1919.

In between, there are detailed accounts of operations by both navies in the North Sea, including the German raids on the East coast of England, the blockade of Germany and submarine operations by both sides.

Specific attention is paid to the German deliberations, and American and British responses, to what became the unrestricted submarine warfare campaign.

Throughout the book there are also chapters devoted to the individuals who played major roles in the naval war and their relationships. So, on the German side most attention is paid to Kaiser William II, Admiral Tirpitz and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, together with Admirals Scheer and Hipper. Possibly the most interesting descriptions relate to the German submarine campaign, considerations of likely British and American responses to it, and eventual German expressions of disregard. These descriptions include good coverage of the international legal issues at play and the political judgments made by the leaders of each country. Readers will feel sympathy for Bethmann-Hollweg and his attempts to dissuade William, who eventually found his military advisers more persuasive.

On the British side, most attention is paid to Admirals Jellicoe, Beatty and Fisher, as well as Winston Churchill in his time as First Lord of the Admiralty. The relationship between Fisher (as First Sea Lord) and Churchill, initially very warm but destined for destruction, is very well described. Massie's contrasting characterisations of Jellicoe and Beatty are noteworthy. He is harsher on Beatty and his admittedly interesting personal life. He is if anything, a little too understanding of Jellicoe's defensiveness, unwillingness to delegate and sometimes excessive loyalty to underperforming subordinates.

A significant portion of the book is devoted to three campaigns; Coronel and the Falklands, the Dardanelles and, of course, Jutland, with each being given five chapters. The treatment of each is comprehensive, although Australian readers may be disappointed by the offhand description of the sinking of the *Emden*. Nevertheless, each of these campaigns and the political and strategic issues accompanying

them is described masterfully.

As an example, the descriptions of Admiral Sturdee, his relationship with Fisher and his appointment to lead the hunt for Spee in the South Atlantic are both vivid and revealing. Furthermore, his account of the battle of the Falklands and of the destruction and sinking of the *Scharnhorst* is genuinely stirring, yet at the same time sobering. Similarly, Massie explains well the genesis of the Dardanelles campaign and the lack of resolution that accompanied its planning and conduct. Finally, he identifies all of the now well known and analysed aspects of Jutland, evoking in this reader at least, a sense of frustration at the many missed Royal Navy opportunities on the night of that battle.

As might be expected in such a wide-ranging work, several themes run through *Castles of Steel*. Of these, two in particular are noteworthy. The first is the extent to which Britain, and the Royal Navy especially, were let down by poor communications—in the widest sense of that word. At the national level, political direction was sometimes unclear, or at least ambiguously transmitted. The instructions to Troubridge in the operation against the *Goeben* and the differences among the Army, the Navy and the Cabinet over the Dardanelles campaign highlight this.

Operationally, the situation was often much worse. Massie identifies any number of occasions on which poor tactical communications cost Britain dearly. Beatty's failure to keep Evan-Thomas's battle squadron informed of his intentions and to keep Jellicoe and the Grand Fleet informed of the enemy's position during the afternoon of Jutland, are probably the most significant examples but, regrettably, there are others. These failings were sometimes the result of inadequate technology, as in the inability to get messages to Cradock off South America, and sometimes the result of human failings, as in the case of the hapless Lieutenant Commander Seymour (Beatty's Flag Lieutenant) at Jutland and on other occasions.

The result, clearly outlined by Massie, was missed opportunities on a scale that almost defies belief. This was doubly disappointing in view of the constant access that the Royal Navy had to German naval signal traffic. This access could not always be translated into timely and usable information, but neither was best advantage gained from it.

On the other hand, the German Navy at a tactical level did not seem to suffer as badly as did the British. Nevertheless, the fact that the Royal Navy was reading their message traffic did not seem to have occurred to them. The consequences could have been much worse.

The quality of leadership, especially the Royal Navy leadership, is the second major and constant theme. As they are portrayed by Massie, several of the Royal Navy's most senior officers were less than inspirational, and all too often lacked initiative. The names Milne,

Goodenough, Moore and Pelly come to mind.

Beatty, for all his dash, failed to provide any guidance to Evan-Thomas when his battleship squadron joined the battlecruisers at Rosyth before Jutland. But, neither is there any evidence that Evan-Thomas sought any guidance. Even the consummately professional Jellicoe was perhaps too cautious and even pessimistic for his own good.

Perhaps Britain expected too much from its Navy and its Nelsonian traditions. After such a long peacetime interlude and with so much depending on the Grand Fleet maintaining numerical superiority over the High Seas Fleet, initiative and risk-taking may have come to be seen as the same thing. While Massie does a good job of cataloguing the issue, anyone looking for a thoughtful explanation of the development of Royal Navy leadership in that era should read Andrew Gordon's *The Rules of the Game*.

There are several other important themes throughout the book, including the impact of submarines, mines and to a lesser extent, aircraft, on capital ship operations. One theme that should not be forgotten and that appears frequently throughout the book, is the exceptional personal courage displayed by officers and sailors on both sides.

*Castles of Steel* is certainly a great read, but it is not without its flaws. It is sparsely illustrated and while photographs may be neither here nor there, the lack of maps (there are only six and they are fairly stark) is a definite shortcoming. Further, on checking several factual details with both the Corbett and Newbolt official history, and the Marder history, there is evidence of inaccuracies in Massie's work. These may be of little consequence, but more seriously, in describing Jellicoe's removal from the position of First Sea Lord he paints a somewhat one-sided picture of both the process and of the lead-up to it. The Marder account, for example, makes clear why Lloyd George became increasingly unhappy with Jellicoe, without in any way approving of the manner of the dismissal. This reader was, therefore, left with some nagging doubts as to the book's overall accuracy and objectivity.


The real strength of this book is that it is a very easily read account of World War I at sea. But *Castles of Steel* is by no means a definitive account of the war at sea and it provides no new insights on its conduct. As such, it is unlikely to satisfy historians. The vast majority of readers, however, will find *Castles of Steel* very rewarding; not least for the personal dimension it gives to this history. Those who are tempted to read more will find many worthy books listed in Massie's bibliography. ♦

Robert K Massie, *'Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea'*, Random House (Jonathan Cape), London, 2004, casebound and jacketed, 8658pp, \$79.95.

# On the Warpath: An Anthology of Australian Military Travel

**Robin Gerster & Peter Pierce (eds)**

**Reviewed by Dr Malcolm Kennedy**



Robin Gerster is Associate Professor in the School of Literary, Visual and Performance Studies at Monash University in Melbourne. Peter Pierce is Professor of Australian Literature at James Cook University in Townsville. In this anthology Gerster and Pierce have pulled together a large and heterogeneous collection of writings from over fifty writers. These writers are a very diverse group many of whom, in real life, would have probably had nothing to say to, or do with, the others had they been put together in a small room.

Indeed, the inclusion of the notorious John Pilger and Wilfred Burchett appears to be a deliberate attempt to be provocative. This is especially so given that Pilger's piece is nothing more than a telling reflection of his profound ideological fixations and his early and continued ignorance. Burchett's cosy intimacy with yet another of the world's pantheon of murderous dictators is hardly excusable, even with his claim to have braved an 'unjustified imperialist' air attack. These two pieces, ironically, support the editors' ideas on war providing gratuitous opportunities for tourism.

The single most disappointing feature of the book is the brevity of each of the selections. The introductory paragraphs to each writer by the editors are generally useful in providing a context, although many are superficially, and some are profoundly, disingenuous. Most of the pieces selected have something of interest to say. But the focus on the theme of 'war and travel' leaves the reader repeatedly looking for something more of what the writer in question had to say about their experience of war, its personal impact and its longer-term consequences.

The sixteen-page introductory essay by the editors makes many fashionable, but questionable, assertions about the history and evolution of Australian society. It also makes selective use of snippets of writing to support the editors' views of the past and present nature of our society. Their academic concern for a 'quest for Australian identity' is misplaced. A more careful reading of their own text provides considerable evidence that most servicemen and women were both comfortable and clear about their national identity.

This confection is far more about the editors' notions of tourism than it is about the serious business of war. They note at one juncture: 'It is therefore not hard to be cynical about war tourism'. Given that they are preoccupied with

picking tourism bones out of writing that is actually about a much broader, deeper and more perilous experience, it is little wonder that they arrive at such a sterile deconstruction.

The fundamental premise put by Gerster and Pierce is that for most soldiers, and Australian ones in particular, going to war means travel and thereby: 'Soldiers on overseas campaigns are the ultimate package tourists'. This provides the reader with a clear insight into the disappointing intellectual tenor of this book. Unfortunately, the anthology does a disservice to the several dozen authors included who have written profound and enduring material on the vast complexity that is war.

A sample of the authors such as Gunning, Paterson, Tilton, Bean, Gullett, Monash, Manning, Slessor, White, Wake, McKay, Inglis, and Stanley have all given vastly more valuable accounts of the positive and negative consequences of war than they are permitted in the slices of their prose included in this volume.

The 'tourist soldier' argument is a pale and empty analysis of the experience of war. The theme can perhaps be made to fit, to a degree, some of the non-military camp followers, but it largely devalues what most of the authors selected for this anthology actually have to say.

It may be too obvious to point out, but for most Australian servicemen and women war has demanded that they fight for Australia's national interests in overseas conflicts. A minor aspect, of this otherwise dangerous activity, is the consequent travel to other countries and differing societies. The book places too much emphasis on this one aspect of a much more complex set of experiences. It very largely ignores the very considerable benefits to individuals and Australian society that have accrued from the observation of, and interaction with, people in societies different from our own.


The negative associations that this book subtly imputes to military service can be given a powerful corrective by a meditation on the actions of the very large number of military personnel who, deeply influenced by their overseas service, have spent much of their lives continuing to better relations between Australia and her neighbours. ♦

*Robin Gerster and Peter Pierce, (eds.), 'On The War-Path: An Anthology of Australian Military Travel', Melbourne University Press, 2004, paperback, 368pp, RRP \$34.95.*

# Krazy Hor: A Soldier's Story

Stan Krasnoff

Reviewed by Brigadier John Essex-Clark



Stan Krasnoff was an infantryman who, as a lieutenant colonel, commanded the 3rd battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment after the Vietnam War. He resigned his commission after this command because he felt unwilling to join what he viewed as the 'rat race' to higher appointments.

Krasnoff experienced many of the difficulties the Australian Army faced during and post-Vietnam. *Krazy Hor* contains elements of Krasnoff's youth, army career, and activities in retirement. I know the author as we were instructors together at Canungra. Though I served in Vietnam, I did not serve with the Australian Army Training Team, or with the Pacific Islands Regiment. Therefore, in writing this review, I have had to rely on comments about Stan's book from some of my friends who did serve in those areas.

Stan Krasnoff's life was a roller-coaster ride as a child and a soldier. This is clear in the way this short book jumps from time to time and place to place without an amalgam; rather like a rapidly shaken Kaleidoscope. Krasnoff jerks his readers from event to event and the book is more a series of entertaining anecdotes rather than the account its sub-title, *A Soldier's Story*, infers. To cover a 22-year army career and an extraordinary youth in 202 easily read pages is nigh impossible. Perhaps Stan wanted this book to fill in some of the gaps about the social activities, personal dislikes and humorous incidents not covered by his earlier book, *Shadows on the Wall*, which described his experiences with the Training Team in Vietnam.

With a neat and often witty turn of phrase and the odd but quaint mixed metaphor, Krasnoff describes his evacuation from Shanghai as a child; his time in a refugee camp in the Philippines; his officer training and, far too tediously, his many amorous bouts; plus incidents in his service in Kapooka, New Guinea, Canungra, Vietnam, South Australia and Enoggera. There are a few interesting perceptions, such as that of alcohol abuse in the army. He has some good quotes, the best of which could be then Lieutenant Colonel Ron Grey's, 'I want the few, the very few, who get the job done—against all odds.' Krasnoff praises his heroes effusively, sometimes to the point of sycophancy; damns a few lesser mortals and takes a few painful jabs at, in his words,

Australia's 'Clayton's' defence force. He debunks his staff appointments and relishes the joys of command. He grumbles with disgust about some aspects of the Army and Australia's defence strategy, and makes some justifiable gripes about control of army activities sliding towards the public service, and the defence force serving political whims. He, probably purposefully, avoids the dictum that 'He who pays the piper calls the tune'.

In his penultimate chapter that he titles 'Catharsis', Krasnoff broods about his post-traumatic stress disorder and his faith—espousing the Greek stoic: Epictetus. This brooding leads into his finale: a rambling diatribe on his perceptions of Australia's defence and how to combat the ills of the world: perceptions that he then coyly but correctly annuls with the first sentence of his final paragraph—'But what do I know?'

Unfortunately there is no index and no maps or photographs, except that of the author on the front cover. This could be rectified to add interest and usefulness to any further editions or expansion of the book.

Writing this book, Stan Krasnoff gets so much 'phlegm off his chest', it was probably a catharsis in itself. Unfortunately, Stan Krasnoff, who was a fine natural leader and well-respected soldier, leaves the reader bereft of understanding as to Stan Krasnoff's true substance, and more aware of his flippancy and cynicism towards the serious art of soldiering and leadership. To a soldier, his 'story' could be fun but it is also disappointing. ♦

*Stan Krasnoff, 'Krazy Hor: A Soldier's Story', Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2004, paperback, 202pp, RRP \$35.00.*

**It can't happen here is number one on  
the list of famous last words.**

—David Crosby

# Redcoats to Cams: A History of Australian Infantry 1788 to 2001

Ian Kuring

Reviewed by Neil James

Ian Kuring's *Redcoats to Cams* is first of all, but not only, a labour of love by an infantryman paying tribute to his trade. It recounts the story of the contribution of infantry to Australian military, and wider history, and pays a detailed tribute to the trade at the very heart of past, present and future soldiering. The author, an infantryman, served as a regular soldier 1965–2001 then transferred to the Army Reserve to serve with the Army History Unit. *Redcoats to Cams* began its gestation in 1996. The then commanding officer of the School of Infantry, Jim Dittmar, very much a soldier in both the intellectual and practical traditions, commissioned a booklet to be used in giving trainee infantrymen of all ranks some idea of the history of their trade, and the many lessons learnt the hard way in numerous battles. Ian Kuring, an ex-curator of the Infantry Corps Museum, was the ideal man for the task. Ian had the passion, the interest, the research and writing abilities and, just as importantly, the ability to get on with all ranks and types.

In the late 1990s, the Army History Unit took over the low-cost project and expanded it into a reference book, because there was a growing realisation that such a work deserved, and would interest, a far wider readership. This book is testimony to the superb work of the unit in managing the continued recording of our military heritage, and the continuing need to nourish the intellectual aspects of the profession of arms. *Redcoats to Cams* was largely based on mining secondary sources (the bibliography is 19 pages) because there was insufficient money available to fund original research. This throws an interesting sidelight on Army priorities.

As well as its worth as a reference—and it will be regarded as a major one—this is a very readable book with fresh and expressive prose. The technical and sometimes arcane jargon of soldiering is translated into everyday language. Even when you dip into it in search of a specific detail you find yourself drawn into reading on and on.

The structure of the book is particularly well thought out to provide a superb and easily searched and understood reference resource. Fourteen chapters cover the activities of our infantry from 1788 to 2001. Two further chapters look into the future of the infantry and offer some reflections respectively. Many of the chapters include useful tables of the units involved in the operations discussed. Maps and photos are cleverly used to impart information not just to decorate the text.

The 69 pages of appendices provide excellent coverage of background detail on battle honours lists, Victoria Cross winners, the organisational structure of infantry battalions over the years and the reasons the structures changed, a list of common infantry acronyms and abbreviations, establishment (wiring) diagrams for every type of infantry unit over the whole period, a superb summary of the different types of infantry unit, the badges of the various infantry regiments, and a detailed list of the tables, maps and photographs included in the book. This is supported by 14 pages of indexes, broken up by Australian units and formations, other country's formations, weapons and equipment, and general entries.


The chapter covering the 1972–2001 period in particular includes some perceptive and pithy comments on the various reorganisations and reorientations of the Army over the period, the transition difficulties with training, training areas, equipment and doctrine, and the effect of peacekeeping missions and overseas exercises during a time of relative peace. Kuring is particularly good on the troubles the infantry (and the ADF as a whole) endured throughout the late 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s in trying to meet the often inconsistent, or less than coherent, strategic guidance set down by various governments with the insufficient and often unsuitable equipment that was made available.

His chapter on the future of the infantry is brief but workmanlike and a good summary of the problems to be faced in equipment, doctrine and tactics. Kuring's final chapter, 'Reflections', should be compulsory reading for every academic strategist, civilian bureaucrat, journalist, media columnist and politician before they even think about how the infantry (and the ADF) should ever be employed.

Australian infantry, and indeed the Australian Army, punch above their weight and have generally always had to. There are few armies in the world that can produce infantry warrant officers like Ian Kuring—men who approach their trade practically but who can also see the value in studying and understanding the past in order to fight even better in the future. *Redcoats to Cams* is a superb reference work. It is a credit to its author, publisher, original sponsor, the Army History Unit and all those known and unknown staff officers and commanders who supported its production, because they understood that the profession of arms requires intellectual succour and public recognition as well as practical excellence.

While the book is too big and heavy to carry in an infantryman's basic pouch, it is not too heavy to be used cleverly by any thinking infantryman. ♦

*Ian Kuring, 'Redcoats to Cams: A History of Australian Infantry 1788 to 2001', Australian Military History Publications, Loftus, NSW, 2004, casebound and jacketed, 571pp, RRP \$27.95.*



# Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime

Eliot Cohen

Reviewed by Bill Deane

Eliot Cohen, Professor of Strategic Studies at Baltimore's Johns Hopkins University, has produced a superbly researched and comprehensively detailed study of leadership: its fundamentals, application, constraints and the tensions the latter can generate when it is most intensely stressed—wartime. Cohen does not expressly make the distinction, but leadership in its purest form is inspirational, not managerial. It is displayed, not given. Its essence lies in persuading others to voluntarily follow a course of action they would otherwise be disinclined to take, be the risk death or glory. Merely heading a polity or organisation does not automatically endow the officeholder with this intrinsic quality, although the term 'leader' is now usually applied to anyone with executive power. Here the author views his four luminaries as leaders by virtue of the positions they occupied and great ones by the way they handled them.

As wartime leaders, Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill and David Ben-Gurion all displayed inspirational characteristics, but their main problems were managerial. Chief among these was their relationship with their senior military commanders and the question that has probably dogged the military-political interface since at least Sun Tzu's 4<sup>th</sup> century BC treatise *The Art of War*: how far should politicians go in telling generals how to wage a war? As a student of strategic studies at Harvard, Cohen was inspired by Samuel P. Huntington, 'arguably the greatest political scientist of our time', whose 'classic' 1957 book, *The Soldier and the State*, he cites extensively and challenges effectively. Briefly, Huntington favoured what Cohen calls the 'normal' theory of civil-military relations—give the military the tools, tell them what is required, isolate them from the politics and let them get on with it. After all, they are the professionals. 'To ask too many questions (let alone give orders) about tactics, particular pieces of hardware, the design of a campaign, to press too closely for the promotion or dismissal of others than the most senior officers is meddling ... inappropriate and downright dangerous'.

Serving and former senior military officers, particularly if they have Vietnam experience, will doubtless nod their heads in agreement. Cohen's thrust, however, is that history demonstrates that his four great wartime statesmen did all these things and succeeded not despite but because of them. Although leading four different types of democracy in exceptionally trying circumstances, they have enough in common to bear comparison, and they differ enough to exhibit the various problems associated with wartime civil-military relations.

Shortly before the American Civil War began, Lincoln overruled his military advisers and ordered the peaceful resupply of the isolated Fort Sumter to induce the South to fire the first shots. When battles were in progress, he practically lived in the telegraph office attached to the War Department's headquarters, perhaps sending a dozen or more messages daily to the field generals. He pressed for the adoption of breech-loading weapons, personally tested other weapons, ordered his generals to switch their preference for occupying ground to killing Confederate troops, and for much of the war had a trustworthy civilian observer reporting daily back to him from the front.

'War is too important to be left to the generals' opined Clemenceau. Fitting the action to the thought, he frequently visited forward positions, sometimes within machine-gun range, 'dodging shells and chatting to soldiers', ensuring that any directives he had issued, particularly in regard to defences in depth and their mapping, were being carried out, checking details such as the adequacy of tobacco supplies and sacking divisional commanders he believed too old and incompetent.

No stranger to close combat, Churchill, for Cohen 'the 20th-century war statesman *par excellence*', revisionist studies notwithstanding, advanced the careers of unpopular mavericks such a Chindit commander Orde Wingate, constantly bombarded Service Chiefs with requests for detailed information and got right up their noses by directly questioning junior ranks, initiated reforms that improved RAF bombing accuracy and irrational though some of his enthusiasms were, generally chivvied the military into an animation they would otherwise not have displayed.

Like Churchill, David Ben-Gurion, Israel's defence minister and premier, demanded complete compliance with a stream of detailed instructions he issued to the several, sometimes rival, terrorist and militia organisations from which he formed the Israel Defence Force that resisted the Arab coalition's attack on the newly formed state in May 1948, on occasion ordering what weapons would be sent to which units and which enemy positions would be attacked.

In summary, Cohen sees all four as typified by an obstinate, unyielding determination to win their war revealed in necessary ruthlessness—Churchill sinking the French fleet at Oran, Clemenceau's lack of hesitation in shooting defeatists, Ben-Gurion killing ostensibly friendly Jewish fighters to obtain their weapons, Lincoln's willingness to introduce martial law and suppress the rights of *habeas corpus*—yet a ruthlessness leavened by an intuitive wisdom that recognised the point when moderation and restraint were needed to avoid sullyng success. So Huntington's theory surrenders to Clemenceau's realism and Cohen's *aperçu*—'War is too varied an activity for a single set of professional norms'. ♦

Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime*, Simon&Schuster, Sydney, 2003, paperback, 333 pp., RRP \$27.95.



# Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the Brink of Catastrophe

Gavan McCormack

Reviewed by Neil James

Professor Gavan McCormack, currently living in Tokyo, holds the chair in Japanese history at ANU and has written numerous books and articles on North Asian matters. This book is his attempt to summarise the complex problem of contemporary North Korea.

McCormack writes regularly for publications such as the *New Left Review*, *Eureka Street*, the *Age* and the *Sydney Morning Herald*. He sits heartily within the Australian cultural milieu that is prone to blame the United States for most of the world's problems (and to attribute most of Australia's disagreements with Asian countries as always Australia's fault).

This said, there's much of interest in his account. He notes that North Korea has failed its people and he lists in detail the many depredations, horrors, hypocrisies and contradictions of the Kim Jong Il regime. Where McCormack parts company with much, but certainly not all, conventional strategic thought is in arguing that reassuring this peculiar but, as he sees it, not irrational, regime is more important than any viable alternative. He argues strongly that the price of avoiding potentially catastrophic war on the Korean peninsula means ignoring the regime's chequered record for truthful negotiation and adherence to diplomatic conventions—and is even worth risking accusations of appeasement. As he notes: 'The Kim Jong Il regime is indefensible but violent intervention to change it is more likely to lead to the sort of chaos that is engulfing Iraq and Afghanistan than to resolution of problems that, in the last resort, only the Korean people, North and South, can solve'. The culturally and racially homogenous Koreans are, in fact, comparatively well equipped to avoid the racial and religious sectarianism of Iraq and Afghanistan—but McCormack's essential point about the complexities of forced regime change still stand.

A McCormack theme that the North Korean regime is culturally reminiscent of pre-World War II Japan resonates strongly. He carries the analogy further by describing North Korea today, beset by natural and man-made disasters, and under siege and threat of foreign attack (at least as they see it), as resembling, '... nothing so much as Japan in the last stages of the Pacific and China wars in 1945—chronic shortages of food, factories not working, transport and communications in chaos, people reduced to selling anything they possess in order to get food, and a psychological mood of exhaustion and tension in anticipation of some final cataclysm'.


The book is structured around seven chapters that seek to place the crisis, and North Korea and its Juche ideology, more

within the Confucian rather than the Marxist tradition. McCormack notes that the communist party has not held a conference in decades and that, rhetoric aside, the country is more a military dictatorship and an absolute hereditary monarchy than a communist remnant. Perceptions, both in North Korea and outside it, that the regime has lost the 'mandate of heaven' reinforce the regime's fears for its survival. The sudden political and military collapse of Iraq when 'containment' was judged to fail exacerbates North Korean perceptions of both vulnerability and impending attack. The chapters on inter-Korea relations and the role of Japan are well traced. McCormack emphasises the psychological and political baggage in Japan concerning its invasions and colonial excesses in Korea. He makes the telling point that current Japanese angst, about North Korean abductions of a handful of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, are really a symptom of Japan's inability to face up to its conscription, abduction and horrific treatment of tens of thousands of Koreans in the 1930s and 1940s.

However, the chapter on US–North Korea relations, and the objectivity of the book in general in this regard, unfortunately undermine much of the discussion. The anti-American bias is often subtle, for example, where he states that the 'UN passed an American resolution' in 1950 when they actually passed, after much discussion and amendment, a resolution originally proposed by the USA. Other statements too often stray into glib cliché or polemics, such as where he wrongly compares US support to South Korea 1945–50 with the later Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

More seriously, for an Australian, he falsely claims that UN Command prisoners of war were not tortured by the North Koreans. This is a claim completely at odds with well-documented reality, including the award of a posthumous George Cross to Australia's Private 'Slim' Madden for his bravery under torture and maltreatment. This is despicable territory, for which Wilfred Burchett, quoted approvingly and inappropriately in McCormack's footnotes, will remain forever condemned. McCormack also displays a weak grasp of international law, especially the UN Charter and the Security Council's responsibility to maintain international peace and security irrespective of whether a conflict is perceived to be 'civil' or intra-state. He completely misunderstands the concept of a weapon of mass destruction (and its Soviet origins). His penchant for cliché, such as 'freedom delivered by cruise missile would be ephemeral at best', does not buttress his argument and, in this case, fundamentally misunderstands the relation of tools to ends. This is a book well worth reading but only with an open mind, and certainly not in isolation from the many other books on the complex problem of North Korea and its neighbours. ♦


Gavan McCormack, *Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the Brink of Nuclear Catastrophe*, Random House, Sydney, 2004, paperback, 229pp, RRP \$13.95.



# Terrorism Explained: The Facts About Terrorism and Terrorist Groups

Clive Williams

Reviewed by Tony LeRay-Meyer



Clive Williams is a former military intelligence officer with thirty years experience before he took up his current appointment as Director of Terrorism Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University.

The terrorism genre has grown exponentially in the last three years. A myriad of works have been produced in attempts to capture a readership seeking answers in a post-September 11 world. *Terrorism Explained* fills a useful niche. It is not a book for the informed reader or analyst but a book clearly aimed at the beginner—the high school or undergraduate student who is seeking an entry point into understanding the complexity of terrorism.

Williams has sought to engage his target audience with a readable, almost conversational, text, rather than a formal, dry and lengthy technical analysis of what is otherwise an enormously complex subject. *Terrorism Explained* provides a basic text for those not ready for more comprehensive or technical works but the book's approach is essentially self-limiting and does not match the promise of its title.

The book begins with a brief overview of terrorist history and then moves very quickly through the emerging characteristics of contemporary terrorism. It seeks to cover the complete spectrum, from assassins to macro-terrorism, tactics to infrastructure, and finally an introduction to risk management. As this is covered in only 137 pages the book avoids in-depth or extensive analysis of organisations, individual relationships and technical jargon.

Inevitably, the book's limited scope and constrained length limits its capacity to more fully explore the breadth of the subject. Many concepts are raised but not explored in any depth. Although this is clearly a conscious approach by the author, a possible alternative may have been the wider and more detailed use of case studies to enhance the reader's comprehension of the concepts and issues raised. For example, the coverage of the guerrilla and conventional warfare mounted by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka did not address the use of the 'Black Tigers' as the movement's terrorist capability. Other issues introduced, such as suicide operations, are not followed up in any depth. An insight, through brief case studies, into the employment of females as suicide

operatives in Algeria in 1956 or more recently in Chechnya would have been very effective in providing an understanding of this factor in the nature of contemporary terrorism.

There is as yet no universally accepted definition of terrorism and consequently much sterile debate in academic and professional forums. A key strength of *Terrorism Explained* is the effective personal definition of terrorism offered by Williams. He defines terrorism in terms of political motivation, the targeting of non-combatants, the intent to 'terrify', and the aim to achieve a strategic outcome.

This effective definition offered a sound foundation for the 'story' to be related in the text, but the subsequent analysis of terrorism is insufficiently related back to his definitional model. The definition should have been better used to underpin his coverage of the history of terrorism or his brief discussion of concepts and tactics. Clive Williams has produced a basic and readable text targeted at the student seeking an introductory or general entry point into a complex and burgeoning subject. However, *Terrorism Explained* largely belies the promise of its title and is not suited to the informed reader or the beginner seeking a detailed introduction. ♦

Clive Williams, *Terrorism Explained: The Facts About Terrorism and Terrorist Groups*, New Holland, Sydney, 2004, paperback, 223pp, RRP \$24.95.

When we do not find peace within ourselves, it is vain to seek for it elsewhere.

—Duc Francois de la Rouchefoucauld

# Living by the Sword: The Ethics of Armed Intervention

Tom Frame

Reviewed by Neil James

Dr Tom Frame was a naval officer for 14 years before ordination in 1993 and is now the Anglican Bishop to the Australian Defence Force. He is noted analytical historian in both church and naval history and a master of clear, strong and illustrative prose. Within Anglican circles, and despite his relative youth as a bishop (2001), he is acknowledged as an intellectual theologian in the traditional stream. In this book he has drawn on all these talents and experiences to discuss a range of Christian theological, and wider ethical and philosophical, issues concerning the use of force in the affairs of mankind.

Based on a series of lectures and seminars he presented to New College at University of NSW in September 2003, and launched on Anzac Day 2004, the book is set very much in the contemporary Australian context. It has attracted much public interest because Bishop Frame retracts his initial, and well-publicised, pre-war judgement that the 2003 collective intervention in Iraq was a 'just war'. While written by a bishop the book is unfortunately somewhat of a curate's egg. While Dr Frame is a noted historian and capable theologian, and the book demonstrates these strengths, it does suffer in part from a want of political science scholarship. He has also been badly let down by his editors and fact checkers with some chapters including errors of fact or omission, and incomplete or arguable interpretations, which mar what would otherwise be an excellent reference to a vital subject. Fortunately, these deficiencies can be readily corrected for subsequent editions.

Beginning with a long autobiographical preface of Dr Frame's spiritual journey in reconciling Christian belief and military service, the book includes an introduction, nine thematic chapters, an epilogue and two appendices. The first chapter provides an excellent summary of the effects of Christian belief and warfare on each other from the crucifixion of Christ by the Romans, through the conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity, to the mid-5th Century fall of the Western Roman Empire. Chapter two covers the interaction of Christian belief, temporal rule and warfare from the fall of Rome to the present day, with special emphasis on the development of the 'just war tradition' in Christian theology and practice—and in international law.

His third chapter brings a good summary of the development of the opposing pacifist and 'just war' traditions within Christian theology, and Christianity's progressive rejection of the belief that there was a scriptural basis for spreading the Christian message by the sword. In Chapter four he applies just war theory to the 1991 and

2003 wars with Iraq, concluding that the first was a just cause but the second probably not—although it is surely too early for such a definitive judgement on several of the agreed just war criteria. Chapter five covers Church–state relations based on an excellent discussion of its scriptural basis. The following two chapters discuss the problem of intervening in the affairs of other states, especially by pre-emptive action, and the practical and moral difficulties of a standing UN constabulary.

These latter three chapters in particular unfortunately include some errors, omissions or conclusions that are commonly arguable. As a sample, there is confusion between the concepts of collective defence and collective security, and inferences or assertions that Pakistan opposed the Taliban and that French involvement in Rwanda in 1994 was enlightened self-interest, when in both cases the opposite was more the case. The nature of Eritrea's annexation and eventual secession from Ethiopia is misunderstood. Discussion of the break-up of Yugoslavia misses the important example of Slovenia. The discussion of humanitarian intervention is somewhat cursory and does not address several modern developments and emerging international law in this regard. The discussion of declared and undeclared wars is considerably out-of-date and the fact that such declarations hold no legal status since the UN Charter was signed is absent. The discussion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty wrongly ascribes to Pakistan and India the very status that has long led them to oppose the treaty. Two helicopters, not one, were shot down in Mogadishu in the 'Blackhawk down' battle.

The chapter on conscientious objection is an excellent summary of a complex topic. His final chapter on the morality and practicality of Australian defence strategy, and our record of warfare, is largely a good one, but the discussion and assignment of wars and campaigns to justified and unjustified lists include many arguable definitions, descriptions and conclusions. The epilogue is short and illustrative. The two appendices on Australian contributions to peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations respectively are particularly marred by numerous factual errors, omissions and repetition of listed operations under different names or titles. That these were based on a Department of Defence report makes it even worse. The choice of 1950 as a starting date is also unfortunate as 1945 is generally taken as the beginning of the modern era for such multinational activities. However, this too was apparently because of the flawed records provided by the Department of Defence.

All in all a very good book but the next edition should be a great one. ♦

Tom Frame, *Living By The Sword: The Ethics of Armed Intervention*, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2004, paperback, 278pp, RRP \$34.95.

