AIR 5190 - The Perennial Lightweight Project

- analysis of an Australian defence acquisition

This article is copyright. Enquiries should be directed to

Westbrook Lewis Pty Ltd at churchus@alexia.net.au

Part 2 of 2

News of the launch order for the C-27J arrived in November 1999. The order was placed by the Italian Air Force and covered 12 aircraft for delivery in 2001-2004.

In early February 2000, an Australian technical journal reported on developments in AIR 5190 and attributed the information to Defence. The LTAC project office had completed its assessment of the revised tenders and made a recommendation which had yet to be examined by the DSSB. The Defence position on the project was that it was not simply a replacement for the Caribou and if that had been the case the aircraft would have been re-engined years previously. CASA and LMATTS had been told to expect definite information in late-February or March.

It was also generally known that the Defence budget was overstretched. Operational resources were heavily committed to the UN-endorsed deployment to East Timor, and preparations for security support during the Olympic Games. Rectification of the Collins-class submarines and procurement of the Hawk lead-in fighters/trainers and AEW&C aircraft were demanding a large component of the capital investment budget. The plans and schedules of all acquisition and infrastructure projects were under review and adjustments would be made for the near term. For the longer term, a White Paper was being developed for issue later in the year.

Defence budget papers for FY 2000-2001 released in May 2000 mentioned an intention to review the ADF's tactical transport fleet including the way ahead for the Caribou. They referred also to studies to investigate life-of-type and supportability aspects for the aircraft.

On 13 June the Defence Minister announced that the White Paper would be preceded by a public consultation process on defence and security issues. To further the process a small apolitical community consultation team was formed and a public discussion paper on defence was released on 27 June. The purpose of the discussion paper was to raise community awareness and outline aspects, contingencies and options for the next 15 years. It briefly analysed the environment, strategic, organisational, technology and resource issues and included a summary of current capabilities. The role of the consultation team was to co-ordinate a series of public meetings and discussions, receive and collate all forms of input, and provide a consolidated report to the Minister.

In July 2000 technical journals were able to report authoritatively report that the LTAC project office had completed evaluation of revised tenders in November 1999, and that the DSSC had made a firm recommendation in late-February 2000. Defence had in June written to CASA and LMATTS advising them it had decided against a further extension of the tender process and that AIR 5190 was suspended but not cancelled. Defence had also briefed the primes on its reasons for not proceeding in the near term, and Air Force was to continue studies to determine how the Caribou could be kept in service for another 5 to 8 years.

Several reports claimed a clear victory by CASA and attributed the information to usually well-informed sources. That could mean poor confidentiality within Defence or- equally well - inadvertent relay of rumour contrived by a publicity agent. One journal commented that aviation circles estimated CASA and LMATTS had each spent in excess of $10m in attempting to win the competition.

Also in mid-2000, Defence Report 1999-2000 noted that a low sortie launch rate of 85% for the Air Lift Group as a whole was due to Caribou aircraft only achieving a rate of 55%. It attributed this to maintenance difficulties especially with engines, lack of current aircrew, and the pressure of operations in Timor.

The community consultation team provided its report - Australian Perspectives on Defence - to the Minister on 29 September. The notes in the public version of that report relating to airlift, AAR, logistics and transport were:

• "(Army) should be deployable by land or sea readily, with suitable transport and support from the Navy and Air Force, and supported by local infrastructure and industry wherever possible."
• "Many are of the view that the trend has been to consider the ADF's deployable logistic support capabilities less important because of the availability of commercial support and reliance on the high standard of national infrastructure. They argue that this trend needs to be redressed because it has left the Army vulnerable when required to deploy to areas where that support is not available, such as East Timor."
• " …. highlighted the need for a fast, logistic support vessel, able to carry a battalion-sized force and preferably helicopters as well."
• "Concern was expressed that there was no replacement light tactical transport aircraft in prospect, and some suggested that such an aircraft should be built in Australia. Others suggested that heavy lift aircraft should be leased from commercial sources when required."
• "There was also some strong support for the need for an air-to-air refuelling capability."

In late-2000 the technical press reported that a group of several Australian companies and an American company Pen Turbo Aviation had proposed to Defence a private financed initiative for re-engining the Caribou, and that this was on similar lines to a study completed by de Havilland Canada during the 1980s. Pen Turbo had a prototype flying with the R-2000 Twin Wasp radials replaced by Pratt and Whitney Canada PT6A-67T turboprop engines (takeoff power 1,060kW) driving Hartzell 5-bladed propellers conveying a general improvement in hot and high performance. At the normal all-up weight of 12.9 tonnes and with STOL capabilities maintained, the DHC-4T prototype had demonstrated a 15 percent increase in maximum payload, substantial improvement in payload/range figures and a small increase in cruising speed.

. . . Figure: DHC-4T Turbo Caribou. (Pen Turbo)

Pen Turbo was in the process of obtaining FAR 25 supplemental type certification from Canadian and American authorities (issued 14 November 2000 and 27 February 2001 respectively). The proposal was for austere refurbishment with two re-engined aircraft on lease for training while ADF Caribous were sequentially modified for $US3-4m each. That seemed to be good value for money but the press reported in November that Air Force did not intend to pursue re-engining, or at least not prior to the White Paper.

Overseas in late-2000, the C-27J and C-295M were engaged in a head-to-head competition in Switzerland. In December the Swiss defence authority summarised its evaluation as showing that the C-27J has superior flight and transport capabilities but the C-295M would have lower acquisition and life-cycle costs. The Swiss, who do not operate any C-130s, announced that they would order two C-295M. They disclosed also that this would necessitate procurement of some light off-road vehicles to complement in-service 4x4 armoured scouts which evaluation had shown to be portable only in the C-27J. A press release from CASA noted that contract signature was expected in October 2001 with delivery scheduled for 2003. This was the first export order for the C-295M. It was followed in March 2001 by an order from the United Arab Emirates for four aircraft equipped for maritime patrol. The C-27J was apparently not tendered. There may have been other direct competitions but these were not publicised by CASA or LMATTS.

The public version of DWP2000: Our Future Defence Force was released on 6 December 2000. Notes relating to airlift, AAR, logistics and transport were:

8.27 "… An additional squadron (about 12 aircraft) of troop-lift helicopters to provide extra mobility for forces on operations. In particular, these helicopters will enhance our capability to operate off our newly acquired troop ships, HMAS Manoora and Kanimbla. These helicopters are planned to enter service around 2007."

8.32 "Our airlift capabilities will be enhanced by the acquisition of new aircraft to replace the Caribou from 2010, and by the refurbishment of our 12 C130H aircraft by about 2008. We plan to undertake a major program to provide better electronic warfare self-protection of our transport aircraft and helicopters from missiles by around 2004."

8.33 " … Logistics capacity will also be enhanced by a number of important programs including a major replacement program for Army's fleet of trucks, scheduled to start by 2008."

8.42 " …our AAR aircraft - four Boeing 707 aircraft - are close to the end of their effective life. Over the next few years they will need to be substantially refurbished or replaced if we are to retain an AAR capability …"

8.47 "… scheduled a major project to replace and upgrade our AAR capability. This project will acquire up to five new-generation AAR aircraft, which would have the capacity to refuel not only our F/A-18 aircraft but also our F-111 and AEW&C aircraft over a wide area of operations."

On 22 May 2001, the Minister issued a statement on major capital equipment projects approved for Defence in the 2001/02 May budget. Thirty-eight projects had been approved and one of the new projects was an extension for the Caribou. Substantial details were provided for just five projects and one of them related to airlift so it is reproduced in full.

" Extension of the Working Life of the Caribou Light Tactical Airlift.

• The Caribou aircraft currently performs both troop and cargo transport functions. The most cost-effective means of continuing to provide this light transport and tactical airlift capability for the ADF over the medium-long term is to extend the life of the ADF's Caribou aircraft for ten years. The acquisition of a replacement Light Tactical Airlift Capability (LTAC) will be considered at the end of this decade.
• The ADF has 14 Caribou transport aircraft that provide the capability to operate from short airfields with rough or soft surfaces. This capability allows for the supply and resupply of combat forces in locations where larger aircraft are unable to operate due to the limited length or condition of the landing strip, and where rotary aircraft are either unavailable or not appropriate for the nature of the supply task.
• This project will extend the operation of the Caribou to 2010, from the previously planned withdrawal date of 2002/03. This project provides funds to cover increased maintenance costs associated with supporting a 35 year-old aircraft, and to cover costs associated with sustainment of engines and other aircraft equipment. Funding will also replenish stocks of spares, which were deliberately drawn down in anticipation of the aircraft's withdrawal from service.
• Funding will be provided to support this capability from 2001/02.

This project will contribute to Defence Output 4: Air Force Capabilities."

Corporate Developments Overseas

In June 1999, there was an official announcement of planning for a merger of CASA and the German-American company DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG (DASA) headquartered in Europe. This move was part of a general consolidation of the western European defence and aerospace industry which was reported to be having numerous discussions on ways to combine and compete with the giant North American companies Boeing and Lockheed Martin.

In October 1999, DaimlerChrysler announced that its aerospace component DASA was to merge with France's Aerospatiale Matra to form a consortium to be known as European Aeronautic Defense and Space (EADS). This expanded a relationship between the two companies which together with British Aerospace (BAE) and other companies were producing the Airbus line of commercial aircraft.

During late-1999 and early-2000, several reports noted that Finmeccanica the Italian state-controlled company and owner of Alenia Aerospace was determining how to rationalise some of its interests. These included how Alenia might be privatised, and that parts of the company such as the Space Division had already been established as independent companies. Finmeccanica was also reported as having discussions with BAE, the EADS partners and other entities. In April 2000, Finmeccanica and EADS agreed to form a joint venture military aircraft company to be formalised in early-2001.

In May 2000, the multi-national European Commission gave conditional approval to the merger of DASA, Aerospatiale-Matra controlled by the conglomerate Lagardere and the French government, and CASA controlled by a Spanish state holding company SEPI. In the EADS consortium, CASA was planned to be the core of a Military Transport Aircraft Division.

In July 2000, CASA formally joined EADS. Also there were reports that Alenia was discussing a proposed partnership with EADS agreed to by Finmeccanica in April and known then as the Joint Venture Company. One report noted that a spokesman for Alenia had said that although the joint C-27J program with Lockheed was not included in the joint venture talks it might be added later. There was little publicised comment or analysis of how Lockheed might view a proposed novation of its arrangement with Alenia Aerospace.

In early-2001 EADS was reported as close to agreement with Finmeccanica regarding acquisition of the Aeronautics Division of the latter's Alenia Aerospace subsidiary. It was not clear from those reports if the earlier discussions or proposed partnership included the Space or other divisions of Alenia Aerospace.

This was clarified in June 2001 when Defence Data published a summary of western European defence and aerospace company relationships (http://defence-data.com/ current/pagerip1.htm). The summary listed Finmeccanica as 50/50 owner with Lockheed of LMATTS, and through its ownership of Alenia Aerospace as 50/50 owner with EADS of the new European Military Aircraft Company (EMAC). Finmeccanica's contribution to EMAC evidently included what had been the Aeronautics Division or subsidiary of Alenia Aerospace.

Projects and Airlift in the 21st Century

In June 2001 a new planning document was released as Defence Capability Plan 2001-2010 (DCP2001) Public Version. DCP2001 replaced the Pink Book and similarly details all current Unapproved Major Capital projects and adds Approved Projects not yet let to commercial tender. Its introduction notes that planning of some proposals is not mature enough to fully detail each phase, and that such proposals are described in a single phase. Compared to the Pink Book, DCP2001 has longer notes for each project and includes more planning dates for the approval process but does not provide a bar chart of expected expenditure year-by-year. The year for completion of a phase and wind-down of expenditure for acquisition is sometimes mentioned in the notes. Extracts from the airlift projects are:

AIR 130 Phase 2: Chinook Mid-life Upgrade
Modernisation of 6 CH-47D medium lift helicopters within guidelines to be provided by the ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan.
YOD 2007/08. In-service delivery 2010.
Scale of expenditure $100m - $150m.

AIR 5046 Phase 5/6: Additional Troop Lift Helicopters
Phase 5 is capability definition study commencing in 2001/02.
Phase 6 is to acquire about 12 aircraft to enhance mobility especially from newly acquired maritime warfare ships for troop transport, search and rescue, vertical replenishment and medical evacuation. Army has 36 Blackhawks with primary roles of Airmobile Operations and Special Missions. Blackhawk is not compatible with ship-borne operations. Navy has seven Sea Kings that provide utility lift in support of the fleet. Sea King is not optimised for combat operations over land. Solution will be a Military-Off-the-Shelf Helicopter taking into account commonality with existing aircraft.
YOD 2001/02. RFP 2002/03. Contract 2003/04. In-service delivery (first) 2007.
Scale of expenditure: $350m - $450m.

AIR 5046 Phase 7: Blackhawk Mid-life Upgrade
Modernisation of 36 S70-A-9 helicopters within guidelines to be provided by the ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan
YOD 2005/06. In-service delivery 2010.
Scale of expenditure: $750m - $1000m.

AIR 5190 Phase 1A: Caribou Life Extension Decision not to proceed with Phase 2 ((sic)) in late 2000 has meant urgent action is needed to address Caribou support. Recovery program for re-instatement of deeper maintenance of Caribou, wound back in preparation for introduction of LTAC, will include long lead-time spares and clearance of the backlog of critical Engineering Change Proposals. Phase does not include provision for revised engine solutions. Activity already commenced and will be ongoing.
Scale of expenditure: $100m - $150m.

AIR 5190 Phase 2: Light Tactical Airlift Capability
Aircraft will be a replacement for the current Caribou. Phase is also likely to provide for a Level 5 full-flight simulator. Possible options could include platforms such as the CN295 ((sic)), C27J, V22 Osprey or Chinook. Replacement options may be affected by solutions for AIR 5414 Phase 1 C-130H Refurbishment and recommendations flowing from an ongoing Airlift Study.
YOD 2004/05. RFT release 2005/06. Contract 2006/07. In-service delivery 2010.
Scale of expenditure: $750m - $1000m.

AIR 5401 Phase 1: Medium Tactical Airlift Capability
Improve on-line availability of C-130H out to the planned fleet withdrawal date of 2008. Requirements will focus on replacing poor performing avionics components and undertaking some structural work while aircraft is undergoing deep maintenance with prime contractor Qantas Defence Services. Avionics component unlikely to commence before mid-2002.
Scale of expenditure: $30m - $50m.

AIR 5402 Phase 1: ADF Air Refuelling Capability
Replace and enhance AAR capabilities. To be capable of refuelling ADF fighter, strike and surveillance aircraft. Additionally enhance strategic airlift for forces deployed in-country or overseas. AAR now provided by three B707 which are operationally limited and approaching effective Life of Type. ((One of the four tankers was apparently retired early in 2001.)) Capability requires up to five new generation tanker/transports from 2006. Modification of aircraft to include boom/hose and drogue, and cargo systems.
YOD 2002/03. RFT release late-2002. Contract 2003/04. In-service delivery 2006.
Scale of expenditure: $1500m - $2000m.

AIR 5414 Phase 1: C-130H Refurbishment
Major refurbishment of existing C-130H fleet to extend platform life-of-type until at least 2020. Identified needs that may relate to this stage include systems, structures, avionics.
YOD 2003/04. RFT release 2003/04. Contract 2004/05. In-service delivery 2008.
Scale of expenditure: $450m - $600m.

AIR 5416 Phase 2: EWSP for Selected ADF Aircraft
Multi-phased proposal to develop comprehensive Electronic Warfare Self Protection (EWSP) capabilities for selected ADF aircraft. Phase 1 in progress includes development of radar warning receiver, and two competitive EWSP suites. Phase 2 will implement Blackhawk, Chinook and C-130J EWSP capabilities.
YOD 2002/03. In-service delivery 2004/05.
Scale of expenditure $150m - $200m.

The project descriptions are informative. The AIR 5046 acquisition is planned as a Request for Proposal from one or more selected primes to provide specific aircraft. The AIR 5190 Phase 2 entry confirms that the current intention is to undertake an austere refurbishment of the Caribou. Its engines are not to be replaced. The references to options for AIR 5414 Phase 1 and a continuing Airlift Study imply that the C-130J is again being considered for AIR 5190. AIR 5401 bracketed with AIR 5414 has a lower scale of expenditure than envisaged in PB1997-2001 and it is planned to retain the C-130H for a further period. Project AIR 5416 does not mention the C-130H or AIR 5414. The scale of expenditure for AIR 5402 has been increased and would be sufficient for acquisition of five new medium tanker/transports or five heavy tanker/transports or tanker/freighters. There was no mention of AAR for any airlift aircraft.

In general: project schedules have been compressed with YOD, RFT and contract in successive years. AIR 5402 is more rapid with about one year from YOD to contract. The projected total expenditure on airlift to 2010 is large. There are typographical errors in AIR 5190 and none - readily apparent - in the other airlift entries. In line with, as an adjunct to, or despite the planning outlines already released, a continuing study will be making recommendations for airlift and specifically AIR 5190.

In the interim Defence had been making arrangements to meet International Civil Aviation Organisation Stage 3 noise limits and to phase out its remaining 707-338C tankers before the end of 2003. A closed briefing for invited aerospace companies and banks was held in Canberra in early-August 2001. Reports indicate that Defence plans to issue in September a RFP for lease of several AAR tankers to cover the period from 2002/03 until delivery of the AIR 5402 tanker/transports or tanker/freighters. The draft RFP had a commercial cost-cap of $30m per year for up to five years and was for dry-lease with aircrew and maintenance to be provided by Air Force. The closing date for proposals was planned for mid-October.

With regard to the ALS, it would be useful to get ahead of the present and then look back on any aspect that may affect the future of AIR 5190. Such a survey might in particular reveal some change since the mid-1990s. Also aviation and defence journals have frequently commented that in the period 2010 to 2025 Defence will have to address block obsolescence of F/A-18 fighters and AP-3 maritime patrol/ASW aircraft and possibly F-111 strike fighters. Refurbishing or replacing each of those capabilities will be expensive, so overshadowing the ALS is the need for affordable actions on airlift that can be completed before any funding crunch in the period commencing 2010-2015. The ALS will be assessing needs and prospective solutions from top to bottom. It is convenient to start with AAR. However before surveying ALS it is useful to review news from overseas.

Overseas Developments in Mid-2001

During July, Swiss authorities announced that the planned order for two C-295M would not proceed to signature in October 2001.

Also in late-July Lockheed Martin issued a press release on airdrop testing just concluded at a US Air Force base using three C-130J-30s. It referred to completed tests as including parachute-assisted deployment of pallets weighing up to 42,000 pounds and paratroop drops from altitudes up to 25,000ft. The release also noted that the aircraft were the first stretched C-130Js fitted with an enhanced computer-controlled cargo handling system which allows pallets to be quickly transitioned from tie-downs to rollers. In late-August one aircraft was to be deployed to an operational airborne unit for further paratroop testing, and then delivered to a reserve unit during November.

In early-August the journal Flight International reported on other developments relating to the Hercules. The US Air Force has awarded Boeing a $US485m contract to develop upgrade kits for C-130Es and C-130Hs as part of a proposed $US3.9b modernisation program for 519 aircraft. Outline planning is for two C-130H aircraft to be modified for flight testing beginning in 2004 with fleet upgrade from 2005 to 2014. Flight referred to anticipated results as a 20-30 year extension of service life, and limiting the procurement of new C-130Js to those needed to replace the oldest C-130Es which are to be retired. Separately it was reported that the modernisation program will include a glass cockpit with six LCDs, head-up displays and upgraded communications and installation of the AN/APN-241 weather radar.

Additionally Flight International reported that Lockheed Martin expects an improvement in C-130J operational capabilities shortly with approval of the latest software standard (Block 5.3) by the Australian and US air forces. The company also said that it had fixed problems with a refuelling pod for the KC-130J by returning to a design used on earlier aircraft, and had during July completed testing a revised pod on the KC-130J for AAR of helicopters and F/A-18 fighters. The journal noted finally that the US Marine Corps has ordered 52 KC-130Js and expects a further 70 to be ordered for its reserve component.

In late-August EADS announced that it had signed a contract with Polish authorities for eight C-295M aircraft to be delivered to the Polish Air Force from 2003 to 2005. As part of the arrangements EADS is to buy a majority shareholding in an aircraft company in Warsaw. Other entrants in the competition were the AN-32M produced by Antonov in the Ukraine, and the C-27J. The C-27J has yet to obtain its first export order.

ALS and Air-to-Air Refuelling

DCP2001 specifically mentions boom and hose-drogue systems but the ALS may not have to provide the refuelling boom (transfer rate approx 3,000 lpm, extended length approx 10m) on all tankers, or indefinitely on any tankers. Use of a boom does minimise individual transfer time and sub-system weight in the receiver, but its weight and bulk demand installation on the tanker fuselage. Also the short separation between a boom tanker and receptacle receiver is hazardous for both aircraft. Alternatively, the tanker with two or three lower capacity hose-drogue units (transfer rate approx 1,500 lpm, hose length approx 25m) can provide simultaneous transfer with redundancy. Use of hose-drogue units also means that hazard is somewhat transferred to the one or more probe receivers. The result is that - except for some large bombers - the fixed receiving probe has become a virtual standard on subsonic aircraft. The twelve C-130J-30s were delivered without probes but with appropriate pump and plumbing arrangements. Indicative drawings of the Boeing 737 Wedgetail - four on order for Aircraft Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) - show a fixed receiving probe.

. . . Figure: F-111 refuelling from USAF KC-135R. (Defence)

The US Air Force has more than 600 boom tankers and many of these carry also two underwing hose-drogue pods. Some have a refuelling boom that includes a short deployable hose-drogue. With this flexibility already available several of its recent fighters have been designed for receptacle refuelling. All European fighters are designed for hose-drogue refuelling and one new supersonic fighter has a fixed refuelling probe. Together with many other designs it is in the running to succeed the F/A-18. All US Navy and Marine fighters are designed with refuelling probes. Presumably any sizeable aircraft including the F-111 can - at some cost in flight and stealth performance - be fitted with a fixed or semi-retractable receiving probe. Apparently it is more effective or cost-effective to acquire boom-equipped tankers than modify the 35 F-111s. As continually upgraded, the F-111 capability will not be replaced for a long time. That will probably be after 2020 or even 2030. At that time each boom might be replaced by a lighter hose-drogue unit.

So notwithstanding any prospective support from and to American forces, Defence guidance might mandate hose-drogue/probe refuelling for selection of the fighter to succeed the F/A-18. At the least it will not mandate boom/receptacle refuelling. For expedient use and especially during surge the freighter/tanker with only hose-drogue dispensing units continues to have useful and - subsequent to the F-111s - probably general potential.

Whenever practicable tankers operate from bases with long paved runways as needed to also support the operation of many types of fighter and patrol aircraft. Guidance will have included potential operating bases and also airstrip distribution, ranges to tanker orbits and for escort/ferry, loiter durations, approximate numbers of patrol and fighter sorties, and their approximate take-on quantities. In addition as part of the ALS preparation, AAR issues have been examined in detail by Carlo Kopp in Aerospace Centre Working Paper 82 (www.defence. gov.au /aerospacecentre) and in two series of articles for Australian Aviation (April-May 2001 and Dec 1999-April 2000 repeating ACWP82). But for mainline refuelling the ALS has to determine the suitability, approximate size and number of medium or heavy strategic tanker/transports or heavy tanker/freighters as discussed in ACWP82. The latter are envisaged as conversions of large commercial aircraft with a nose door and capacity for outsize cargo in the main cabin.

For some time also Defence has displayed interest in the potential of heavy strategic/tactical freighters and freighter/tankers. One contender is the EADS A-400M which is in development with more than two hundred on order for eight European countries. In most respects it resembles a scaled-up Hercules with a normal maximum payload of about 32 tonnes. There is a proposed freighter/tanker version with hose-drogue dispensing units. With J-model Hercules already in service, the prospect for ADF acquisition of the A-400M in the near-term is effectively zero. Also as the first twelve J-models were acquired in long-body J-30 configuration, Defence may have already determined that it cannot afford to acquire any aircraft with a capability to carry bulkier or heavier freight.

However, for this a larger contender is the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Globemaster III. It has a flyaway cost about twice that projected for the yet-to-fly A-400M. The turbofan powered C-17 is in-service with the USAF and four in an extended-range version have been obtained under a 7-year lease arrangement by the Royal Air Force to complement its 80 early and late-model C-130s. The C-17 has a normal maximum payload of about 75 tonnes. It can lift this load between airstrips with a takeoff distance of less than 2,400m and then fly 2,400nm and land within a distance of 900m. With a 50% load it can use 1,000m airstrips. Similar to the A-400M, a KC-17 freighter/tanker variant has been proposed with hose-drogue dispensing units, and optionally an AAR boom swivelled or offset below the ramp.

At industry quoted prices the flyaway cost of the C-17 is about 250% that of a C-130J. With the cost of spare engines and other unique items, the system cost to the ADF of acquiring four KC-17s would equate to that of adding about twelve KC-130Js. The ADF might commit all of the funding provisionally allocated to AIR 5401 and 5414 toward acquisition of KC-17s. Conceivably, KC-17s could be acquired under AIR 5402 itself. However, C-17 aerodynamics are directed at reducing takeoff and landing requirements rather than economic cruise and loiter at altitude. Also Air Force is known to be wary of swing-role aircraft and understandably would prefer mainline AAR based on strategic tanker/transports or tanker/freighters. Surge capability is a different matter and for that the KC-17 would be a useful expedient. The same applies especially to KC-130 variants.

From the bottom up, the ALS may be required to make recommendations on AAR for helicopters, and possibly other light aircraft. Some Blackhawks are currently equipped with long-range tanks for missions such as combat search and rescue. No helicopters or other LTA are currently equipped as AAR receivers or tankers. High capacity jet tankers are too capable and even at low speed generate too much turbulence for regular AAR of helicopters. Light transports have marginal cost-effectiveness as tankers because their fuel offload can support few aircraft and at limited range. Other customers are unlikely to procure a KC-295M or KC-27J and certification of either would probably involve direct or indirect funding from Defence. Buddy-refuelling of a light aircraft - or fighter - by a companion fitted with underwing tanks/hose-drogue units is practicable but expensive. It is sometimes employed by naval forces but only rarely in other situations. The most cost-effective solution is usually a medium size tactical freighter/tanker such as the KC-130 that can refuel any probe equipped aircraft, and during surge support a flight of fighters or a patrol aircraft at fairly long range. KC-130s and also some strategic tanker/transports are qualified for hose-drogue refuelling of helicopters including the Chinook and Blackhawk.

Aircraft used predominantly as tankers are typically tasked at heavy takeoff weights but they tend to accumulate fewer flying hours than freighters and can have long useful lives. Hence upgrade and modification of several C-130Hs to KC-130Hs could be a viable option for the near term. This applies particularly because the US Air Force intends to upgrade some 500 early-model Hercules' to gain an extra 20 to 30 years of service life as freighters and special-purpose aircraft. Modification to produce KC-130Hs for the ADF would mean that local stocks of engines, spares, test and training equipment could not be rationalised, so unless KC-130H usage were constrained this could become a costly form of stopgap. If however New Zealand were to retain and refurbish its C-130Hs, then some or all deep maintenance on ADF H-models might be transferred there.

DWP2000 did not mention AAR for any level of airlift. But for expedient AAR of combat aircraft and if necessary of airlifters, the near-term alternatives are: acquisition of KC-130Js; the less likely modification of C-130J-30s to KC-configuration with a fuel offload almost two tonnes lower; and modification of C-130Hs to KC-130Hs with these used almost exclusively as tankers to obtain return on investment. Eventually any KC-130Hs would have to be replaced, probably by KC-130Js.

ALS Freighting and Tactical Transport

In the middle, ADF airlift currently has the twelve C-130J-30s complemented by twelve C-130Hs, locally designated as strategic transports and medium tactical transports respectively. As in other Armed Forces and with more than 2,000 produced, the C-130s are proven and very capable. Presumably operations could use as many as practicable with aircrew numbers but the aircraft cannot be stretched across the entire spectrum of airlift tasks. Also there are other C-130s available in the Pacific at least and further examples in Asia.

. . . Figure: C-130 cargo hold. (Defence)

For long-range transport the C-130s can be complemented by strategic tanker/transports and more-so by the strategic tanker/freighter for heavy and over-size freight and vehicles. In some circumstances such as Timor, heavy airline freighters can be obtained under short-term lease. Some are configured with a loading ramp to reduce the need for ground-based equipment. At the top end also is the C-17 designed as a large capacity strategic and tactical freighter able to use in common with the C-130 many airports and airstrips that are inaccessible to medium and heavy strategic tanker/transports and heavy tanker/freighters.

Going down in range and size, the argument for fixed wing LTA is sometimes criticised as being more about efficiency than effectiveness. That is valid but only for some missions. The loads delivered or picked up by an LTA can involve airstrips unusable by a C-130 at ranges impossible for a Chinook or other helicopter without air-to-air or surface refuelling. How many such airstrips may have to be used ? Enough to consider AIR 5190 as a project. Long and slow flights by helicopters introduce hazards that are difficult to assess in terms of effectiveness or efficiency. However since the retirement of their Caribou, American forces have relied upon more than 700 C-130s complemented by about 300 heavy freighters and 900 heavy and 3000 utility helicopters. Soon the latter will be joined and some will be replaced by the V-22. With bigger responsibilities and resources, the small American freighter may have to be bigger than anyone else's.

For work at low altitude, airlift needs flying cranes and probably more than six Chinooks. Also aircraft go off-line, are destroyed in accidents and by enemy action and concurrency has to be provided at all levels. For combat transport within possible range of shoulder-fired and crew-served weapons, utility helicopters with dual engines and a single rotor have better survivability than dual rotor aircraft. Airlift needs as many utility helicopters as can be funded in parallel with armed reconnaissance and fire-support versions. The V-22 might be considered for a light transport role such as the AIR 5190 LTAC, as a potential successor for the Chinook, or below those aircraft where - despite its higher speed and ramp - it would be confronted by the agile and robust utility helicopter. Light utility helicopters with a maximum payload of about one tonne are outside the scope of airlift.

ALS in General

In connection with delivery of the C-130J-30s, the options for further C-130s were reported as applying until 2002. These may have been extended. If not, the ALS will be required to make a recommendation.

Input from New Zealand would be concentrated on Hercules and LTA including helicopters. The NZDF also operates six Lockheed P-3K maritime patrol/ASW (MPA) aircraft and in recent years it retired several British Aerospace-HS Avro Andover light fixed wing transports without direct replacement. If the NZDF plans to keep its five C-130Hs then - to support also its P-3Ks - the C-295M or MPA might be advanced as preferable to the C-27J. Alternatively, acquisition of the C-130J would probably preclude any new LTA. Possibly the NZDF will not procure any new airlifters. Input from the US would mention the advantages of commonality with equipment used by US Forces.

If civilian agencies were asked for input on ADF airlift, then the National Disasters Organisation would probably stress utility helicopters and flying cranes, medium and possibly heavy freighters. The Australian Maritime Safety Agency would focus on improving fast-response search and rescue.

The ALS has a complex task. Its big issues are:

• strategic transport and freighting, C-130J-30, medium and heavy tanker/transports, heavy tanker/freighters, A-400M and C-17;
• tactical freighting and airdrop, C-130J-30, C-130H, C-130J, A-400M, C-17 and LTA;
• battlefield transport, flying cranes, interdiction, combat search and rescue, LTA including helicopters;
• specialist/strategic tanking, boom and hose-drogue, medium tanker/transports, heavy tanker/transports and tanker/freighters;
• expedient tanking, buddy-refuelling, KC-130J, A-400M, KC-17 and modification of in-service aircraft to produce KC-130J-30s or KC-130Hs;
• refuelling of helicopters and other LTA, KC-130J and modification to produce KC-130Hs or KC-130J-30s, acquisition of KC-195Ms or KC-27Js;
• alliance plans and considerations; support to national and international agencies;
• resources, training, expenditure and scheduling;
• options, acquisition and lease;
• recommendations for current and future projects.

Airlift Paths Excluding LTA

Summarising the above paragraphs: for airlift and concurrency Defence needs a mix of aircraft. To enable and sustain combat airpower in a surge, mainline airlift has to be augmented by expedients. This applies regardless of the number of freighters, freighter/tankers and more specialised tanker/transports or tanker/freighters that can be afforded, and also contingent support from allies. Airline transports and freighters might be readily obtainable on short-term lease but that is unlikely to apply for tankers. As an expedient tanker - diverted from other military use - the KC-17 would be very capable and expensive. However, the KC-17 and also the strategic tanker are inappropriate for low-altitude refuelling of slow-flying helicopters and at higher levels have too much capacity for cost-effective AAR of other LTA.

The KC-130 is less capable but more flexible for both tanking and freighting. If any LTA were to be fitted with AAR probes then the KC-130 or a similar aircraft would become essential. Some of the current C-130Hs could be refurbished and modified to KC-130Hs but eventually those would have to be succeeded, probably by KC-130Js for rationalisation. For heavy and bulky freight the strategic/tactical C-17 is far more capable than commercial freighters. If any offset had to be obtained between acquisition projects, then it could only come from the middle ground and the mooted replacement of the C-130H.

The (K)C-17 is either a mirage or an outline on the horizon. In Defence's part of the world it may have to be investigated when it becomes more apparent. There is also a chimera. In the recent past Boeing has accepted late-model Airbus airliners as trade-ins on 777 airliners. In the future EADS might propose the A-400M with the C-130J-30 as a trade-in. The ALS and Defence have to deal with certainties - especially in funding - and provide adaptation to cater for uncertainties and intangibles. The big problem is not how to get from here to there, it is to keep moving well equipped and with standbys for whatever eventuates.

In-line with all planning outlines for airlift projects in DCP2001, there are - exclusive of LTA and the LTAC project - four near-term options in prospect:

Further expenditure could deliver six new J-models, for example:

In early-August 2001, Aircraft & Aerospace Asia-Pacific noted that Defence planning is for the remaining three 707-338C tankers to be grounded by end-2002. Elsewhere it reported that the recently retired chief of Air Force had said the Timor operation showed the need for a large capacity short field airlifter. Also that he commented the life extension of the C-130H could be abandoned with several C-17s acquired instead. Excluding LTA and AIR 5190, this might be structured as:

Alternatives at somewhat lower capital cost would include:

Depending on acquisition/leasing and funding, many variations of options D through H+ could be developed and some would be more practical than any of the above. Most of the options would have the total number of Hercules reduced below 24. But in general there are two certain outcomes that bear on AIR 5190:

• the number of Hercules routinely available as freighters will fall below 24;
• LTA will be heavily tasked to meet the lower bound of tactical transport needs.

As a corollary to these, the LTAC to be acquired under AIR 5190 should be in service to provide flexibility for projects such as AIR 5401/5414 before the number of C-130s on-line as freighters begins to fall for reasons other than deep maintenance. Some elements in Defence have apparently been exploring and planning along these lines since before the mid-1990s when AIR 5190 appeared as an unapproved project in the Pink Book. Evidently that view gained wider support during 1997 and this has persisted into 2001.

Back to AIR 5190

Within AIR 5190, industry expects iteration but not so much as to fundamentally change the nature of the project. In its studies Defence has exhaustively analysed the LTAC several times. Evidently each time a definite decision was reached, it was for LTA rather than more C-130s and/or more CH-47s while possibly accepting separately that more of each would be useful. So the next ITR or RFP is likely to resemble the 'definitive' RFT issued to the primes on 1 May 1998. Nevertheless DCP2001 implies that AIR 5190 might be revised to acquire additional Hercules - C-130Js or KC-130Js - instead of LTA. Parameters indicate that an almost fully loaded C-27J or C-295M (or a fully loaded CH-47D or V-22B) can readily land and takeoff from short and confined airstrips unusable by a C-130J and which the latter could not approach for a LAPES delivery. Also the system cost of adding five C-130Js is similar to the system cost of adding 12 CH-47Ds or introducing 8 CV-22Bs, 10 C-27Js, or 14 C-295Ms. Operating costs might favour the smaller number of Hercules but they would provide less concurrency.

The ITR for AIR 5190 referred to a capability gap between the C-130 and Chinook. The Ministerial statement of 22 May 2001 described the gap in some detail. Effectiveness rates higher than efficiency. For the LTAC, effectiveness is filling the gap and efficiency is taking on part of the role that is currently performed by the C-130. Starting with a fresh sheet of paper, the main difficulty could be deciding the need for any tactical airlifters intermediate between a lower bound and a similarly straightforward upper bound. The ADF already has its twelve new C-130J-30s. Will these be adequate as heavy freighters or will they serve in the medium category and be complemented by bigger aircraft in the ADF or as obtainable on short-term lease or as contributed by allies ? Regardless of those larger questions, ADF airlift has an on-going need for light freighters. Periodic Defence assessment of the lower part of tactical airlift will reach the same conclusion as in the 1990s: extra Hercules would be less effective and less cost-effective than similar expenditure on suitable LTA.

Extra Hercules in combination with extra Chinooks - for example 3 Hercules plus 5 Chinooks - might be practical in situations with a high density of suitable airstrips. However, typical loads for ADF aircraft within a combat zone do not consist of 90 troops or 20 tonnes of freight, or 30 troops or 9 tonnes of freight. Twenty troops plus two tonnes of stores, or eight troops plus two Perentie 4x4s seem much closer to the mark. Reliance upon the Hercules and Chinook would be inferior in terms of capability, concurrency and cost-effectiveness to Hercules and Chinook plus the C-295M or C-27J. The ALS might separately recommend acquisition of more Chinooks and more utility helicopters, but such aspects are outside the scope here.

The case for the conventional fixed-wing LTA rather than the innovative Bell Helicopter Textron & Boeing V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor has to be examined in more detail. Development of the Osprey has been delayed by hardware and software problems related to engine tilting and cross-shafting, and attitude and flight control especially during transition and vertical descent. Four aircraft and 30 people have been lost during test, development and operational evaluation trials. The US Marine Corps has more than 400 MV-22s on order as transports and for air assault. Smaller numbers of HV-22s and CV-22s (about 50 of each) have been ordered by the US Navy for fleet transport, special warfare and combat search and rescue; and the US Air Force Special Operations Command for special missions and combat search and rescue. So the V-22 will finally be made to work to an acceptable standard and will enter large-scale use with US forces. It is optimised for forward flight and has both VTOL and STOL capabilities. See Table 3.

Repetitive proposal of the V-22 as a viable candidate for AIR 5190 may result from Air Force attempts to reclaim a position in VTOL operations but it is more likely to reflect concern for the prompt recovery of downed aircrew. Army might see the V-22 as useful for interdiction but not if that led to a reduction in the number of utility helicopters. The V-22 has not been included in any publicly released list of candidates for the land/ship-based utility helicopters. As addressed in AIR 5406 Phases 5/6, these could be a marinised version of the Blackhawk with some commonality also with 16 Seahawk anti-submarine and surface warfare helicopters operated by Navy. The main alternatives are the Sea King and various derivatives of the Iroquois.

. . . Figure: MV-22 in transition. (Bell Helicopter)

Examination of photographs indicates the hanger door of the 9,000 tonne amphibious warfare ships Kanimbla and Manoora is high enough to admit an HV or MV-22 but that probably only one could be accommodated. These ships reach their expected design life in 2015. Their replacement is to be considered under joint project JP 2027 Phase 4 with a YOD of 2009/10. Navy has one other 6,000 tonne amphibious warfare ship. This has a smaller hanger, and reaches its expected design life in 2010. The CV-22 could be less costly to acquire than the HV or MV-22 which have the wing swivel system for maritime stowage. If however the HV/MV-22 is unlikely to be acquired on the grounds of performance and cost for ADF land/ship-based operations, then it is unlikely that a similar number of CV-22s would be acquired for ADF land-based operations. If size was the deciding factor, then AIR 5190 is the only current project that might acquire the V-22.

The main argument for the V-22 is its capability for VTOL and the main argument against is the inefficiency of its highly loaded wing when used as a STOL aircraft. If one rotor was disabled in STOL mode, the V-22 could recover to an expedient airstrip. It is more expensive than the competitors and would provide less concurrency but it is an outstanding technical achievement. So this could be an instance of an unusually effective system versus a more efficient or notionally cost-effective alternative. The power needed to drive its rotors for VTOL does translate into a heavy potential payload in STOL mode but the V-22 cabin is smaller than that of the Caribou. Its capacity is non-compliant with the troop/paratroop and vehicle loads specified as essential in the ITR for AIR 5190.

Conceivably the essential load criteria might be relaxed for AIR 5190 Phase 2. EADS and LMATTS might regard such a change as outright bias in favour of the V-22. One possible outcome is that they would compete only if compensated as in a funded RFP.

In head-to-head competition the C-295M is less expensive to acquire and operate than the C-27J. Within a combat zone the ADF is unlikely to carry many more than 30 personnel in one LTA or probably any aircraft. For airstrip-airstrip transport of troops and aero-medical evacuation the two contenders are equivalent. System costs lessened by commonality between the C-27J and C-130J-30 probably favour the C-295M. Concurrency favours the C-295M. However, in any surge the ADF would be able to lease LTA from commercial sources. For example, the Australian civil register includes almost forty Dash 8 aircraft with a useful short-field performance and a maximum AUW of 15 to 20 tonnes. The Dash 8 is well suited for personnel transport. In general, defence funds are better directed toward acquisition or lease of military aircraft with strong features that are not usually available in commercial substitutes. Those features were specified as essential and important in the ITR.

The guesstimate of typical tactical payloads several paragraphs above was 20 troops plus two tonnes of stores, and eight troops plus two Perentie 4x4s: approximately four to six tonnes. This is greater than the Caribou's normal maximum payload but six tonnes equates to just 55% and 80% of the normal maximum payloads of the C-27J and C-295M.

Parameters indicate that the C-295M must have a STOL performance with a six tonne payload fairly close to that of the C-27J. For paratrooping, airdrop and transport of pallets the two contenders are equivalent. Transport of bulky and heavy freight and vehicles favours the C-27J. Loading trials for the US Army have confirmed the C-27J can transport two HMMWV trucks that are in the same 2-tonne cargo category as the 6x6 Perenties. The HMMWV is more representative of modern light tactical trucks. Current ADF light armoured vehicles - Bushmaster, LAV-25, and the M-113(mod) - have weights in the 10 to 16 tonne class. A bare M-113 has been loaded into a C-27J but in useful form it also is too large to be carried inside any LTA. Almost inevitably the ADF will acquire a smaller light armoured vehicle. Most examples of modern wheeled and tracked vehicles in this category weigh from 4 to 7 tonnes and typically their height over the turret is about 2m. The cross-section of the C-27J cabin is better suited for airlift of these and also engineer/construction vehicles. Nevertheless light trucks and armoured and engineer vehicles of lower overall height could be acquired. Also the cost of 1,000 or 2,000 sets of readily dismantlable cabs and ROPS for Perenties or successor vehicles could be defrayed against the lower capital cost of acquiring the C-295M.

Knowledge of the offset and AII components is insufficient for comparative comment. AII might be decisive if one proposal was flagrantly inadequate or generously above the target figure of 35%. There is one qualification on AII: release of intellectual property especially that relating to software in the avionics, radar and in other airborne and ground systems. That was a problem during acquisition of the C-130J-30s. If repeated in AIR 5190 it could be decisive. However in connection with the order for the Wedgetail AEW&C system, Australia and America reached some general agreement on software. Presumably suitable agreements already applied or were included in the proposals for the C-295M and C-27J. Selection of the C-295M might usefully diversify sources of support and supply.

For the ADF, accepting an unproven product and finding it has deficiencies could be a poor outcome but delay can result in poor interim capability. In terms of AIR 5190's ITR the Caribou was already inadequate and it still has to be maintained until after the date of contract signature for new LTA. The Caribou airframe could apparently go on for a long time yet. The big problem is its engines. Austere refurbishment of the Caribou is a cost-effective way to cover a short delay but it will be difficult to maintain the aircraft through to 2010 by scavenging on and for R-2000 engines. That austerity implies AIR 5190 is to be decided and will deliver interim or new model aircraft in useful time. Lease of interim aircraft outside AIR 5190 must have been considered and rejected on grounds of crews and training, inadequate performance, cost, lack of availability or concern for an apparent preference.

Looking back, the Caribou could well have been upgraded with turboprop engines and more capable propellers at any time through the 1980s-1990s. Project managers have one rule, get the resources and use them quickly. In that respect they have the sharp mind of teenagers most of whom could express in direct words everything in this article. The latter especially do not see advantage in multiple layers of procedure to guard against the slightest possibility of reprovable error. Even with such precautions it is on paper - with the advent of the heavy tanker/freighter and the (K)C-17 - easy to query the C-130J-30 acquisition: perhaps the C-130J ?

Within AIR 5190 there is no need to wait until 2006/07 for selection and contract signature. That milestone is linked with but not necessarily determined by provisional funding allocated to projects on a year-by-year basis. Two maxims have been especially applicable and sometimes in conflict throughout AIR 5190: "Anything will do for a while, nothing will do forever", and "Best is the enemy of good enough except in simulation."

From what is publicly known and can be inferred, CASA and LMATTS are keen to achieve sales and acquisition by the ADF carries well-earned kudos. By 2004/05 the performance of the C-295M and C-27J will have been tested and presumably validated in operational use by their launch customers, and possibly further validated by other early customers. In a pragmatic environment, the careful phasing of aircraft and a full-flight and mission simulator is axiomatic. If the primes compete comprehensively and each puts several unbadged aircraft on a ramp and arranges for a simulator ready to fly, then the delivery schedule of strategic tankers under AIR 5402 might be stretched to release some funds for early acquisition of LTA. That would be in line with an earlier outline of AIR 5402. The whole schedule for AIR 5190 Phase 2 could then be moved to the left.

The difficulty with maxims is deciding which to apply when, and the reciprocal when to apply which. So planning has a third maxim: "Do what seems appropriate, preferably for the near and longer terms." On that basis leasing can be a prime contender. Defence is now aiming to sign for a modernised LTAC in 2006/07. Also and even if AIR 5402 does receive all its aircraft on a parochial schedule, the signature date for AIR 5190 Phase 2 could be moved earlier to obtain LTA on short-term lease and subsequent purchase.

There are three residual questions regarding the competition itself. First and jumping over intervening steps in the process, how far to the left might contract signature for AIR 5190 Phase 2 be moved ? Second, will the essential load criteria be revised downward to admit the V-22 and what would be the reaction of EADS and LMATTS ? Third, regardless of walls erected to preserve confidentiality, how energetically would EADS be prepared to compete against part of itself in tendering the C-295M ? Defence might anyway have to resort to a funded RFP competition. That could in part explain DCP2001's reference to the V-22 as a potential candidate for AIR 5190.

Conclusion

Defence has many projects resembling AIR 5190. Some of these are usefully delayed or progressed by upgrade, and others are established as new bases of capability and then subject to periodic upgrade. AIR 5190 was approved as a new capability during 1996 and the answer to be determined is which aircraft and when. There are dangers in trying to do comprehensive work and in predicting a definite outcome. This article has looked at only the Caribou, AIR 5190 and its contenders, and related aspects of airlift planning.

Initially it was difficult to get past the mass of data from many sources; then the CN-235 as a substitute for the Buffalo, the cabin length of the C-295M, the cross-section of the C-27J, and AII. The issues that now stand out as vital are: STOL with a reduced load, capacity to substitute for the C-130, concurrency, intellectual property, and delivery of aircraft synchronised with a full-flight and mission simulator and with other projects.

Naturally views change and also criteria in projects. It was fortunate the V-22 did not re-appear until late but its comparison with the Chinook and Blackhawk is interesting. Also it is likely that mention of the V-22 in DCP2001 was at least endorsed and possibly mandated by a shrewd committee with the power to direct change in previously essential criteria. The competition for the LTAC and the simulator are now in a revised Phase 2 with a YOD of 2004/05 and signature in 2006/07. In accordance with the standard project caveats, that new phase could be commenced with revised criteria and an expanded short-list. There can be certain benefits in having two heavyweights and projects have at least two other permanent difficulties: how to avoid gold plating, and promises of future performance.

The schedule for AIR 5190 Phase 2 is timed to ensure that the brochure performance and reliability of the C-295M and C-27J and possibly the V-22 have been confirmed by service with their launch and preferably at least one other early customer. The C-295M and C-27J will reach that stage well before 2006/07. On the data and as suggested by its history, AIR 5190 Phase 2 will be moved to the left with YOD, approval, RFT or RFP, selection and signature completed earlier than now scheduled. Given the late in-service dates of the competing aircraft and the serpentine nature of the acquisition process that seems almost impossibly rapid. But it could be achieved despite and because of the press of other projects.

If both the C-295M and C-27J prove reliable then - regardless of any change in the minimum essential load criteria, and of other likely contenders - the winner of AIR 5190 will be the one that has the better STOL and range performance with payloads of about six tonnes and nine tonnes. With the smaller load each can probably attain CBR3 and get closer to the Caribou, but the latter was not required to reach upward toward the C-130. However, the stretch of the C-295M fuselage was not accompanied by wing modifications to provide a STOL performance similar to that of the CN-235. On the basis of its STOL characteristics combined with payload/range capabilities and cabin cross-section, the winner will be the C-27J which Lockheed has been astutely and appropriately marketing as the mini-Hercules. It is a big light freighter and that has contributed to making AIR 5190 an awkward project.

. . . Figure: C-27J and C-130J-30 with C-17 in background. (Lockheed Martin)

For the needs of ADF airlift the C-27J is better than the C-295M, and much better than the V-22 or more C-130s. As with all equipment, Defence would prefer to have an attrition reserve. That could mean acquisition of about 16 aircraft but with funding constraints the order will be for twelve C-27J with an option for several more.

So finally there are two options which make AIR 5190 somewhat like the Nile.

_ _ _ end part 2 of 2 (Table 3 follows) _ _ _

ANALYST: David Churchus

COPYRIGHT: Westbrook Lewis P/L

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. This analysis includes quoted material and substantial extracts from the following documents copyright Commonwealth of Australia reproduced by permission:

AIR 5190 - Light Tactical Airlift Capability - Invitation to Register Interest for the Supply of a Light Transport Aircraft to the Australian Defence Force
- AFMAT 5/97;

AIR 5190 - Light Tactical Airlift Capability - Industry Brief
- AFMAT 5/97;

Australian Perspectives on Defence: Report of the Community Consultation Team
- CCT, DPS September 2000;

Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force
- DoD, DPS OCT010/2000;

Media Release: Major Defence Capital Equipment Projects
- MIN 146/01 22 May 2001;

Defence Capability Plan 2001-2010: Public Version
- DMO, DPS JUN004/01.

TABLE 3: Chinook, Osprey and Blackhawk

Notes.

1. Supplemented by one or more auxiliary tanks. See note 3.

2. CH-47D: castored rear wheel units kneel for stowage;
V-22: wing of HV-22 and MV-22 (and probably the CV-22) swivels over fuselage;
S-70A-9: empennage and tailrotor folded.

3. CH-47D: three 3,025 litre auxiliary fuel tanks in cabin;
CV-22B: overload max STOL AUW and four 2,325 litre auxiliary tanks in cabin;
S-70A-9: four tanks (two 1,700 and two 870 litre) on external stores support system.