White Paper - An Analysis

Summarising
Introduction
The Conceptual and Strategic Overview
The Capability Plan
1. The Acquisition Program
Assessing the White Paper
1. The Ugly
The Financial Program

To a considerable degree, the 2000 White Paper Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force represents an orthodox Defence Department view that has changed little over a quarter of a century. While there are some sound elements, it fails to meet the intellectual challenge of what is really a new era in international conflict management.

Even in orthodox terms, it must be seen as a catch-up program to make up only partially for a decade or more of neglect. For example, the program to acquire armed reconnaissance helicopters in 2004-05 neatly avoids reference to the 1994 White Paper commitment to have those aircraft in service this year.

Secondly, like previous White Papers, this is a statement of intent. There is no actual legal or constitutional commitment to providing the resources for the program that has been outlined. Not only does it not commit future governments - or even the present one - it is proof neither against changing personal or institutional preferences within the Defence machine, not of course, against changing strategic circumstances.

In particular, the financial commitments after Year Two of the program represent the commitment of a declining proportion of national and government resources. That assumes, of course, that sustained economic growth will continue and that the Federal government's share of the national cake will stabilise at the current level of about 21 per cent of GDP. If those two factors do not remain constant, the government of the day is presented with a ready-made excuse to cut back on its announced program.

On the positive side, the program reflects the determination to improve the deployability of joint forces, especially the air and land elements. This reflects strategic reality and is somewhat at odds with some of the declaratory, orthodox and politically correct aspects of the document.

The suggestion in a number of areas that Australia can be defended almost solely by future air power supported by naval and ground forces is overly simplistic. This sort of assertion has been made by air power enthusiasts for decades and it has never been proved to be true. It sounds like one of those simple, all-encompassing solutions to not just one but a series of complex problems. Apart from the problem that it puts all our financial eggs into one basket, it removes from the government of the day a whole range of options for the use or threat of use of military force.

Most disappointingly, the White Paper makes no commitment to serious reform of the management and command system. This bloated, erratic, disorganised and expensive structure is designed to manage Australia's involvement in a Third World War which, we are told and we know, is not going to happen. In A.D.A's view, serious reform and streamlining of the higher defence organisation is the most urgent issue in defence. It has been ignored in this statement of government policy.

Introduction

Last week's White Paper was the fourth published by an Australian government over the last quarter of a century. It joins such other similar statements of defence policy as the 1991 Force Structure Review, the 1997 Australian Strategic Policy and the restructuring the Australian Army publication as statements of government policy. All tend to follow a pattern in presentation and, at least in respect of financial commitments, all have been marked by a consistency in failing to meet promises of increased resources and a highly disciplined performance in meeting promises of reductions.

Only time will tell whether this White Paper will be any more effective in achieving political commitment to funding promises. Moreover, time will tell whether Australia's strategic circumstances will remain sufficiently benign to allow for modest resource commitments to a small and hard-pressed Defence Force.

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The Conceptual and Strategic Overview

The first part of the White Paper attempts to set out a conceptual approach to national defence and the strategic context in which that approach is to be placed. This is not at all easy given that the section includes a range of judgments about modern conflict that represent a worst case position that is increasingly at odds with historical experience. Similarly, judgments about regional countries are strikingly bland and unhelpful and quite different from what we read in the daily press. Hopefully, the classified estimates are more complete. Clearly these judgments are couched in terms that in a public document do not give offence to the governments of those countries. For the Australian reader, however, they lead to the conclusion that the defence strategy is of questionable relevance to the strategic environment.

The White Paper asserts that conflict between states is rare but cannot be ruled out. It refers to changed international attitudes to security which make intervention to contain or end armed conflict more probable than in the past but tends to rule out the possible benefits to Australia by reiterating the, for me, vague and somewhat plastic concept of self-reliance. Unlike the 1976 White Paper which introduced self-reliance, this version seems to suggest that self-reliance means demonstrating that Australia is prepared to do more for itself while still ultimately relying on the American alliance. This is hardly a unique concept and, indeed, it is one which fits neatly with the current strategic environment.

That said, the White Paper then goes on to assert the fundamental nonsense that direct attack on Australia at one of three different levels of intensity is our most serious problem but then goes on the assert that such a threat is unlikely in any significant sense.

Of course it is. The difficulties for any adversary who does not use long-range missile attack on Australia are virtually insurmountable unless he first acquires substantial base facilities in our inner region extending from Indonesia to New Zealand. To us, that suggests that our defence priority should be to contribute as far as possible to the security of that inner region so as to keep it in friendly hands. The White Paper argues, however, that the first - and politically correct - priority must be to defend Australian territory against direct attack. If that were the policy, we would have expected to see a strong contribution to the development of the Theatre Missile Defence.

To achieve this protection against direct attack, the White Paper asserts that Australia pursue a "maritime strategy" of defending the so-called sea-air gap by naval and air forces. That is in fact only one and the first element of a classic maritime strategy - the strategy of sea denial. It is designed to prevent others from using our sea approaches but does nothing to ensure that we can use them for our purposes which might be no more than keeping our sea - and air - lines of communication open, a strategic interest not mentioned although one which is of more than passing importance for a country so dependent upon international communications.

In the context of the sea-air gap strategy, the White Paper again misses the point that, within the sea-air gap, there are some largish lumps of land, on one of which Australian ground forces have been operating for the past 15 months.

What it does do is strongly urge that protection of the sea-air gap is primarily a task for advanced air forces and this assertion underpins the subsequent capability decision to enhance our air combat capability into the future. But more of that later. At this stage, let me say that the proposition is asserted rather than demonstrated by appeals to the assessment that unnamed regional powers are introducing air combat capabilities superior to ours. If this is so - and we suspect the author is referring to China, India and possibly Malaysia - one wonders how they will deploy these advanced capabilities in attacks on a very far distant Australia without bases in our inner region.

In general, we find the whole strategic argument totally unconvincing. The assessments on which it is based are either shallow or hidden. There is a dearth of logic and a degree of incoherence which can only be defended by pointing to the same characteristics in previous White Papers. There is no notion of that basic strategic concept of trading space for time which works well for Australia security from direct attack on our territory, less well for the protection of our wider interests.

In effect, it would be easy to conclude that the strategic posture has been constructed to serve a particular force structure concept rather than the other way around. It does nothing to provide what a peacetime defence policy should always provide - a range of strategic options for the use of or threat of use of military force in Australia's interest.

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The Capability Plan

That said, the Capability Plan that is set out in the White Paper is a much more attractive element. It sets out a ten year plus program for replacing old equipment and introducing new, all of it related to a set of specific broad capabilities. These include Land Forces (including the naval and air elements that support them), Air Combat, Maritime Forces and Information. We are yet to be persuaded that the last warrants a separate heading. Important though it is, it exists fundamentally to serve the combat capabilities just as, for example, the navy's amphibious ships serve the Land Force element.

The Acquisition Program

In so far as the acquisition plan is set out in detail, its timetable looks something like the following:

2001: last DDG retired

2002: JORN is operational

2003: new personal equipment; Thermal surveillance equipment; Seahawk upgrade

2004: new patrol boats operational

2005: Armed recce helicopters operational: Upgraded M113 APCs operational; "bunker buster" missile in service; Additional air defence systems in service; Additional logistic units and bridging equipment

2006: 120mm mortars on LAVs; Five new tanker aircraft in service; ANZAC frigate program complete;

2007: Additional troop carrier helicopters in service; UAVs in service; F/A-18 upgrade complete; ANZAC frigate upgrade complete

2008: Truck fleet replacement

2009: Replacement air defence systems; HMAS Westralia pays off

2010: Tobruk; Caribou replacement

2011: nothing

2012: 100 new fighter aircraft to replace F/A-18 and F-111s

2013: FFGs begin to pay off; New DDGs begin to enter service

2014: nothing

2015: Manoora and Kanimbla to be replaced; HMAS Success pays off; P-3C replacement or upgrade; F-111s withdrawing from service

Personnel

Section Three, comprising one chapter only, deals with Personnel emphasising that "People are Capability". Apart from a commitment to increase the size of the regular ADF by an average of 250 personnel a year for ten years, the chapter is a collection of platitudes and inaccuracies (Reserves are actually 26 per cent, not 42 per cent of the Total Force). The only financial commitment is, for heaven's sake, to cadets!

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Assessing the White Paper

With apologies to Clint Eastwood, we have divided an assessment of the White Paper into The Good, The Bad and The Ugly.

The Good

Value of the Community Consultation process: at the political level, this validated not merely the White Paper itself but also the commitment to what is a significant increase in funding, even if that does fall short of previous commitments. Despite criticism that the response to the consultation was unrepresentative, it was so well-publicised that complainants have no basis for claiming a lack of consultation. The process also has the effect of disarming those critics of defence spending within the Parliament.
Increased operational flexibility: one of most important commitments in the White Paper is to an increase in operational flexibility, giving the ADF more options to offer government for the use or threat of use of armed forces beyond Australian territory and the so-called sea-air gap. This should provide comfort for Australia's regional friends even if it does deny government the excuse that it lacks capability to assist those friends.
Reserves to be incorporated in current operations: pending changes to Reserve legislation that increases the capacity to actually employ reserve forces marks an important development in capability, especially the ability to sustain commitments in time. At the same time, it serves notice on some elements within the Reserve community that the open-ended funding commitments of the past demand the provision of capable forces now, rather than in some future large-scale conflict. The proper employment of that capability will in fact add substantially through experience to the mobilisation base.
Strike capability focussed more on tactical and military targets: the White Paper signals that the strike capability represented by the F-111 force will now be used more realistically against military targets, especially forces in the field and their infrastructure. The long-standing view that the force was capable of applying decisive force against strategic political and economic targets has fortunately been buried. It was always a fantasy because such a small force could never apply a sufficient and sustained weight of attack to achieve decisive results.
Three brigades (6 Bn groups) at not more than 90 days readiness: despite popular reporting, the White Paper promises the provision of six battalion groups rather than six battalions. This is a quite different force capability. Moreover, having such a force at not more than 90 days readiness provides greater operational flexibility especially when backed by useable Reserve forces.
Air combat capability to be forward deployable: an air combat capability tied to mainland bases effectively denies surface forces the protection and support they need. Such a force is unable to support surface forces deployed in the inner region. Configuring the air combat force to be deployable to regional air bases adds to the protection of deployed surface forces but will also build confidence among Australia's regional friends.
ANZAC frigate upgrade: the ANZAC frigates as built lack a significant degree of offensive capability. The upgrade program will configure these ships for a wider range of missions. The "fitted for but not with" original build was an attempt to save money while placing excessive faith in the capacity to "fit-with" at very short notice.
AEW&C plus multi-purpose tanker capability: modern air combat capability, however advanced the tactical aircraft, is so severely limited in the absence of force multipliers such as tankers and AEW&C aircraft as to raise questions about the value of the tactical aircraft themselves. The reservation we would have is that the five tankers represent little more than a training capability. We assume that the authors of the White Paper expect that allied tanker support would be available in likely contingencies.
Army helicopters: in the sort of terrain characteristic of the inner region, troop mobility and fire support cannot be provided in many cases by surface vehicles, especially the wheeled vehicles to which the Army is over-committed. The provision of helicopter fire support and additional troop carrying aircraft will enhance mobility and protection of deployed forces.

The Bad

No notion of the time/space trade-off : in the strategic discussion about priorities, there is no sense that Australia enjoys a substantial strategic space or depth because of the existence of friendly nations across the lines of approach to Australian territory. Any approach by an adversary towards Australia will necessarily engage those countries first. Thus the loss of strategic space will take time, time that can and should be employed to preserve that space or buy time to further develop the ADF. This argues for strategic priority to be given to security engagement in the inner region in support of our friends rather than asserting a priority for the defence of Australian territory, a notion which is as unsophisticated as it is outdated - if it ever was in date.
No priority given to support for Malaysia and Singapore: apart from some vague reference to Australia's (equally vague) obligations under the Five Power Defence Arrangements, there is no apparent commitment to supporting the security of Malaysia and Singapore. This is not likely to help Australia's security or wider relations with those friends of long-standing.
Maritime strategy concept is limited to sea denial: in their references to Australia's "maritime strategy", the authors clearly misunderstand the nature of maritime strategy. Maritime strategy encompasses the concepts of sea denial, sea assertion and power projection. The authors' concept of maritime strategy is limited to sea denial although the other elements are implicit in other concepts of deployable forces.
Over-emphasis on air combat capability: only the more assertive air power theorists would agree with the White Paper's emphasis on air combat capability as the core of a defence of Australia strategy. Control of the air and the use of air space in defence and offense is certainly important but air forces (and submarine forces, for that matter) are essentially transient systems. They are unable to exercise sustained dominance of the surface battle, not are they able to exercise decisive military power.
Implicit that tank capability is to be abandoned: while not specifically stated, the White Paper leads the reader to conclude that the Army's battle tanks will be abandoned with their firepower potential against fortified positions being replaced by a "bunker-buster" missile system. While that may not be an attractive proposition for the occupant of the bunker, neither is it very attractive for the missile firer with those occupants shooting at him. A tank's armour and the power of the main gun provide much greater confidence for the infantry and are consistent with the operational use of tanks by the Australian Army since 1942.
Caribou replacement deferred another 10 years: the Caribou short-haul STOL transport entered service in 1964. By the time it is replaced under the new program, the aircraft will be 46 years old. Our suspicion is that this capability can only be maintained by grounding the aircraft - which is likely to happen when the first inevitable accident due to old age occurs.
Army vehicles of dubious value in the inner region' s terrain: Commonsense and operational experience in East Timor confirm that wheeled armoured vehicles such as the ASLAV and Bushmaster are severely handicapped in wet season operations in the inner region. This experience applies with even more force in the relatively undeveloped areas of Papua New Guinea, especially along the PNG/Irian Jaya border.
Lease of Jervis Bay not being renewed: We note that the lease of this vessel will not be renewed but there is no indication that it will be replaced by other than the LPHs. Whether these are a satisfactory substitute for a vessel characterised by high speed and useful capacity is not discussed.

The Ugly

No serious commitment to DoD reform: the issue of the reform of the higher defence organisation is not raised despite the serious and sustained criticisms that have persisted in recent years. Similarly, there is no commitment to a reduction of the duplication of headquarters and their staffs, the growth in the proportion of officers to other ranks and other manifestations of an excessively bureaucratic organisation. In our view, this is the most important issue in Australian defence policy at this time.
Personnel numbers look seriously inadequate: the increase in regular force numbers from 51,500 to 54,000 over ten years (an average of 250 annually) offers little hope that the "hollowness" of so many units and their excessive operational tempo will be alleviated. Similarly, the White Paper is misleading when it refers to the reserves as comprising 42 per cent of the total force. In terms of effectives, the number is more like 26 per cent. The implication that reserves will be used merely to fill out regular units on an as-required basis will be seriously damaging to Reserve morale, recruiting and retention.
Excessive commitment to and investment in air combat capability at the high end of technology: the White Paper's future directions view of the air combat capability (post F/A-18 and F-111) promises to generate a serious imbalance in the total force or a sharply increased demand in funding. The White Paper does not seriously deal with these options.
Apparent cut back in naval surface platforms?: despite media reports that the navy's surface fleet will be cut back from 14 to 11 ships, we are not persuaded that this is in fact policy. However, the conclusion is understandable given the enthusiasm shown for a new generation of air combat aircraft coupled with the almost off-hand acceptance of just three anti-air warfare destroyers as the FFGs are retired. We assume that the three AAW ships are merely the first of a program that will maintain 14 units but the White Paper should have been clearer on this point. Indeed, given the nature of our "maritime" strategy, some discussion of whether 14 units is adequate would have been helpful.

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The Financial Program

Like all of its predecessors - except the 1994 version - the White Paper has made some significant (on paper) financial commitments over a further ten years. The Table shows the approximate amounts in 2000 value dollars and their approximate equivalents as percentages of Gross Domestic Product and of total Federal outlays (assumed to continue at around 21 per cent of GDP).

Year	Defence Budget - 2000 $ million	Defence outlay as per cent of estimated GDP	Defence outlay as per cent of estimated Federal outlays
2000-01	11800	1.74	7.3
2001-02	12300	1.75	8.34
2002-03	13300	1.83	8.71
2003-04	13690	1.82	8.64
2004-05	14000	1.80	8.58
2005-06	14500	1.79	8.52
2006-07	15000	1.78	8.46
2007-08	15450	1.77	8.40
2008-09	15900	1.75	8.34
2009-10	16400	1.74	8.28
2010-11	16900	1.73	8.22

Note that 2.8 per cent of GDP, the 1987 benchmark, stands today at around $18.5 billion. The shortfall over the past 13 years compared with the 1987 White Paper is $102 billion in today's dollars. The shortfall is more accurately measured by personnel shortages (28 per cent cut in regulars over the past decade and hollow units), equipment cuts and obsolescence (40 year old APC, helos, Caribous etc.), training and maintenance cuts.