Policy Discussion Paper - Australia Defence Association

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The Australia Defence Association does not claim any expertise in defining precisely the size and shape of an ideal Australian Defence Force. In this chapter, however, we will set out what we believe to be a number of key principles. We will also draw attention to a number of key issues whose resolution has become a matter of some urgency. Simply stated, the elected government of Australia through the Cabinet security committee decides what forces if any will be committed to combat. The individual soldier, pilot or ship captain implements that policy and it is the task of the defence organisation to ensure that he has the resources to do the job.

Given that future conflict may take many forms and that demands for ADF involvement are likely to occur at very short notice, the whole defence organisation from the national command structure to individual sub-units must be capable of responding effectively. Effectiveness will be measured in large part by the speed of response to any given contingency whether that response is reactive or proactive. An important element will be the creation of a national command system which will take initiatives. Moreover, in keeping with the demand for speed and responsiveness, the command system will need to follow modern management practice and reduce the number of layers of control.

A common domestic criticism of Australian military commitments is that they have been made in response to requests by allies rather than as an Australian initiative. There have been good reasons for this in the past but these may be less applicable in a future in which Australia seeks to take security initiatives. In particular the concept of 'preventive diplomacy' implies that diplomatic action to prevent the outbreak of conflict will need the latent support of a military force manifestly capable of rapid and effective deployment. Moreover, for political reasons including the need to win public support, the Australian government should be seen to be acting on its own initiative. The existing national command structure includes Cabinet (and especially its committee on Security), the Secretaries' Committee, the Defence Committee and the Council of Defence. The latter are advisory bodies only. In effect Cabinet must draw its advice from each of its members although the Secretaries' Committee plays a role in co-ordinating advice. Each security-related department operates independently, co-ordinating on a more or less ad hoc basis. Such a structure will, by its nature, be reactive and too slow to meet the needs of the future. In peacetime, the security departments (Defence, Foreign Affairs & Trade, and Prime Minister & Cabinet) tend to be preoccupied with day-to-day administrative matters or long-term planning to the exclusion of a rapid response capability. Even Operations branches tend to deal with relatively inconsequential programs.

The new and future strategic environment in which Australia will seek to act not only independently but also perhaps assertively on its own initiative requires the establishment of a dedicated National Security Agency (for the want of a better term) which will monitor the security environment and co-ordinate the provision of advice to Cabinet. Such an agency would be small and comprise senior civil and military officers drawn from the security departments. It would be a consumer of intelligence from all relevant government agencies and would proffer advice on its own initiative. The Agency director would rank as a departmental head or chief of staff and would be a key member of a reformed Defence Committee and Council of Defence, if indeed these committees were to continue in existence. The Secretaries' Committee should be abolished.

Such an agency would be more able to monitor changing strategic circumstances with a longer-term impact and so alert Cabinet to a possible need for increased preparedness to meet or deter more significant security threats. Although current assumptions presume that Australia would have ample warning of serious threats, the natural tendency to ignore bad news of a usually incremental character in the face of more immediate political demands calls for a more influential body than exists at present to focus attention on changes. The NSA would not have any form of command responsibility. This would remain the responsibility of Cabinet acting through the CDF. The issue of levels of command subordinate to CDF is discussed below. To achieve the required level of responsiveness and speed, the national command structure including the security committee of Cabinet, the NSA and the CDF should be exercised in response to as wide a range of imaginative contingencies as possible through a form of war-gaming.

Given the type of demands that may be made upon the ADF, higher readiness levels are likely to be required especially for land forces. Current arrangements provide for an infantry company from the Townsville-based 3rd Brigade to be available within seven days and the balance of the brigade within 30 days. Strategic uncertainties and a need to play a more proactive regional security role suggest that these readiness levels are insufficient especially if, as may be the case, resource constraints mean that the sustainability on operations of a brigade-size force may be severely limited. The implementation of a declared policy to raise the readiness level of the Darwin-based 1st Brigade is not complete and suffers from shortage of both personnel and funds.

Apart from 3rd and 1st Brigade plus the regional surveillance units, readiness levels in the land forces are relatively low. These levels may be acceptable under current strategic guidance but if the strategic priorities set out in the previous chapter are accepted, such readiness levels (or indeed the designation of formations for specific tasks) are unlikely to be helpful. The fundamental implication of a regional security strategy as distinct from a defence of the mainland strategy is that forces must be available for deployment to regional trouble spots. Such deployments will normally be in support of regional friends and allies but independent Australian areas of operations are both desirable and likely to be sought. Thus units and formations will be required for rotation with the rate dependent upon the intensity of operations.

Similar considerations apply to support for UN-authorised or other peacekeeping or peacemaking operations. If Australia is to have some constructive influence on the development of techniques in these fields, there will be a need to contribute more and larger units and formations. The experience in Somalia and East Timor demonstrated Australian expertise and the commitment of forces of credible size and operational effectiveness made the impact of that expertise much more evident. Clearly there is a need for Australia to develop the minimum capacity to deploy a brigade group overseas at short notice and to sustain it on operations for an extended period. Depending upon the type of deployment, this could be managed on a piecemeal basis - a battalion at a time, for example - with the lead battalion able to be en route to its operational area within two weeks of the issue of a warning order.

The strategic challenge of the future suggests that the ADF should develop a capability for two short warning deployments of brigade strength in different parts of Australia's Region of Primary Strategic Interest (RPSI) - or even further afield in the event of a UN requirement. While both deployments would probably not be for intensive combat operations, one may well be. This suggests that the ADF needs to have a capacity to deal with one and a half small-scale conflicts simultaneously. This further suggests that, overall, the ADF should maintain a six brigade capability (including Reserves) with one at one month's readiness, two at two month's notice and the balance possibly at three months but in no case at more than six months. Readiness levels in the RAN and RAAF seem to be adequate to support the proposed strategic concept.

The nature of future conflict with the availability of very effective weapons and sensors with high mobility places a premium upon the skills and resourcefulness of individual soldiers and small teams. While conventional formations will continue to be important (even if they are smaller, more powerful and mobile), the capacity for small teams or individuals to inflict serious actual damage upon an enemy argues the need for a larger and more highly developed special forces capability. Such forces will also be necessary to support air and naval operations by providing intelligence and targeting information for precision weapons.

In a regional security strategy, Australian special forces teams will always suffer from the disadvantage of being Westerners operating in an Asian or Pacific Islands environment. However, they have done so successfully in the past and, on the assumption that the main limitation would be an inability to move freely in the local community, they ought to be able to do so again. In common with modern management practice and the need for rapid action or response as well as recognising the power that modern systems confer upon individuals, the ADF will need to reduce sharply its command and management structures. Detailed oversight of operations and planning procedures will slow action to a degree which will be operationally unacceptable. Higher commanders will give fewer orders and concentrate more on issuing broad directives. Greater reliance will have to be placed upon individual skills and initiative rather than detailed doctrines or instruction manuals. Delegation of responsibility will be much greater although, to make this effective, delegates will carry much greater personal responsibility for their actions.

Under Third Wave combat conditions, small units will be able to use highly capable weapons and sensors traditionally the preserve of large units and formations. Moreover, the terrain conditions likely to be experienced in South-East Asia of the South-West Pacific will make large formations more difficult to handle. In some senses, Third Wave combat in Australia's region will seem like a reversion to First Wave. In Bougainville, for example, the Papua New Guinea Defence Force effectively abandoned the standard infantry battalion structure in favour of the infantry company as its basic operational unit. Sub-units tend to be small teams of about five soldiers.

The PNGDF experience should not be interpreted too rigidly but the development of improved weapons and sensors will confer much greater power upon smaller units. At the same time, the compression of time, the greater availability to soldiers and junior leaders of real-time intelligence and the need for rapid response to situations suggest that the basic operational infantry unit could become the company or even, in some circumstances of terrain and climate, the platoon. In these circumstances, the battalion will operate more like the existing brigade group formation while the traditional division will have no role to play.

The battalion will have greater firepower and mobility than at present and may need to work directly with RAN and RAAF assets. Joint operations will be the norm but their management will commence at lower levels than at present. The battalion will in fact operate its own integral air, artillery and armoured assets. In the context of South-West Pacific operations, the battalion may have to operate as an independent amphibious force deployed by sea and able to call upon integrated naval and air support. For a small defence force, modelling some standard joint operations formations upon the United States Marine Corps may offer a significant enhancement to combat power. While slavish adoption of this model is not proposed, it does represent a capability that ought to be organised and exercised in the Australian strategic context. The transparent availability of such a capability would clearly not represent a threat to any potential adversary in the South-East Asian region but would offer some confidence to South-West Pacific island states that Australia is able to assist them.

The essential characteristics of the national security structure of the future will be flexibility, adaptability and sustainability. These will be required in the force-in-being rather than for some structure being planned for the future. Flexibility is a leadership trait marked by the ability to respond quickly to security challenges at an early stage. In this sense, flexibility is a rational quality which ensures that the national security system is not surprised by security developments. In part a product of good intelligence, a flexible leadership is able to recognise the security dimensions of any given set of circumstances and quickly generate the appropriate response. Flexibility calls for a leadership which seeks to influence rather than respond to events and one whose conceptual approach is based in the future rather than the past. Although historical experience will be important, the antithesis of the flexible leader is the person whose outlook is governed more by experience or procedural manuals than by original thought.

Adaptability (or improvisation) in the context of this study is an organisational rather than a personal quality. An adaptable organisation will be organised, equipped and trained to respond in a timely way to a wide range of unforeseen contingencies. An adaptable organisation can meet a range of demands at short notice. Equipment is selected for its utility in a wide range of circumstances rather than for specialised tasks. Training will emphasise not only individual skills but also the need for personnel at all levels to seize opportunities and to act on their initiative. The antithesis of the adaptable organisation is one which is bound by rigid regulations and hierarchical relationships. Australian forces have traditionally demonstrated great adaptability and capacity for improvisation. These qualities will need not only to be sustained but enhanced and encouraged.

Sustainability is the quality which ensures that the force can be maintained on operations should these extend beyond what might have been expected when the force was committed. Sustainability ensures that replacement units, personnel, equipment and supplies are available to sustain the deployment as long as is necessary. This is more than a matter of logistics; it assumes that deployments will be extended in time or even multiplied in size or spread. While time factors are less urgent, a commitment to any deployment will consider the possibilities of extension and will more or less automatically launch the process of expansion. If, on the other hand, deployments are made with limits imposed by the ability to sustain them rather than the achievement of operational objectives, the sacrifice involved will be wasted. Future operational demands upon the ADF will be defined by Australia's security interests. Above all, these require that the ADF offer the government the widest possible range of options to use the force in support of its policies. A too rigid pursuit of a strategy which is limited in concept and defined primarily by unrealistic limits on resources will deny governments the ability to use - or not use - the ADF to sustain Australia's security.

Modern management concepts recognise that the wide availability of information, a better educated work force and the increased speed of events especially in a Third Wave society allow for greater devolution of authority and a wider span of control for senior managers. In the private sector of the economy, management processes are increasingly scrutinised in an effort to discover what if anything they contribute to a company's profitability. In the public sector with its greater (although perhaps not justified) requirement for accountability, especially in the expenditure of public funds, the move towards greater devolution of authority is occurring only slowly. Indeed it could be argued that developments over the past 30 or 40 years have actually concentrated authority in the centre. Such a concentration will hinder effectiveness in the future because of the inherent obstacles to responsiveness that arise from the demand for constant consultation and review.

Political sensitivities (or a perception of such sensitivities) have contributed substantially to demands for close control. This is not just an Australian practice but one which responded to the power apparently conferred by improved communications. The continuation of those improvements has now led to a situation where close control by middle and higher management levels can significantly damage operational capability. This trend is likely to continue into the future. Clearly, while commanders at all levels must be able to direct and control their forces, especially in a politically sensitive deployment, that control will need to be exercised more through the training process than during operations themselves. Field commanders will have to respond more quickly to events than consultation processes permit. Orders to commanders will need to be advisory rather than prescriptive.

Management systems and structures will need to be scrutinised ever more carefully to remove duplication and unproductive processes. Apart from the factor of monetary cost, these limit the ability of the force to meet its objectives within the resources available. Improvements in communications coupled with the need to devolve authority to lower levels tends to extend the span of control that can be exercised by commanders. In the Australian context, the need for three parallel environmental commands - Maritime, Land and Air - is be difficult to justify. Similarly the specific roles and status of the individual Service chiefs of staff may need to be examined in the light of changing strategic requirements. There seems little reason why the individual chiefs of staff should enjoy any operational command status nor is there any reason why the command of combat forces could not be exercised by at most two joint commands, one for forces at home and one for deployed forces.

In the past, Australian defence managers have been able to enjoy the luxury of deferring decisions sometimes for long periods. Allies have generally borne the brunt of any failure to make timely decisions. In Third Wave conflict, command and management will increasingly be devolved to lower levels with senior levels executing more and supervising less. Officers will exercise more authority to make decisions and be less scrutinised except after the event. They will similarly carry more personal responsibility for decisions and be expected to meet the consequences. On the other hand, the rigid (even vengeful) imposition of sanctions for mistakes will inhibit the exercise of initiative. Decisions will be judged more for their timely quality than their accuracy - which is likely to be a more subjective judgement anyway. For reasons of speed, consultation, especially between commanders and subordinates, will have to give way to the more traditional hierarchical method.

In recent decades, Australian management culture has developed a preoccupation with process rather than results, with inputs rather than outcomes and with rigidity in the written word rather than accuracy in conveying ideas. These characteristics are not unique to this country and we may not be as bad as many others. Third Wave conflict will not tolerate the delays inherent in working through complex management processes with their constant reviews, re-examinations and deferrals.

In Australia's democratic society, it should not be necessary to insist that political control of military operations is the right and the responsibility of the elected government. In the future, however, that control may have to be exercised in a less intrusive way than has been the case in some other countries. The American experience is indicative. During the Vietnam War and such operations as the failed attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran, close control was exercised from the White House and by the President personally. By contrast, in the 1991 Middle East war, there was much greater devolution of command from the political level to the military commander in the field. Subsequent and predicted developments in communications and combat procedures generally will make close political control even more difficult to achieve.

Similar situations can be seen in the recent conflict in Bosnia. The multiplicity of command authorities (NATO, UN, WEU and national commanders) and the perceived need to gain agreement on even low grade tactical targets for air operations meant that the militarily less capable Bosnian Serbs with their more assertive political objectives were able to make their far better equipped 'adversaries' look ridiculous. Even when tactical objectives have been agreed, the time delay has been such that the tactical situation has changed in the meantime. For any democratic nation, a complicating factor for the executive government (which is the national command authority) is the close - and not always competent or well-motivated - scrutiny exercised by Parliament and the media. That scrutiny is, of course, recognised as a proper and desirable role for those groups. In fact, to the degree that it presses the executive to demonstrate competence, it is good.

What is important is that the executive government should recognise the responsibility it has for making decisions which are timely, accurate and effective. This suggests a need for training and experience which will come from practice. The demand for rapid decisions makes it difficult for a Defence Minister or a security committee of Cabinet to await formal advice which has to be explained at length. It would make good political sense as well as military sense if key ministers and, possibly, some of their private staffs were to be involved in strategic and operational war games.

The role of the ADF and its components, the Australian Army, Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Air Force, especially in the future cannot be defined simply. In essence, they are to carry out whatever military operations might be required by the Australian government. Such a vague definition is not very helpful so that planners need to look at the kinds of capabilities that might be required. The 1994 defence White Paper Defending Australia makes a number of references to capabilities but, again, these are defined either in vague terms or in the context of defending the Australian mainland against incursions or the sea-air gap against attempted incursions. Similarly the statement of the roles required are also vague and do not allocate tasks between the various Services. The Annual Report of the Defence Department is even more vague although the statements of Program Objectives give undue emphasis to developing timely expansion against warning. The emphasis placed upon such roles as 'command, control and communications', 'intelligence collection and evaluation', 'surveillance', and 'maritime patrol' seem to be misplaced as these are basic qualities to be expected of any defence force rather than roles or capabilities.

There is perhaps a need for clearer statements of the types of tasks that might be expected of the ADF in the types of conflict that might be reasonably anticipated. Some suggestions for better expression of these roles follow and are based upon two fundamental concepts. The first is that the primary task of the ADF is to contribute to security policy by a manifest capability to support diplomatic and political activity. The second arises from the potential failure of the first and is to defeat an enemy force in battle. The most significant battle environment is on the earth's surface, whether it be on land or at sea. Land and surface forces are the only ones capable - at least for the foreseeable future - of dominating the battlefield and being sustained in place. Air and submarine forces are essentially transient forces and, while invaluable, can do no more than provide support to surface forces.

Based upon the experience of strategic air forces in previous conflicts (especially the 1991 Middle East war), air power doctrine in Australia seeks to assign a more independent strategic role to air forces but the RAAF is never likely to be large enough to exercise the weight of effort required to play a dominant role. In particular, any attempt to apply decisive strategic air attack against a First or Second Wave nation will be likely to fail because their relatively simple economies and military capabilities are more resilient.
Thus the roles of the Australian Army are to:

Historical experience suggests that the primary role of the RAN is to support land forces. This was the navy's experience in Korea, Vietnam and for most of World War II. Obviously, however, the RAN must be able to use the mobility conferred by the sea to directly engage enemy forces and to ensure the protection of merchant shipping. In the latter case, this has always been a primary role of any navy of a trading nation. The growth of seaborne trade has been so substantial as to create greater targets for enemy action thus creating so complex a problem that no single navy is capable of doing the job by itself. The trade protection task is one which pre-eminently demands close co-operation with allies and trading partners.
Thus the roles of the RAN should be:

As indicated above, the primary role of the RAAF is the support, close or distant, of the surface battle. Distant support will attempt the defeat of enemy air forces while close support will apply firepower against enemy surface units on land or at sea. RAAF transport units will be required to provide logistic support to ground forces unless these units are placed under direct Army control.
The roles of the RAAF therefore are to:

These roles contrast markedly with current assumptions in that they virtually exclude the concept of strategic strike. As indicated above, the Australia Defence Association considers that strategic strike is unlikely to be effective against First or Second Wave nations while strategic strikes against Third Wave nations may be more effectively performed by special forces or operators who might even be based on Australian territory. For example, the use of computer hackers and viruses against an enemy's command and control network, or against key national systems or databases would have a strategic effect out of all proportion to the effort. That is not to argue that strategic attacks should be ruled out, only that they should take priority after the primary tasks set out in the previous paragraphs.

A further consideration is that, in future conflict, a primary political objective will normally be to limit conflict and avoid escalation. In these circumstances, heavy investment in strategic strike capabilities will divert resources from more productive capabilities. Clearly if the option is to be maintained, it ought to be derived from more adaptable multi-purpose force elements

Modern information-based sensors and processing systems offer substantial advantages to their users at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Over-the-Horizon radar, satellite imagery and communications, and passive infra-red detection systems all offer real or near real-time intelligence to users. Good intelligence as always is a primary factor which confers operational advantage. Under-investing in intelligence systems is therefore a risk which no country can afford to run. If anything this is more true of a country whose strategic concept is defensive and which will almost invariably concede the opening initiative to an adversary.

On the other hand, balance must be sought and achieved. A number of frequent commentators and former Defence department officials give the impression that substantial investment in intelligence capabilities obviate the need for a response capability, either at the level of actual combat or interdiction for law enforcement purposes. Intelligence is useless without the ability to use it to achieve policy objectives. Intelligence information and analysis is only as good as its users. Commanders need to have confidence in their intelligence support and this confidence has to be earned. But it is also true that no intelligence system can ever offer a complete analysis of enemy capabilities and intentions and forensic standards of proof are rarely achievable. There will always be limits and consumers of intelligence must not only be aware of these but must also be prepared to accept rational speculation as a basis for action.

Modern systems maximise the potential for deception operations. Fake transmissions, dummy installations, camouflage, propaganda and the rest put added pressure on intelligence services. On the other hand, they also confer the capacity to conduct deception operations against an adversary. Deception will be an important weapon in Third Wave conflicts and the AD should place considerable emphasis on this aspect as what might be termed a negative force multiplier.

As the ADF grows to depend more upon information-based systems, these systems themselves will become vulnerable to attack, especially by electromagnetic means. Traditional approaches to security and counter-intelligence will be insufficient to secure vital data and systems from covert or clandestine attack. Of course, in any conflict against a Third Wave nation, the ADF will need to be able to use similar weapons and it is possible to envisage Australian intelligence organs recruiting detachments of computer hackers and virus designers! In this context, the definition of a vital asset becomes more complex. Vital national assets will include large computerised databases (many in the private sector), key personnel (scientists, designers, engineers etc), communications networks and satellites. Because of their apparent greater vulnerability to remote attack, these will in fact become more attractive targets than traditional vital assets such as transport nodes, munitions factories, and mines or oil rigs.

Similarly protection of such assets will depend heavily upon design features rather than physical installations and guards. To the extent that guards and similar protective devices need to be used, there is no real reason why these could not be provided by police or private agencies under contract. The use of ADF units, regular or reserve, for the protection of vital assets will be a waste of expensive and trained personnel who will be needed for other tasks. Moreover, the history of the AIF's 23rd Brigade in Rabaul, Timor and Ambon in 1942 suggests that such piecemeal deployments are a waste of good troops.

The military capabilities needed by the ADF to meet the tasks set out above must possess three basic elements: firepower, mobility and resupply. These may also be described as weapons (including sensors), vehicles and logistics. Any given capability will consists of systems which combine these various elements. Because of its unpredictability and variety, future conflict will demand as far as possible systems which are adaptable to different circumstances.

The ultimate purpose of firepower is to disable an enemy's capacity to fight rather than to kill. Traditionally this has been achieved by the use of destructive weapons ranging from the soldier's personal weapon with its relatively short range and low power through crew-served weapons with greater range and power to weapons of mass destruction. Second Wave warfare became preoccupied with killing and destruction reaching its apotheosis during the Vietnam War with its emphasis on body counts and statistics of vehicles or structures destroyed or damaged. Despite this emphasis - or perhaps because of it - the body counters lost the war.

The ultimate weapons of Second Wave warfare are the weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, biological and chemical. Arms control efforts have been directed almost exclusively to controlling the use and proliferation of such weapons with limited success. The efforts have probably been ill-directed if only because, for all their political value, WMDs have relatively limited military utility. In a more interdependent world, the combat use of such weapons is likely to be more dangerous to the user's objectives than to the victim's because of the hostility generated by other nations. Moreover, in the case of resistance to aggression, the use of such weapons would normally be considered only in the last extremity by which time it has become a weapon of morally pointless revenge rather than of defence.

At the conventional weapons level, most developments have been directed towards achieving greater lethality from greater accuracy. Guided weapons ranging from terminally guided artillery shells, laser-guided bombs and infra-red, wire or radar guided missiles are intended to reduce the number of war shots required to disable a given target. Equally, defence against such weapons has been directed at neutralising the guidance system. While results have been impressive (on both sides) the escalation of cost has been such as to cripple defence budgets for all but the wealthiest or most threatened nations. This has a flow on effect in training because of the reduced opportunities to train with live ammunition.

Future conflict, especially against First Wave nations or sub-national groups, is likely to demand more of the individual soldier with personal weapons essentially little different from those of half a century ago. This will place a premium upon the individual's capacity to carry sufficient ammunition to achieve his objectives so that economy in consumption will be important. For the individual, careful target selection and economy in ammunition use will call for more traditional soldier's skills in shooting. Research into a range of non-lethal weapons will almost certainly result in the development of ammunition rather than dischargers which can disable troops or installations rather than destroy them. Disabling agents (gases, lasers, ultra-sound, sprays), anti-friction agents (used against vehicles), and super-adhesives are just a few of the concepts that are under investigation or have actually been deployed in operations. Not all are effective and many can only be used against small targets. The risk of damage to own forces or collateral damage is often significant although, in the latter case, generally acceptable.

Non-lethal weapons are more useful in the context of low level conflict against small and concentrated targets, or in aid to the civil authority. More important are the forms of electronic weapons designed to disable communications systems, sensors, command and control networks, and mass communications media. Electronic warfare systems targeted against these in active or passive modes will become more important, especially in Third Wave conflict. These may not have a specifically military application. During the confrontation some years ago between the French military authorities and Greenpeace at Mururoa Atoll, the French failure to neutralise Greenpeace's global communications capability ensured an effective French defeat. Even though French troops were able to arrest the trespassers (which is what the trespassers wanted anyway), they were not able to prevent Greenpeace broadcasting inflammatory images around the world.

Force structure planners have no choice but to provide the ADF with a wide range of weapons with many applications. Not all will be as adaptable as may be desired; it is difficult to use a Harpoon missile against a jungle bunker! What is important is that planning take account of the range of modern sensors and other systems which maximise the ability of our troops and reduce the capacity of the enemy. These will include basic items such as night vision equipment, which must be seen as essential rather than desirable, and advanced electronic warfare systems.

Conferring mobility upon a defence force is the function of platforms which convey weapons and their operators to the most suitable firing position at any given time. Mobility is conferred by sea, air or land platforms. The important qualities of platforms are speed, capacity, endurance and survivability but compromises will always be essential to ensure the most suitable mix of these qualities.

Apart from highly specialised combat vehicles - fighter aircraft, warships and armoured vehicles, for example - reductions in military research and development and a continued limit on resources suggests that more use will need to be made of platforms designed and built primarily for civilian use. Extensive and expensive modification of such vehicles will need to be avoided unless there are overriding factors which demand modification. There are dangers in this. The pre-eminent lesson of the Falklands War, for example, was that warships built to civilian standards did not withstand battle damage as well as those built to full naval standards. Economising on construction of platforms can be attractive but those which are likely to 'go in harm's way' need to be made as invulnerable as possible.

Mobility concepts can also be defined as strategic or tactical. Strategic mobility implies the capacity to move significant forces to a potential battlefield, possibly over great distances. Tactical mobility refers more to the movement of forces within a battlefield or operational area. Given the nature of Australia’s RPSI as well as the continent itself, both strategic and tactical mobility are essential elements of the ADF's capability. Pursuit of a regional security strategy implicitly requires an ability to move forces over large distances and to use facilities which are less than ideal. The ADF has a small capacity to move ground forces by air and sea but greater emphasis needs to be placed upon sea movement. Air movement will be possible only when the destination is controlled by friendly forces and where there is no urgency to complete the establishment of the force in place. Air transport does not have the capacity to move forces (as distinct from personnel and light equipment). If the need is for a force to be moved with its heavy equipment/weapons and supplies, sea movement is the only practicable option. Any ships earmarked for such operations must also be able to use primitive cargo handling facilities, either over the beach or through under-developed ports.

Tactical mobility places a premium upon speed so that air movement is more important than surface movement. In particular, operations in any region with a poorly developed transport infrastructure will require large numbers of helicopters. Operations within the RPSI are likely to be in countries poorly served by roads or major airfields so that helicopter lift and helicopter firepower will be important. In anything less than large scale conflict, there will be an overriding necessity to maintain the domestic civil economy at as close to normal activity as possible. This will severely limit the ability of the ADF to acquire civil transport assets. Moreover, modern transport is increasingly specialised or requires specialised cargo handling equipment so that the utility of civilian ships or aircraft for military purposes cannot be taken for granted. This suggests that civil logistic support should not be counted upon in future conflict.

The necessity to maintain the civilian economy in any conflict other than a major war suggests that the ADF must ensure that its own capabilities and operations can be supported in peacetime from dedicated sectors of the economy. The imperative to sustain the civilian economy is emphasised by the political vulnerability to any reduction in economic activity or standards of living that would result from conflicts which do not manifestly attack Australia in the physical sense but where Australia's interests are engaged. One of the advantages of the commercialisation process that has been pursued in recent years is the de facto reservation of elements of the civilian economy to support the ADF. In the same way, the development of specialised shipbuilding and repair, aircraft maintenance capabilities, and the economic protection of weapons and ammunition factories represents a significant if unquantifiable investment in logistic support.

For all that, the ADF continues to be too dependent upon overseas sources of supply, especially for consumable items such as guided weapons. While most of these are sourced from our prime ally, the United States, Australia's increasing strategic independence suggests that close attention should be paid to the establishment of a guided weapons design and manufacturing capability in this country in case our chief source of supply disapproves of any specific commitment of the ADF. Claims that our supplies are protected by binding agreements may not be sustainable in the specific political climate. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in any actual conflict, the consumption of stores, especially ammunition and spare parts, will grossly exceed peacetime assessments. This tendency to underestimate consumption in combat should be accepted despite detailed analytical results to the contrary. Such assumptions have implications for the maintenance of war stocks or of manufacturing capacity.

A.D.A. has not conducted an analysis of the systems available in the existing force structure except to note that some elements are missing while others have exceeded or will by 2010 reach the end of their reasonable operational life. Announced programs to complete acquisition or replace capabilities have not been considered because these are so often subjected to delay or deferral because of resource constraints. However, attention is drawn to the following issues for each of the Services. The Army is operating more than 700 30-year old M-113 armoured personnel carriers with a number of variants. Despite their age and obsolescence together with an apparent inability to identify a suitable and affordable replacement, these vehicles continue to provide good service and should do so in the more likely conflict situations. Nevertheless, the most assiduous conservation and modernisation programs cannot sustain them indefinitely and replacement will become urgent soon.

The venerable M2A2 and L5 105mm artillery has only been partially replaced by the Hamel gun. Current strategic guidance minimises the value of artillery for low to medium level conflict or protection of vital assets on Australian territory. Similarly, the M198 medium artillery currently in service will be 30 years old in 2010. Analysis may suggest that the retention of a medium artillery capability in a regional security strategy might be undesirable especially if lighter, more portable and longer-range systems, such as Mobile Rocket Launchers are available but the substantial reduction in artillery assets overall means a loss of the vital element of firepower. The 1994 White Paper mentions the possibility of replacing the Leopard AS1 tanks with a lighter vehicle, more suited to regional operations. The Leopards are currently 20 years old but are the most capable main battle tanks in the region. In the Australian and regional environment, tanks are most suitable for infantry support and protection rather than fast and far-ranging armoured warfare so that any new vehicle must have good protection and firepower, even if this is at the expense of speed and range.

Other items facing replacement at or about 2010 include the S70A-9 Blackhawk and CH47-D Chinook helicopters, and the Rapier SAM system. The RAN is already facing a serious obsolescence problem. The guided missile destroyers are well past their useful operational life and one has been taken out of service. The ANZAC-class frigate program provides for an increase in the number of surface platforms but their capability has been reduced far below design potential and an approved upgrade program has been cancelled. By 2010 the six guided missile frigates will be respectively 30, 29, 27, 26, 18 and 16 years old while the maximum credible operational life of ships of this size is probably not more than 25 years. Attempts to modernise and extend the life of earlier classes of ships were pronounced unsatisfactory and will not be pursued in the future unless technological change can immunise warships from their stressful maritime environment.

The RAN will take delivery of eight ANZAC frigates and six Collins-class submarines. The government has an option to acquire two additional submarines of this class but doing so is likely to unbalance the RAN in a time of financial stringency. Submarines, being transient systems, are of less value than the more adaptable surface combatants in a regional security strategy where intense conflict is less likely to occur. New Zealand's failure to take up the option of two additional ANZAC frigates offers Australia the opportunity to do so and it should. However, the loss of the powerful and adaptable destroyers leaves a serious gap, especially for high-intensity conflict.

The RAN's amphibious capability will need replacement by 2010 if it is to be maintained. A regional security strategy demands the sea transport capability that the existing three old ships plus landing craft represent. Between now and 2010, the RAN will further invest in a class of Off-shore Patrol Vessels to replace the inadequate Fremantle-class patrol boats. These latter are no more than coastguard craft with no combat capability. All the new surface combatants will require armed helicopters. The ANZACs are to carry a single missile-armed second-hand Sea Sprite helicopter and the existing S70B2 Seahawk helicopters embarked in the FFG-7s will be approaching their end of life. Thus, between now and 2010, the RAN will need perhaps as many as 50 new armed helicopters of varying types.

The principal strike weapon of the RAAF, the F-111C has now been in squadron service for 27 years and is expected to be kept in service until 2010 when the original aircraft will be 37 years old. Eighteen F-111G models have been acquired to sustain the force which, however, lacks the in-flight refuelling support to allow it to realise its potential. By 2010, the F/A-18 force will also be approaching the end of its useful life with the oldest aircraft 25 years old. At least one squadron of P3-C aircraft will require replacement soon and the other by 2010. Currently, the RAAF is replacing its C-130E Hercules with the J model and planning the replacement of the CC08 Caribou transports. By 2010, it will need to replace its C-130H transports which entered service in 1978.

The existing air-to-air refuelling capability has little more than training value and is simply not large enough to support serious and sustained combat operations while the long-discussed airborne early warning and control capability is fighting against an endemic shortage of funds. Clearly the next 15 years will require the replacement of a large proportion of the ADF's current inventory as well as the addition of capabilities that have been in the planning stage in some cases for decades. Previous programs have been characterised by a degree of incoherence which resulted from a lack of effective control and some wishful thinking about effective life cycles, as well as limits on resources. While reorganisation in Defence should have solved the worst of the problems of control, there is a need for longer-range planning of capability replacements to be implemented as a discipline with, possibly, the broad outline being incorporated in legislation. This would help government allocation of resources and make defence planning less of an auction. Longer-range planning - out to 25 or 30 years - might also obviate the need for costly bulk replacements of classes of platforms by allowing a constant production stream in key factories or shipyards.

While research and development of new systems will not be maintained at Cold War levels, there are a number of weapons and capabilities on the market which, subject to closer scrutiny, could enhance the capability of the ADF in meeting the challenges of the future. The weapons include Mobile Rocket Launcher Systems which can be made small enough to be used by special forces or large enough to replace conventional artillery. Modern MRLS are mobile, accurate, long range, capable of using a range of warheads and have a high rate of fire. Their manufacture and that of their ammunition is relatively simple. In the terrain which characterises much of Australia's RPSI, short range indirect fire weapons confer advantages upon small units. The use of small mortars, around 60mm, as a section weapon or for special force units would add significantly to their effectiveness especially in combination with night vision equipment.

For battlefield intelligence collection, remotely piloted aircraft (RPV) have proved themselves valuable in collecting and distributing real time intelligence and targeting information to forward units. RPVs can also be used by warships for surveillance and target acquisition and in a more stealthy way than by using helicopters. The ADF still lacks a number of critical capabilities, especially in the field of force multipliers. The RAAF’s existing in-flight refuelling capability has no more than training value and could not support operations of any realistic size or intensity. And despite years of discussion, the RAAF still lacks the airborne early warning and control capability that is central to the effective use of air assets. The lack of reach of the RAAF's fighter and strike assets as well as the adoption of a regional strategy suggests that the RAAF should be prepared to deploy its forces from regional airfields.

Given the reversion to a regional security strategy, the decision to abandon fixed wing air defence and strike capability in the RAN was probably a mistake. Reintroduction of the capability would be difficult, time consuming and expensive but a new examination ought to be made. The availability of small carriers and STOVL aircraft, now much more capable than they were a decade ago, could make restoration more cost effective and add substantially to flexibility.A regional security strategy coupled with changes in communications and surveillance systems suggests a possible need for increased space-based capabilities together with hardened communications links at all levels. A high level of dependence upon continental communications networks will be inadequate, the more so if these are not adequately protected against interference. Information-based technologies will reduce the cost of training by the increased availability of more realistic simulators sometimes based upon virtual reality. It will be possible to simulate actual operations and practice individual soldiers, junior leaders and even groups such as sections in the field for specific operational tasks with a wide range of actual combat conditions and emergencies. Naturally, such simulations will not replace the continuing need for physical fitness, endurance, resourcefulness and so on. Simulations will also be available at higher levels up to and including the national command organisation. HQADF may need to establish a training cell or establish facilities at another establishment to exercise higher commanders and staffs including members of the Cabinet security committee.

The need for a high degree of intelligence, training and mental flexibility as well as physical fitness will be hallmarks of the 21st century warrior. Indeed, these needs are already apparent as personnel are faced with the challenges of managing complex situations under restrictive rules of engagement. Future conflict at all but the highest levels of intensity is likely to face troops with demands to restrict the use of force in many circumstances. At the same time, the speed of events will place greater responsibility for decision-making upon junior officers and NCOs, sometimes even private soldiers. Fortunately, Australian traditions support the concept of using initiative at all levels and these traditions will need to be supported and bolstered in training programs and management practices.

Inevitably mistakes will be made or the other sound tradition of what might be termed 'constructive disobedience' will come into play. Troops will respond to actual circumstances which are not covered by their training or orders. In situations, common in peacekeeping for example, where there appears to be a conflict between orders or rules of engagement on the one hand and humanitarian instincts on the other, Australian soldiers can be expected to follow their humanitarian instincts. Procedures designed to restrict the use of initiative should be avoided and personnel trained more intensively to deal with the unexpected in constructive and effective ways. It cannot be overemphasised that commanders, even at battalion level, will be more likely to issue broad directives rather than specific orders and will exercise less control of the battle than formerly. Their control of operations will actually be exercised at the training stage when the battle plan is simulated. The ADF has been and continues to be well served by its people who are of very high quality. Concerns have been expressed that social, demographic, technological and other changes combine to make the recruitment and retention of a sufficient number of suitable personnel much more difficult than in the past.

Recruiting levels will be fundamentally affected by demography. DA94 expresses concern that only eight per cent of school leavers express any interest in a career in the ADF. This figure amounts to some 80,000 (male and female) of any single age cohort but in 1998-99, just on 68,000 Australians enquired about enlistment in the ADF and 16,000 submitted formal applications. Of this figure, only 3087 were actually enlisted. In other words, 81 per cent of all actual applicants were rejected. The notion that 81 per cent of genuine applicants were found to be unsuitable beggars belief and one presumes that the enlistment numbers were driven more by recruiting ceilings than by availability of suitable personnel. If, on the other hand, 81 per cent were found to be unsuitable on health, education or other grounds, Australia has a serious population problem which transcends difficulties in ADF recruiting.

Drawing conclusions about personnel retention is difficult given that the ADF has been downsizing in recent years and voluntary separations are always influenced by the variable state of the civilian labour market. DA94 does note however that attitudes to career planning by young people now emphasise job mobility rather than employment stability. This factor will result in higher underlying separation rates than have been common with obvious implications for training. DA94 and conventional attitudes suggest that problems of retention can be largely overcome by improving Service pay and conditions. This is, however, a traditional approach which, important in itself, may take insufficient account of actual social changes.

Social change is an imprecise term which is usually invoked to explain some phenomenon which is not otherwise explicable or where the explanation might offend some particular interest. Arguably the most significant and overarching social change of the past 30 years has been the emergence in the 1960s of the cult of individualism. This culture which emphasises individual rights over community responsibility has had wide-ranging social effects which concern A.D.A. only to the extent that they are hostile to the group cohesion and mutual support ethos of the military organisation. To this extent, social change over the past 30 years has not been helpful to the ADF but it seems to have managed.

Given the nature of the ADF as an organisation drawn from the community and serving the community, it must always reflect that society so that railing against social change is a somewhat pointless exercise. The ADF will always tend to attract those for whom belonging to a group with mutual responsibility is attractive. Training and character formation should reinforce those tendencies. The alternative of trying to change the ethos of the ADF to adapt to this cult of individualism would be self-defeating. In any case, social change is not immutable and not always bad. There are signs that some of the essentially selfish aspects of extreme individualism are becoming less acceptable or attractive to society, especially among the young.

What is clear is that the technological demands of Third Wave conflict will require personnel at all levels of high quality - educationally, physically and morally. These are also likely to be people who will seek higher levels of mobility, especially in the technical and professional branches. This may call for some radical changes in recruiting and career planning. Thus personnel, both commissioned and non-commissioned, in the professional and technical specialisations may need to be recruited on short terms and trained by the ADF with a minimal initial return of service obligation. Thereafter, the individual could be encouraged to make a future career change back to the ADF at a higher rank, depending upon experience and qualifications. Many engineers, technicians, aircrew, divers, medical and legal personnel for example could pursue a career path with two or more periods of their working life served in the ADF.

Clearly such personnel could not expect to attain the highest ranks which ought to be held by combat personnel anyway. The ADF exists to be an efficient combat organisation and many of its people will serve in combat specialisations such as infantry, armour and artillery. These will have less incentive to pursue a two-track career because their warrior skills have few if any civilian equivalents. It also follows from this theme that combat specialists should be rewarded under the pay system as the most important people in the ADF, not as is so often the case as the least worthy. The present pay system has developed to ensure a reasonable level of competition for professional and technical specialists with the civil sector and there is no competition for warriors. But by failing to recognise their unique value to the ADF, it devalues the whole organisation and the core of combat specialists that defines its purpose and achievements. Social change and the demands for new specialisations in Third Wave conflict mean that traditional organisational and personnel management practices will need to be overhauled and made very much more flexible. As just one example, there may need to be a greater interchange of civilian and military personnel to perform some tasks. Thus many of the significant numbers of people required for deception operations might be found in the television and related special effects industries. These could be employed directly or by commercial contract with their companies. The possibilities are almost endless given some degree of lateral thinking.

Future conflict demands that the ADF examine much more closely the role of reserve forces and even whether they have any utility. The obvious reasons for having a reserve capability include the cost element - that reserve forces are cheaper than regulars - and that reserves provide a good base for expansion in time of need by maintaining a reservoir of trained civilians. Reserve forces also provide a substantial link between the ADF and the wider community. Reserve forces can be made up of whole units and formations, or by a pool of experienced individuals who can be used to flesh out an expansion in key areas.

Clearly, though, reserves have no value if they cannot be used when needed. Current legislation and policy ensure that the reserves are barely useable, especially those who make up combat, combat support and logistic units. In the case of limited deployments, the obstacles to call out that arise from issues of employment and the lack of legal control over reservists make call out rarely worth the trouble. Most reserve units are so under strength as to be unavailable in less than 12 months, a readiness level which makes them quite ineffective. On the other hand, there could be significant military benefits in using reserve units in some low intensity deployments such as peacekeeping. These would build military skills and readiness and so enhance the value of the force overall. The availability of reserve units for such deployments would also boost Australia’s standing and influence. To achieve this outcome would not only demand a change of attitude within the ADF but also substantial change to community attitudes. There is no reason to suppose that this could not be achieved and should perhaps be tested. A further consideration is that those enlisting in the reserves must be left in no doubt that they have an unavoidable obligation, that the ADF in effect owns them and grants them leave to pursue their civilian employment only so long as they are not needed. DA94 recognises the need to deal with this issue but in a somewhat tentative way. A more determined approach to the issue will certainly reduce enlistments in the reserves but retention levels and performance are likely to improve substantially.

This issue is raised as part of this discussion paper because it is always a matter of some popular public discussion and the legislation does provide for its introduction virtually at the discretion of the government of the day. The military benefits of national service are difficult to perceive. In effect, national service is useful only for the production of a mass army. Given the demographic figures and some imprecise assumptions about suitability, a two year non-selective national service scheme could boost the size of the Army by around 40,000 in the first year and 80,000 thereafter. What the Army or the government could do with all these additional soldiers is uncertain. Certainly the perceived strategic environment does not call for an army of that size.

Most calls for the reintroduction of national service emphasise the social rather than defence benefits to the community. Military service is seen to be beneficial for young people. That assumption is of course dependent upon the point of view. Many of the young people concerned might not see it that way, nor would their instructors who have more important things to do than repair the damage done (or perceived to have been done) by dysfunctional families or education systems. The cost of such a national service scheme would be crippling. Assuming (reasonably) that the community would not accept the European practice of paying national servicemen a pittance compared with their regular counterparts, the cost of an all-inclusive national service scheme would be of the order of $3.8 billion at today’s prices in wages alone. With the cost of additional equipment, housing and other essential items, such a scheme would not cost less than $8 billion annually over and above the present defence outlay of $11 billion. Of course, national service is an option that will and must remain open to government. What must be questioned is whether conscript forces have any value in Third Wave warfare. The experience of the Middle East war of 1991 and the Falklands war of 1982 suggest very strongly that a numerically inferior but well trained, equipped and motivated all-volunteer force is superior in all respects to a conscript force. Notably, many countries that have traditionally depended upon conscription are abandoning the practice in response to a decline in international tensions and the growing perception that conscripts do not make the professional soldiers required in Third wave warfare. This, rather than the traditional political objections to national service, is the most powerful argument against its reintroduction.